Defining Power
More than Might?
Volume 27, Issue 2
When the French Foreign Minister suggested the USSR might placate the
Pope by tolerating Catholicism, Josef Stalin famously quipped, "The
Pope? How many divisions has he got?" It is an irony of history that the
figure whose weakness Stalin scorned helped to catalyze the fall of his
empire. The late Pope John Paul II is widely regarded as pivotal to the
events that ultimately led to the fall of Communism... (More)
When the French Foreign Minister suggested the USSR might placate the
Pope by tolerating Catholicism, Josef Stalin famously quipped, "The
Pope? How many divisions has he got?" It is an irony of history that the
figure whose weakness Stalin scorned helped to catalyze the fall of his
empire.
The late Pope John Paul II is widely regarded as pivotal to the events
that ultimately led to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. With his
churches providing meeting places that promoted the rise of Poland's
Solidarity Movement and his preaching against fear and for "fidelity to
roots," John Paul II confronted Communism's philosophy of oppression and
promoted a revolution of peace. By the late 1980s, Soviet domination in
Eastern Europe was crumbling under a wave of peaceful popular revolt. As
former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged in 1992,
"Everything that happened in Eastern Europe in these last few years
would have been impossible without the presence of this Pope."
History delivered a decisive verdict: the joke is on Stalin. The joke
is, however, too easily dismissed as only a joke, as one more blunder of
a terrible dictator and one more myopia of his obsolete system. The tale
is also a cautionary one that should give cause for reflection. Modern
practitioners and theoreticians of international relations agree that
power is important, but deciding how expansively to define power
remains, now perhaps more than ever, a central question. It is the
question that guides this symposium. What is power? By extension, how
has power changed, and what is its future?
Power has assumed an evasive identity that academics and politicians
alike struggle to pinpoint. Some realists say military power is
preeminent, papal proclamations notwithstanding. Some emphasize the
economic basis of power, believing political ascendancy impossible
without economic dominance. Some swear by people power-roughly the "soft
power" of Harvard's Joseph Nye-that is earned and obtained through
domestic public opinion. Still others focus on power wielded through
diplomatic means, noting the importance of individuals such as US
President Woodrow Wilson, architect of an international order.
A brief chronology of international cooperation and conflict lends
credence to each characterization of power. It is in the changing global
context, which alters the nature and distribution of power, that the
debate becomes critical. Even the past 30 years have witnessed a
profound historical shift as borders have become more porous, economic
flows more free, democratic governance more widespread, and liberal
ideology more accepted. A small terrorist organization, Al Qaeda, has
wielded great power against the ostensibly impenetrable United States.
Non-governmental organizations, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, helped stabilize the Asian tsunami crisis while state
governments faced administrative barriers to the provision of relief.
And a previously impoverished and politically closed state, China, has
sustained an explosion in economic growth that prompts many to envisage
superpower status in its future. Today, the means of obtaining and
wielding power are changing, and the international system is struggling
to adjust.
Our authors attempt to anticipate this uncertain future as they analyze
distributions of power in our world and in worlds still to come. Gregory
Treverton and Seth Jones begin by demystifying the forces that
characterize power and offering an array of analytical tools with which
power might be measured. Robert O. Keohane examines which international
actors are most and least accountable in the exercise of their power,
while Rodney Bruce Hall takes note of the increased contribution of
non-governmental organizations to the international arena. Peter
Ackerman and Jack DuVall highlight the strength of "people power," or
civilian-based resistance, as a strategic means to stable democratic
ends. The symposium culminates with an interview with Richard Haass, who
distinguishes power from influence and forecasts changes in the
distribution of power among states and non-states alike.
It should be clear that any understanding of power in the modern world
must transcend the question of "how many divisions has he got." How
exactly to transcend Stalin's question is the complicated but
indispensable puzzle this symposium begins to solve.
-----
Features Stalin's Joke
+++ Measuring Power
How to Predict Future Balances
by Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones
Измерение Мощи
Как Предсказывать Будущие Балансы
Определение (Мощи), издание 27 (2) - Лето 2005
Григорий Тревертон - Директор РЭНДА Центр Политики (Интеллекта)
Corporation's и Объединённый Декан Школы Дипломированного специалиста
РЭНДА Pardee.
Сет Г. Джонс - политический ученый в РЭНДЕ и дополнительном профессоре в
Джорджтаунском Университете.
(Мощь) - неуловимое понятие(концепция). Поскольку политический ученый
Ганс Моргентау написал, " понятие(концепция) политической (мощи)
излагает одну из самых трудных и спорных проблем политической науки. "
Понимание природы(характера) (мощи) долго был центральным к исследованию
международных отношений и к работе американского Сообщества Интеллекта.
Задача теперь тем более важна и неуловима, потому что Соединенные Штаты
обладают беспрецедентным количеством экономической, военной, и технологи
ческой энергии по сравнению с другими государствами(состояниями). Все же
это должно осуществить его (мощь) в мире не только связанных с
государством(состоянием) ограничений на ту (мощь), но также и
межнациональных сил и негосударственных актеров, которые действуют как
конкуренты, определители, constrainers, и, иногда, усиливающие агенты
той (мощи).
В рассвет 21-ого столетия, понятие(концепция) (мощи) является что более
важно, и более обсужденный. Как измерять (мощь) Соединенных Штатов
фундаментально для главных дебатов по американской внешней политике.
Если, поскольку globe's "unipolar (мощь), " Соединенные Штаты имеет
(мощь) вне прецедента, то его проблема внешней политики упрощена, для
друзей и союзников, должен будет следовать за этим, любят ли они это или
не, и потенциальные противники будут запуганы перспективой той
власти(мощи).
Если, с другой стороны, фактическая американская (мощь) менее чем
иногда принимается(предполагается) или менее годная к употреблению чем
надеявшийся, то Соединенные Штаты могут стоять перед перспективой, что
бывшие союзники и друзья будут, почти как закон физики, хотеть видеть
снятое ориентир. Они будут, если не "balance " против этого, то по
крайней мере сидят на заборе при обстоятельствах как Ирак. Они будут
склонны рассмотреть Соединенные Штаты ' пытка с определенным
Schadenfreude- довольны, чтобы видеть, что доминирующая (мощь)
(сокращала) до более нормального размера, хотя готово стоять с
Соединенными Штатами, если это серьезно было в беде.
