Китайский дракон копит силы. Растущая мощь Китая тревожит Вашингтон
Наш комментарий: "Специалисты, готовившие
доклад Пентагона в этом году, подчеркивают: для достижения этих целей Пекин ввел и все более широко использует понятие «всеобъемлющей национальной мощи», под которой подразумевается проведение как «мягких» действий (экономическое и культурное влияние в мире, повышение привлекательности Китая для мирового сообщества), так и более активных «твердых» шагов (наращивание военного потенциала, количественное и качественное совершенствование национальных вооруженных сил, укрепление дипломатического влияния страны в мире)"
Подъем современного Китая. Всеобъемлющая национальная мощь и великая стратегия (Ху Аньган) http://www.situation.ru/app/j_art_1195.htm
Самолеты 6-го поколения: китайский ответ на планы ВМС США
Вашингтон и Пекин продолжают разработки беспилотных сверхзвуковых истребителей
China’s grand strategy, as it defines it, is one of:
* maintaining balance among competing priorities for sustaining momentum in national economic development; and,
* maintaining favorable trends in the security environment within which such economic development can occur.
Two concepts central to understanding how China would achieve the goals of its grand strategy are “comprehensive national power” (CNP) (zonghe guoli) and the “strategic configuration of power,” or “shi.” CNP is the concept by which China’s strategic planners evaluate and measure China’s national standing in relation to other nations. It includes qualitative and quantitative measures of territory, natural resources, economic power, diplomatic influence, domestic government, military capability, and cultural influence.
The “24 Character” Strategy
In the early 1990s, former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997) gave guidance to China’s foreign and security policy apparatus that, collectively, has come to be known as the “24 character” strategy: “observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.” Later, the phrase, “make some contributions (you suo zuo wei)” was added.
This strategy has often been quoted by senior Chinese national security officials, especially as it relates to China’s diplomacy. Although certain aspects of this strategy have been debated in recent years within China’s security establishment – namely the relative emphasis placed upon “never claim leadership” or “make some contributions” – taken as a whole, the strategy suggests both a short-term desire to downplay China’s ambitions and a long-term strategy to build up China’s power to maximize options for the future.
China’s leading civilian and military think tanks and educational institutions apply slightly different measures to monitor changes in China’s relative CNP. A recent report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for example, ranked China sixth among the top 10 nations, based upon economic, military, and diplomatic metrics. Such statistical modeling exemplifies China’s interest in understanding the sources of national power and indicates how Chinese strategists measure the relative distribution of power in the international system.
The “strategic configuration of power,” or “shi,” is roughly equivalent to an “alignment of forces,” although there is no direct Western equivalent to the term. Chinese linguists also suggest it refers to the “propensity of things,” “potential,” or the “potential born of disposition,” that only a skilled strategist can exploit.
Since the early 1980s, Chinese leaders have described their national development strategy as a quest to increase China’s CNP. They continuously assess the broader security environment, or “strategic configuration of power,” for potential challenges and threats (e.g., potential conflict with Taiwan that involves the United States) as well as opportunities (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) that might prompt an adjustment in national strategy.
China’s leaders have identified the initial decades of the 21st Century as generally favorable, and view it as a “strategic opportunity” to make China an economically strong, unified state. Chinese leaders value such progress for its own sake, as well as for the enhancements to military forces and national power this progress will allow.
At the core of China’s overall strategy rests the desire to maintain the continuous rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). A deep-rooted fear of losing political power shapes the leadership’s strategic outlook and drives many of its choices. As a substitute for the failure of communist ideology, the CCP has based its legitimacy on the twin pillars of economic performance and nationalism. As a consequence, domestic economic and social difficulties may lead China to attempt to bolster support by stimulating nationalist sentiment which could result in more aggressive behavior in foreign and security affairs than we might otherwise expect.
Chinese leaders and strategists rarely use a Western “ends-ways-means” construct to discuss strategy. Rather, they discuss strategy in terms of two central concepts: “comprehensive national power” (CNP) and the “strategic configuration of power.” These concepts shape how Chinese strategic planners assess the security environment, gauge China’s relative position in the world, and make adjustments to account for prevailing geopolitical trends.
