Стратегам на англ. яз: Советский спецназ в против НАТО. амер. взгляд из 1988.
Доброго здравия!
Н
The Soviet Spetsnaz Threat to Nato
Capt Erin E. Campbell, USAF
The Spetsnaz are the only Soviet troops who can think for themselves and take
quick decisions.
-Abdul Haq, Afghan rebel leader
IN recent years, Soviet military doctrine has increasingly emphasized the use of conventional forces in conducting
military operations. As a result, Soviet tacticians have stressed the need to wage a blitzkrieg-style attack to defuse
NATO's military might before a war could escalate to a nuclear level. Traditionally, however, westerners examine
future wars primarily by focusing their attention on thermonuclear weapons and conventional forces while granting
scant attention to a third dimension of Soviet military operations--saboteurs, secret agents, and special forces.1 This
third dimension of warfare essentially entails the use of military active measures that are special operations involving
surprise, shock, and preemption in the enemy's rear echelons with the ultimate goal of winning a quick victory by
producing conditions conducive to the rapid advance of the main Soviet force.2 The Soviet troops entrusted with
fulfilling these preemptive actions are "special purpose" or "special designation" (spetsnaznacheniya) troops, more
commonly known as Spetsnaz forces. Because of Soviet military doctrine's focus on the need for surprise and
preemption of the use of nuclear weapons, Spetsnaz forces could play a prominent role in the successful
implementation of overall Soviet war strategy. Moreover, current evidence indicates the Soviets are fortifying and
preparing their Spetsnaz apparatus to decimate the capabilities of NATO's military and political organizations in the
opening phases of a potential surprise attack against Western Europe.
Strategy for a War Against NATO
The Soviet Union is none too eager to engage in an overt armed conflict against Western Europe. Nonetheless, one
cannot discount that in the future extraordinary events may error simultaneously which, collectively, could precipitate a
crisis situation between NATO and the Soviet Union/ Warsaw Pact nations. C.N. Donnelly (head of the Soviet Studies
Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, England) suggests that two phases would precede the
outbreak of hostilities: the preparatory phase, and the crisis phase, both designed to employ all measures to exploit
NATO's weaknesses and to reduce its combat potential.3 During the preparatory stage, the Soviets' primary aim is to
weaken the West's capacity to wage nuclear war either by preventing the development or the deployment of new
weapon systems or by depleting the political will to use them. This is accomplished via Soviet political active
measures--for instance, propaganda campaigns, disinformation, and the sponsoring of Western peace movements.
From the Soviet point of view, it is most desirable to operate exclusively at this level, whereby Soviet influence and
power gradually grow in Europe and US power declines until the states of Europe are effectively "Finlandized" and the
United States becomes isolated.
Should these political active measures fail, however, the prewar crisis phase would ensue. This phase is likely to
commence only if some aspect of Soviet policy fails and it then becomes apparent to the Soviet Union that a war is
either inevitable or that war is the only means by which the leadership can achieve a vital policy objective. At this
juncture, the Soviets would initiate unconventional warfare methods (i.e., military active measures) to degrade NATO's
fighting capability, creating favorable political and military circumstances for a successful follow-on campaign, The
Soviets define unconventional warfare as a variety of military and paramilitary operations which include partisan
warfare, subversion and sabotage (conducted during both peace and war), assassination, and other covert or
clandestine special operations.4 These missions are assigned to special units of the Committee of State Security
(KGB--Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopusnosti), to the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate
(GRU-Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravienie), and to airborne, ground, and naval forces, all of which possess
Spetsnaz forces.
At this crisis stage, the Soviets will put these forces into play. From the outset, the ultimate Soviet objective will be the
total political collapse or neutralization of key NATO governments.5 Because frontal military assaults would be less
effective in accomplishing this, Soviet strategy emphasizes the need for initial operations in the enemy's rear echelon,
the domain of Spetsnaz forces whose operations are intended to sow the seeds of a political-military collapse. Indeed,
the Soviets' aim is to prevent the formation of a static, frontline war with NATO on one side and Warsaw Pact forces
on the other.6 Therefore, the Soviets intend to infiltrate NATO's rear area before the outbreak of hostilities to begin
eroding NATO's political and military structure from within.
In the late 1970s, the Soviet army redeveloped its doctrine for the "deep operation" in conventional conditions, and it
determined that the sine qua non of success is surprise.7 While the Soviets do not expect total surprise, they do
believe that, if a sufficient degree of tactical surprise is achieved, then NATO deployment should be patchy and
incomplete, and some corps would still be moving toward their defensive positions when open hostilities begin. Thus,
the primary concern of Soviet strategists and tacticians is to launch low-visibility operations that ensure surprise,
induce operational paralysis, and obstruct enemy mobilization and deployment.
