ВИФ2 NE

	От	Alex Medvedev
	К	Лейтенант
	Дата	10.05.2023 07:28:44
	Рубрики	Армия; ВВС; 1941;

Re: на самом...

Если коротко - ВВС были в курсе высокого процента отсева курсантов во время обучения из-за неподходящих психологических характеристик. Поэтому они озаботились созданием тестов, которые оценивали не только физические параметры и образованность кандидатов, но и могут ли они воевать в одиночку на истребителе или в составе команды бомбардировщика, есть ли у них качества для пилота или навигатора или бомбардира. Те кто не подходил на эти должности шли обучаться на стрелков. За время программы были разработаны последовательно несколько тестов. То что MMPI появился в 1943 году, когда ВВС активно сотрудничала с психологами для выявления склонностей больших масс людей не совпадение, а продукт этих программ.

Faced with the challenge of rapidly expanding the Air Corps, the senior leaders, such as Arnold, believed that the selection process would have to be streamlined. By 1941, despite his misgivings, Arnold had agreed to forego the college requirement for a standardized test to screen applicants. In addition, the Air Staff understood that not everyone would complete the rigorous training, so they had to recruit with attrition in mind. For example, a 1943 report from Air Training Command to the Commanding General Army Air Forces concluded: . . . to meet training requirements for heavy bomber crew production, it [the Air Staff] anticipated elimination rates in pilot training would be 31 percent in primary, 13 percent in basic, and 2 percent in advanced. The elimination rate in navigation would be approximately 15 percent, and in bombardiers, 20 percent...
After meeting the minimum requirements, aircrew candidates reported to classification centers for an average of three more weeks of testing.335 They would also face more cuts; 15 percent would be eliminated for physical or other deficiencies.336 It was also at the classification center that the candidates learned whether they would go on to pilot, navigator, or bombardier training. Between the testing and waiting, the stress was hard on the candidates and the classification centers went out of their way to reassure the candidates why the process was necessary. They were also assured that the process was a means of protecting the interests of the trainees themselves as well as those of the government.337 However, the cadets were cautioned that all parts of the test, including the psychological examination, were critical to their ultimate classification.338
The purpose of the Aircrew Classification Battery, as opposed to the Qualification Examination, was to differentiate among men best suited for training as pilots, bombardiers, navigators, and gunners.339 It was, in effect, designed to test aptitude for crew positions. For example, the official history of the selection program noted that an applicant who was “careful, accurate, and mathematically inclined might make an excellent navigator but fail to make the grade as a pilot.”340 The components of this battery were a written exam, a psychomotor test, and a psychological evaluation.
In Summer 1941, the medical division of the Army Air Forces established an experimental program to develop psychological testing instruments that could be used to screen candidates for the desired characteristics.341 The results of this experiment would become part of the Aircrew Classification Battery. This experimental test was administered to cadets at the replacement centers in order to collect data on the students and to improve the content of the psychological test before it was accepted for use on all applicants.342 The purpose of this experimental testing was the “development of means [written, verbal, and psychomotor tests] for measuring those aptitudes, special abilities, and psychological characteristics associated with subsequent success or failure of cadets in flight training.”343 A 1943 bulletin about psychology noted that after each class completed training a thorough analysis of the test instrument was conducted to “determine which tests should be retained as predictive devices for the selection and classification of future classes.”344 Based on this limited testing, on 8 December 1941, Arnold directed the medical division to begin using these new testing procedures — the written, verbal, and psychomotor tests — to screen candidates.345 Not all of the tests had been validated, but the medical officers believed that enough data had been collected to “permit early conversion from a peacetime and experimental project to a wartime classification system.”346
The psychomotor test, according to the official history, “sought to measure such characteristics as steadiness, balance and equilibrium, reaction time, and ability to think clearly and read directions under conditions of confusion.”347 The testing involved jigsaw puzzles and various mechanical devices that were manufactured for the sole purpose of carrying out this testing.348 However, delays in the production of psychomotor testing equipment along with the very large number of men to be tested forced many classification centers to improvise what historian Mark Wells later called “locally devised tests of questionable value.”349 Moreover, some candidates doubted the efficacy of at least a few of these locally generated stopgaps.
