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25.03.2005 21:59:34
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Армия;
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А вот оценки Janes World Armies
Россия:
The tactics employed in the open-space combat during the recent Chechen war bore little resemblance to the anti-insurgency doctrines used by the Western armies. The Russians used massive and often indiscriminate artillery and missile fire to obliterate enemy positions before the infantry would move into hostile areas. Point target strikes would often be foregone in favour of artillery sweeps covering the entire area of enemy's deployment, which often included heavy bombardment of centres of civilian population. Fuel-air weaponry, including the 300 mm multiple rocket launcher Smerch, was used to destroy bunkers and fortified areas on the city outskirts.
Since the end of the first Chechen campaign (1996) a more flexible posture has been adopted. During the second campaign, the combat has been conducted by tactical groups (TGs) - a new type of Russian army formation. A TG is built around a traditional unit (company, battalion or regiment) and shares a considerable degree of tactical autonomy. TGs have been reinforced with additional artillery, aviation and armour resources on a long-term basis. TGs would be allocated extra artillery and Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and Forward Air Controllers (FAC). A regimental TG would consist of two Battalion TGs (BTGs); one BTG would conduct combat raids while the other would set-up a base and guard the rear. A typical BTG would include: a battalion HQ, three assault company TGs equipped with armoured vehicles, mortar and anti-tank guided weapon (ATGW) batteries, signals and supply platoons, a tank company, two artillery batteries and extra mortar battery, a group of commandos (snipers), a reconnaissance company, a FOO and a FAC. The degree of autonomy and the level of resources given to TGs point to a major shift in Russian tactical thinking.
Corruption, indiscipline and disorder in the Russian military
Nothing illustrates the pitiful depths to which the Russian Army has sunk better than the regular toll of desertions, beatings, rapes and killings that its soldiers endure, the most recent reports, including footage, of which surfaced in October 2004. Recruiters at the 76th airborne division, designated as Russia's first fully professional unit, complain that endemic discipline offences and failure to meet minimum standards result in dismissal of up to 40 per cent of their contract soldiers after only 4-5 months of service. A report presented by Russia's Chief Military Prosecutor in mid-2004 pointed to a shockingly high level of criminal activity in the armed forces. Only between January and June 2004, 7,300 Russian servicemen, including 800 officers, were convicted of various crimes. In those six months, US$17 million worth of defence funds were misappropriated and over 100 senior MoD officials charged with fraud. The number of non-combat deaths in 2004 reached over 500, including 109 suicides.
he army has always been the most difficult of the services to reform. Even today with a much-reduced force the service structure, force posture, planning and training patterns do not meet present day requirements, a legacy of the Soviet era. Soviet strategy during the Cold War was to gain conventional superiority over NATO forces in Europe. Emphasis was on to motorised infantry, tanks, heavy tube artillery and ballistic missiles. Tactical flexibility and initiative were discouraged, the troops were not trained how to operate in small unsupervised formations and were neither equipped nor trained for close-range combat. Instead, the troops mastered standard drills for launching large-scale armoured thrusts into enemy's territory. Morale of infantry soldiers was low and their principal motivation was a harsh discipline and wish to complete their national service as early as possible.
The VDV is still in much better shape than the Ground Forces. While plagued with the continuing departure of junior officers and `contract' servicemen, General Shpak believes that even at a time when manpower accessions have plummeted, the VDV's `airborne mystique' ensures that it will get enough young men wanting to wear the blue beret. However, up to 70 per cent of the VDV's junior officers are currently planning to leave service as soon as their contracts expire, reflecting the continued frustration endemic to Russian officers.
The lack of high-quality conscripts that Russia is currently producing will necessitate the amendment of training procedures. A key problem has been the lack of resources for both individual training and also major unit exercises.
Emphasis is continually given to the airborne soldier, who is proving to be the mainstay of peacekeeping and intervention operations in the Caucasus and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
There is evidence too that the Russian serviceman is being trained to accept more independence. Peacekeeping operations will mean that the level of responsibility must move further down the command chain, even to junior non-commissioned officer level. Consequently, important similarities are developing between the Russian soldier and his Western European and North American counterparts.
