Возник вопрос по возможному применению МРА против АУГ в Средиземном море.
Капитанец в книге «Битва за Мировой океан в «холодной» и будущих войнах» пишет:
Согласно оперативным планам, в случае военных действий для ударов по авианосцам в центральной и восточной частях Средиземного моря привлекались дивизия морской ракетной авиации ВВС ЧФ и дивизия дальней авиации ВВС пролетом через Югославию. Задачи штаба 5-й эскадры - обеспечить выдачу целеуказания и наведения при ударе по авианосцу.
The main constraint of Mediterranean geography on this scenario is that it does not appear to allow for use of aircraft in the initial strike – large groups of armed aircraft taking off from Black Sea bases would provide advance warning of the strike and might not get through NATO air defenses in Turkey and Greece.
То есть появление МРА на сцене в начальной стадии кажется маловероятным, поскольку взлёт ударных групп будет обнаружен, и им не удастся прорвать ПВО Греции и Турции. Но CNA, всё-таки, не официальный источник.
Интересная информация есть в The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s
Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986; John B. Hattendorf,
Описывая работу «Второй группы стратегических исследований» (1982-1983 гг.), Хаттендорф говорит следующее:
Examining the Mediterranean theater, SSG II looked at the full range of possibilities, ranging from withdrawal of the carrier battle groups entirely to “a full forward press” into the eastern Mediterranean. They concluded that a full forward posture was preferable, since the United States routinely operates in the eastern Mediterranean in crisis. Such a presence signals both commitment to our allies as well as determination to an enemy. This concept involved risk, and SSG II concluded that earlier studies, which had determined that even a two-carrier battle group could not long survive, were too pessimistic. They went on to develop a tactical concept of carrier havens that could be used to allow carriers to survive in the forward areas and to let them strike at the Soviets from the onset of war. In the Mediterranean this involved an antisurface warfare campaign that rapidly destroyed the Soviet Mediterranean squadron as an anticarrier threat. Then, using deception and target denial as the basis for a campaign against Soviet long-range bombers, these would also be paralleled with early carrier and land-based forces in the southern flank that would slow the Soviets’ growing force advance, focus Soviet attention away from the Mediterranean, and tie down Soviet air forces. In achieving these objectives, the defense of both Greece and Turkey would be essential.
This strategic plan envisaged two related and feasible naval campaigns which would contribute greatly to the overall strategic objectives:
(1) The destruction of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, and possibly its operatingbases in Libya and Syria.
(2) The organization of a “gauntlet defense” of the Aegean Sea which, even if the Dardanelles were to fall, would deny entrance to the Mediterranean to all Soviet ships in the Black Sea. This would involve both U.S. and allied air, surface, subsurface, and mining forces.
То есть по тексту вроде как получается, что, опять же, в начальной фазе предполагалось столкновение 6 флота с 5 ОПЭСК, и только после уничтожения последней и перемещения АУГ в восточную часть Средиземного моря предполагалось столкновение с советской МРА.
Соответственно, возникает вопрос – стало бы появление МРА в начальной стадии конфликта по сценарию Капитанца неожиданностью для американцев? Или они были готовы и к такому варианту событий?
