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Exeter
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В. Кашин
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11.08.2004 14:20:48
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Современность;
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Наоборот
Вы просто не в курсе. Разработка "глобальной ударной системы" как раз основной бзик американцев сейчас. И все первые проекты вращались вокруг создания неядерных БЧ для "Минитменов", МХ и "Трайдентов". Но от этого отказались именно главным образом по соображениям опасности таких решений для стратегической стабильности. И исходя из этих соображений Конгресс недавно вообще фактически запретил создание CAV c использованием МБР или БРПЛ: запрещается "to develop, integrate, or test a CAV variant that includes any nuclear or conventional weapon. . . [or] develop, integrate, or test a CAV for launch on any intercontinental ballistic missile or submarine-launched ballistic missile".
Вот типичная статья про эти проблемы, например:
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - MARCH 31, 2004
Air force assesses strike risk options
MICHAEL SIRAK JDW Staff Reporter
Washington, DC
The US Air Force (USAF) is considering a series of options to lessen the chance that third parties could mistake the launch of its next-generation global strike system as a nuclear-armed ballistic missile strike heading their way.
They range from confidence-building measures to technical adjustments to how the weapon would be used.
The air force is designing the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) to carry conventional munitions through space and attack targets thousands of kilometres away within several hours of launch from coastal bases in the US (JDW 12 December 2001). Expendable rocket boosters would carry the CAVs into space at first, with re-usable launch vehicles envisaged for later decades.
Flight tests of a prototype CAV and small expendable launch vehicle are expected to start around 2006. Initial fielding could occur around 2009 to meet a Department of Defense (DoD)- validated requirement for a Prompt Global Strike capability.
Air force officials say the CAV would free the US from a reliance on forward bases in order to attack targets deep inside hostile territory. Its use, however, carries potential risk, say outside observers, because other countries, especially nuclear powers like China and Russia, could mistake it for a long-range nuclear-armed ballistic missile and might therefore be prompted to respond with their own nuclear launch.
The USAF maintains that CAV launches could look qualitatively different from other rocket missions, but does acknowledge the concern.
"Use of intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM]-like boosters with conventional weapons is decidedly different and unprecedented," states the service in the report 'Concept of Operations for the Common Aero Vehicle' that it issued to the US Congress in February. "As a result, the DoD has an obligation to minimise the risk of third-party miscalculation."
Accordingly, the service says it is exploring a series of new operational measures (see box).
"While no system can totally preclude all potential misperceptions, the DoD believes this risk can be managed to very acceptable levels," states the report.
A US State Department official familiar with the report told JDW that he is "heartened" that the air force is considering a broad range of options. "This is an issue of serious concern," he noted, adding, however, that it is still too early for formal talks with other nations because the US has not yet formulated its policy on the CAVs.
The air force has also discussed at times the option of placing conventional warheads on existing Minuteman III or Peacekeeper ICBMs, but the idea is not currently favoured, said Col Rick Patenaude, chief of the deterrence and strike division in the Air Force Space Command's requirements directorate.
"We want to do everything we can to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the risk of somebody misunderstanding what is on top of the missile," he told JDW. "Would you put a Common Aero Vehicle on a Minuteman III? My answer is 'no'. Would you put a Common Aero Vehicle on a Peacekeeper? My answer is 'no'."
The Common Aero Vehicle
The CAV is under development as part of the USAF-Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Force Application and Launch from the Continental US programme.
The vehicle is envisaged as an unpowered yet manoeuvrable shroud that protects a payload of weapons through the rigours of space and atmospheric re-entry and delivers it precisely over a target.
The initial CAV design, coupled with an expendable booster, is expected to have a range of up to 3,000nm (JDW 2 July 2003). Later configurations, operating with re-usable launch systems, would place targets up to 9,000nm away within reach, according to the air force. The initial CAV will carry up to 454kg of munitions. The air force does not plan to develop weapons unique to the CAV, but instead intends to incorporate emerging munitions on to it.
These munitions include the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator, Brilliant Anti-Armor (also known as the Brilliant Anti-Tank, BAT) submunition, nascent Small Diameter Bomb and yet-to-be-developed Wide-Area Search Autonomous Attack Miniature Munition. Together they would provide the capability to strike hardened and deeply buried fixed sites, as well as moving and relocatable assets.