The demographic crisis is exacerbated by others in health and education. Of young men of draft age, only two-thirds met the minimum requirements to be considered fit for service, and one in four of those had health problems. Less than a quarter had completed secondary education to a satisfactory standard, and one in 13 was illiterate. This helps explain why, in October 2003, the Duma passed the first reading of a bill to reinstate compulsory military training at schools and professional colleges. As well as having a practical impact on the draft cohort, Putin hopes that it will restore to the military some of the prestige it has lost in recent years.
It is hoped that moving to a professional armed forces will overcome the worsening conscript problems. The conscript service remains as unpopular as ever and draft evasion among middle-classes means that it is mostly poorer and underprivileged young people who end up in the army. As a result, the social and health profile of an average conscript reflects endemic health and nutrition problems facing the younger generation of Russians from deprived backgrounds. One in five will leave the army chronically ill as a result of poor diet, overcrowding and minimal medical and sanitary provision. Conditions for conscripts and contract soldiers alike are exceptionally unfavourable. Four out of five conscripts will face beating by their officers or fellow soldiers at some point in their service, which for one in three will be serious enough to lead to hospitalisation or a medical discharge (over 100,000 draftees are referred for extra medical checks each year). According to the Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, in 2002 some 20,000 servicemen were wounded or in injured as a result of accidents and criminal activity in the armed forces.
Given these factors it is unsurprising that a significant number of personnel, currently 35 per cent of recruits, are discharged for health reasons annually; and 1,800 conscripts are "on the run" and on the "wanted list", according to the MoD. Financial and social conditions of service for contract soldiers and officers have marginally improved since 2000 but still remain far from those needed to boost morale.
Белоруссия:
Belarus has a mixed conscript-contract force, with the latter accounting for around 40 per cent of the military's total strength. Like in many other post-Soviet forces, draft evasion and crime are endemic, morale is low and standards of combat training fall way short of those in the West.
Conscripts perform 12 months of national service and are trained in two motor rifle divisions. The newly trained recruits are then posted to either mobile forces units or various territorial defence formations.
Украина:
The Ukrainian army is predominantly a conscript force. Only 20 per cent of soldiers and non-commissioned officers serve on a contract basis. The Ukrainian army faces challenges similar to those of forces of other post-Soviet states. Draft evasion, desertion, and drug and alcohol-related crimes are rife. Standards of combat training and discipline are very low.
Ukraine's defence budget for 2003 was set at US$782.5 million, a figure not sufficient to support such a large military force. It is thought that an extremely high percentage of the Ukrainian armed forces equipment - perhaps as much as 60 per cent - is probably unserviceable and that in the short term the situation is unlikely to get better.
Молдавия:
Moldovan defence expenditure has been on a serious downward trend since the early 1990s. Accurate figures are difficult to obtain, but many reports suggest that the country spent over US$200 million in 1992. However, the situation in 2001 was very different and latest figures suggest that defence expenditure in 2001 was in the region of US$ 20 million. There is clearly no room in this budget for any credible procurement and the armed forces appear to exist on a 'day-to-day' basis.
The land defence force comprises three mechanised infantry brigades, the Ungeny Artillery Brigade, the Signal Regiment, the Special Forces Battalion, and the 22nd Peacekeeping Battalion. In addition there is a Ministry of Defence, Guard and Service Battalion.
Notes: The three brigades of mechanised infantry have no tanks but do possess about 198 light armoured vehicles. All are almost certainly under strength and equipped with obsolete equipment, much of which is unserviceable. In general terms it is expected that each of these 'brigades' will resemble more a reinforced battalion than a brigade of the NATO type.