Установление государственной (Мощи)
Размеры(Измерения) (мощи) имеют значение значительно в today's
американских дебатах политики). Если Соединенные Штаты - действительно
униполярное государство, тот, который является преобладающим почти вне
исторической аналогии, то ее проблема политики(полиса) упрощена. Другие
государства(состояния) будут иметь небольшой выбор, но следовать за
этим. Они будут походить на Канаду в известном высказывании, приписанном
прежнему Премьер-министру Лестеру Персону: Соединенные Штаты "The - наш
лучший друг, любим ли мы это или нет. " С другой стороны, если
Соединенные Штаты являются менее доминирующими, то стратегия
национальной безопасности, основанная на preponderance-on предположение,
что все главные полномочия будут на Соединенных Штатах ' side-may не,
сохраняется. Что, если другие государства(состояния) начинают
формировать себя не с Соединенными Штатами, а против этого, или по
крайней мере страховать их ставки?
Государственная (мощь) может быть задумана на трех уровнях: уровень
ресурсов(средств) или способностей, также известных как
(мощь)-в-будучи, уровень преобразования (мощи) через национальные
процессы, и уровень власти(мощи) в результатах, которыми обращаем Ваше
внимание на state's тенденцию преобладать при специфических
обстоятельствах. Отправная точка для того, чтобы думать about-and
развивающаяся метрика for-national (мощь) должна рассмотреть
государства как "capability контейнеры. " все же те
capabilities-demographic, экономические, технологические, и
others-become проявляют только через процесс преобразования. Государства
должны преобразовать материальные ресурсы(средства), или экономическое
мастерство, в инструменты более годные к употреблению, типа боевого
мастерства. В конце, однако, то, о чем высшие чиновники заботятся больше
всего, не (мощь) как способность, или даже (мощь), преобразованная из
национального идеала, политики, и социального единства. Они заботятся о
(мощи) в результатах. Тот третий уровень (мощи) является безусловно
самым неуловимым, поскольку это случайно и относительно. Это зависит,
как (мощь) проявляется, и против кого осуществлена (мощь).
Главные категории, используемые, чтобы идентифицировать(опознать) первый
уровень государственной власти(мощи), уровень способности, являются
валовым национальным продуктом (валовой внутренний продукт), население,
расходы защиты, и менее точный фактор, захватывая новшество в
технологии. Используя эти оценки, (мощь) суммирована как процент полной
глобальной (мощи), и четырнадцать государств(состояний) держат по
крайней мере долю в один процент. Соединенные Штаты - наверху структуры
млщи, хотя это - едва изолированная и односторонняя (мощь). В то время
как Соединенные Штаты в настоящее время (проводят) почти одну пятую
полной глобальной (мощи), это близко сопровождается Европейским союзом,
который рассматривают как объединенный актер, и Китай, который каждый
держит приблизительно 14 процентами. Индия, кроме того, держит
приблизительно 9 процентов, в то время как Бразилия, Южная Корея, и
Россия каждый держит приблизительно 2 процента.
Эти числа, хотя только оценивает, предлагают возможные союзы, которые
могли соответствовать (мощи) Соединенных Штатов, действующих один или с
его традиционными союзниками. Такая оценка (мощи) также исследует
наиболее вероятные местоположения на будущий конфликт, основанный на
шести критериях. Проектирования указывают, что Азия - безусловно самая
опасная (регион), с шестью из восьми самых склонных к конфликту
двусторонних балансов, вовлекающих Китай. Оценка также указывает, что к
2015, уровню американской (мощи) будут близко угрожать Китай и Индия, в
то время как Европейский союз и все неамериканские члены Группы Восемь
испытают медленное снижение в (мощи).
Преобразование Ресурсов(Средств) во (Мощь)
Ученый Carnegie Эшли Теллис и его коллеги в РЭНДЕ недавно предложили
повторную проверку понятия(концепции) "national власти(мощи). " Они
начали, предполагая, что дотошная детализация видимых военных активов
обязана понимать истинное основание национальной (мощи). Это также
требует исследования таких переменных как способность для новшества,
природа(характер) социальных учреждений, и качества основы знания. Для
Теллиса и его коллег, все эти факторы влияют на country's (способность)
произвести один элемент, который является все еще фундаментальным для
международной politics-effective военной (мощи).
Их основной аргумент - то, что национальная (мощь) разделена на три
связанных царства: природные ресурсы, национальная работа(выполнение), и
военные способности. Первое царство охватывает уровень
ресурсов(средств), или доступных для, или произведенный, страны. Второе
царство, национальная работа(выполнение), получено из внешних давлений,
стоящих перед страной и эффективностью ее управляющих учреждений и ее
общества в целом. Третье царство, военные способности, понято в терминах
эксплуатационного мастерства или эффективности. Военная способность
произведена и в результате стратегических ресурсов(средств), доступных
для военной организации и в результате ее способности преобразовать те
ресурсы(средства) в эффективную, принудительную (мощь). Эти три
царства, взятые вместе описывают национальную (мощь).
Подход Теллиса - все еще одна из материальных способностей, хотя это
добирается до того, что можно было бы назвать (мощью)-in-being. Это - о
(мощи) годной к употреблению, но не вовлекает результаты (мощи). Вместо
того, чтобы расценивать государства как, простой "containers
способности, " этот подход рассматривает идеи, организацию, и политику.
Его окончательная цель состоит в том, чтобы понять процесс, которым
национальные ресурсы преобразованы в вооруженные силы(военных)
capabilities-especially те, которые улучшат боевое мастерство.
Фактически, Теллис ' подход может быть применен к любой стране, и его
команда опытным путем применила анализ к Китаю. Но так как данные могут
легко сокрушить осуществление, это обязательно на макро-уровне
сосредоточиться на трех или четырех самых критических факторах. Поэтому,
взаимодействие ресурсов(средств) (мощи), поддающихся трансформации
способностей, и результатов доминировало над обсуждением.
Хотя многие из проблем, исследуемых Теллисом и его коллегами являются
критическими, есть все еще потребность думать о расширении возможностей
индикаторов. Вообще, четыре дополнительных области важны для
преобразования (мощи). Первая область охватывает экономические проблемы,
включая доступ к капиталу(столице). Исследователи вообще
сосредотачивались на внутренних экономических ресурсах(средствах) и
способностях. Изменения в мировой экономике, однако, создали стимул,
чтобы найти новые индикаторы, которые измеряют способность государств
использовать глобальные ресурсы(средства) для внутренних действий.
Например, станет все более и более важно определить воздействие
привлекающих третьих лиц для выполнения работ внутренних рабочих мест к
компаниям в зарубежных странах. Вторая область вовлекает учреждения и
политические структуры, определенные для данного государства. Важные
индикаторы включают уровень коррупции и размера того, что называют
"selectorate "- другими словами, размер группы, которой лидер является
фактически ответственным. Этот индикатор имеет значение особенно, потому
что это затрагивает способность государств (разместить) и распределять
ресурсы(средства). Одна треть, и связанный, область включает ценности,
трастовый, социальный капитал, и другие аспекты гражданского общества.
