От Nagel Ответить на сообщение
К All Ответить по почте
Дата 15.03.2023 12:27:47 Найти в дереве
Рубрики Флот; Армия; Локальные конфликты; Версия для печати

The Russian Military Has a Tendency to Reinforce Failure

During the first phase of the war, it was apparent that the course of events described in the
orders issued to units diverged significantly from developments on the ground. Nevertheless,
units continued to seek to execute their orders long after it had become apparent that
assumptions in those orders were wrong. This behaviour has continued throughout the war.
The continuous attempts to assault Bakhmut, for example, long after it ceased to be on Russia’s
main effort, demonstrate that until an order is countermanded commanders will continue to try
to execute their last instruction. In the early phases, during offensive operations, this was best
demonstrated around Mykolaiv and Chernihiv. In both cases, Russian units had been ordered
to bypass resistance to reach their objectives. The orders made clear that resistance was
expected to be light. When this assumption was demonstrated to be false, however, Russian
commanders continued to seek to bypass strongpoints, even when it degraded their tactical
position, exposed their flanks and diluted their combat power by spreading concentrated forces
over a long frontage in contact with Ukrainian troops.

Страница 47.

This approach has probably had the greatest impact in creating a gap between potential and
actual capability as regards Russian fires. All reported contacts are treated as true. All fire
missions appear to be given equal priority and are prosecuted in the order in which they are
received unless an order to prioritise a specific mission comes from higher authority. It seems
that those directing fire missions either do not have access to contextual information or are
indifferent to it. In any case, observations of Russian pre-planned fires shows that they will
strike targets that have moved and subsequently engage the same target in its new position,
suggesting a purely chronological prioritisation of activity. Страница 48

Royal United Services Institute
for Defence and Security StudiesPreliminary Lessons in Conventional
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion
of Ukraine: February–July 2022