новейший этап "войны умов" вокруг "китай статистики"
Пуденко Сергей сообщил в новостях
следующее:6589@vstrecha...
>
> Кактус сообщил в новостях
> следующее:6587@vstrecha...
> КМГ широко и четко шагает по миру. И все это кто не дубина уже
понимают.
> Доклад Конгрессу СШа о воен силах Китая начинается опять таки с ее
> упоминания
>
>
точнее,_доклады_, начиная с 2000г (в нем о КМГ подробно) вплоть до
последнего http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/dod-2006.pdf
"Главным путем для реализации своих стратегических целей Китай считает
наращивание совокупной национальной мощи. Это понятие широко
используется не только исследователями, но и запечатлено в важнейших
партийных документах, включая доклад на XVI съезде китайской компартии."
Целый срез вопросов встает во весь рост, который вполне соответствует
основам шушаринской постановки темы о критериях развития общества, о
том, в чем оно конкретно выражается, как его наиболее аутентично мерить
и уметь управлять. Массивы такого рода сотавялют несколько главок
Полилогии вслед за ключвеыми фрагментами о КМГ в 3м (вводные постановки)
и 4 томе. Во 2 м томе широко обсуждается общая постановка о критеряих и
не раз вводятся побисковские работы, которых, увы , в натуре по крупному
АШ просто не читал, просто зацепил их следы - напр. у Громыко в РАО
рассказ и Киясовском проекте. Но АШ- адепт КМГ-постановки (фактчиески
единственной, отражающей сам дискурс Полилогии и конструктивно
альтернавтиный "экономизму",главному монстру. АШ всецело поддерживает
"это направление работ китайских ученых" и пожалуй даже доктринизирует
его. На самом деле,история с КМГ более динамична,драматичсна и
многоаспектна, чем представляется АШ судя по короткому знакомству с
пересказами ее у Портякова - и то, пересказывается ранний этап,начало
1990х. В конце 90х бомба КМГ "рванула" , - вызвала широкий
международный резонснанс, отраженный в хороше книге на фас.орг по
упомянутой ссылке - на нее ссылаются сетевые источнки по КМГ, включая
Википедию, в нескольких статях. Однако,затем наступили 2000е годы, а уж
теперь, накануне 17 съезда КПК, ситуация снова значительно иная -потому
что совсем иной расклад в реалиях общества -после нового этапа !11ой
пятилетки"). Методология КМГ и ее использование, как пишут ведущие
кмг-сты, обязаны развиваться сооветственно. Поэтому так суетится Сютон
С ранее обуждавшимися в этой ветке китайскими работами всё становится
еще более важно и интересно, если включить _новейшие массивы_ материалов
и попытаться отрефлектировать особенности этапа,начавшегося где-то пять
лет назад. Когда Китай вступал в ВТО -
и тогда появились вот такие материалы (Борис Львин-бесноватый либерал,
правее обычных, он и наш сайт обгаживал самым грубым образом). См ниже
Одним словом, все это называется _всемирной "эпистемической борьбой"_
или даже войной умов вокург основополагающего вопроса своременности.
акутальней не бывает. И год от года ситуация меняется.. На кону среди
прочего - принципы "учета и контроля" общества, экономич. и социальной
статистики. А за ними -война за аутентичную картину мира и текущая война
за его передел. Война за КМГ -сущсевтенная часть текущей мировой войны.
Точно такой же взрыв ( но в местном,ссср-варианте) был в конце
совка,когда Ханин вышел со своей "Лукавой цифрой" . Смотрите, как пляшут
теперь амеры на "лукавых китайских цифрах" и методиках. И вспоминайте
недавнее прошлое, а то покажется что приходится "бросиаться из строны в
строну". Да ничего подобного, эта работа по аутетичному воссатнволению
контекста -сути происходящего_ ведется тут , и на сайте, уже 5 лет (и
Ханина тогда привлекли) . Догоняем поезд, "ранувей трейн". Уже догнали.
Вроде такого не бывает, но мы все же "на рысаках" догнали давно, в
1980х, ушедший поезд (имени Рэя Клайна и прочего цру)
Here I am just a-drownin' in the rain
With a ticket for a runaway train
_Что происходило на КМГ фронтах после 2002 вплоть до сегодня_- вот с
этим теперь быстро надо разобраться. По предв.прикидкам, кстати, Ян
Сютон - это крупный деятель с бол.амбицими с западным образованием
(Калтех), и его нынешний агрессивный подход - ревизионизм по отношению к
ранее отстоявшимся фреймам китайской КМГ. Слава богу,из-за обострения
эпистемической борьбы из-за указанных причин в посл.два года прошла
массовая выкладка работ в сети, переводы кит. на англ,рефлексии всякого
рода специалистов на вского рода форумах и конгрессах вроде "Мирового
китайского форума"
Забавная статья о китайском росте. Должна служить отрезвляющим примером
для любителей вэвэпэшной цифири. Потому что на самом деле эти цифры
почти ничего не значат - даже когда они "правильные". То есть вся эта
ситуация с величиной "роста" китайской экономики вообще иррелевантна.
