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Exeter
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Harkonnen
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Дата
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13.05.2009 00:40:59
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Рубрики
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Современность; Танки;
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Re: ...То видно,...
>>Дискредитация конепции FCS как раз и проистекает из того, что обеспокоенность относительно недостаточности уровня их пассивной защиты и стала одним из главных пунктов для закрытия программы.
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>А источники этизх утверждений можно узнать, где говорится что это "один из главных" пунктов?
Е:
Вообще-то об этом можно в любом серьезном материале, описывающем FCS прочитать.
Мне, простите, лень искать особо, поэтому вот Вам наугад комментарий JDW по поводу отмены FCS:
"Instead, by calling a halt to the programme the army is being given the opportunity to develop vehicles that will provide a significant increase in capability, taking into account the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003.
Additionally, by cutting the FCS manned vehicles the army will ensure that funding is available for the wider FCS programme, incorporating elements of the Ground Soldier System programme, network-centric warfare developments, unmanned ground and air vehicles as well as ground sensors. These are likely to be rolled into existing platforms under the FCS 'spin-outs'.
The original FCS concept was developed at a time when it was perceived that high levels of mobility, combined with increased situational awareness, would provide greater success than high levels of armoured protection. However, in a decade that has seen the main battle tank re-emerge as a vital asset and an emphasis placed firmly on protection against an array of threats, the FCS vehicles were in danger of becoming obsolete before even they could enter service.
Cancelling the programme will provide the funds to develop and build vehicles that have greater relevance to current and future warfare. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has stated a requirement for vehicles that "meet the needs of the full spectrum of conflict". Achieving such a goal will provide a significant challenge to both the army and industry, with the need to balance the need for high manoeuvrability, which is proven to provide advantages in conventional conflict, with the high levels of protection that are essential in a counter-insurgency environment where outmanoeuvring the enemy is not always an option.
There are two main options available: develop a vehicle that meets the dual requirements of mobility and protection; or develop several vehicles intended for specific environments. While the latter approach may sacrifice the logistical, maintenance and training benefits that a common platform provides, it would provide a way to ensure that the full spectrum of challenges is met. This strategy could also incorporate the MRAP (mine-resistant ambush protected) vehicles that have already been procured under a USD25 billion programme.
С уважением, Exeter