Таким образом, как люди сотрудничают и взаимодействуют в политических и
экономических отношениях? Заключительная область - социальная структура,
мера, которая включает социальную стратификацию и этнический и
разделения класса.
Стратегические Ресурсы(Средства)
Какие переменные помогут нам идентифицировать великие державы в
международной системе в 2020? Важные переменные включают население,
человеческий капитал(столицу), экономическую (мощь), технологическое
мастерство, и военные способности. Однако, (отдельная) самая важная
форма (мощи) в 2020 продолжит быть военной (мощью). Хотя военная
(мощь) лучше всего обозначена бюджетами защиты, другие (измерения) могли
бы включить определенные военные расходы, типа (земли), воздуха, и
военно-морских расходов(проведения) силы. В то время как эти индикаторы
являются легко измеримыми, однако, они не всегда коррелируют хорошо с
военной эффективностью. Фактически, история демонстрирует, что меньшие
армии победили больших противников из-за лучшего обучения, доктрины, и
стратегии.
Сегодня, экономическая (мощь) - окончательный (основа) военной (мощи),
и лучший индикатор экономической власти(мощи) - валовой внутренний
продукт. Как бюджеты защиты, однако, валовой внутренний продукт
обеспечивает только ограниченную картину (мощи). Это говорит немного о
составе экономики, типа того, возглавлено ли это ведущими секторами, или
во власти старых и уменьшающихся(снижающихся). Поэтому, часто одинаково
важно рассмотреть переменные, типа человеческого капитала и технологии.
Лучший "грубый " мера человеческого капитала - средний год
образовательного достижения. В измерении технологии, лучший индикатор -
на душу расходы на научные исследования.
В конечном счете, однако, ни один из этих индикаторов не обеспечивает
полную картину (мощи) в 2020. Артикулирование идеального индикатора
трудно и, возможно, невозможно. Но это, вероятно, будет иметь некоторое
отношение к "quality ": способность государств, чтобы преобразовать эти
компоненты в продукции и использовать их. Что действительно решает, что
(мощь) в конце - state's способность, через единство и цель,
мобилизовать и преследовать национальные амбиции.
Инструменты Власти(Мощи)
Почему мы оцениваем и предсказываем уровни (мощи)? Оценка (мощи)
является критической к пониманию будущих угроз национальной безопасности
и развития полезных инструментов, чтобы обратиться к ним. Это
утверждается, например, что будущие угрозы Соединенным Штатам будут
вызваны комбинацией экономических, военных, экологических, и другими
переменными. Сокращенный список этих угроз включает терроризм,
загрязнение, межнациональное организованное преступление,
демографические изменения и даже новые угрозы здоровья, типа Серьезного
Острого Дыхательного Синдрома.
Поэтому, меню "old " и "new " инструменты (мощи) будет необходимо, чтобы
сражаться с этими угрозами. Фактически, несколько "old " инструменты
(мощи) нуждаются к замене- из них один, который является вооруженными
силами(военными). В прошлом вооруженные силы(военные) сосредоточились на
обычной и ядерной войне. В будущем, это будет должно сосредоточиться на
том, чтобы противостоять асимметричным силам. Экономические инструменты
находятся (одновременно) в потребности изменения; (более умные)
правительственные инструменты не душили бы рынки и новшество, но
обеспечат социальную защиту к поселениям.
Более интересный, возможно, значения для дипломатии как традиционный
инструмент (мощи). Дипломатия в Соединенных Штатах традиционно была о
продаже американского образа жизни к иностранным правительствам и
поселениям. Лучший подход мог бы состоять в том, чтобы продвинуть
местные группы, учреждения, и политику(полисы), которая является
совместимой с американскими целями. Например, американское правительство
могло бы начать(ввести) политику обеспечения помощи группам за границей,
что идеалы поддержки и политика(полисы), совместимая с американскими
интересами, даже когда эти группы явно не поддерживают, и возможно даже
выступать против, Соединенные Штаты.
Эта стратегия может помочь узаконивать Соединенные Штаты за границей и
помогать этому лучше достигать изменения политики через дипломатию и
совместные(кооперативные) усилия. Кроме того, это могло бы быть
выгодно(полезно) для Соединенных Штатов, чтобы принять политику
"strategic сдержанности. " Тренирующаяся сдержанность в Соединенных
Штатах ' использование твердой (мощи) за границей уменьшит
уравновешивание и увеличит региональное сотрудничество.
Улучшение Нашей Способности Предсказывать (Мощь)
Несколько переменных и индикаторов обеспечивают информацию о текущем
состоянии распределения (мощи), особенно более мягкие формы. Такие
переменные-которые включают культурную привлекательность, политические
результаты и управления, поколение знания и использование, и управление
эффективностью- могут быть включенными в предсказание распределений
(мощи).
Первая из этих переменных, культурной привлекательности, включает
"consumption " (потребление) американской культуры, распространенность
английского языка, распространение учреждений американского стиля, и
очарования американских университетов. Было бы интересно провести опрос
общественного мнения, который задавал вопросы ответчиков, типа: Если бы
Вы могли бы жить где-нибудь в мире, кроме вашей собственной страны, где
Вы жили бы и почему? Ваш выбор был бы больше всего под влиянием
экономических, политических, или культурных факторов? Одинаково
интересный был бы индикатор поколения знания и использования. Это
включает разнообразие научно-исследовательских расходов (общие суммы,
уровни фундаментальных исследований, военные уровни исследования),
степень образования на уровне колледжа и вне, качество образования, и
инфраструктуры знания, типа компьютеров, телефонов, и распространенности
сетевых пользователей. Третья переменная - набор политических
результатов, типа голосов ООН и Мировых Торговых
управлений(постановлений) спора Организации, которые определяют, который
заявляет победу и который проигрывает, в то время как дополнительные
индикаторы могут включить влияние негосударственных актеров,
эффективности управления, и мер глобализации.
Могло бы быть полезно основываться на этих переменных и индикаторах
несколькими способами. Сначала, они могли быть включены в набор
факторов, от которых вычислены совокупные индексы власти(мощи).
