ВИФ2 NE

	От	Skvortsov
	К	Skvortsov
	Дата	09.05.2021 10:29:53
	Рубрики	WWII; Флот;

Признаю, ошибся. В 8.21 первое сообщение об авианосце.

At 0720, Petty Officer First Class Amari Hiroshi, pilot of the Tone Number 4 Aichi
E13A float plane, immediately radioed back to the Nagumo fleet that he had sighted
ten ships, distance 240 miles from Midway, heading southeast at twenty knots. Nagumo
received the message sometime before 0745. In the narrative summary of the operation
in the official report, Nagumo states he received the message at 0500 (0800 Midway
time). In the same document, however, in the detailed action log portion of the narrative, there are entries at 0745 and 0747, which establish that Nagumo gave orders acknowledging Amari’s report. At 0745, Nagumo gave orders to reverse the initial order to rearm the Japanese carrier attack aircraft (kankos) on board Akagi and Kaga with bombs and now rearm them with torpedoes. These orders are consistent with the fact that
Nagumo received the Amari message before 0745. In addition, the conclusion that
Nagumo received Amari’s message at 0745 is supported by American intelligence in
Hawaii that at 0747 Nagumo sent in the clear that Tone’s Number 4 plane was directed
to determine the types of ships seen and remain in contact.

At 0758, the Tone search plane reported back to Nagumo that the ten- ship fleet
seen had changed course to 080 degrees, but the float plane did not radio back the
types of ships seen. The officers on the deck of Akagi were totally frustrated and at
0800 sent out another message for the scout crew to immediately report back the types
of ships being observed.

At 0811, just as the sixteen SBD-2s from Midway arrived and were closing in on
Hiryu, Tone’s Number 4 plane radioed Nagumo that the ten ships it was observing were
five cruisers and five destroyers. Nagumo and his staff were relieved that there were no American carriers present.

Ten minutes later at 0821, the float scout plane signaled that a ship in the rear of the ten-vessel formation appeared to be a carrier. The message astonished Nagumo and his staff, but some present on the bridge still clung to the words “appears to be” as a justification that it still was not certain that a U.S. carrier was present. However, the size of the American fleet present went against this conclusion, and Nagumo proceeded to make his subsequent decisions on the basis that at least one U.S. carrier was in the corridor northeast of Midway. At 0830, Tone’s search plane reported back that two additional enemy ships had been observed and appeared to be cruisers.