The reputation of the People's Republic as an economic powerhouse is
based in part on pure bunk
The People's Republic of China is awash in gaudy numbers. For much of
its exceedingly long history (5,000 years), the country has held out the
promise of the world's biggest market (now more than 1.2 billion
consumers). Beijing posted the highest growth rate of any major economy
last year-an estimated 7.3 percent, when much of the world was stumbling
closer to zero. China is at once the recipient of the most foreign
investment of any country in Asia (nearly $47 billion last year), the
sponsor of the world's biggest hydroelectric project (the $27 billion
Three Gorges Dam) and the site of the world's highest railway, to Tibet
(5,000 meters). The parade of gloating statistics would seem to portray
a country that is larger than life-or at least larger and more
illustrious than nations that must rely upon less quantifiable measures
of worth, like, say, France.
YET THOSE FIGURES are themselves hardly scientific. Historians trace
China's current economic boom back to Deng Xiaoping's famous "southern
journey" to the city of Shenzhen in July 1992. Perched atop a golf cart,
the 87-year-old paramount leader exhorted local authorities to redouble
their efforts to attract foreign capital and open up the economy. The
comments led to nearly a decade of double-digit growth. Or did they?
Many of the white-hot numbers emerging from the People's Republic in the
1980s and 1990s are now thought to have been cooked up by
eager-to-please cadres. The pressure on Chinese officials intensified
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when Beijing decided that the
country had to grow by at least 7 percent a year in order to create
enough jobs to forestall social unrest. Not surprisingly, reported
growth rates have not dipped below that level since then. After Deng's
trip, the numbers reported by provincial authorities became "an
important criterion in evaluating local government officials'
performance," says Wang Xiaolu of China's National Economic Research
Institute. "This [has] created the incentive for statistical
falsification."
Economists and professional China-watchers have long taken Chinese
numbers with a grain of salt, and no one seems to have been terribly
hurt by the puffed-up stats. But the massive labor protests that roiled
the rust-belt cities of Daqing and Liaoyang recently provide stark
warning of the dangers of relying on smoke and mirrors. Thousands of the
laid-off workers who took to the streets don't even exist in China's
jobless statistics: they are considered xiagang, laborers who are
offered a tiny monthly stipend from their former companies and who are
thus not counted as unemployed. Protests most often stem from the fact
that even those meager benefits have vanished into thin air. And if GDP
growth really is much slower than officially announced-some economists
think China could have grown as little as 3 percent last year-then such
demonstrations are sure to intensify.
Chinese aren't bad at math: they invented the abacus as early as the
third century. But in China, numbers can often seem little more than
rhetorical flourishes. (Recently Premier Zhu Rongji spoke without irony
about whether his government had achieved its promise of "one 'must',
three completions and five reforms".) Today an element of fakery has
crept into several major statistics put out by Beijing. Even some
Chinese economists agree that, in addition to the marquee growth figure,
industrial output numbers have been inflated. The official jobless rate
is seriously understated, as are the billions in nonperforming loans
that are dragging down Chinese banks. Don't even try to pin down China's
military budget. Officially it was $17 billion last year, but the actual
figure could be up to five times larger.
The real problem is that numbers in China are often more of a political
than a scientific tool. During the disastrous 1958-1960 Great Leap
Forward, Mao Zedong's regime trumpeted huge gains in steel
production-thanks to backyard steel furnaces that were in fact
useless-even as millions of Chinese starved to death. Sensitive death or
casualty figures-whether from the 1976 Tangshan earthquake, the 1989
Tiananmen crackdown or the current HIV/AIDS crisis-are inevitably
low-ball numbers. The biggest obstacle to objective statistical
reporting is the fact that "provinces have a [political] imperative to
meet or exceed certain targets," says a Western diplomat in Beijing. "So
guess what? They meet or exceed their targets." Earlier this month the
Guangzhou Daily reported that a township official in Hunan province had
fudged GDP and profit figures-and was promoted to chief of a county
statistics bureau.
Since 1998 nearly all Chinese provincial authorities have over reported
growth rates, leading to a situation in which the sum of the parts adds
up to more than the whole. (In statistics unveiled before the Chinese
Parliament this month, every province but Yunnan reported GDP growth
rates that exceeded the national figure of 7.3 percent.) In January,
Hong Kong brokerage house CLSA declared that "the data that show China
as the fastest-growing economy in the world are not worth the paper they
are written on"; the company refuses even to forecast China's 2002 and
2003 GDP growth. Thomas Rawski, a professor at the University of
Pittsburgh, has conducted probably the most exhaustive review of Chinese
GDP growth figures by comparing them against energy consumption, farm
output, industrial production and other factors like floods and drought.