Spetsnaz activity thus would be initiated prior to the advancement of main army forces at the front to ensure surprise.
The Soviets believe that creating such disruption would assure the advancing main forces of a rapid, uninterrupted,
and hence successful advance. The actual damage that a small team could accomplish would be moderate at best;
however, the shock to national morale resulting from such acts as the assassinations of senior politicians,
industrialists, financiers, and the like on the eve of the war would be disproportionately great in comparison to the small
cost of attempting such an operation. It is essential to bear in mind that these Spetsnaz operations are not designed in
themselves to result in a Soviet victory since their task is merely to reduce the enemy's resistance; rather, their
function in the overall Soviet war plan is to enable the main army to conclude war operations in a more abbreviated
and less risky fashion.
Wartime Missions
Prior to the employment of combat airborne and naval Spetsnaz units, the Soviets would preposition other Spetsnaz
forces within enemy territory. In preparation for a war, the Soviets would post to their embassies and consulates a
certain number of Spetsnaz officers and warrant officers in the guise of technical personnel, guards, gardeners,
drivers, and so forth.8 Similarly, groups of professional Spetsnaz agents posing as tourists, delegations, sports teams,
or as passengers on merchant ships, civil aircraft, or commercial trucks would attempt to infiltrate into enemy
territory.9 Finally, on the eve of war, Spetsnaz units, employing various pretexts and covers, may concentrate in
neutral states and enter enemy territory once fighting has commenced. Also at this time, various Spetsnaz elements
would covertly deploy and link up with their indigenous agent assets to set in motion operations in the target area. It is
expected that KGB agent assets would likewise emerge to conduct their special operations and that local Communist,
Leftist, and possibly terrorist elements also might be activated to implement these operations.10 In short, Soviet
Spetsnaz forces would then be poised and ready to strike when necessary.
As the Spetsnaz missions are but one element of an integral war plan, the Soviets believe Spetsnaz objectives can be
successful only if they take place on a massive scale concurrent with operations conducted in the enemy's rear areas
by airborne troops, naval infantry, air assault brigades, divisional deep reconnaissance units, KGB teams, and similar
groups from the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, the main Spetsnaz forces will be dropped simultaneously on all fighting
fronts while the professional "athletics" regiments will operate within range of capital cities, regardless of their distance
from the front-line.11
Soviet Spetsnaz forces entering their operating area in Western Europe would first pursue the following primary
objectives listed in descending order of importance:
The physical incapacitation and destruction of NATO nuclear and chemical warheads, means of delivery, and
related command, control, and guidance elements--both strategic (e.g., Polaris submarines in bases) and
tactical (e.g., air-delivery systems).
The disruption of NATO political, strategic, and tactical command, control, and communications elements. This
also includes the elimination of personnel in key positions.
The physical incapacitation of certain electronic warning and reconnaissance equipment, radars and early
warning equipment, air defense equipment of all types, and possibly ballistic missile early warning systems.
The capture of key airfields and ports to prevent reinforcement or redeployment, particularly by the United
States; the destruction or neutralization of airfield and port facilities not required intact by the USSR, plus
railways and key road junctions important in mobilization plans.
The disruption of key industrial targets and facilities (e.g., power stations, oil refineries, military-electronics
industries, etc.).12
Finally, in the wake of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed in December 1987, allied air assets
and air bases would likely become a much higher priority target for Spetsnaz forces after ground-based assets have
been dismantled.
