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Рубрики WWII; Флот; Версия для печати

Дёниц, линкоры и война на Тихом океане

Штришок к пассивной роли Task Force One (линкоры) в 1942 г. И иллюстрация в тему глобального характера Второй мировой.

The succes of the German U-boat campaign against tankers... threatened the very survival of Great Britain. Within six months of the United States's entry into war, nearly 2 million of 5.6 million tons of national tanker assets had been sunk. American tankers were required in the Atlantic to keep Great Britain in the war. As a result, Admiral Nimitz had, through the most of the spring of 1942, only seven tankers with which to service entire fleet. Nimitz's staff calculated that, at best, these ships could keep no more than four carriers and their escorts at sea for any period of time.
Given the number of tankers available and the oil storge available, logistically the use of carriers and battleships anywhere but on the West Coast of the United States was an "either or" proposition.
During the initial five-month period of its existence, the role of Task Force One was seriously debated at the Cominch and CinCPac levels.
Throughout this period, however, the operations of Task Force One were limited by the direction of CinCPac whose position was clearly delineated in a statement of 22 April 1942: If the BBs operate from Pearl, Pearl supply can't stand it.

Вкратце: японцы зря жгли Пёрл-Харбор, истребление американских танкеров волками Дёница к весне 1942 г. сделало операции американского линейного флота в Тихом океане логистически невозможными.

Источник: статья с говорящим названием Task Force One: The Wasted Assets of the United States Pacific Battleship Fleet, 1942. (David C. Fuquea, The Journal of Military History 61 (October 1997) 707-34).