В течении последних 10 лет, СВР установила датчики предоставленные ЦРУ в Российском посольстве в Пьонянге. Датчики должны были следить за признаками активности севернокорейской атомной программы. Представители ЦРУ тренировали офицеров СВР в функционированнии датчиков, дата из которых была потом переданна обратно ЦРУ. Операция на данный момент закончена.
Russia Helped U.S. on Nuclear Spying Inside North Korea
By JAMES RISEN
ASHINGTON, Jan. 19 — Russian intelligence officers secretly placed sophisticated nuclear detection equipment inside North Korea at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1990's, to assist the United States in tracking the North Korean nuclear weapons program, intelligence officials say.
The Russians placed nuclear monitors provided by the C.I.A. inside the Russian Embassy in the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, to try to detect telltale signs of activity from the North Korean nuclear weapons program. The C.I.A. trained officers from the S.V.R., the Russian intelligence agency, in the operation of the American equipment, and the Russians then shared their findings with the Americans.
The joint operation has since ended, and it is unclear how long it lasted or whether it provided useful intelligence on the state of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Nor would officials say whether the Russians placed detection equipment in other locations in North Korea besides their embassy in Pyongyang.
But the disclosure of the clandestine operation against the North Koreans reveals a remarkable level of intelligence cooperation between Moscow and Washington on one of the most important security issues in the post-cold-war era — the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The decision by the C.I.A. to turn to the Russians for help also demonstrates how the United States has been forced to rely on assistance from other nations to collect information from inside North Korea, one of the most closed societies in the world.
Current and former American officials say the fact that the United States does not have an embassy in North Korea has made it difficult for C.I.A. officers to obtain direct access to the country. Overseas C.I.A. stations are usually inside American embassies, and undercover C.I.A. officers typically have diplomatic immunity and pose as employees of the State Department or other government agencies. As a result, the agency faces major hurdles in gathering intelligence in countries where the United States does not have permanent diplomatic representation.
"It is a very tough country to get data from," said one person familiar with American intelligence operations concerning North Korea. "We have tried every which way we can to get information."
The C.I.A. turned to its former adversaries in Russian intelligence for assistance to take advantage of Moscow's longstanding relationship with the North Korean government. The Soviet Union supported North Korea during the Korean War in the early 1950's and throughout the remainder of the cold war, until the Soviet collapse in 1991. North Korean nuclear scientists are believed to have received training in the Soviet Union. More recently, Russia has tried once again to improve its ties to North Korea, at least in part to enhance its economic links to South Korea and the larger Pacific marketplace.
Russia has also been trying to play an important diplomatic role in the current standoff between North Korea and the United States over the North's nuclear weapons program, which is no longer controlled by an agreement that suspended nuclear work, provided aid to North Korea and allowed international inspections. Over the weekend, in fact, a top Russian diplomat met with North Korean officials to propose a new plan to resolve the crisis.
The secret agreement between the C.I.A. and Russian intelligence came sometime in the early 1990's, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and at about the same time that the North Korean nuclear weapons program first emerged as a major international issue.
The joint operation represented a major test of efforts by the C.I.A. and S.V.R. to forge a new relationship in the post-cold-war period. Even though the C.I.A. had asked for the help, it did not completely trust the Russians to tell the truth about what the nuclear monitoring equipment detected, although there was apparently no evidence that the data received from the Russians had been altered or tampered with.
As the clandestine American-Russian operation was getting under way, the North Korean nuclear program was quickly becoming one of Washington's biggest post-cold-war concerns. North Korea had pledged not to develop nuclear weapons and had agreed to monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, but by the early 1990's, there was growing evidence that North Korea was secretly flouting its agreements. As signs of North Korea's determination to build nuclear weapons mounted, the Clinton administration intervened, and hammered out a new agreement in 1994 aimed at freezing the North Korean nuclear program, particularly plutonium reprocessing at a facility in Yongbyon. Despite the agreement, American intelligence concluded that North Korea had generated enough fissile material to produce one or two nuclear bombs.
The latest crisis over the North Korean nuclear program erupted last year, when United States intelligence obtained strong evidence that North Korea had secretly developed a uranium enrichment program, which would represent a second track toward the development and production of nuclear weapons. American officials said there was fragmentary evidence of a uranium enrichment effort as far back as the late 1990's, but much more compelling evidence of such a program came last year, officials said. Now American officials fear that North Korea may be poised to break out with full-scale nuclear weapons production.
Plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment are the two routes to making fuel for nuclear bombs, and experts say detecting the different nuclear fuel production methods calls for different types of intelligence collection. American officials say North Korea has become adept at deception tactics to mask its weapons program, but there are certain signs intelligence experts look for.
Traditionally, uranium enrichment facilities have required large amounts of electricity and water, making it possible to identify them by spy satellite photographs of power grids and other industrial infrastructure.
Plutonium reprocessing, on the other hand, is a chemical process requiring less power and water, and so such plants can be situated in more remote locations, like Yongbyon, which is about 60 miles north of Pyongyang.
But plutonium reprocessing gives off distinctive emissions that can be tracked and measured, even in very small amounts. Experts familiar with the joint operation between the C.I.A. and Russian intelligence said plutonium reprocessing emits an isotope of krypton in gaseous form that is relatively easy to detect. The Russians were apparently given American sensing equipment to help analysts determine whether reprocessing was under way at Yongbyon, which after 1994 would have been a violation of the agreement reached under the Clinton administration, known as the Agreed Framework. The equipment could also help the C.I.A. determine whether plutonium reprocessing had secretly been moved to another site in North Korea.
"Krypton is a very good technical indicator that is hard to hide," said one person familiar with the intelligence efforts. "If you are able to situate the sniffers in the right places, then you could have confidence that you can find out whether plutonium reprocessing is going on or not."
In addition to the detection equipment the C.I.A. gave to Russian intelligence, the United States could use sensors on aircraft flying near North Korea, as well as ground-based sensors in nearby countries.
