Вот как раз про это свежая статья
Здравствуйте, уважаемый Никита Каменский!
Перевод не даю, так как Вы суть вопроса примерно изложили.
JANE'S MISSILES AND ROCKETS - JULY 01, 2004
IFF failure led to destruction of RAF Tornado
A Royal Air Force (RAF) Board of Inquiry investigating the destruction of an RAF Tornado GR.4A by a US Army Patriot missile during the March 2003 invasion of Iraq has concluded that the aircraft's identification friend-or-foe (IFF) system had failed. However, it also criticised the missile-classification criteria used by the Patriot system, and the US Army's Patriot rules of engagement, firing doctrine and crew training.
At the time of the accident, Tornado GR4A ZG710 was returning to Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. Returning to Kuwait airspace after their mission over Iraq, the crew of ZG710 completed appropriate checks, including noting that the IFF switches were set correctly. The pilot had just begun a descent towards Ali Al Salem and the aircraft was at an altitude of 17,938ft when it was hit by a Patriot missile at 0248 hrs on 23 March 2003 (local time). Both crew members were killed.
The Patriot battery that conducted the engagement had been monitoring for Iraqi tactical ballistic missiles. When ZG710 was tracked by the system, the symbol that appeared on its radar display indicated that an anti-radiation missile (ARM) was coming directly towards the battery. The track was interrogated for IFF but there was no response. Having met all classification criteria, the Patriot crew launched the missile against what it believed to be an incoming ARM.
Investigations conducted by the US Army and the RAF showed that the Patriot Battery's IFF interrogator for the encrypted Mode 4 was working throughout the engagement period, but that the Mode 1 unencrypted code, which was used by all Coalition aircraft in Iraq, was not loaded.
The Patriot unit was operating autonomously, without voice and data connections to and from its battalion HQ, a factor that may have contributed to the difficulty the battery had in receiving the Mode 1 IFF codes. The Board concluded that the lack of IFF Mode 1 codes increased the probability of the accident, and was therefore a contributory factor.
A ground engineering check on ZG710's encrypted Mode 4 IFF was completed satisfactorily before the aircraft's engines were started, and an RAF Regiment Rapier Missile unit that regularly checked the IFF of departing aircraft did not report the aircraft or log a fault. In line with extant procedures, only Mode 4 was checked on the ground.
"There is no firm evidence that ZG710 responded to any IFF interrogations throughout the entire mission, although there is evidence that the navigator checked the IFF switches at the appropriate times," said the RAF. "The Board concluded that ZG710's IFF had a fault and, as an IFF Mode 4 response would have prevented the Patriot Anti-Radiation Missile classification and engagement, concluded that the lack of IFF at the time of the accident was a contributory factor."
A study of the Tornado avionics has shown that certain power failures associated with the IFF may not be displayed to the crew, so the report concludes that the most likely explanation for the absence of an IFF response was that there had been a power supply failure. Further work is to be done to research the failure modes, reliability and serviceability of the Tornado IFF system.
The Board found deficiencies in the way that ZG710's mission was planned. The aircraft had followed the published speed and height procedures for a return to Ali Al Salem, but this routing had not taken account of the position of the Patriot batteries and their likely arcs of coverage. The Board concluded that "airspace routing, airspace control measures and a breakdown in planning and communication were contributory factors in the accident".
The Patriot system identifies hostile missiles through their flight profile and other characteristics, including the lack of an IFF response. The criteria programmed into the Patriot computer were based on the many different types of ARM available worldwide, so were very broad. As ZG710 commenced its descent into Ali Al Salem, its flight profile met these criteria.
The Board considered that "the criteria should have been much tauter, based on the known threat from Iraq, and concluded that the generic Anti-Radiation Missile classification criteria programmed into the Patriot computer were a contributory factor in the accident".
The Board also concluded that the Patriot rules of engagement for ARMs were not robust enough to prevent a friendly aircraft being classified as a missile, so were also considered contributory factors in the accident. Patriot crews are trained to react quickly, engage early and to trust the Patriot system, said the British report. The Patriot crew had about one minute to decide whether to engage. Had they delayed firing, ZG710 would probably have been reclassified as its flight path changed.
"The crew were fully trained, but their training had focused on recognising generic threats rather than on those that were specific to Iraq or on identifying false alarms," the Board concluded, saying that Patriot firing doctrine and training were contributory factors in the accident.
Because the Patriot battery's communications suite was still in transit from the US, the unit's only contact with its battalion HQ and other units was through a radio relay with a nearby battery, which was equipped with voice and data links to and from the battalion HQ. As a result, the Patriot crew did not have access to the widest possible tactical picture of the airspace around them.
The Board considered it likely that "a better understanding of the wider operational picture would have helped the Patriot crew, who would then have been more likely to identify ZG710 as a friendly track, albeit one without a working IFF. The Board concluded that the autonomous operation of the Patriot battery was a contributory factor".
The Board has made 12 recommendations. These include that further work should be conducted to research the failure modes, reliability and serviceability of the Tornado IFF system, and that closer co-ordination be implemented between planning and operations organisations regarding airspace usage.
The commander-in-chief, RAF Strike Command, has agreed with the Board's recommendations, and recommended that in future a positive challenge-and-response IFF check be completed after take-off for every aircraft, and that the Tornado IFF installation be modified to ensure that the cockpit warning is triggered in all failure modes. All recommendations are currently being implemented.
С уважением, Exeter