Грузия:
The Georgian defence budget plunged to crisis levels in 2000-2002, reflecting the larger fiscal crisis of the Georgian government. Of the US$18 million allocated to the Ministry of Defence, only about 71 per cent had actually been delivered by the end of November. An estimated 20 per cent or more of what does arrive is lost to institutional corruption. Defence officials stated that, even had the entire budget been delivered, it would not have been sufficient to house and feed the army, air force and navy and maintain their equipment, let alone undertake meaningful training, exercises and procurement. The ministry estimates its annual force subsistence needs alone at about US$32 million and requires US$57 million to function 'normally'. By comparison, Georgia's defence budget in 2002 was lower than those of such microstates as Belize, Djibouti, Fiji, Lesotho and Malta. In the CIS, only Moldova and Tajikistan spent less. An emergency supplementary allocation of US$5 million to pay for repair of air-defence equipment was made in August but remained unfulfilled due to lack of revenue.
The Border Guards, which has a separate budget allocation, suffered even more hardship. The Guards had expanded to assume the duties of Russian counterparts in mid-1999 but had not seen a commensurate or realistic increase in their funding to account for this. Border Guard Commander Valeri Chkheidze estimated that he needed more than twice the allocated budget to perform basic functions.
The armed forces suffer from extremely low levels of morale and professionalism. The army is oversized and cannot afford to house and feed the troops. What little equipment it has is largely unusable. Serious attempts to retrain and restructure the armed forces began only after the country had been independent for 10 years. There are proposals to reduce the current level of mostly conscripted military personnel to a largely volunteer force, modelled along the lines of the EU's proposed rapid reaction force.
All 18- to 27-year-old males are liable for military service. The length of service has been reduced from two years to 18 months. Call-up, however, remains inapplicable in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and very widely avoided across the rest of Georgia due to the appalling conditions endured by recruits. In 2002, for example, conscription failed by up to 65 per cent to meet its target intake. From 2002, young Georgians had been able to pay a conscription deferral fee of GEL200 (just under US$100) per year, which was to be used to supplement the defence budget.
The overall quality of military education was a major source of concern until the US commenced its Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) in May 2002. Originally labelled as providing 'counter-terrorist' training for Georgian forces, it subsequently became clear that GTEP involved standard light infantry tactics for company-sized units. The US European Command has described the mission of GTEP as "to enhance the capabilities of the Georgian military to respond to security threats, and enable the government to provide protection and stability to the citizens of Georgia and the region." Under the programme five combat infantry battalions received four months of training. The first new armoured unit commencing training in early 2004.
Another objective of the programme is for trained Georgian personnel to pass on the knowledge acquired to non-selected units. However, this did not appear to have occurred by early 2004 and there remained great concern about the quality of training available to most Georgian conscripts. At the time of writing the army's six brigades have continued to operate according to different methodologies. The army is badly in need of a bridging doctrine to allow the disparate units to operate together over the next decade.
Nevertheless, training by US Marines and Special Forces under GTEP since May 2002 has revolutionised the demoralised ground forces by introducing a core of competence at the heart of the army. Salaries of personnel selected for and completing the GTEP average US$270 per month, while wages for the rest of the army are minimal and infrequently paid. There is thus a considerable amount of discontent among the 80 per cent of the force not selected for GTEP units.
Азербайджан:
The Azerbaijani Army is a better organised and more professional service than it was in the mid-1990s but it continues to suffer huge problems in training, equipping and motivating its soldiers. The army is still hindered by corruption in its ranks and a highly politicised officer corps. The quality and readiness of much of the army's equipment is also a problem, as a decade of poor maintenance and chronic shortages of spare parts means that many systems are not operational, cannibalised for parts, or operating at less than optimal status
he problem of poor equipment readiness is compounded by the lack of consistent and regimented training at the individual, small unit, battalion and brigade, and then combined arms levels. Training teams from Turkey are working with the Azerbaijanis to refine their training techniques and procedures, bringing them more in line with NATO standards. However, the training challenge for the enlisted soldier is compounded by the many problems noted earlier and by the personnel turbulence created by the short term of service served by most conscripts. The short term of service makes it extremely difficult and very expensive to train these soldiers in any technical skills. In turn, this makes it difficult to develop a skilled enlisted corps that can effectively support the army's extensive technical support requirements.
