Спасибо. Правильно, новый БНК F- и D-классов никому не нужен, если не несет
зонального ЗРК/Иджис и/или КРМБ, и даже основные ПКРК в качестве основного боекомплекта получают ракетки с увеличенной дальностью и возможностью работы по земле. Фрегат или ЭМ - это уже что-то такое, не меньше 5 тыщи тонн. Если же ЗРК маленький, ПКРК обычный тактический - это уже корвет, даже если 2000 водоизмещением. Нет смысла строить фрегат с возможностями корвета - ну или OPV вообще без ракетного оружия.
Вообще, тенденции интересные. И особенно - подводнолодочные.
Вот в этой статейке - http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/c54ee0a4-987f-4a66-800e-ef88de9381d1/The-Emerging-Republic-of-Korea-Navy--A-Japanese-Pe
есть очень интересный пассаж:
In the Falklands War a British nuclear-powered submarine,HMS Conqueror, attacked and sank a World War II–vintage Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Argentine navy’s surface operations ceased totally, and eventually Argentine maritime operations of all kinds against British forces were substantially contained.With this single submarine operation, the Royal Navy had gained sea control around the Falklands. In other words, a tactical action by an SSN—a torpedo attack against a surface ship—gained an unexpected strategic advantage, by establishing regional, but total, sea control.
Many navies—notably the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy, and the
Royal Navy itself—have made every effort, over the entire course of other wars, to achieve such a capability, regardless of casualties or damage to themselves, and yet have failed. Gaining such a strategic advantage is the very raison d’être of an armed force, the goal of its nation and people in wartime, the pride of its servicemen and women. Nonetheless, many navies have looked for a key to the true significance of submarines in the single success of HMS Conqueror in the Falklands.
If the ROKN planners dare instead to seek the strategic significance of conventional submarines in the sea surrounding the Korean Peninsula, taking full account of the limitations of diesel-electric-driven boats, they will have established a good basis for future naval operations and strategy. There are indications suggesting that some answers may become clearer in the near future.
