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Дата 30.04.2003 09:02:21 Найти в дереве
Рубрики Локальные конфликты; Версия для печати

Ре: Продолжаем разговор...

Спасибо за интересныи отчет.

>The RAF experimented briefly in 1940 with daylight attacks on industrial targets in Germany but abandoned the effort when losses proved unbearably heavy. Thereafter, it attempted to find and attack such targets as oil, aluminum and aircraft plants at night. This effort too was abandoned; with available techniques it was not possible to locate the targets often enough.
* Then the RAF began its famous raids on German urban and industrial centers. On the night of May 30, 1942, it mounted its first "thousand plane" raid against Cologne and two nights later struck Essen with almost equal force. On three nights in late July and early August 1943 it struck Hamburg in perhaps the most devastating single city attack of the war -- about one third of the houses of the city were destroyed and German estimates show 60,000 to 100,000 people killed. No subsequent city raid shook Germany as did that on Hamburg; documents show that German officials were thoroughly alarmed and there is some indication from interrogation of high officials that Hitler himself thought that further attacks of similar weight might force Germany out of the war.

>Там-же и про УСАФ есть.
>Из отчета следует, что до 1944 года немецкая промышленностьпрактически не страдала от налетов - союзники бомбили города, уничтожали в основном гражданских.
*Там же о бомбардировочнои кампании:
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In the wake of these attacks there are great paths of destruction. In Germany, 3,600,000 dwelling units, approximately 20% of the total, were destroyed or heavily damaged. Survey estimates show some 300,000 civilians killed and 780,000 wounded. The number made homeless aggregates 7,500,000. The principal German cities have been largely reduced to hollow walls and piles of rubble. German industry is bruised and temporarily paralyzed. These are the scars across the face of the enemy, the preface to the victory that followed.
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The German experience suggests that even a first class military power -- rugged and resilient as Germany was -- cannot live long under full-scale and free exploitation of air weapons over the heart of its territory. By the beginning of 1945, before the invasion of the homeland itself, Germany was reaching a state of helplessness. Her armament production was falling irretrievably, orderliness in effort was disappearing, and total disruption and disintegration were well along. Her armies were still in the field. But with the impending collapse of the supporting economy, the indications are convincing that they would have had to cease fighting -- any effective fighting -- within a few months. Germany was mortally wounded.

>Конечно, Америка помогала СССР вести войну. Но на основании чего вы ету помощ считаете решаюшим фактором в разгроме Германии?
*В придыдущем сообщении я привел свои доводы. Мое личное мнение -- мы болтались на волоске. Лендлиз, бомбардировки, Африка и Италия разгрузили и не дали сорваться. То что в 44ом мы были на границе с Германиеи не гарантировалo победы -- в 41ом фашисты стояли у Москвы, и что? Если бы не потери нацистов при бомбардировках и их ослабленная промышленность, кто знает как все бы сложилось. А заслуга американцев в том что на нашем фронте все сложилось так как сложилось.

>Тоесть роль Америки в победе над Германией - решаюшая, а роль СССР тогда - второстепенная?
*Мое мнение -- обе страны играли одинаково важную роль. Без помощи Штатов мы вряд ли бы закончили воину как мы закончили ее в 45ом. Без Союза американцы бы просто не зацепились бы в Европе. Я к тому что в наших учебниках сильно недооценивают роль CШA, как и в американских роль CCCP.

Янки, гоу. Гоу, Янки.