хорошим людям чего не делаешь-то (+)
Вот копия письма Блэйми и.о. министра обороны Фрейзеру. В нем он информируется об утечках и пр.
ULTRA
TOP SECRET AM) PERSONAL 6 January, 1949
My dear Acting Minister,
As you know, the Allied Intelligence Organisation is now world wide and operates through many various channels, some of which are so secret that as little as possible in regard to them is set out on paper.
One of its functions is to counter, as far as possible, the collection of Intelligence by the enemy. In the course of this service it has been definitely proved that there are leakages of information from Australia which have their origin apparently in Canberra.
As examples of this, the following are brought to notice. CO A Special Spy Report from HARBIN on 24th November, 1944 gave details concerning General MacArthur's plans for certain operations in the Philippines.
The source of this report was given as the Soviet Ambassador in Australia.
(ii> Another HARBIN Special Intelligence Report dated 2nd December gave information of a similar nature.
The source given in this case was Soviet Minister in Australia. Ciii) A news background sheet, which was distributed to Newspaper Editors by the Department of Information, contained certain information. This information dealt with the utilisation of Australian Etorces. The matter has already been dealt with in correspondence between the acting Minister for Defence and the Minister for Information. This Item of news was also the subject of a HARBIN Intelligence Report in practically identical terms with those of the background news sheet.
(iv) Details of the Army Intelligence Service estimate of Japanese strength in the Philippines, issued in the AMP Weekly Intelligence Summary on 4 November, 1944, were known in full in TOK1O on llth November. This information is believed to have been transmitted from Sydney.
Action is being taken to restrict the dissemination of information that may be published in the Army Intelligence Summary by limiting the information contained therein and by limiting further the number of recipients.
It is suggested that you might consider it desirable that such action as can be taken at Canberra, to limit the association of official personnel with foreign representatives, is put in train.
The matter Is recognised as one of great delicacy since, apparently, allied official channels play an important part in the transmission of information.
The oases given above are samples of many that have recently come to notice.
Yours faithfully,
General
Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces Senator J M Fraser, Acting Minister for the Army.
Letter from General Sir Thomas Blarney to the acting minister for the Army, 6 January 1945. It was this letter that first informed the government of the leakages of information from Australia. (3DRL 6643, item 2/59)
Далее - копия радиоперехвата секретного доумента, попавшего в руки японцев. Звиняйте,книга так переплетена, что трудно сканировать. Но представление дает.
Appendix 1
AMF Weekly Intelligence Review No. 4 November 1944
AUSTRALIAN MILITARY FORCES WEEKLY INTELLIGENT
REVIEW NO. 118 ~~ ^
Compiled from information received from 1200 27 Oct 44 to 1200 hours 3 Nov 44
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I Summary of Significant Events
PART II Section 1 - Summary of Operations by Areas
(a) Land
(b) Sea
(c) Air
Section 2 - Strengths and Dispositions of Enemy Forces
(a) Land
(b) Sea
(c) Air
Section 3 - Enemy Organisation
Section 4 - Enemy Equipment
Section 5 - Tactics
Section 6 - Extracts from Captured Documents
Section 7 - General
PART III Other Fronts
PART IV Topographical
PART V
Security
APPENDICES A.
B. Type 100 82mm Mortar Fusse - Instantaneous or Delay
C. Japanese Conventional Signs
strengthen the Northern coast of this island. It is of interest that as yet no
Ojder t0tjon in support of this has been received.
jflf°r
nt from the extent of the enemy's air reaction, that for the defence E ISLANDS he is prepared to utilise some of his reserve air strength "'the JAPAN-MANCHURIA area, staging them in through FORMOSA. During In"'1' 'n ^ continuous attacks were launched against our beach-head, shipping and tlu. wee ^ ^ sca\e not encountered heretofore in the SWPA. These attacks interfered jiff'P8;.. |j construction and the maintenance of our invasion forces. A feature of ul111 3't'cs employed against our naval vessels was the frequent use of suicide crash ''"' ^Though some success was achieved against our light naval forces, these methods J'Vt ed unsuccessful against our heavy units.
Roth aerial reconnaissance and ground reports lend weight to the belief that derable reinforcements reached LUZON during the month of September. It is C°n ted that at least one major formation, probably a division, arrived during that Wt"od Until our land based aircraft can close the waters of the PHILIPPINES to >er'° , it seems certain he will endeavour to reinforce still further his main bastion
It is now estimated that in the recent naval battle off the PHILIPPINES, a total of 63 Japanese vessels were involved. Of these 47 were either sunk or badly damaged.
PART I
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
Except for small enemy pockets, organised resistance has ceased in the VALLEY Further South, an Allied force is advancing along the ABUYOG-I road towards the West coast against little opposition.
Subsequent to the Allied landing on LEYTE, no surprise would occasioned by reports of a redistribution of the enemy strength on X/IIW
354
С уважением, ВЛАДИМИР