Фактически, система гибкой надбавки, которая уже существует, должна
сделать это объединение легким. Кроме того, могло бы быть полезно
создать индекс неограниченной власти в отличие от текущего индекса
относительной (мощи). Хотя государства характеризованы их процентом от
системы, много государств и негосударственных актеров увеличили их
неограниченную способами, которые затрагивают полное поведение
системы. Например, когда негосударственные актеры, типа террористических
групп достигают существенной неограниченной власти, включая способность
причинить вред, тот факт может быть более важным чем их относительная
(мощь), которая, вероятно, будет скромна. С другой стороны,
относительная (мощь) Соединенных Штатов, в то время как огромно в
абсолютных терминах, имеетпределы - которые стали видимыми в Ираке.
Индикаторы или пороги для неограниченной власти были бы полезными.
Во вторых, может быть полезно упростить и улучшать пользовательский
интерфейс для того, чтобы обратиться к (мощи). Это могло бы быть
полезно, например, добавлять, что основная способность сообщения
сосредоточилась на индексах (мощи) и составляющих элементов этого. Это
могло бы также стоить полагать, что специализированная форма упрощает
управление строительства(сооружения) индекса и надбавки.
Прогнозы, однако, только будут столь же хороши как основная модель. Есть
по крайней мере три области, где (основы) любой модели (мощи) могут быть
увеличены. Сначала, было бы полезно повернуть внимание к функции
производства в экономической модели. Качество прогнозов экономического
роста фундаментально для большинства того, что делает модель. Было бы
полезно лучше представить ту функцию производства в пути, который строит
более экстенсивно на текущих теориях эндогенного роста. Другое
критическое изменение) вовлекает развитие подмодели образования.
Возвращения к образованию, и в терминах качества и распространенности,
могут иметь важные значения для моделей будущих структур власти.
В-третьих, область, которая нуждается в существенной работе, -
представление долга и его воздействия на страны. Существенные изменения
(мощи) могли произойти(встретиться) в международной системе в результате
изменений обменного курса и финансовых кризисов.
Кроме того, было бы (полезно) развить множество сценариев о будущем
мощи), вместо того, чтобы положиться только на основной случай. Самый
интуитивный набор сценариев основывался бы на различных(других)
предположениях о нормах(разрядах) экономического роста. Например,
Корпорация РЭНДА применила технику, названную(вызванную) "fault линии "
к Китаю. Анализ спросил, какие главные "fault линии, " или бедственные
ситуации, могли бы серьезно затронуть способность China's выдержать
быстрый экономический рост. Это идентифицировало такие факторы как
безработица, бедность, социальное волнение, коррупция, эпидемические
болезни, так же как водные ресурсы и загрязнение. Это тогда спросило,
как эти бедственные ситуации могли бы произойти, и тем, насколько они
затронут рост China's.
Ключи- внешнего воздействия (exogenous), к потрясению системы- , тоже
важно рассмотреть. Будущие удары могли бы включить удары системы
энергии, финансовые удары, крах ключевых режимов, или смертельных
террористических нападений. Одним путем РЭНД смотрел на удары -
"breaking " continuities-searching для факторов, где предсказания
непрерывности кажутся сомнительными, даже если предсказывая точно, как,
уже не говоря о то, когда, та непрерывность могла бы сломаться,
неуловимо. Ломка особенно вероятна, когда две меры непрерывности -
неудобные партнеры. Например, несколько лет назад, воздействуйте на
включенные удары exogenous модели азиатского Фьючерса в Корее и Китае. В
Корее, поддержана (в большой степени) вооруженная конфронтация, как раз
когда Северная Корея (снижается) (в экономическом отношении), но не
разрушается. Точно так же в конфликте Китая-тайваня, величина отклонения
идет вверх и вниз в температуре, в то время как Китай не принимает
фактическую тайваньскую автономию, и Тайвань не объявляет де-юре
независимость.
В сумме, есть множество шагов, которые должны быть предприняты, если мы
должны лучше понять (мощь) и предсказать международные распределения
(мощи). Они включают усиливающиеся индексы родственника и неограниченной
власти, увеличивая (основы) модели власти(мощи), и развивая будущие
сценарии. Если (предпринято), эти шаги могут предоставить тактикам более
полезный набор переменных, чтобы измерить (мощь), и в конечном счете
улучшить их способность понять будущую окружающую среду безопасности.
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1339/
Measuring Power
How to Predict Future Balances
by Gregory Treverton, Seth G. Jones
From Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer 2005
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Gregory Treverton is Director of the RAND Corporation's Intelligence
Policy Center and Associate Dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School.
Seth G. Jones is a political scientist at RAND and adjunct professor at
Georgetown University.
Power is an elusive concept. As the political scientist Hans Morgenthau
wrote, "The concept of political power poses one of the most difficult
and controversial problems of political science." Understanding the
nature of power has long been central to the study of international
relations and to the work of the US Intelligence Community. The task is
now all the more important and elusive, because the United States enjoys
an unprecedented amount of economic, military, and technological might
in comparison to other states. Yet it must exercise its power in a world
not only of state-related constraints on that power, but also of
transnational forces and non-state actors that act as competitors,
qualifiers, constrainers, and, sometimes, enhancers of that power.
At the dawn of the 21st century, the concept of power is more important,
and more debated. How to measure the power of the United States is
fundamental to the major debates over US foreign policy. If, as the
globe's "unipolar power," the United States has power beyond precedent,
then its foreign policy problem is simplified, for friends and allies
will have to follow it whether they like it or not, and would-be
adversaries will be cowed by the prospect of that power.
If, on the other hand, de facto US power is less than sometimes assumed
or less usable than hoped, then the United States may face the prospect
that erstwhile allies and friends will, almost as a law of physics, want
to see it taken down a peg. They will, if not "balance" against it, then
at least sit on the fence in circumstances like Iraq. They will be
inclined to view the United States' travails with a certain
Schadenfreude-happy to see the dominant power reduced to more normal
size, though prepared to stand with the United States if it were
seriously in trouble.
Ascertaining State Power
Measurements of power matter significantly in today's US policy debates.
If the United States is really the unipolar state, one that is
preponderant almost beyond historical analogy, then its policy problem
is simplified. Other states will have little choice but to follow it.
They will be like Canada in the famous saying attributed to former Prime
Minister Lester Pearson: "The United States is our best friend, whether
we like it or not." On the other hand, if the United States is less
dominant, then a national security strategy based on preponderance-on
the assumption that all the major powers will be on the United States'
side-may not hold true. What if other states begin to form themselves
not with the United States but against it, or at least hedge their bets?
