От Ibuki
К Skvortsov
Дата 01.10.2021 22:31:43
Рубрики WWII; Танки;

не может авиция потопить современный быстроходный линкор (с) У. Черчиль

>Не было флота, способного охранять линии снабжения.
>Был флот, способный приплыть и утонуть под ударами палубной авиации. Или утонуть в гавани Сайгона как при нападении на Мерс-эль-Кебир.
Ну тогдашние адмиралы не считали авиацию достойной внимания даже одного мизинца своей ноги и смело посылали на убой "Принс оф Уэлс" и "Рипалс". Способности авиации, тем более дикарской авиации стали настоящим шоком. Многие линкорофилы и по сей день не могут прийти в себя и считают что это все была какая-то фальсификация.

Так что превосходство японцев в палубной авиации при стратегическом планировании флотов европейских держав предназначенных для серьезной войны с серьезным противником (с) не рассматривался как фактор.
От Skvortsov
К Ibuki (01.10.2021 22:31:43)
Дата 01.10.2021 23:08:08

THE VULNERABILITY OF CAPITAL SHIPS TO AIR ATTACK

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
THE VULNERABILITY OF CAPITAL SHIPS TO AIR ATTACK
Report by a Sub-Committee

July 30, 1.936

.........

59. We have given full consideration to the information already available as a result of the various experiments and it is plain to us that capital ships cannot be constructed so as to be indestructible by bombing from the air. This would probably be true even if factors of speed, armament and weight were disregarded in the design of the ship so that the thickness of the defensive armour could be indefinitely increased. If this fact, which we regard as being beyond the possibility of doubt, is kept in mind, it throws light on some of the more extravagant criticisms of the policy of building capital ships. The critics have written and spoken as if the issue was between those who deny and those who assert the vulnerability of capital ships to air attack. That is not the real question. In circumstances favourable to an attack from the air which could be driven home by a large and powerful force the most heavily armoured capital ship could no doubt be destroyed, or at least seriously crippled.

От марат
К Skvortsov (01.10.2021 23:08:08)
Дата 02.10.2021 19:26:48

Re: THE VULNERABILITY...

>COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
>THE VULNERABILITY OF CAPITAL SHIPS TO AIR ATTACK
>Report by a Sub-Committee

>July 30, 1.936

>.........

>59. We have given full consideration to the information already available as a result of the various experiments and it is plain to us that capital ships cannot be constructed so as to be indestructible by bombing from the air. This would probably be true even if factors of speed, armament and weight were disregarded in the design of the ship so that the thickness of the defensive armour could be indefinitely increased. If this fact, which we regard as being beyond the possibility of doubt, is kept in mind, it throws light on some of the more extravagant criticisms of the policy of building capital ships. The critics have written and spoken as if the issue was between those who deny and those who assert the vulnerability of capital ships to air attack. That is not the real question. In circumstances favourable to an attack from the air which could be driven home by a large and powerful force the most heavily armoured capital ship could no doubt be destroyed, or at least seriously crippled.
И при этом зачем-то пишите, что Адмиралтейство умоляет правительство Британии заказать два линкора, несмотря на то, что уже доказано(на бумаге) преимущество авианосцев. Странные у вас методы.
С уважением, Марат
От Ibuki
К марат (02.10.2021 19:26:48)
Дата 03.10.2021 17:34:37

Re: THE VULNERABILITY...

>И при этом зачем-то пишите, что Адмиралтейство умоляет правительство Британии заказать два линкора, несмотря на то, что уже доказано(на бумаге) преимущество авианосцев. Странные у вас методы.

>И при этом зачем-то пишите, что Адмиралтейство умоляет правительство Британии заказать два линкора, несмотря на то, что уже доказано(на бумаге) преимущество авианосцев. Странные у вас методы.
Не основательно доказано. Далее в том же источнике разносят самолетофилов в пух и прах:


Construction of certain auxiliary vessels for the Navy : hearing before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Seventy-fifth Congress, first session, on S. 2193 ... May 4, 1937.

