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Ibuki
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ttt2
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21.09.2021 02:10:55
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Современность; Флот;
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Re: Шанс есть...
>>>Нужен, не спорю, но не такой. Фрегаты, эсминцы, ДПЛ. С какого боку Австралии север
>Какой высаживающийся агрессор? Вы смеетесь? Кто там может высадится?
Китай в первую очередь, и все остальные кто захочет посягнуть на конституционный порядок и территориальную целостность Австралии.
>От Китая до Австралии 10 тыс км и куча стран и островов. Сначала придется все это захватить, пупок развяжется.
Да уж, морской стратег из Вас совершенно никакой.
>Прям страх берет от угрозы 8 ПЛ. На эти 66 или сколько там миллиардов можно построить мощный флот защиты от которого толку больше будет.
Конечно, страх. берет ведь это у агрессора должна будет болеть голова как ему прикрыть 12000 км коммуникаций, а не Австралии как им прикрыть 12000 км побережья.
ASPI September 2014
The submarine choice Perspectives on Australia’s most complex defence project
Vice Admiral Ray Griggs—Submarines in Australia’s maritime strategy
It’s important that, as we look at the upcoming White Paper process, there’s a broad understanding of the role of submarines in Australia’s defence strategy. Submarines are a critical element of our maritime strategy.We’re not looking at trying to deliver a science project that lives on the boundaries of the laws of physics. What we’re looking at is probably best characterised as a contemporary version of the Collins class capability. Yes, as the Prime Minister says, this will be a significantly more capable submarine. And that improvement in capability can be achieved over time by evolving the design. This doesn’t mean any decisions have been made with respect to any of the options that are before the government. As you’ve heard from the Defence Minister, government is understandably using the White Paper process to reconfirm in its mind what the right submarine options and numbers are.For Australia, our submarines provide us with strategic weight in a way that no other ADF asset or combination of ADF assets does. By strategic weight, I mean that submarines are a capability that shapes or changes the behaviour of other nations and the calculus of their leaders. And what are submarines designed for? They’re an offensive capability, intended to sink ships and other submarines. Yes, they do other tasks, but this offensive capability is the bread and butter of the trade. Because of their potency, our submarines can have a powerful conventional deterrent effect.This deterrent effect operates in two distinct ways. The first is fairly well known—their offensive capacity means a potential adversary must consider whether the use of force against Australian interests is wise, achievable or without risk of an Australian response. This is an immediate, direct deterrent effect.But there’s also a much longer term deterrent impact. Because we have such capable submarines in the ADF order of battle, any potential adversary must be able to defeat our submarine capability. And, as many in navies and air forces around the world can testify, antisubmarine warfare is one of the more complex maritime warfare disciplines to be effective at. It takes a range of expensive high-end capabilities—surface, air and subsurface units—which must be developed and maintained over many years.As we contemplate the direct cost of the new submarine program for Australia, I think we should always balance that against the considerable cost impact that the investment we make imposes on others to try to counter the effect of our submarine capability. This aspect of the submarine discussion is largely absent in the public domain; if we’re truly thinking strategically, it needs to be there, front and centre.Submarines provide the Australian Government with options to take action in our national interest. Importantly, the government can exercise those options to act at any time of Australia’s choosing and under almost any conceivable threat scenario. And we can act as our interests dictate, either as part of an alliance, within a coalition or unilaterally.So, as we discuss all the different characteristics of our submarines, we need to keep coming back to the strategic impact of different decisions. Decisions about capability, stealth, range and endurance all have an effect on the strategic weight we gain from our submarine capability. We can’t say exactly where or when Australia will need its future submarines and all the strategic weight they bring. But their deterrent effect will continue to play a significant role in contributing to the security of our inherently maritime region—through their preparedness to fight and win at sea.
Vice Admiral Ray Griggs is Chief of the Royal Australian Navy
>И сколько раз австралийские ПЛ плавали в Желтое море? Или даже Восточно Китайское?
Подводная лодка она на то и подводная чтобы никто не знал чем они занимаются. “Если ты подлодку не видишь это еще не значите что нее нет (с)»
https://www.theage.com.au/national/secret-spy-missions-forced-to-the-surface-20060908-ge33cl.html