CAVs could also deploy sensor payloads, including small unmanned aircraft and unattended ground sensors, according to the air force.
The CAV's real value is "timely arrival" against operational forces, said Gregory Jenkins, director of advanced concepts in the Air Armaments Center at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, during an interview in November 2003. "CAV is supposed to be like a cutting-edge vehicle that gets there first when you don't have anything else to get there and you have a need . . . When the tanks are rolling into some town doing ethnic cleansing, you have to be able to stop them before they get there. We already know how to kill those targets. We just have to get the [munitions] there fast."
Measures to minimise the risks
* Expanding existing military-to-military consultations, such as the Russia-US Defence Consultative Group, to include information on emerging weapon systems like the CAV;
* Amending existing international agreements on launch notifications such as the May 1988 Russia-US pact, which provides for at least 24 hours' notice before ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile test flights;
* Allowing on-site inspections of CAV launch sites that are more intrusive and frequent than visits allowed at ICBM bases under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty;
* Establishing launch notification 'hotlines' and using other ad hoc 'back-channel' communications to advise other nations' leaderships - at the times and levels appropriate to the circumstances - of the imminent use of a CAV;
* Declaring nuclear-free CAV launch sites at coastal bases in the US to distinguish them from ICBM sites in the northern central US so that future Chinese, Russian and other nations' overhead surveillance satellites could more easily identify the launch points and recognise the non-nuclear nature of the launch;
* Incorporating CAV launch data into shared early-warning projects like the Joint Data Exchange Centre that Russia and the US have agreed to establish in Moscow; and
* Creating specific launch profiles for CAV missions to differentiate them from nuclear-tipped ICBMs such as unique flight trajectories, plume intensities and number of booster stages employed.
А вот про решение Конгресса на серьезные ограничения на CAV:
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - AUGUST 11, 2004
US Congress puts clamps on space project
MICHAEL SIRAK JDW Staff Reporter
Washington, DC
The US Congress has limited the development of an ambitious US Air Force long-range strike system until more is done diplomatically to mitigate the chance that third-party nations could misconstrue its use as the launch of a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), together with the air force, requested $21.6 million from Congress in Fiscal Year 2005 (FY05) to continue work on the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), with the goal of beginning prototype flight testing around 2006.
The CAV is an atmospheric re-entry shroud envisaged to carry conventional munitions through space and attack targets thousands of miles away within several hours of launch. At first it would be carried aboard expendable rocket boosters; eventually the air force plans to operate it on reusable space launch vehicles.
Outside observers say - and US defence officials have acknowledged that - the launch of a CAV could resemble the profile of an intercontinental ballistic missile in flight, especially when carried on an expendable booster. This could lead to miscalculation on the part of other nations that have nuclear weapons capabilities, leading to an unintended escalation of a crisis with potentially catastrophic consequences, they note.
Concerned that safeguards are not in place to prevent such miscalculations, congressional appropriators reduced the programme's funding by $5 million in the final version of the FY05 defence spending bill that they completed at the end of July.
Further, they inserted language that bars the programme from using any of the $16.6 million "to develop, integrate, or test a CAV variant that includes any nuclear or conventional weapon. . . [or] develop, integrate, or test a CAV for launch on any intercontinental ballistic missile or submarine-launched ballistic missile".
Instead, the CAV programme can only apply the funds toward "the development of hypersonic technologies for non-weapons related research, such as micro-satellite or other satellite launch requirements," they said.
They noted, however, that they would consider expanding the scope of the CAV programme in subsequent years "if safeguards negotiated among our international partners have been put in place".
CAV programme officials are adjusting to the congressional action. "We are currently reviewing the FY05 language and determining the impact on the programme," DARPA spokeswoman Jan Walker told JDW. CAV activities are part of the larger DARPA-led long-range strike technology development effort, dubbed the Force Application and Launch from the Continental US programme.
The air force issued a report to Congress in February that outlined a series of potential confidence-building measures like enhanced military-to-military consultations, launch notification hotlines, nuclear-free CAV launch sites and on-site inspections.
С уважением, Exeter
- Да нет же - В. Кашин 11.08.2004 14:50:48 (41, 2112 b)