State power can be conceived at three levels: the level of resources or
capabilities, also known as power-in-being, the level of power
conversion through national processes, and the level of power in
outcomes, by which we refer to a state's tendency to prevail in
particular circumstances. The starting point for thinking about-and
developing metrics for-national power is to view states as "capability
containers." Yet those capabilities-demographic, economic,
technological, and others-become manifest only through a process of
conversion. States need to convert material resources, or economic
prowess, into more usable instruments such as combat proficiency. In the
end, however, what policy-makers care most about is not power as
capability, or even power converted from national ethos, politics, and
social cohesion. They care about power in outcomes. That third level of
power is by far the most elusive, for it is contingent and relative. It
depends on how the power manifests itself, and against whom the power is
exercised.
The main categories used to identify the first level of state power, the
level of capability, are gross domestic product (GDP), population,
defense spending, and a less precise factor capturing innovation in
technology. Using these estimates, power is summed as a percent of total
global power, and fourteen states hold at least a one percent share. The
United States is at the top of the power structure, though it is hardly
an isolated and unilateral power. While the United States currently
holds nearly a fifth of total global power, it is closely followed by
the European Union, considered as a unified actor, and China, which each
hold about 14 percent. India, moreover, holds about 9 percent, while
Brazil, South Korea, and Russia each hold about 2 percent.
These numbers, though only estimates, suggest possible alliances that
could match the power of the United States acting alone or with its
traditional allies. Such a power assessment also examines the most
likely locations for future conflict, based on six criteria. Projections
indicate that Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of the
eight most conflict-prone bilateral balances involving China. The
assessment also indicates that by 2015, the level of US power will be
closely threatened by China and India, while the European Union and all
non-US members of the Group of Eight will experience a slow decline in
power.
Converting Resources into Power
Carnegie scholar Ashley Tellis and his colleagues at RAND have recently
offered a re-examination of the concept of "national power." They began
by assuming that a meticulous detailing of visible military assets is
required to understand the true basis of national power. It also
requires a scrutiny of such variables as the aptitude for innovation,
the nature of social institutions, and the quality of the knowledge
base. For Tellis and his colleagues, all of these factors influence a
country's capacity to produce the one element that is still fundamental
to international politics-effective military power.
Their core argument is that national power is divided into three linked
realms: natural resources, national performance, and military
capabilities. The first realm encompasses the level of resources either
available to, or produced by, a country. The second realm, national
performance, is derived from the external pressures facing a country and
the efficiency of its governing institutions and its society at large.
The third realm, military capabilities, is understood in terms of
operational proficiency or effectiveness. Military capability is
produced as a result of both the strategic resources available to a
military organization and its ability to convert those resources into
effective, coercive power. These three realms taken together describe
national power.
The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities, though it
gets to what might be called power-in-being. It is about usable power,
but does not involve power outcomes. Rather than regard states as simple
"containers of capability," this approach considers ideas, organization,
and politics. Its ultimate objective is to understand the process by
which national resources are converted into military
capabilities-especially those that will improve combat proficiency. In
fact, Tellis' approach can be applied to any country, and his team has
empirically applied the analysis to China. But since data can easily
overwhelm the exercise, it is imperative at a macro level to focus on
the three or four most critical factors. Therefore, the interplay of
power resources, transformative capabilities, and outcomes have
dominated the discussion.
Though many of the issues explored by Tellis and his colleagues are
critical, there is still a need to think about broadening the scope of
indicators. In general, four additional areas are important for power
conversion. The first area encompasses economic issues, including access
to capital. Researchers have generally focused on domestic economic
resources and capabilities. Changes in the global economy, however, have
created an impetus to find new indicators that measure the ability of
states to utilize global resources for domestic activities. For example,
it will become increasingly important to determine the impact of
outsourcing domestic jobs to companies in foreign countries. A second
area involves the institutions and political structures specific to a
given state. Important indicators include the level of corruption and
the size of what is called the "selectorate"-in other words, the size of
the group to which a leader is actually accountable. This indicator
matters especially because it affects the ability of states to allocate
and distribute resources. A third, and related, area incorporates
values, trust, social capital, and other aspects of civil society. That
is, how do people cooperate and interact in political and economic
relationships? The final area is social structure, a measure that
includes societal stratification and ethnic and class divisions.
Strategic Resources
What variables will help us to identify the great powers in the
international system in 2020? Important variables include population,
human capital, economic power, technological prowess, and military
capabilities. However, the single most important form of power in 2020
will continue to be military power. Though military power is best
indicated by defense budgets, other measurements might include specific
military expenditures such as ground, air, and naval force spending.
While these indicators are easily quantifiable, however, they do not
always correlate well with military effectiveness. In fact, history
demonstrates that smaller armies have defeated larger opponents because
of better training, doctrine, and strategy.
Today, economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power, and
the best indicator of economic power is GDP. Like defense budgets,
however, GDP provides only a limited picture of power. It says little
about the composition of the economy, such as whether it is spearheaded
by leading sectors, or dominated by old and declining ones. Therefore,
it is often equally important to consider variables such as human
capital and technology. The best "off the shelf" measure of human
capital is the average year of educational attainment. When measuring
technology, the best indicator is per capita expenditure on research and
development.
Ultimately, however, none of these indicators provides a complete
picture of power in 2020. Articulating an ideal indicator is difficult
and, perhaps, impossible. But it is likely to have something to do with
"quality": the ability of states to convert these components into
outputs and make use of them. What truly determines power in the end is
a state's ability, through unity and purpose, to mobilize and pursue
national ambitions.
Instruments of Power
Why do we evaluate and forecast levels of power? Power assessment is
crucial to understanding future national security threats and developing
useful instruments to address them. It is argued, for example, that
future threats to the United States will be caused by a combination of
economic, military, environmental, and other variables. An abbreviated
list of these threats includes terrorism, pollution, transnational
organized crime, demographic changes, and even new health threats such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.
Therefore, a menu of "old" and "new" power instruments will be needed to
combat these threats. In fact, several "old" power instruments need to
change-one of which is the military. In the past, the military focused
on conventional and nuclear warfare. In the future, it will need to
focus on countering asymmetric forces. Economic instruments are equally
in need of change; smarter government instruments would not stifle
markets and innovation, but would provide social protection to
populations.
More interesting, perhaps, are the implications for diplomacy as a
traditional instrument of power. Diplomacy in the United States has
traditionally been about selling the American way of life to foreign
governments and populations. A better approach might be to promote local
groups, institutions, and policies that are compatible with US goals.
For example, the US government might initiate a policy of providing
assistance to groups abroad that support ideals and policies compatible
with US interests, even when these groups do not explicitly support, and
perhaps even oppose, the United States.
This strategy may help to legitimize the United States abroad and help
it better achieve policy change through diplomacy and cooperative
efforts. Moreover, it might be beneficial for the United States to adopt
a policy of "strategic restraint." Exercising restraint in the United
States' use of hard power abroad will decrease counterbalancing and
increase regional cooperation.
