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realswat
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28.04.2015 09:00:05
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Рубрики
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WWII; Флот;
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Линкоры в ВМВ: пара цитат
Продолжается нелёгкая работа по реабилитации безвинно осуждённых кораблей.
Сегодня просто дам пару цитат на английском из академических статей.
Первая содержит соображения современных исследователей:
Clark G. Reynolds argues that between 1919 and 1939 'conservative battleship admirals ... returned to the old prewar anti-intellectualism, their naval war colleges and fleet maneuvers looking to another Jutland and virtually ignoring the promise of the airplane'.2 Arthur J. Marder writes of 'the Jutland syndrome' and quotes Admiral of the Fleet Casper John's observation that during the inter-war period 'the obsession with Jutland ran through the Navy as a deadening virus'.3 And most recendy, Correlli Barnett charges that 'Jutland - that is, a future Jutland fought against the Japanese fleet in Far Eastern waters - befogged the Royal Navy's thinking over the entire horizon of maritime warfare in die years before the Second World War'.4
These views have been qualified, if not contradicted. Geoffrey Till argues that the aircraft carrier was not capable of replacing the battleship during the 1920s and he and Norman Friedman demonstrate that it had an important role in the British battle fleet before the outbreak of war.5 Wayne P. Hughes observes that 'an ex post facto reading of naval operations off the northern European coast and in the Mediterranean [conducted by the Royal Navy during the Second World War] leads not to the conclusion that the ascendancy of air power should have been obvious but to an appreciation of how close the competition between gun and airplane really was'.6 And even Marder had second thoughts about the fairness of criticizing the admiralty for maintaining a large force of battleships.7 All this notwithstanding, however, pre-war Royal Navy tactical planning has gone largely unstudied. The widely held view that it was overly influenced by the past, and thus faulty, continues to draw sustenance from what are believed to be the obvious lessons of the first six months of the war in the Pacific.
Jon Tetsuro Sumida. ‘The Best Laid Plans’: The Development of British Battle-Fleet Tactics, 1919–1942 // The International History Review, xiv, 4, November 1992, pp. 661-880.
Во второй приведены точки зрения некоторых небезызвестных адмиралов:
there were many who pointed out that the battleship had nonetheless played a critical role in World War II. As the British First Sea Lord Cunningham told Churchill in 1944, the battleship remained ‘the basis of the strength of the fleet. . .[and]. . .a heavier broadside than the enemy is still a very telling weapon in a naval action’.4 Reviewing the experience of World War II, the British naval staff concluded that the heavy guns of the battleship still had a major role to play:
The battleship, in fact, provides a sure means of destroying the enemy heavy ship: bombers can be countered by fighters, but there is no counter to the heavy ship, adequately protected by fighters, except that from suitable surface forces. Thus so long as any potential enemy possesses heavy ships, the battleship will remain an essential part of the fleet.5
A few years later the emergence of the Soviet navy with its new Sverdlov heavy cruisers seemed to prove the point.
Geoffrey Till. Maritime Airpower in the Interwar Period: The Information Dimension // The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.27, No.2, June 2004, pp.298 – 323.