CNP. China’s strategic planners use CNP scores to evaluate China’s standing in relation to other nations. These scores are based on qualitative and quantitative measures of territory, natural resources, economic prosperity, diplomatic influence, international prestige, domestic cohesiveness, military capability, and cultural influence. China’s leading civilian and military think tanks apply slightly different criteria for CNP. A 2006 report by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for example, used economic, military, and diplomatic metrics to rank China sixth among the world powers.
Since the early 1980s, China’s leaders have described their national development strategy as a quest to increase China’s CNP. They stress economic growth and innovation in science and technology as central to strengthening CNP. A key assumption of this strategy is that economic prosperity and stability will afford China greater international influence and diplomatic leverage as well as a robust, modern military.
A commentary in the official Liberation Army Daily in April 2006 shed some light on the relationship between CNP, military modernization, and China’s international status: “As China’s comprehensive strength is incrementally mounting and her status keeps on going up in international affairs, it is a matter of great importance to strive to construct a military force that is commensurate with China’s status and up to the job of defending the interests of China’s development, so as to entrench China’s international status.”
“Strategic Configuration of Power.”
The “strategic configuration of power,” or “shi,” is roughly understood as an “alignment of forces,” although there is no direct Western equivalent to the term. Chinese strategic planners continuously assess the “strategic configuration of power” for potential threats (e.g., potential conflict over Taiwan that involves the United States) as well as opportunities (e.g., the collapse of the Soviet Union) that might prompt an adjustment in national strategy.
China’s leaders describe the initial decades of the 21st Century as a “20-year period of opportunity,” meaning that regional and international conditions will generally be peaceful and conducive to economic, diplomatic, and military development and thus to China’s rise as a great power. Closely linked to this concept is the “peaceful development” campaign to assuage foreign concerns over China’s military modernization and its global agenda by proclaiming that China’s rise will be peaceful and that conflict is not a necessary corollary to the emergence of a new power.
Stability, Sovereignty, and Strategy
The perpetuation of CCP rule shapes Beijing’s perceptions of China’s domestic political situation and the international environment. Regime survival likewise shapes how Party leaders view instability along China’s periphery – e.g., North Korea, Central Asia – which could escalate or spill over into China. Concern over maintaining legitimacy also influences how Beijing treats the status of China’s land and maritime territorial claims, since any challenge to Chinese sovereignty could undermine the strength and authority of the Party.
China has settled territorial disputes with many of its neighbors in recent years. However, disputes with Japan in the East China Sea, with India along their shared border, and with Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea remain. Although China has attempted to prevent these disputes from disrupting regional relations, occasional statements by PRC officials underscore China’s resolve in these areas. For example, on the eve of President Hu’s historic October 2006 visit to India, PRC Ambassador Sun Yuxi told Indian press, “the whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory . . . we are claiming all of that – that’s our position.”
Balance, Position, and Strategy
Beyond China’s efforts to maintain stability on its borders and assert its territorial claims, Beijing seeks to advance its strategic interests into the “greater periphery” encompassing Central Asia and the Middle East. The security goals behind this emphasis include maintaining access to resources and markets, and establishing a regional presence and influence to balance and compete with other powers, including the United States, Japan, and India in areas distant from China’s borders.
Similarly, China’s strategy for the developing world seeks to secure access to resources and markets, build influence in multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, and restrict Taiwan’s diplomatic space. To build these relationships, China emphasizes its self-proclaimed status as the leader of the developing world and one that can sympathize with local dissatisfaction over the effects of globalization and perceptions of a widening “north-south” gap.
Resource Demands and Strategy
As China’s economy grows, dependence on secure access to markets and natural resources, particularly metals and fossil fuels, is becoming a more urgent influence on China’s strategic behavior. At present, China can neither protect its foreign energy supplies nor the routes on which they travel, including the Straits of Malacca through which some 80 percent of China’s cruse oil imports transit – a vulnerability President Hu refers to as the “Malacca Dilemma.”
China relies on coal for some two-thirds of its energy, but its demand for oil and gas is increasing. In 2003, China became the world’s second largest consumer and third largest importer of oil. China currently imports over 40 percent of its oil (about 2.5 million barrels per day in 2005). By 2025, this figure could rise to 80 percent (9.5 – 15 million barrels per day). China began filling a strategic petroleum reserve in 2006. By 2015, Beijing plans to build reserves to the International Energy Agency standard of 90-days supply, but with poor logistics and transportation networks, this may still prove inadequate.
