> "Сюрпрайз" случился исключительно потому что линкоры Олдендорфа оказались не там где ожидал Хелси
Сам Хэлси про это не упоминает:
14. Although the Center Force continued to move forward, the Commander THIRD Fleet decided that this enemy force must be blindly obeying an Imperial command to do or die, but with battle efficiency greatly impaired by torpedo hits, bomb hits, topside damage, fires, and casualties. From long experience with the Japanese, their blind adherence to plan, and their inability to readjust disturbed plans, the Commander THIRD Fleet had long ago adopted a policy of attacking first. The Southern and Center Forces had been under heavy and persistent air attacks while proceeding through inland waters in daylight. Japanese doggedness was admitted, and Commander THIRD Fleet recognized the possibility that the Center Force might plod through SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS and on to attack LEYTE forces a la GUADALCANAL. The Commander THIRD Fleet was convinced that the Center Force was so heavily damaged that it could not win a decision, while the possible maximum strength of the Northern Force, as reported by CTF 38, constituted a fresh and powerful threat. It was decided that earliest possible attack on the powerful Northern (Carrier) Force was essential for breaking up the enemy plan and retaining the initiative.
15. The alternatives were to:
a. Divide the forces, leaving TF 34 to block SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS while the carriers, with light screens, attacked the Northern Force;
b. Maintain integrity of our own entire striking strength concentrated off SAN BERNARDINO STRAITS;
c. Strike the Northern Force with all of our own striking strength concentrated.
(a) was rejected; the potential strength of the undamaged Northern Force was too great to leave unmolested, and requiring TF 34 to engage the Center Force while at the same time exposed to attack by land-based and possibly carrier-based air attack was not sound. This alternative spread our strength and risked unprofitable damage in detail.
(b) was rejected because it permitted the Northern Force to function as planned unmolested, and because destruction of Japanese carrier forces would mean much to future operations.
(c) was adopted; it maintained the integrity of the BLUE striking fleet; it afforded best possibility of surprise and destruction of enemy carrier force. It was particularly sound and necessary if the strength of the Northern Force proved to be the maximum reported. It was recognized that the Center Force might sortie and inflict some damage, but its fighting power was considered too seriously impaired to win a decision. Finally, it was calculated that THIRD Fleet forces could return in time to reverse any advantage that the Center Force might gain and Commander third Fleet was firmly convinced that (c) would contribute most to the over-all PHILIPPINES campaign even if a temporarily tight situation existed at LEYTE.
В целом же механизм принятия решений Хэлси был достаточно сложным, но если попробовать сжато, то:
1. Имело место "стратегическое мэхэнианство" - своей целью Хэлси считал уничтожение японского флота, а не защиту десанта
2. Имело место "мэхэнианство тактическое" - нежелание делить свои силы, что делало необходимым выбор главной цели для нанесения решительного удара.
3. Выбор в качестве главной цели соединения, включавшего авианосцы - отмечаем ту самую сложность "многомерной угрозы", когда "прогрессивное" стремление разобраться с "главными кораблями" противника оказывается ошибочным.
4. Ошибочные донесения авиаразведки как о результатах ударов по силам Курита (очень сильно преувеличены), так и о составе сил Одзава (преувеличенны умеренно - если не считать состава авиагрупп, определить который был практически невозможно).
Что из этого можно уверенно исключить некими организационными мерами, прописанными в уставах - да так, чтобы работало в любой ситуации? КМК, ничего.