It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in several
ways. First, they could be incorporated into the set of factors from
which aggregate power indices are computed. In fact, the system of
flexible weighting that already exists should make this incorporation
easy. In addition, it might be useful to create an absolute power index
in contrast to the current index of relative power. Although states are
characterized by their percentage of system power, many states and
non-state actors have been increasing their absolute power in ways that
affect overall system behavior. For instance, when non-state actors such
as terrorist groups achieve significant absolute power, including the
ability to do harm, that fact may be more important than their relative
power, which is likely to be modest. On the other hand, the relative
power of the United States, while enormous in absolute terms, has
limits-limits that have become visible in Iraq. Indicators or thresholds
for absolute power would be helpful.
Second, it may be useful to simplify and improve the user interface for
addressing power. It might be helpful, for instance, to add a basic
report capability focused on the indices of power and the component
elements of it. It might also be worth considering a specialized form to
simplify the controlling of weighting and index construction.
Forecasts, however, will only be as good as the underlying model. There
are at least three areas where the foundations of any power model can be
enhanced. First, it would be useful to turn attention to the production
function in the economic model. The quality of economic growth forecasts
is fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be helpful to
better represent that production function in a way that builds more
extensively on current theories of endogenous growth. Another critical
change involves the development of the education sub-model. Returns to
education, both in terms of quality and prevalence, may have important
implications for models of future power structures. Third, an area that
needs significant work is the representation of debt and its impact on
countries. Significant power shifts could occur in the international
system as a result of exchange rate changes and financial crises.
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to develop a number of scenarios
about the future of power, rather than relying only on the base case.
The most intuitive set of scenarios would build on different assumptions
of economic growth rates. For example, the RAND Corporation has applied
a technique called "fault lines" to China. The analysis asked what major
"fault lines," or adversities, might seriously affect China's ability to
sustain rapid economic growth. It identified such factors as
unemployment, poverty, social unrest, corruption, epidemic diseases, as
well as water resources and pollution. It then asked how these
adversities might occur, and by how much they would affect China's
growth.
Wild cards-exogenous shocks to the system-are also important to
consider. Future shocks might include energy system shocks, financial
shocks, collapses of key regimes, or lethal terrorist attacks. One way
RAND has looked at shocks is "breaking" continuities-searching for
factors where predictions of continuity seem dubious, even if predicting
exactly how, let alone when, that continuity might break is elusive.
Breaking is especially likely when two measures of continuity are uneasy
partners. For example, several years ago, work on the Asian Futures
model included exogenous shocks in Korea and China. In Korea, the
heavily armed confrontation is sustained even as North Korea declines
economically but does not collapse. Similarly, in the China-Taiwan
conflict, the stand-off goes up and down in temperature while China does
not accept de facto Taiwanese autonomy, and Taiwan does not declare de
jure independence.
In sum, there are a number of steps that must be taken if we are to
better understand power and forecast international distributions of
power. These include strengthening indices of relative and absolute
power, enhancing the foundations of the power model, and developing
future scenarios. If taken, these steps can provide policy makers with a
more useful set of variables to measure power, and ultimately improve
their ability to understand the future security environment.
Improving Our Ability to Forecast Power
Several variables and indicators provide information about the current
state of power distribution, especially the softer forms. Such
variables-which include cultural attractiveness, political outcomes and
rulings, knowledge generation and use, and governance
effectiveness-might be incorporated in predicting distributions of
power.
The first of these variables, cultural attractiveness, includes the
"consumption" of US culture, the prevalence of English, the spread of
US-style institutions, and the allure of US universities. It would be
interesting to conduct an opinion poll that asked respondents questions
such as: If you could live anywhere in the world, other than your own
country, where would you live and why? Would your choice be most
influenced by economic, political, or cultural factors? Equally
interesting would be an indicator of knowledge generation and use. This
includes a variety of research and development expenditures (total
amounts, basic research levels, military research levels), the extent of
education at the college level and beyond, the quality of education, and
knowledge infrastructure, such as computers, telephones, and the
prevalence of networked users. A third variable is the set of political
outcomes, such as UN votes and World Trade Organization dispute rulings,
that determine which states win and which lose, while additional
indicators may include the influence of non-state actors, governance
effectiveness, and measures of globalization.
The Politics of Power
New Forces and New Challenges
From Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer 2005
Richard N. Haass is the President of the Council on Foreign Relations.
He is also author of The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History'
s Course.
What are the primary forces that characterize power in today's world?
What you are asking boils down to distinctions between different kinds
of power. Power comes in a number of packages. You have military power,
economic power, diplomatic power, some would even say cultural power.
What all these types of power have in common, however, is that power is
not to be confused with influence. Power is another word for potential;
power is a capacity. What foreign policy is about-what national security
policy is about-is translating capacity, potential, and power into
influence or accomplishments. Power is simply what you begin with. The
question for the people who have it, wield it, or who influence those
who wield it, is what do you do with that power.
How is power distributed among states, and how is that distribution best
measured?
It is a complicated question. Take the United States, for example.
Obviously the United States has the greatest concentration of military
power by an order of magnitude. The United States has tremendous
economic power given the size of its roughly US$11 trillion economy. The
United States also has enormous diplomatic power. These types of power
are all dependent on one another: military power and political power are
in part reflections of an economic foundation, and economic power is, in
part, a reflection of the global stability that allows normal economic
activity to take place. So various forms of power are to some extent
interdependent.
In addition, what matters in international relations is not simply how
much power you have, but how much power others have and what they do
with it. Power as an end in itself is not very interesting. What really
matters is one's ability to translate power into influence. So the fact
that the United States may have far more military power than another
country on paper is less relevant than the question of what amount of
military power the United States is able and willing to bring to bear in
a given situation, in contrast with the amount of relevant military
power someone else is willing to bring to bear. It is extremely
difficult to go from static measures, which do not reveal a great deal,
to something that is more meaningful.
How have the forces of globalization shifted power, not only among
states, but also among international organizations and non-state actors?
As your question suggests, one of the shifts has been away from states.
States never quite had a monopoly on power. Even hundreds of years ago
there were other actors, such as the Catholic Church and the Dutch East
India Company. But it is fair to say that states now share more power
with non-state actors than at any other time in history. A non-state
actor can range from something that is quite small-it could be an
individual on the Internet-to something quite large, such as the United
Nations. It can be a multinational corporation. It can be a group like
Greenpeace or Doctors Without Borders. It can be Al Qaeda or even
Hezbollah. In other words, non-state actors can be benign or they can be
anything but benign.