In recounting his experience as an aviation cadet in Washout, Charles Watry goes into detail about one particular test. In the test, he was told to hold a pencil-thin rod inside a hole in a metal plate without touching the sides of the hole. Unfortunately, there was a universal joint in the middle of the rod that caused the rod to twist and bend making it impossible to hold the rod without touching the sides. Whenever the rod touched the side, it would complete a circuit and a green light would come on. Watry recalled that the lights were positioned so that the cadet was aware of how many errors he had made.350 The examiner then tallied the number of times the light came on for a final score and sent the cadet on to the next, in Watry’s words, “demonic psychomotor test.”351 Watry noted that if the test itself was not stressful enough, the examiners induced their own form of stress. As Watry recalled, one of the examiners was constantly berating, cajoling, or harassing the cadet throughout the test.352
On the other hand, the examiner was not always an expert and in some instances had no more experience that the candidates. These examiners were often hard pressed to process the number of candidates coming through the classification centers. One examiner, Private A. Jack Jernigan, was pulled from his basic training class and became a psychomotor test administrator because he had a bachelor’s degree in education.353 Jernigan was assigned to the testing unit on a Tuesday and was expected to begin administering the test on Friday. By his own admission, he did not fully understand the tests, but he dutifully administered them.354 In addition, at times he felt overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. Jernigan recalled testing, on average, over five hundred men every day.355 During a five-week period in late 1943, nearly 14,000 enlisted men were administered the psychomotor exam at the testing center in Miami.356 Of the 14,000 men tested, nearly 6,000 were disqualified or failed some portion of the exam.357 The number and pace apparently took its toll on Jernigan himself. In a letter home he lamented, “I’m tired of sitting here seeing these young kids come through preparing to fight.”358 Nonetheless, he pragmatically concluded, “I would like to fight, but I would hate to be killed. Guess I will stay here.”359
After the physical exam, the psychological evaluation was the most critical factor in determining the suitability of an applicant. Approximately 10–15 percent of cadets failed the psychiatric interview.360 According to Arnold, the psychological exam was to determine if the “bewildered applicant” possessed a “normal, healthy mind, reflexes, aspirations, and inhibitions.”361 The applicant was asked a series of questions about his family history and he had to “know the history of each [family member] from birth to the present time.”362 A medical examiner summed up the purpose of the psychological evaluation this way: “We must know that any applicant will develop into the type of man we would like to associate with for the remainder of our military service as brother officers.”363 Moreover, in his official report to the Secretary of War, Arnold paid tribute to the program:
The Aviation Psychology program paid off in time, lives, and money saved, and through its selection of the raw material has aided in the establishment of an effective combat air force. This has been done at a total cost of less than $5 per candidate tested.364 However, the official medical history of the US Army in World War Two concluded that the psychiatric testing could best be labeled “intuitive and haphazard.”365
Results from the Aircrew Classification Battery were weighted and combined in a manner to produce composite aptitude ratings.366 These were grouped into three categories designed to predict graduation or elimination from pilot, bombardier, or navigator training.367 The test was accurate enough to determine the potential for success by score. An applicant who scored a nine on the test had only a four percent chance of washing out.368 On the other hand, an applicant who scored a one had a 77 percent chance of washing out.369 The scores became known as the “stanines,” a contraction of the words “Standard nine.”370 This score was very important to the Air Force as well as to the individual.
Those who did not score well on the Aircrew Classification Battery were considered the “poorest investments” as aircrew. Based on their stanine scores these individuals were still considered assets to the Army Air Forces and were selected for other categories, such as mechanics, where the chances of “a good return on the investment were greater.”371 The scores also indicated a strong relationship between interest and success among pilot, bombardier, and navigator candidates.372 However, at times, the needs of the Army Air Forces came first and some cadets whose stanine scores indicated that they would have been best suited for navigator or bombardier training were assigned to pilot training.373 Not surprisingly, they were eliminated from flight training at twice the rate of those whose scores indicated they were best suited for pilot training.374
Even in operational training, the stanine continued to be a predictor of success and those with higher scores went on to be airplane commanders at disproportionately higher rates than those who had lower scores.375 However, data from the field indicated that performance there correlated less with predicted ability and more with the pilot’s passion for flying at the job at hand.376 The stanine score was also an indicator of a propensity for “pilot error” accidents. The higher the stanine score, the less likely a pilot would be involved in an accident attributable to “pilot error.”377 The study also indicated that the higher stanine scores translated into better gunnery scores as well.378
By raising or lowering the minimum stanine score for each crew position, the Army Air Force could adjust the supply of aircrew and “meet the needs of the moment,” according to the official history.379 Early in the war, when the need for aircrews was critical, the minimum scores were lower. For example, in 1942, the minimum score for acceptance into pilot or bombardier training was three, but after 1944, when the need was less severe, the minimum score was raised
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Aircrew Qualification – The
Classification Battery
To meet the ever-growing need for pilots
and aircrew, in January 1942, the AAF
abandoned the requirement that cadets in
the flying programs had to have two
years of college experience. Aviation
Cadet Examining Boards administered a Stanines
After completing all three of the
tests, officials scored the results on a
nine-point scale. Called a standard nine,
or “stanine,” this composite score
evaluated physical, psychomotor, and
psychological attributes in an attempt to
best match those entering the
comprehensive training programs to the
needs of the service. Initially, pilots and
bombardiers required only the lowest
stanine, 1, to qualify; in December 1942,
air force officials raised this to 3. While
pilot candidates only needed a low
stanine score, reflecting the enormous
need for aviation cadets to enter pilot
training, navigator candidates typically
required the highest stanine scores.
