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Skvortsov
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Kosta
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Äàòà
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03.10.2021 12:07:43
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Ðóáðèêè
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WWII; 1917-1939;
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Äà âîò îíè:
However, the documentary record shows clearly that the Nomonhan conflict was a factor, and not an unimportant factor, in Soviet calculations in the summer of 1939. In a speech before the Supreme Soviet on May 31, Molotov stressed the resolve of theSoviet Union to defend the borders of the MPR as its own. Without referring specifically to the recent battle, he mildly admonished the Japanese that “it would, therefore, be best for them [Japan] to drop, in good time, the constantly recurring provocative violations of the USSR and the MPR by Japanese-Manchurian military units.”23
The Soviet press played down the Nomonhan fighting to such an extent that the first official references to the incident did not appear until June 26, one and one-half months after the initial clash. Thereafter, the few battle reports were written in a relatively restrained tone and were relegated to the inside and back pages of Soviet newspapers. According to the editor of the First Army Group’s newspaper, Stalin personally forbade detailed reporting about the battle.24
The evidence indicates that Stalin was not merely embarrassed by the Nomonhan incident, but was alarmed as well. Although he knew through Richard Sorge that the Japanese army was not yet prepared for a large-scale war with the USSR, and that the leaders in Tokyo were striving to avoid such an occurrence, he could not be certain that Kwantung Army would act rationally or obey the instructions from Tokyo. Had not Japanese field armies taken the bit in their mouths in 1931 and 1937 and launched military campaigns with far-reaching consequences? After a seemingly interminable period of diplomatic sparring, in which the Germans and Soviets attempted to ascertain one another’s “sincerity,” Molotov finally got around to discussing specific outstanding issues between the two nations. One of the first issues he raised was that of German “encouragement and support” of Japanese aggression against the USSR. When the German ambassador, Schulenburg, attempted to turn this charge aside, Molotov insisted that Berlin must prove its good faith not only with words, but with deeds.25
In describing this interview in more detail to Weizsacker a few days later, Schulenburg summarized Molotov’s sentiments as follows: “Finally—and this seems to me the most important point—M. Molotov demanded that we cease to support Japanese ‘aggression’.”26
On August 12 Astakhov reminded Molotov—as if it were necessary—“By the way, the prospect of drawing Japan into the German-Italian alliance remains a reserve option for Berlin in the event of our agreement with England and France.”27
Molotov learned a few days later that Ribbentrop was anxious to fly immediately to Moscow to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German-Soviet relations, he asked forthwith “how the German Government were disposed toward the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, and further, whether the German Government
were prepared to influence Japan for the purpose of improving Soviet-Japanese relations and eliminating border conflicts.”28
Upon receipt of this momentous news on August 16, Ribbentrop immediately instructed
Schulenburg to inform Molotov and Stalin that Germany was prepared both to conclude a nonaggression pact and “to exercise influence for an improvement and consolidation of Russian-Japanese relations.”29
Molotov reacted favorably to this statement, which
Schulenburg reported to Berlin. Ribbentrop then ordered Schulenburg immediately to arrange another meeting with Molotov at which he was to explain the extreme urgency of the Polish situation and the need for quick action. Schulenburg was instructed to tell Molotov that “we are in complete agreement with the idea of a nonaggression pact, a guarantee of the Baltic states, and Germany exercising influence on Japan.”30
The Soviet-Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the exclusive, nor even the principal, factor that led Stalin to conclude the alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a war in Europe in which the principal capitalist powers might tear themselves apart could
well have been reason enough. However, the Soviet-Japanese conflict was also on Stalin’s mind and was a factor in his calculations that has received little attention in standard historical accounts of the outbreak of the war. This analysis, focusing on those
East Asian events, is an attempt to clarify the record. This is not a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, it puts an important piece into place that previously has been overlooked or misplaced in the jigsaw puzzle called “the origins of the Second World War.” In so doing, it makes that puzzle less confusing.