Indications of Current Spetsnaz
Preparations Against NATO
In recent years reports emanating from Great Britain and Sweden indicate that the Soviets may be positioning and
preparing Spetsnaz elements for possible wartime use against Western Europe. In Great Britain, Soviet defectors
have disclosed that the Soviet Union has established a covert detachment of female Spetsnaz personnel in the area
surrounding Britain's Royal Airfield at Greenham Common since the deployment of the US Air Force land-based
Tomahawk cruise missiles there in December 1983.13 According to these defectors, three to six trained agents from
Warsaw Pact and West European countries--including Great Britain--infiltrated women's protest groups at Greenham
Common and were present "at all times." These agents claim to have trained in camps situated in the Carpathian
military district and the Ural and Volga military districts in the western Soviet Union. Realistic, full-scale replicas of
cruise missile launchers and mock-ups of the Greenham Common defenses have been built at these secret camps to
help train Spetsnaz teams.14 Using these mock-ups, the women were trained to attack the missile sites under war or
surprise conditions in a preemptive strike. Additionally, the defectors claim that the terrain features of these camps
mirror those at various British and French nuclear installations" to enable hit-and-run Spetsnaz raids to be rehearsed
in an environment simulating actual conditions as closely as possible.15 Furthermore, the infiltrated agents are said to
be tasked to act as "beacons" for other Spetsnaz and airborne troops who would be used to attack the missiles in
war.16
Since the early 1980s Sweden has suffered from a steady bout of violations of its territorial waters by foreign
submarines that have been determined to belong to the Soviet Union. The reports issued by the Swedish navy were
granted but passing attention by both the Swedish public and the international media until 27 October 1981, when a
Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground in a restricted area of the Karlskrona archipelago in an incident generally
referred to as "Whiskey on the rocks."17 While the Swedish government issued a strong formal protest, the Soviets
sloughed off the intrusion as an unintentional navigational error. In yet another incident, in October 1982, alien
submarines entered the Stockholm archipelago--another military restricted area--and part of this force even penetrated
Harsfjarden, which is the main base of the Swedish navy. Despite an extensive month-long hunt, Swedish armed units
were unable to catch any submarines. Photographic evidence released later revealed prints and sea tracks made by
these vessels.18 Three submarines had penetrated inshore to the sea walls of the residence of King Carl Gustaf XVI.
After this public disclosure of Soviet violations of Sweden's territorial waters, Soviet submarine incursions continued
despite the public embarrassment and, in fact, increased and became more brazen. Before 1981, Soviet submarines
had departed from Swedish waters as soon as they realized their presence had been detected; ill the ensuing years,
they have behaved more arrogantly, remaining within the restricted area despite increasingly strenuous Swedish naval
activities to curtail their operations.19 During the 1970s the submarine violations had numbered between two and nine
per year. In 1981 they rose to 10 and in 1982 to 40. In 1983 the Swedish defense chief could report 25 certain
violations and at least all equal number possible. The figures listed do not refer do not refer to mere observations but to
fully analyzed incidents, given the final characterization of certain, probable, or possible violations.20
Numerous tentative explanations have emerged to account for these Soviet submarine incursions. A variety of military
missions have been suggested--for example, gathering intelligence on defense installations and navigational
conditions in the vicinity of the Swedish naval bases; shadowing the trials of new weapons; and observing military
exercises. It has been proposed that the intrusions might reflect a significant change in the USSR's operational
strategy in the Baltic, based on its naval predominance in the area.21 Some speculate that the Soviets are attempting
to seek out safe havens for their nuclear missile submarines in times of crisis where they will be difficult to find and
where Western forces would be highly reticent to attempt destroying them so close to allied or neutral shores.22
However, the idea also has been seriously entertained that these missions entail dropping off or retrieving Spetsnaz
teams or agents, training and familiarization exercises in Swedish waters, and testing Swedish military capabilities
and crisis management techniques.23
A Swedish commission tasked with investigating these submarine incidents agreed that preparation for the landing of
Spetsnaz forces is a possible explanation. One of the several signs pointing in this direction is the increase in
submarine incursions in the vicinity of permanent defense installations on the Swedish coast; in earlier years, the
activity appeared directed at Swedish navy exercises and testing of materiel. Furthermore, Carl Bildt, a prominent
member of the Swedish Submarine Commission, has emphasized the importance in today's Soviet strategy of
diversionary Spetsnaz forces that would likely land via submarines to undertake sabotage raids against crucial
command targets as well as vital political and military installations.24 Thus, it is not unlikely--particularly in light of
Sweden's apparent lack of success in controlling Soviet underwater intruders--that the Soviets would be practicing
contingency Spetsnaz operations when the consequences of getting caught appear to be so negligible.
Finally, there is a disconcerting political and military consequence resulting from these continued submarine
incursions: the Europeans seem to have become desensitized to the territorial violations, which have been relegated
to the sphere of everyday occurrences. The publicity surrounding the sensational report of the Swedish Submarine
Commission has subsided and is now nearly forgotten, and new incursions are treated quite routinely.25 As one
observer of these incidents laments, "If Sweden permits the intruders to operate freely in sensitive waters, the first
step will have been taken psychologically toward subservience to the Soviet Union."26
Red Dawn for NATO?