Армения:
Armenia's armed forces are only in a position to be effective in self-defence and in limited offensive operations against poorly trained and equipped forces. The success against Azerbaijan in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh was due more to the Azerbaijani weaknesses than Armenian strength.
There is no doubt that the Armenians have a history of being good soldiers and Armenia retains the support of the Russians, who have regarded Armenia as a natural ally for generations. However, the Armenian armed forces face severe difficulties, which include a lack of trained senior officers and a very limited defence budget that has to be made available from an ailing economy.
Nagorno-Karabakh forces
In the Armenian-controlled enclave within Azerbaijan, there is also the well-equipped, trained and led Karabakh army. There is a high degree of integration between the forces of Armenia and Armenian-ruled Nagorno-Karabakh. This military force receives direct economic and logistics assistance from Armenia; and soldiers, equipment and units from the Armenian armed forces have frequently been transferred for service there. Both conscripts and officers from Armenia are routinely sent for duty to Karabakh, often posted to the frontline between Karabakh Armenian and Azerbaijani forces.
The Karabakh military, formally known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Self Defence Force, is regarded by many as the most professional standing army in the region. Much of the high calibre of the army is due to the constant training and continuous attention to improving combat readiness.
Казахстан:
formations are understrength by the accepted RFAS-type standards and that, for example, in each motor rifle division it is possible that only one of three brigades (previously motor rifle regiments) is up to strength, one brigade is at 50 per cent strength and the third brigade is at cadre strength. This state of affairs is probably reflected in the armoured division.
The following appear to be reserve divisions with a purely mobilisation role: 68 MR Division and 80 MR Division.
Poor standards of training, even in basic military knowledge and competence, are commonplace. The problem is exacerbated by the underfunding of the armed forces.
In practical terms, specialist training is more accessible. Specialists will be based at the MoD Cadet School, Zhus Ulan (Young Guard) School, and the Aktyubinsk Higher Military Institute.
Узбекистан:
Uzbekistan has arguably the most capable armed forces of the Central Asian countries, although problems persist in the Uzbek military, including low morale, and poor leadership standards among officers. It aims to strengthen its boundaries and to form a new, highly mobile ground force, as a defence against insurgency and a means of combating regional terrorism.
Киргизия:
The defence budget for 2003 was US$24 million, accounting for 1.44 per cent of GDP.
Kyrgyz defence budget has grown by more than 40 per cent since 2000 in response to the incursions by Islamist militants and the heightened fear of terrorism. The regime's growing sense of insecurity has also contributed to the rise in defence spending, with more money now spent on special operations forces and air combat assets. Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz state is economically too weak to provide adequately for its armed forces.
While the Kyrgyz high command is staffed almost entirely of ethnic Kyrgyz officers, Russian assistance and advice remain of paramount importance, above all in training, air defence and border protection. The US has increased technical support and training to the Kyrgyz army, having found a new stronghold in the region through counter-terrorism actions. The Kyrgyz forces are unable to deal with the penetration of large numbers of militants into the southern regions without external support.
Akaev has called for the strengthening of border troops, and the reform of the armed forces in an attempt to improve combat readiness. Technical support to aid the reforms has been provided by Russia, Turkey, the US, and some EU member states. In a programme due to be completed by the end of 2005, Defence Minister Col Gen Esen Topoev begun restructuring the 10,900-strong army in a move away from conscription towards professionalisation. It is hoped that a professional army could repulse Islamist militants. But despite relatively attractive incentives to recruits, continuing shortfalls in resources and delays in paying salaries make achieving the 2005 target unrealistic. Length of conscript service could also be reduced to one year. Demobilised troops are to be transferred to the new border guard force.
Maintaining discipline among conscripts remains a problem. Desertion - at over 10 per cent, the highest among the Central Asian republics - continues to prevent the effective creation of combat-effective armed forces. There is neither tradition nor experience upon which to build a better force.