Power in its various forms is not, then, simply the province of
nation-states. This is enhanced by globalization-by globalization I mean
the flow of things across borders with tremendous velocity and in
tremendous volume, whether ideas or people or drugs or arms or fissile
material or greenhouse gases or money. What makes it so interesting is
that in many cases these flows take place at such speed and in such
volume that governments cannot control them. In some cases, governments
do not even know about them. So there has been something of a shift away
from states toward these other organizations. All that said, there is
also a danger in allowing the analysis to go too far. States still
remain the principal actors in the international system. More than any
other set of actors, nation-states can shape the international system,
and more than any other state, the United States can have an impact. I
would describe states as first among equals, or more literally, first
among unequals. One has to recognize that primacy. At the same time,
states are not alone in this world.
Is the trend toward a decrease in sovereignty destined to be long-lived
or merely ephemeral?
There have been challenges, certainly, to the primacy of the state or to
the dominance of the state, and some of these challenges come from what
you might describe as "below." By that I mean smaller entities, such as
corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), whether they be
benign or malignant. States are also challenged by larger entities, such
as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), or various
regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union. It
is thus fair to say that the sovereign state is being challenged from
below and also from above.
What is interesting is that some of these challenges are structural and
some are voluntary. For example, in the area of trade, nation-states are
willingly ceding some of their sovereignty to the WTO because it serves
their interests to have trade regulated by such an organization. We must
then distinguish between those areas in which governments voluntarily
give up certain sovereign rights-as in trade and, potentially, the
environment and global climate change-and those areas in which the state
finds itself challenged simply as a fact of life. I think we are talking
about very different phenomena going on in the world.
You spoke of globalization as forcing challenges to state primacy,
almost as if states have had these challenges thrust upon them. But is
globalization not a system that states themselves, particularly the
United States, have desired and created?
In some areas, the shift of power is a voluntary one. Trade is a perfect
example of governments shifting certain authority to an organization
such as the WTO. In my view, the shift has occurred because the US
government has correctly decided that it benefits from a world trading
system that requires the existence of an organization such as the WTO
with its dispute-resolution mechanism. Elsewhere, however, the shift
toward globalization simply happened. In many economic areas, one simply
has, for example, the emergence of independent or increasingly
independent multinational corporations, or one has pools of investment
that flow.
So there are somewhat autonomous actors with which states have to
interact, but the states still have a lot of power. This is not all or
nothing. States can still do much to regulate the activities of
autonomous organizations. States can also decide not to just regulate
but to outlaw these organizations, which is the case with respect to the
drug trade, the slave trade, and terrorism. The bottom line is that
states have considerable capacity to push back. International relations,
if you will, becomes two-pronged: not just state-to-state, but between
states on the one hand and sub-national and supra-national actors on the
other.
We talked about the preeminence of US power. What are the greatest
threats, international or domestic, to US power at this point?
In the short term, the greatest threat would probably be a massive
terrorist attack, possibly involving a weapon of mass destruction. That
has to be the principal security threat facing the United States today,
but I could list many others, including an assassination in a critical
country such as Afghanistan or Pakistan where no obvious alternative
leadership is in place. I could imagine an economic crisis, triggered
either by an economic event or a non-economic event, with the same
result-a massive flight from the dollar with all its economic but also
strategic consequences. I can imagine a crisis in the Taiwan Strait that
could confront the United States with some extraordinarily difficult
decisions about how to act.
What is interesting, however, is the low likelihood of war between the
United States and another major power in the near future. With the
exception of a Taiwan crisis, it is inconceivable to me to envision a
conflict between the United States and any of the other major powers of
the day, essentially China, India, Russia, Europe, or Japan. This is
worth noting; it constitutes a remarkable break in the historical
pattern of the previous few centuries, when great power conflict was not
just the norm, but the dominant paradigm for the world.
In terms of long-term risks, one has to consider what North Korea, Iran,
and others might do with weapons of mass destruction and their nuclear
programs. As decades pass, the United States will face the challenge of
how to deal with a rising China and a declining Russia. Both challenges,
while different, could be extremely difficult for the United States,
because one thing we do not want to see is a reversion to an
international system in which great power competition again becomes the
dominant characteristic.
What would happen were the United States to lose much of its predominant
power?
The United States could lose its predominance in essentially one of two
ways, yielding very different worlds. One would result from the loss of
US predominance to China. The United States would not be replaced by
China-that is far-fetched-but rather would lose its position of primacy.
This could come from a combination of a gradual weakening of the United
States and a gradual strengthening of China. The world would be no
longer unipolar, but bipolar or multipolar. Thus one alternative world
would be one in which the balance of power would re-emerge, replacing
today's imbalance of power. You would have a much more competitive
relationship between the United States and China, perhaps the emergence
of a new Cold War. That to me is one way in which history could evolve
over the next several decades, although it is not a terribly attractive
way, to say the least.
A very different alternative to a unipolar world would be an apolar
world in which the current situation is replaced not by the emergence of
one or more powers with whom the United States has to share world
leadership, but by the ending of US primacy. The danger is that without
US primacy and without any sort of a balance that would take its place,
the world would degenerate in many ways, and it may even take on
elements of a modern dark ages. That would be a world in which, for
example, terrorist organizations had tremendous sway, in which failed
states could be counted in the dozens, in which disease-HIV/AIDS and
others--ravaged societies and populations, and in which local conflict
became endemic. That to me would be an even worse alternative.
So I would suggest that the goal of US foreign policy should be to avoid
either of these alternatives, either the emergence of a multipolar, new
Cold War kind of world or the emergence of a world without poles, in
which order breaks down.
What would be the role of the United Nations in the apolar world?
The role of the United Nations in any world is what the major powers
want the role of the United Nations to be. The United Nations is not an
independent sovereign entity. When the major powers agree, the United
Nations can act, and when the major powers cannot agree, the United
Nations essentially has to be a bystander to history, and that is the
whole concept of the Security Council. So, almost by definition, if you
are talking about a world in which order is breaking down in the
political-military sense, in the areas of health, or in the areas of
trade, where protectionism becomes the rule, by definition this is a
world in which international institutions, including but not limited to
the United Nations, play hardly any role.
You said that the goal of US foreign policy, very broadly, should be to
avoid the emergence of a multipolar world or an apolar world. That would
suggest that US foreign policy should really be about maintaining or
increasing US power. What are your broad strategic recommendations for
sustaining and furthering US power?
I would favor the United States maintaining its position of primacy-not
as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. The purpose of our
foreign policy cannot simply be to perpetuate US predominance, because
if that is all our foreign policy is, inevitably we will end up in that
second world I talked about where competitors will rise.