He says China's economy may actually have shrunk -minus 2.2 and minus
2.5 percent, respectively-in 1998 and 1999.
On the other hand, unemployment figures are downplayed in order to mask
the suffering caused by economic reforms and restructuring. The official
jobless rate of 3.6 percent in 2001 does not include xiagang workers,
who are estimated to have numbered 10 million last year. Nor does it
include farmers who have left their fields to find work in the cities-a
"floating population" of around 150 million migrants who are at least
seasonally unemployed. Tsinghua University professor Hu Angang has
researched the problem using definitions of joblessness more in line
with international standards. He concludes that China's unemployment
rate was 7.6 percent in rural areas and more than 8.5 percent in the
cities last year-well above the breaking point at which Beijing claims
social turmoil is inevitable. "We're facing a flood of laid-off
workers," warns Hu.
An even more urgent time bomb may be hidden in China's debt numbers.
Central bank governor Dai Xianglong confessed to Parliament this month
that national domestic debt was much higher than the official numbers-16
percent of GDP in 2001-suggest. Dai said the figure was closer to 60
percent if unfunded state pension liabilities, local government debt and
major banks' nonperforming loans were thrown in. Dai's unusual candor is
the good news. The bad news is that independent economists say Dai's
statistics are still based on China's yearbook GDP growth statistics. A
more realistic figure is higher still-closer to 100 or even 125 percent,
according to economist Rawski. The bad-loan numbers at state banks alone
are terrifying. The Bank of China has reported two different figures for
its nonperforming loans in 1999-one based on Chinese methodology, the
second more closely in line with Western accounting standards. The
latter is 2.6 times bigger than the former. (The books of China's "Big
Four" banks have been called "meaningless" by Moody's.)
Skeptics say that such discrepancies prove the glam image of China in
the popular imagination is, in fact, a sham. In "The China Dream,"
author Joe Studwell warns investors about "opening a statistical
Pandora's box" when they try to measure China's potential. He argues
that Beijing's economic foundations have been "laid on sand and
constructed from the kind of hubris that drove the Soviet Union in the
1950s." Gordon Chang goes one step further by predicting "the coming
collapse of China" within a decade in a book of the same title; he
believes the regime will soon be unable to finance the deficit spending
that has propelled China's recent growth. These pessimists pooh-pooh the
corporate hype that portrays Beijing as a gateway to a vast ocean of 1.2
billion avid consumers. (Actually, many children haven't been counted by
census takers, so the actual population figure is closer to 1.3
billion.)
What those bleak scenarios fail to take into account, however, is just
how messed up Chinese numbers really are. Statistics have been distorted
not only by political diktat, but by a bewildering array of technical
complications such as conflicting definitions, murky price indexes and
shifting methodologies as the country transforms from a centrally
planned economy to something more in line with the market. Funny
numbers-some too high, some too low-are embedded higgledy-piggledy
throughout the system. Sometimes inflated numbers in one area are
partially canceled out by underestimated economic activity in another:
Rawski, for instance, says that pre-1997 growth figures were too low
because they did not take into account burgeoning growth in China's
service sector. "Some numbers are relatively reasonable and others are
totally implausible," says author Nicholas Lardy, who has written
extensively about the Chinese economy and banking system. "It's unfair
to paint every statistic with a black brush."
For instance, there are good political-and practical-reasons for
underreporting growth. Zhejiang province on China's bustling eastern
seaboard is believed to have shrunk its figures to underplay its
fast-developing private sector. Other wealthy provinces-Guangdong has
been named-have apparently reported low-ball figures to avoid some tax
payments to the central government. Even Beijing's statisticians
regularly deflate the economic performance figures reported by
provincial governments in a process called yasuo shuifen , "squeezing
out the water." Officials say the revisions-a murky procedure involving
citizens' sample surveys, price-index adjustments and not a little
guesswork-ensures that national figures are relatively accurate. Central
government statisticians at the National Statistics Bureau (NSB) "are
not the cause" of the unreliability of Chinese numbers, says Rawski.
"Rather, I see them as among the prominent victims."
Part of the problem, in fact, is that even if Beijing were interested in
accurate, thoroughly transparent statistics, authorities would not have
the means of producing them. The NSB "lacks the capacity to collect data
outside normal information channels," says Rawski. Like other centrally
planned economies, Beijing has traditionally derived its figures from a
reporting system and not from sample surveys, which are less subject to
political influences. "Unless the system is changed," says economist Min
Tang of the Asian Development Bank, "you will have systematic
overreporting." Chinese officials are working with the International
Monetary Fund and the ADB to set up universal standards for the
collection of information. The ADB has provided $600,000 to help Chinese
authorities develop a survey sampling system for economic indicators; a
trial project is taking place in Jiangsu province.