With the increasing emphasis in Soviet military doctrine on winning a war under either nuclear or nonnuclear
conditions, the Soviet Union seems more inclined to wage a blitzkrieg war, employing surprise and shock that would
be facilitated through the use of their Spetsnaz forces. It is significant, however, that a congressional report titled
NATO and the New Soviet Threat, presented to the Committee on Armed Services in 1977, made no mention of the
potential use of such military active measures. While open acknowledgment of Spetsnaz operations has finally
emerged in Western military planning in the early 1980s, greater consideration must be given to these forces in
estimating the Soviet threat to NATO.
For the Soviets, NATO vulnerabilities further enhance the desirability of using Spetsnaz forces against Western
Europe. As a collection of independent nations, NATO would likely require greater time to reach unified action in the
event of a Soviet attack on Europe. Thus, preemptive operations--taking out military and political targets--might prove
tempting because the Soviets may perceive they will encounter little initial resistance as West European leaders
determine what course of action to pursue. Additionally, since the Soviets and their
Warsaw Pact allies have a considerable edge over NATO in numbers of conventional forces, they may deem it
imperative to take out NATO's nuclear forces prior to any overt military assault, leaving NATO highly weakened and
vulnerable to Soviet demands.
In sum, it appears the Soviets ,are most likely to continue their current ploys to undermine Western Europe from
within-for example, by infiltrating and manipulating organizations opposed to Western government policies and by
bullying susceptible nations into passive acquiescence of Soviet actions. However, there are indications that the
Soviets currently are continuing to reinforce their Spetsnaz capability against Europe. Thus, while open warfare in
Europe does not seem imminent, Western military planners must be prepared to contend with the presence of
Spetsnaz forces if war should occur.
Notes
1. Aleksei Myagkov, "The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Soviet Analyst, 9 January 1980, 5.
2. Stephen Seth Beitler, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Operations Forces" (MS thesis, Defense Intelligence
College, 1985), 4.
3. C.N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Maneuver Group: A New Challenge for NATO," Military Review, March 1983,
45.
4. Foreign Intelligence Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, "Soviet Use of Unconventional
Warfare," Military Intelligence, October-December 1982, 3.
5. John J. Dziak, "Soviet Intelligence and Security Services in
the Eighties: The Paramilitary Dimension," Orbis, Winter 1981,786.
6. C.N. Donnelly, "The Development of the Soviet Concept of Echeloning," NATO Review, no. 6, December 1984, 15.
7. C.N. Donnelly, " Operations in the Enemy Rear," International Defense Review 13, no. 1 (1980): 14.
8. Viktor Suvorov, "Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces," Military Review, March 1984,43.
9. Ibid.
10. John J. Dziak, "The Soviet Approach to Special Operations," in Special Operations in US Strategy, ed. Frank R.
Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar, and Richard H. Shultz (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, National Strategy
Information Center, Inc., 1984), 112.
11. Suvorov, 43.
12. Donnelly, "Operations in the Enemy Rear," 36.
13. Yossef Bodansky, "Soviet Spetsnaz at Greenham," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 January 1986, 83.
14. "Greenham Defenses 'Copied for Spetsnaz Training,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 January 1986, 84.
15. Ibid.
16. Bodansky, 83.
17. Kirsten Amundsen, "Soviet Submarines in Scandinavian Waters," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1985, 113.
18. Edgar O'Ballance, "Underwater Hide-and-Seek," Military Review, April 1984, 71.
19. Thomas Ries, "Soviet Submarines in Sweden: Psychological Warfare in the Nordic Region?" International Defense
Review 6 (1984): 695.
20. Amundsen, 113-14.
21. Ries, 695.
22. Lynn M. Hansen, Soviet Navy Spetsnaz Operations on the Northern Flank: Implications for the Defense of
Western Europe (College Station, Tex.: Center for Strategic Technology, Texas Engineering Experiment Station,
Texas A&M University System, 1984), 29.
23. Ries, 695.
24. Carl Bildt, "Sweden and the Soviet Submarines," Survival, July/August 1983, 168.
25. Amundsen, 120.
26. Ibid., 121.
Contributor
Capt Erin E. Campbell (BA, Wake Forest University; MA, Naval Postgraduate School) recently completed work as an
AFIT student at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, where she studied national security affairs,
specializing in Soviet studies. Her next assignment will be with the Soviet awareness team at Bolling AFB,
Washington, DC. Captain Campbell has published articles on the Soviet Union in SAC Intelligence Quarterly and has
written for Aviation magazine. She is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of
expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government,
Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