The purpose of US foreign policy should be to enlist others, in
particular the major powers, in helping the United States meet the
defining challenges and problems of this era. Those defining challenges
are essentially manifestations of globalization-things like terrorism,
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protectionism, genocide,
state failure, and so forth. In all of these situations, the United
States needs partners. It needs their active cooperation.
So I would suggest that the purpose of US foreign policy should be to
integrate others into promoting international cooperation to meet these
challenges head-on, none of which the United States can successfully
cope with by itself. Either we lack the resources, or in some cases the
nature of the problem is such that no country, no matter how great its
resources, can successfully deal with it alone. Again, this is where
globalization comes in. It is in that nature of global problems that
they cannot be solved by individual countries.
So again you are saying it is influence, not power, that the United
States wants to wield?
That is part of it, because the United States needs to bring its power
to bear. But I take your point, that it also needs to translate our
power into influence so that others bring their power to bear, and that
is the only way the United States will be successful. In order to do so,
I would suggest that there are two prerequisites. One is that the United
States needs to stay strong, both so that it has something to bring to
the table and also to discourage others from challenging it. But second,
it has to be persuasive, which means the United States has to support
goals that others will not see as simply in US self-interest, but also
in theirs. So the purpose of successful diplomacy should be to create
large degrees of overlap between what is the US national interest and
what others come to see as their national interest.
How do rogue states like North Korea and Iran, which are great powers
neither economically nor militarily, but have nonetheless garnered
substantial political leverage, come to wield power?
There are many ways to have power. It does not take tremendous military
might or economic wealth to wield power. Terrorist operations, for
example, are quite cheap. What Al Qaeda did on September 11, 2001 was to
some extent one of the most cost-effective military operations-indeed it
may well have been the most cost-effective military operation-in the
history of the world. It was cost-effective not only in terms of what it
cost them and in terms of the destructive consequences, but also in
terms of the national response that the terrorist attacks stimulated.
Other countries or other groups do not need to match the United States
tank for tank, plane for plane, or dollar for dollar in order to have
substantial power, especially if a country got ahold of a weapon of mass
destruction. North Korea has power through counterfeiting and through
drugs. Iran has power through their support for terrorism and because of
its energy resources, which has been augmented by an extremely tight
energy market and gives it a good degree of international leverage. So
countries may have forms of negative power-the power to cause harm, or
the power to destroy. There are also countries with potential positive
power, and the goal of US foreign policy ought to be to get those
countries with positive power to partner with us, to contribute what
they can so we can take on those that have negative power.
While Europe has recently implied an interest in selling arms to China,
the United States has a close relationship with Taiwan, and Russia has
and may still sell arms to Iran. Each of these arms-sales flows is
somewhat contrary to the idea of an ideal world order envisioned by the
other powers. Is this indicative of some underlying conflict in the way
power is distributed among these states?
I think it is simply a reflection of the fact that we live in a world in
which there is not always 100 percent agreement or consensus on what
needs doing, and even when there is consensus on the goals, there is
profound disagreement on how to get from here to there. So countries,
for example, might agree that they do not want an Iran or North Korea to
acquire nuclear weapons or, if they do develop them, to use or transfer
them, but they could-indeed they do at times-have very different ideas
about what should be done in order to influence an Iran or a North
Korea.
For example, in the run-up to the Iraq War, there were very different
ideas about what needed to happen, or what strategies should be pursued.
You mentioned the case of the European technology transfer to China. The
Europeans are clearly motivated by a desire to expand their ability to
sell to the world's fastest growing market, and it is still unclear if
the United States and Europe can therefore agree on what guidelines
ought to govern this technology transfer.
It is also still unclear if there will be consensus among the United
States, Europe, and Russia about how to specifically put together a
package to shape Iranian behavior vis-a-vis its nuclear program. But we
live in a time where, as I said before, the chance of major power
conflict is remote.
It does not mean that the major powers are existing in some sort of a
19th century concert where they agree on everything. They are not.
Foreign policy takes place in this in-between situation, and the goal of
diplomacy is to move it more in the direction where we and the others
essentially come closer in our assessments of what needs doing, but we
are obviously not there yet.
So you believe these disagreements, at least at this stage, reflect more
superficial challenges?
It has profound consequences, but it does not mean that simply because
we disagree on technology transfer to China, the United States and
Europe are in an adversarial position. We are not. Sometimes the United
States and others are simply going to have to agree to disagree, and
when that happens, we try to limit the disagreement.
It normally makes sense to try to compartmentalize differences, so even
if the United States and Europe disagree about what technologies ought
to be transferred to China, that does not preclude their ability to
cooperate on what needs to be done about Iran or the Middle East or some
other problem. We have to accept the fact that there are going to be
inevitable areas of disagreement, and the challenge of diplomacy is to
limit the scale of the disagreement and then also to limit the
spillover.
Let us shift gears to Asia for a minute and discuss the balance of
power, or the way power exists right now in states in Asia. Over the
last 20 to 25 years, a lot of predictions about the future of power in
Asia have gone wrong. For example, we heard of Japan as a rising power,
which did not materialize. The tiger economies of the 1990s did not do
so well. Why do you think these predictions did not pan out?
All predictions do not work out exactly as planned because people tend
to extrapolate from the present into the future, and history is not
linear. That said, they were not all that wrong in the sense that Japan
has grown significantly. It is one of the world's major economies, and a
somewhat unappreciated development is how Japan has become one of the
most significant military powers in the region and the world. So even if
Japan has not become quite the superpower that some predicted, it still
has become a significant regional and international player economically
and militarily. This is despite its economic drift.
China is growing at a remarkable rate, plus its base has gotten bigger.
However, its gross domestic product per capita is only around US$3,000,
so it obviously has a long way to go. It is likely that it will get
there, although it is not guaranteed. There are a lot of things that
could derail China, from a Taiwan crisis to simple domestic instability
if its political system proves unable to deal with the dynamism of what
is happening economically.
I would say, taking a step back, what distinguishes Asia is this sense
of dynamism. That you do have a significant number of countries,
including China, Japan, India, Korea, and others that are growing to
varying degrees economically. I think the real question for Asia is how
it accommodates all this economic growth-to what extent countries try to
translate their economic power into military power, to what extent it
can develop institutions that will help it get through what could
otherwise be a difficult transitional period. The only other point I
would add to it is that all of this suggests to me the importance of the
United States remaining actively involved. If there is any chance Asia
is going to get through this transitional period in a stable, orderly
way, it is going to be because the United States remains very much
involved in Asia, and ultimately participates in local arrangements
meant to increase the degree of order in the area.