To Beijing's credit, some of China's most suspect numbers have been
exposed because central authorities have begun to push for greater
transparency. Recently a senior NSB official told the Financial Times
that an internal investigation during the second half of 2001 revealed
at least 60,000 violations of Chinese statistics law. Some of the worst
news out of Chinese banks is emerging as domestically listed banks begin
to adhere to stricter accounting standards in their reports. "The new
directive that financial institutions must use international accounting
standards suggests that central authorities are getting religion-maybe a
little late, but they're getting it," says Lardy. As reforms mandated by
Beijing's accession to the World Trade Organization take hold and
government protectionism diminishes, Chinese firms will have to focus
more on being genuinely competitive-and less on faking numbers that hide
all their red ink.
The other good news may be that China, at least so far, doesn't seem to
be Enron. Despite the grim reality behind its rosy statistics, the
People's Republic has yet to implode. Officials have been able to head
off major labor unrest with a combination of payoffs and the threat of
force. With savings rates above 40 percent, huge bank holdings of
domestic savings and $223 billion in foreign-exchange reserves-all of
which are thought to be reasonably accurate numbers-China's buying power
remains impressive.
Yet Beijing cannot expect its bogus books to be accepted with a wink
forever. From the 1997 Asian Flu to crises in Russia and Argentina to
the Enron debacle, most of the world's recent spectacular economic
collapses were made worse by inaccurate data. Masking giant China's many
problems will only guarantee that its stumbles will be more painful than
they need be.
(Post a new comment)
[info] max_kv 2002-04-03 06:38 (link)
На самом деле, это далеко не первый текст о дутых китайских цифрах за
последний где-то месяц. Прошло по почти всем крупным деловым западным
СМИ и "аналитическим источникам" типа EIU, даже в русских аукнулось.
Ссылки щас искать некогда, но за базар отвечаю.
Причем, судя по некоторым стилистическим особенностям и явной
перекличкой ссылок-первоисточников, ноги растут то ли из одного места,
то ли рядом. (Reply to this) (Thread)
[info] bbb 2002-04-03 06:42 (link)
Да, об этом начали писать месяц-два назад. Просто статья понравилась. А
ноги растут, конечно, из одного и того же места - из китайского ЦСУ. Они
сами объявили о проблемах. (Reply to this) (Parent) (Thread)
[info] max_kv 2002-04-03 06:59 (link)
На самом деле и раньше были такие сомнения. Сейчас они обострились
настолько, что китайцы, судя по всему, были вынуждены признать их
правомерность. Есть подозрение, что какая-то тут есть связь с принятием
в ВТО. Но какая именно не знаю - то ли есть какие-то стандарты
раскрытияинформации, то ли их "мочат", то ли, наоборот, китайцы сами
решили прибедниться, чтобы подольше сохранять статус развивающейся
страны или что-то подобное. (Reply to this) (Parent) (Thread)
[info] toshick 2002-04-03 20:47 (link)
Не просто сомнения.
Только раньше была популярна теория, что хитрые китайцы занижают
показатели роста, чтобы скрыть свой реальный военный потенциал. А
потребление электроэнергии типа позволяет их вывести на чистую воду. На
самом же деле их цифрам, видимо, доверять вообще нельзя - кроме валютных
резервов, наверное. ;-)
(Reply to this) (Parent) (Thread)
[info] bbb 2002-04-04 06:10 (link)
Ну, какие-то цифры внешней торговли можно проверять по статистике
партнеров, по крайней мере партнеров из OECD. Более того, по структуре
экспорта и особенно импорта можно тоже разные выводы делать. А цифирки
ВВП и ейного роста - на что вообще? Какой с них прок-то? (Reply to this)
(Parent)
------
Call you up in the middle of the night
Like a firefly without a light
You were there like a blowtorch burning
I was a key that could use a little turning
So tired that I couldn't even sleep
So many secrets I couldn't keep
I promised myself I wouldn't weep
One more promise I couldn't keep
It seems no one can help me now,
I'm in too deep; there's no way out
This time I have really led myself astray
Can you help me remember how to smile?
Make it somehow all seem worthwhile
How on earth did I get so jaded?
Life's mystery seems so faded
I can go where no one else can go
I know what no one else knows
Here I am just a-drownin' in the rain
With a ticket for a runaway train
And everything seems cut and dried,
Day and night, earth and sky,
Somehow I just don't believe it
Bought a ticket for a runaway train
Like a madman laughing at the rain
A little out of touch, a little insane
It's just easier than dealing with the pain
Runaway train, never going back
Wrong way on a one-way track
Seems like I should be getting somewhere
Somehow I'm neither here nor there
Runaway train, never coming back
Runaway train, tearing up the track
Runaway train, burning in my veins
I run away but it always seems the same