Initially, navigator candidates needed a 5
stanine to qualify for training, and
officials raised this to 7 in November
1943. Bombardier candidates needed a
6 stanine by mid-July 1943 to qualify for
training. In February 1944, AAF
officials had pretty much leveled the
stanines for the aircrew training
programs. At that time, navigator
candidates needed to score 6,
bombardiers and pilots 5, to qualify for
training. Students who had high stanines
typically graduated at higher rates than
those with lower scores. A faculty board
at the training centers also considered
the trainees’ personal preferences in
making the assignments. However,
because 97 percent of the cadets wanted
to be pilots, the classification procedure
first took into consideration the type of
aircrew training needed by the service,
then the stanine score, and finally
individual preferences.67
As spelled out in the Aviation
Cadet Manual of 1942, those who would
train as fighter pilots had to be between
64” and 69” tall, while other pilots could
be as tall as 76”. Navigators and
bombardiers had to measure between
60” and 76” in height. The allowable
weight was adjusted for height and
weight, but no one who weighed more
than 160 would be accepted into fighter
pilot training and no one over 200 would
be accepted into any of the aircrew
programs. In July 1943, AAF officials
relaxed the physical qualifications for
aircrew members somewhat. Instead of
requiring 20/20 vision, for example,
20/30 was acceptable so long as it was
correctible to 20/20. In addition to
eliminating the requirement for two
three-part battery of tests, in addition to
a rigid physical examination, to help
identify those who might make the best
pilots, navigators, and bombardiers. The
first part of what was being called the
“classification battery” was the Aviation
Cadet Qualifying Exam (ACQE).
Designed to measure the candidate’s
comprehension, judgment, math skills,
mechanical ability, alertness, and
leadership qualities, the ACQE replaced
the education test used in earlier years to
measure the candidate’s general
knowledge and intellectual skills.
Instead of being used to judge
educational qualifications for those who
did not possess the required school
transcripts, the ACQE better predicted
qualification for aircrew training and
duty as an air force officer. A
psychomotor test measured eye-hand
coordination, reflexes, ability to perform
under pressure, and visual acuity.
Finally, the candidates underwent an
interview with a trained psychologist. years of college in January 1942 as
noted before, officials instituted another
significant change in requirements by
allowing married men to apply for the
aircrew programs.68
Between March 1942 and March
1944, aircrew classification centers
processed 400,000 applicants, sending
260,000 to pilot training, 40,000 to
navigator training, and 40,000 to
bombardier training; the balance were
eliminated from further officer training.
By February 1944, the press to accept as
many candidates as possible into the
flying training programs was over. The
War Department stopped accepting
requests for transfer from officers and
enlisted men in the Ground and Service
Forces into flying training after 22
February. AAF Letter 35-66, dated 8
March, went further, curtailing the
transfers of enlisted men into aircrew
training programs, except crewmen who
were returning from an overseas
operational tour and AAF African-
American enlisted men.69 Men selected
for ground duty programs did not go
through the classification program.
Throughout the war, the AAF
revised the ACQE: Test AC-10-A, for
example, was officially put into use on
15 January 1942 and remained in effect
for about 2 1/2 months before being
replaced by Test AC-10-B. Version 10-
B, in turn, was replaced by C, D, E, F,
G, and H, with each iteration being used
for about six weeks. The three-hour test
included sections of vocabulary, reading
comprehension, practical judgment,
mathematics, alertness to recent world
events, and mechanical comprehension.
Scores in the mathematics section was a
useful predictor of those who would be
successful in navigator training, less so
for pilots and bombardiers. Reading
comprehension was important to the
success of both pilot and navigator
cadets; judgment scores were most
predictive of pilot candidates’ success.
As the test matured, testing officials
reduced the number of questions in the
vocabulary and mathematics sections
and increased the number of questions
relating to current events and mechanical
comprehension. Fewer than 40 percent
of pilot candidates who scored 90 or
higher on the test were eliminated from
training, while almost 60 percent of
those who scored lower than 90 washed
out. For bombardiers, statistics were
similar, but the test results varied
significantly for navigator aviation
cadets. Less than 20 percent of those
who scored 90 or higher failed to
complete training while over 50 percent
who scored less than 90 washed out.70
ACQE Test AC-12-I, introduced in July
1943, marked a significant change in the
testing procedure. By the summer of
1943, the AAF recognized that a
significantly increasing portion of
aviation cadet applications were coming
from men under 20 years of age who had
no college experience. To compensate, officials developed a two-part test with
less emphasis on educational material
and more on perceptual skills. The first
part of the test consisted of four, timed
sections. The second part of the test was
more nearly like the earlier versions of
the ACQE.71
Aircrew Classification Centers
To facilitate the processing of the
tremendous number of men needed for
the aircrew training programs, Training
Command established three aircrew
classification centers in March 1942.
Located in Nashville, at Kelly Field, and
at Santa Ana, the classification centers
were, essentially, collecting points where
thousands of qualified candidates for
aircrew training could be kept while
awaiting their assignments. Here,
would-be air force officers received their
first uniforms and faced a series of tests,
the classification battery. Officials
expected to process as many as 205
applicants each day, six days a week, at
Nashville, 154 at Kelly Field, and 102 at
Santa Ana. This plan was based on the
geographic distribution of the population
of the United States. Eugene Fletcher,
who arrived at Santa Ana on 7 January
1943, briefly described the physical,
psychological, mental, and motor skills
tests in his book, Mister: The Training of
an Aviation Cadet in World War II.