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От
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Skvortsov
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К
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ttt2
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Дата
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03.10.2021 10:00:32
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Рубрики
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WWII; 1917-1939;
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А в самой книге он даже цитирует документ:
>Эта статья основана на его книге NOMONHAN, 1939: The Red Army's Victory That Shaped World War (U.S. Naval Institute Press).
В книге цитируется отрывок из меморандума Рибентроппа:
During the fateful night of August 23–24, while the nonaggression pact was being drafted and the Japanese Sixth Army was being smashed, Stalin, Molotov, and Ribbentrop discussed a wide variety of issues affecting German-Soviet relations. An official on Ribbentrop’s staff preserved the substance of this conversation in a detailed memorandum. Seven broad topics were discussed. The first was the question of Soviet-Japanese relations. Ribbentrop repeated his readiness to use his influence to affect favorably the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. At that moment the events in Moscow and on the battlefield both pointed toward a satisfactory resolution of the Nomonhan incident — from the Soviet point of view — and this is reflected in Stalin’s reply.
"M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace — so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."