ARTICLE BY ADMIRAL OF DIVISION O. DI GIAMBERARDINO , ITALIAN NAVY , PUB LISHED IN THE GIORNALE D'ITALIA OF MARCH 12 , 1937 CONCLUSIONS

The following are my final conclusions in regard to airplane versus battleship warfare : The great modern warships react against air attack by intense large - caliber machine - gun fire creating around them an impenetrable zone . In order to give the reader an idea of the mass of this fire we can affirm that a modern cruiser can fire up to 7,000 bullets a minute . This obliges the plane to fly at high altitude . Besides the automatic guns there are on board several antiaircraft guns each of which can fire from 15 to 20 rounds a minute . These guns can fire a dis tance of well over 3,000 meters . A ship's reaction against planes at high altitudes is very strong , but not to be compared with that against low - flying planes . The reaction is in direct relation to the probability of the ship being hit and while it is less strong at distances over 3,000 meters , the plane's capacity for making direct hits from a high altitude is relatively much less . The modern antiaircraft fire - control centers enable accurate firing even against planes which are constantly changing direction and height . The firing is less accurate if the plane is performing acrobatics but in that case it becomes impossible for the plane to drop bombs . To reduce straight flying to a period of 15 seconds , considered sufficient for the bombs to be accurately aimed , is not only not practicable but entirely fantastic .
Nowadays the plane flies straight to the attack , attempting to reach the point , which is difficult to establish , from where the bombs may be dropped directly on the target . It must determine the deviation caused by the wind as exactly as possible , correct its effect on the course , measure its own speed , determine that of the enemy and in fact , carry out operations which require pot 15 seconds but several minutes of perfectly level flying . Furthermore , if the plane should lose time in getting into a straight flight it might pass over the bombing point and have to repeat the attack . The plane cannot therefore subordinate its fighting function , that is the possibility of dropping the bombs as accurately as possible , to a defensive maneuver . If it were to do this and render its attack less accurate by a maneuvered flight , it would offer an indirect but decided advantage to the enemy antiaircraft defense . Straight flying is essential for massed attacks in closed formation , in ac cordance with the tactics now approved by the Air Force , and improved aim is thus favored by the size of the target . The fundamental element of judgment is the very slight possibility of the plane of hitting a small target such as a ship from medium and high altitudes which has been demonstrated both in peace and in war . We have only to consider the experience of the Spanish civil war , in which both sides have attempted to bombard from the air ships which , besides having little or no protection , had very inefficient antiaircraft defense . It would have appeared certain that they would quickly be destroyed ; but on the contrary , in spite of repeated and powerful attacks at sea and in port — that is , with moving and stationary targets - only one , the Jaime I , was hit , while at anchor , in its least protected part , but was able to continue its journey from Malaga to Cartagena , where it was repaired , and after 15 or 20 days was again at sea supporting the " Red " attack on Majorca . All newspaper reports of the sinking of ships by air bombardment are there fore false . These meager results must be attributed not to the poor capacity of the aviators but to the generic practical difficulties of bombardment . This can be well understood by sailors , as there exists a similar disaccord at sea between theory and practice in regard to the firing of torpedoes , especially against targets maneuvering at high speed . A multiple torpedo attack may be effected by several units well equipped for the solution of the cinematic problem , but the theoretical certainty of hitting any target is belied by facts . In firing from the air the errors , unknown and imponderable factors which come into play , are far more numerous . The present minimum percentage of effective hits from the air are not accepted by the navies as definite data , and therefore modern construction takes great account of the new offense , greatly increasing antiaircraft defense , giving spe . cial protection to hulls , and building a horizontal plating which can resist the largest bombs . We repeat that about 20 years ago a German ship withstood nineteen 381 - mm shots weighing 900 kilograms each , as well as others of smaller caliber and one torpedo , and that now it is possible to build far more resistant ships . The largest air bombs have nothing like the destructive capacity of a 381 - mm projectile . Also , for underwater resistance , multiple hulls are used , while multiple - explosion torpedoes are merely a pretty fantasy which finds no credit with experts in self - propelling underwater arms .
От Skvortsov
К Ibuki (03.10.2021 17:34:37)
Дата 03.10.2021 18:08:14

Главный довод Адмиралтейства в пользу строительства линкоров:


The Admiralty are satisfied that the type must continue if for no other reason than that 11 Capital Ships are building in Europe alone to-day,