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Skvortsov
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Begletz
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04.01.2022 12:42:21
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Армия;
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Напрасно.
Вы можете владеть послезнанием. Но почему Вы считает, что можете его правильно интерпритировать?
>>>Во-1х, это Гражданская война выкосила костяк профессионального офицерства в России, а сталинские чистки чистили уже выдвиженцев Гражданской.
>>
>>Об этом англичане и пишут - исчезло небольшое число полководцев с боевым опытом. Речь о командармах и маршалах, имевших опыт вождения соединений в Гражданскую войну.
>
>Если вы знаете английский, то должны понимать, что они об этом не пишут. А если не знаете английского, не нужно цитировать на этом языке.
Вы сначала сами правильно и целиком переведите, потом советы раздавайте.
"Furthermore, it had directly resulted in the disappearance of the few experienced Commanders in the U.S.S.R."
В английской армии Commanders при написании с большой буквы - это командующие округами, либо всеми войсками на отдельном ТВД.
>Гражданская война не упоминается. Но в любом случае, ее опыт едва ли был применим к ВОВ.
Собственно, упоминается "experience", который получали в ПМВ, гражданскую или служа военными советниками у Чан Кайши, фактически организовывая операции Гоминдана армейского масштаба.
И опыт маневренной войны в Гражданскую был вполне применим к ВОВ. Может быть даже в большей степени, чем опыт позиционной войны в ПМВ.
>Ах-ах! Если вам для диалога нужны комдивы и комкоры, вам не на этот форум.
Да нет. Просто их мнение изложено в мемуарах, и его надо учитывать блогерам.
>>В любом случае оценка боебоспособности советской армии объясняет отсутствие у англичан большой заинтересованности в союзе с СССР в августе 1939 г.
>
>Это не так. Незаинтересованность была прежде всего политическая.
Это Ваше мнение. Существуют и другие.
Most of the foreign military attaches in Moscow and other foreign military observers were convinced that the purge of the military and the reinstatement of political commissars had adversely affected the military effectiveness of the Red Army and, accordingly, the "alliance value" of the Soviet
Union had been reduced in European power politics. Such diverse military commentators as the Japanese general, Masaharu Homma, the Americanmilitary attache to Riga, Major Guenther, and the prominent Nazi, Reichsmarshal Hermann Goring, concurred that the Red Army had sustained extensive damage as a result of Stalin's terror. Moreover, as a result of his
conversations with the several military attaches in Moscow on the condition of the army after the purge, Loy Henderson reported that almost all agreed
"that the fighting efficiency of the Red Army has been adversely affected as a result of the purge and the institution of political commissars. It may be added that this opinion is so generally accepted among the circles of Military Attaches in Moscow that discussion in that circle is confined to the extent of injury and the time and manner in which such injury may be remedied rather than as to whether an injury has been received."
....
As Davies' dispatch of June 6, 1938 indicated, reports that the purge had had a severely debilitating effect on the Red Army were accepted as axiomatic in most Western capitals and, therefore, played a., significant role in the events then unfolding in Europe and Asia. On July 4, 1937, Ambassador Davies reported that Stalin's military purge had destroyed the "confidence" of Western European officials, especially in Britain and France, in the strength of the Red Army.
This development certainly encouraged Hitler's
aggressions, a point apparent in a conversation between the German and British military attaches in Moscow during May 1938. General Kostring told his British colleague that Stalin's purge had crippled the Red Army, thereby neutralizing the Soviet Union as a factor in Berlin's considerations, and that
Hitler would not have attempted the annexation of Austria had not Stalin weakened the Red Army.
The low esteem in which the Red Army was held in London, Paris, and Berlin also contributed to the outcome of the Munich Crisis. During that fateful summer of 1938, as Britain and France capitulated and allowed Nazi Germany to absorb Czechoslovakia the Red
Army was still considered much too enfeebled by the toll of the recent purge to implement the Soviet Union's pledges to assist Czechoslovakia in the event
of hostilities with Germany.
The British historian, E. H. Carr, later recalled,
that an official in the British Foreign Office remarked during the crisis that the Soviet Union could only act "politically" on behalf of Czechoslovakia be cause of the dubious military value of the Red Army.
Similarly, the American military attache in Riga, Major Guenth'er, described the Soviet pledge of
military assistance to Czechoslovakia as sheer bluff—lacking substance because "Soviet Russia will not risk a war at this time due to the unsettled conditions of internal political affairs and within the army."
Hence, the purge had the effect of depriving Britain and France of any reasonable assurance of Soviet assistance in checking the expansionist policies of Hitler, a development with disastrous consequences for Czechoslovakia.
>Но все эти чудесные рассуждения не дают ответа на вопрос, как же это немцы в 1914-5 громили императорскую русскую армию, в которой никогда не было сталинских чисток?
Без Австро-Венгрии Антанта придавила бы Германию еще в 1914-15 г.