Nuclear power and natural gas account for smaller, but growing, portions of energy consumption. China plans to increase natural gas utilization from 3 percent to 8 percent of total consumption by 2010. Similarly, China plans to build some 30 1,000- megawatt nuclear power reactors by 2020.
China’s reliance on foreign energy imports has affected its strategy and policy in significant ways. It has pursued long-term energy supply agreements in Angola, Central Asia, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Venezuela. China has used economic aid, diplomatic favors, and, in some cases, the sale of military technology to secure energy deals. China’s desire to meet its energy needs, moreover, has led it to strengthen ties with countries that defy international norms on issues ranging from human rights, support for international terrorism, and proliferation.
In the past few years, China has also offered economic assistance and military cooperation with countries located astride key maritime transit routes. Concern over these routes has also prompted China to pursue maritime capabilities that would help it ensure the safe passage of resources through international waterways. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2007/2007-prc-military-power.htm
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007
China’s Critical Sea Lanes
цитата из НВО
На первом этапе, ограниченном 2010 годом, планируется в целом завершить переоснащение Народно-освободительной армии на перспективные, высокотехнологичные образцы ВВТ и довести ее огневые и маневренные возможности до уровня ведущих стран мира, что позволит эффективно вести локальные войны любого масштаба. При этом сухопутные войска сохранят свой статус как самого многочисленного вида вооруженных сил страны, предназначенного для решения основных задач по разгрому противника. На флот возлагается важная и ответственная задача по обороне Китая с морских направлений и защите «морских прав» КНР в Мировом океане, а в подготовке ВВС упор делается на ведение действий оперативного и оперативно-тактического характера, осуществляемых самостоятельно (воздушная наступательная операция) или в тесном взаимодействии с формированиями других видов ВС (в том числе и далеко за пределами Китая). Согласно этому плану, в 2008 году должно быть в полном объеме завершено развертывание автоматизированной системы управления войсками НОАК, а совершенствование ядерной триады проводится пока с упором на силы наземного базирования.
К концу следующего этапа, то есть к 2015 году, НОАК должна будет обладать способностью успешно вести разновидовыми группировками войск боевые действия ограниченного масштаба за пределами территории Китая. В этот период предусмотрено осуществление мероприятий, направленных на повышение огневых возможностей оперативных формирований для поражения войск противника. Особенно – на большой дальности. Достичь этого планируется за счет резкого увеличения числа соединений, оснащенных реактивными системами залпового огня крупного калибра (надежда возлагается на российский «Смерч» и его китайские аналоги), а также ракетными комплексами тактического и оперативно-тактического назначения.
И, наконец, в ходе третьего этапа (2015–2020 годы) НОАК, по мнению китайских военных, будет способна вести уже все виды войн против любого вероятного противника. Военно-морские силы КНР должны получить способность проводить операции в океанской зоне на Тихом океане – на так называемой «третьей линии островов», то есть до Гавайев и Австралии с Новой Зеландией включительно.
Здесь также следует особо отметить, что перспективное планирование развития вооруженных сил Китая осуществлено уже на период аж до 2050 года и также насчитывает три этапа, или, как указано в «Белой книге по обороне» КНР от 2006 года, «три шага», в соответствии с которыми планируется «к 2010 году заложить прочный фундамент, к 2020 году – достичь существенного прогресса, а в ходе третьего шага, к середине XXI века, – достичь стратегической цели создания информатизированных Вооруженных сил, способных побеждать в информатизированных (некий симбиоз войны обычной и информационной. – В.Щ.) войнах». К тому времени страна «должна обладать Вооруженными силами, достойными Великой державы и способными победить в любой войне любого противника».
Аналитики Пентагона особо подчеркивают, что китайские военные в рамках реформирования и модернизации НОАК широко и активно применяют наработки, полученные исходя из соответствующего опыта вооруженных сил России и США. Наибольшую озабоченность американцев вызывает все возрастающие возможности НОАК по ведению боевых действий в околоземном пространстве, под которыми предусматривается не только непосредственное уничтожение космических аппаратов или нанесение ударов из космоса, но и активное использование орбит в целях повышения эффективности систем связи, управления, разведки и целеуказания вооруженных сил Китая.
