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Рубрики WWII; Версия для печати

Вы движетесь в правильном направлении

От поста выше:

>>Причем Швейцария распустила армию в самый критический момент, когда действительно собирались его реализовать. Не срослось, швейцарцам повезло.

уже перешли к:

>Ага, и собрались распустить в летом 1940 г, в аккурат когда решался вопрос оккупировать Швейцарию или нет.

Сделайте еще одно усилие:

However, the national military defence situation was precarious at the beginning of the war. There were no operational plans, and insufficient heavy artillery. Mobility was based on antiquated conditions (too many horses, too few motor vehicles), and there were practically no tanks or military aircraft. In order to go some way towards compensating for these weaknesses, the French and Swiss military forces had a secret understanding as early as 1938/39 that they would work together in the event of a Wehrmacht attack on Switzerland. The infantry was in a better condition and at that time the soldiers were still prepared to wage a bitter struggle to defend Switzerland. Here the initial natural spirit of self-defence can be seen. This was implemented by the conscription mentioned above, the maintenance of an army, the arms loans, the general mobilisation at the start of the war and the election of a Supreme Commander – the General – a measure only designed for times when the country was under extraordinary threat.
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Once the army had prepared itself for a linear border defence towards the north, namely Germany, and dug itself in during the first winter of the war in 1939/40, the Supreme Commander regrouped the forces, following the sudden arrival of the Germans at the Swiss-French border to the west after the unexpected fall of France in the summer of 1940. These troops were regrouped according to the concept of the Reduit (all-round defence from the heartland), a concept which conformed to old models but which was new in this situation. This was accompanied by an order to partially demobilise at a time when powerful German tank divisions were just across the border. At the same time there were discussions about the army being discharged and the preparation of Switzerland for the coming «peacetime».
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The number of active soldiers fell between July and October 1940 from around 450,000 to 150,000. Most of the remaining troops were withdrawn from the border and the flat central areas and started to erect defence posts in the Alpine foothills and mountains. This transition from a «doctrine of war» to a «national defence» strategy based ever more on non-military factors meant that the workforce was free to concentrate on economic production. Thereafter, national defence was not so much a short-term defence of the whole country (in a territorial sense) by military means as a longer-term strategy combining economic co-operation, political civility, and maintenance of military readiness to defend the country against the Axis powers. This strategy has, however, only been accorded «symbolic significance» to a great extent by military experts then and now.109 With the withdrawal of combat troops to the Réduit national the popular meaning of «Grenzbesetzung» (border occupation) that had existed to date was undermined. From summer 1940 onwards, the term «Aktivdienst» (active military service) became a key concept of political language.

https://www.uek.ch/en/schlussbericht/synthesis/ueke.pdf

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