От realswat Ответить на сообщение
К All
Дата 21.02.2017 08:28:37 Найти в дереве
Рубрики WWII; Флот; Версия для печати

Полярные конвои, торпедные эсминцы и советский ВМФ

Продолжая флотофильское безумие, комментарий по поводу возникших "побочных" тем.

Поскольку возникла тема угрозы со стороны надводных кораблей немцев для полярных конвоев, стоит упомянуть решение Тови, принятое по итогам проводки PQ17 для PQ18.

Роскилл:
http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-RN-II/UK-RN-II-12.html#page279

For the passage of PQ 18 the naval plans were entirely recast. In Admiral Tovey's opinion covering the convoy with the battle fleet after it had passed Bear Island did not provide really effective protection, and he was strongly opposed to taking his heavy ships into the Barents Sea. If the battle fleet was kept at sea a large number of long-endurance destroyers was absorbed in screening it, and he much preferred to use them to strengthen the convoy's escort. The Commander-in-Chief was confident that, provided the inevitable losses were accepted, we could fight a convoy through, but he thought it essential that it should take its chief defence against surface ship attack along with it; and that meant a very powerful escort of destroyers armed with torpedoes. These would reinforce the close anti-submarine and anti-aircraft escorts until such time as enemy surface ships appeared, when they would at once devote their full effort to attacking them. He considered that 'a fighting destroyer escort' of twelve to sixteen ships would probably deter the enemy surface ships altogether; if they persisted in trying to attack the convoy, it was strong enough to defeat them. Rear-Admiral R. L. Burnett, flying his flag in the light cruiser Scylla, was accordingly put in command of the whole escort, including the sixteen additional fleet destroyers allocated to accompany the outward and the homeward convoys during the critical parts of their journeys.

Тови, не желая подвергать свои линкоры риску атак самолётов и ПЛ к востоку от о. Медвежий, решил положиться на торпедные эсминцы, которым отводилась главная роль в случае атаки немецких надводных кораблей. Вот его собственный комментарий, сделанный позже:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/LondonGazette/39041.pdf

31. Plan. The experience of P.Q.17 had shown that the enemy was now ready to bring his heavy surface forces against the convoys, well to the eastward in the Barents Sea. Nor could it be assumed that he would continue to leave the westbound convoys alone. The cover provided by the battlefleet, while the convoys were east of Bear Island, had always been more threatening than real; for I had strong objections to taking heavy ships into the Barents Sea, far from their bases and exposed to heavy concentrations of U-boats and shore-based aircraft, with little hope of bringing the enemy to action. The battlefleet screen absorbed a number of destroyers which could otherwise be used to provide real cover, close to the convoy. In the variable visibility which prevails in those latitudes, the presence of a strong force of destroyers would constitute a threat which the enemy, in spite of the longer range of his guns, would probably be reluctant to face.
32. I therefore decided to rely for surface cover on a strong force of destroyers, under the command of the Rear Admiral Commanding, Home Fleet Destroyers (Rear Admiral R. L. Burnett, C.B., O.B.E.), flying his flag in the SCYLLA, and to accept the consequent restriction on the movements of the battleships, for which small screens of low endurance only were retained. The destroyer force was to transfer off Nova Zemlya from P.Q.18 to Q.P.14, leaving the former to complete its voyage with the normal anti-submarine escort, reinforced by any forces which the Russians might be persuaded to provide. The fuel requirements of the escort and covering force were to be met by two oilers sailed under separate escort to Spitzbergen, and two more with P.Q.18, transferring with the covering force to Q.P.14.

При этом дефицит эсминцев привёл к тому, что "Энсон" и "Дьюк оф Йорк" отправились в Исландию, и не более того.

Комментарии:
1. Вероятно, на решение Тови повлиял второй бой в заливе Сирта, хотя он и не говорит этого прямо.
2. Неясно, как бы это сработало летом, но Новогодний бой, в общем, подтвердил жизнеспособность идеи.
3. Удивительно, но 16 сильных эсминцев с большой дальностью плавания оказались способны сыграть стратегическую роль - и эту роль в принципе мог бы сыграть Северный флот. Если бы в его составе были соответствующие силы.
4. В связи с любимой шиплаверской темой "универсальный калибр демократии против имперских зениток и ПМК": вообще говоря, сражения с применением торпед эсминцев/крейсеров и участием линкоров во время войны не были редкостью. В Европе - бой у Калабрии, атака эсминцев на "Бисмарк", операция "Церберус", второй бой в заливе Сирта и бой у Нордкапа. На Тихом океане это - бой в "пятницу, 13-го", бой у Гуадалканала, бой в проливе Суригао и бой у о. Самар. В судьбе двух линкоров ("Фусо", "Исэ") торпеды эсминцев сыграли решающую роль, они же лишили последних надежд и "Шарнхорст". Таким образом, однозначного ответа на любимый шиплаверский вопрос нет - в ряде случае наличие 6" противоминной артиллерии могло быть важнее, чем сравнительно сильная зенитная батарея из 133-мм или 127-мм орудий.