Kyrgyz land forces were built along conventional Soviet lines, with motorised infantry units at their core. The infantry performed poorly during the Batken insurgency, displaying a low level of tactical skills, poor discipline and an inability to operate on difficult terrain. Insufficient modernisation and a lack of communications equipment gave the army no real control in emergency situations. The army was oriented towards fighting a conventional war in the lowlands, which hampered its attempts to carry out counter-insurgency operations in mountainous terrain. Some lessons have been learnt: since Batken, the military leadership has sought external military assistance to bring the Kyrgyz fighting force up to modern warfare standards.
In 2002 the Defence Ministry began creating a professional Kyrgyz Rapid Reaction Force to counter guerrilla groups in difficult terrain. The Southern Group of Troops was established, including nine special task battalions, tank battalions, artillery anti-aircraft battalions and other military subdivisions. Three border detachments and two field communications networks were also set up.
Таджикистан:
Brigades of the army were initially assembled by persuading local warlords to bring their troops into the army structure in return for favours. They are still dominated by regional clans, hampering the development of a national army commanding widespread respect. Two of the brigades, the Mahmud (1st Brigade) and Faisali (11th Brigade), engaged in bitter fighting after the commander of the Faisali Brigade was assassinated in June 1995. The Faisali Brigade was dominated by Kulyabis (a clan from northern Tajikistan). In the wake of the clashes, the government tried to disband, redeploy or disarm the two brigades but with only limited success. These developments severely set back the building of a reliable army. The Mahmud Brigade, despite its brief mutiny in 1995, is considered the army's best fighting unit and helped quell the revolt in Tavil-Dara in 1996.
The army command regularly emphasises the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism roles of Tajik land forces. However, the army lacks adequate capabilities and has only a nominal chain of command. Its deployment patterns are hectic, as units are constantly restructured and redeployed to avoid further disintegration and mass desertions. The better part of the army personnel is former opposition fighters, which complicates the mission of defining roles and requirements even further.
The Tajik army consists of around 3,000-4,000 personnel (2004 estimate) and continues to be a loose conglomerate of units, many under the control of warlords. The service is far from being an integrated land force under unified control and with a single set of procedures and doctrines in place. The army units are inferior in training and equipment to the MVD and other security forces. The troops have no combat armour, few radios and little air support is available, since all air force assets are controlled by the Russians and the Tajik MVD.
Туркмения:
Morale is low and numerous reports have detailed draft evasion and desertion in the armed forces, with some paying bribes to local officials in order to avoid military service. Ritualised brutality against fresh recruits and fighting on tribal grounds are common among conscripts. Russian military advisers who served in Turkmenistan during the 1990s noted that the army remains a highly undisciplined and poorly trained force lacking in cohesion, and divided along tribal and social lines. Conscripts are deliberately posted outside their home regions to prevent mass desertions.
President Niyazov has recently instigated a plan to utilise Turkmen conscripts within the economy, deploying them in construction, textile, health industry, railways, communication, farming and regional and local administration. The frequent use of army troops in the agricultural sector has undermined the combat ability of the service and its readiness.
The army suffers from a shortage of officers and combat training is woefully insufficient. Much of army combat training has been reportedly replaced with the so-called 'food independence programmes', whereby conscripts and officers spend most of their time breeding cattle and growing crops.
ts existing armed forces suffer from a serious lack of training and resources for maintenance, let alone for modernisation. There is inadequate funding to maintain even current force levels. No substantial military-technical purchases have been made, nor have Turkmen officers been sent for training to military schools in Russia or the US. An estimated 3,000 troops are occupied simply in guarding stockpiles of inherited Soviet equipment that is far in excess of its requirements, or its ability to maintain such stock. President Niyazov intends to create a highly mobile unit of 50,000 armed forces personnel equipped to deal with new threats to national and regional security. He had, in 2001, already ordered the Defence Ministry, Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Border Guard to reduce their personnel by 10,765 people as part of his policy to redirect more money to the state budget. Niyazov reforms have been criticised for sidetracking potentially ill-disciplined elements within the armed forces, saddling them with yet more non-military duties.