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Skvortsov
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B~M
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Дата
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04.05.2021 11:11:15
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Рубрики
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WWII;
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Вот тут немного подробнее про проблемы с базированием в Норвегии:
>>>>had found no petrol.
>>>ну, довольно странно было бы найти на льду озера горючее, однако и сказать, что служба снабжения (мистер Такой-то и мистер Сякой-то) прое***лась тоже нельзя, отсюда такие речевые выкрутасы.
>>Вроде проблемы были с доставкой из порта.
>>Enemy aircraft had been very active at Andalsnes during the whole of the previous day, but the jetty had not been hit. The railway, however, had been cut by German bombers in several places between Andalsnes and Dombaas and would take twelve hours to repair.
>
>Или озаботиться иными средствами доставки из порта до "ледового аэродрома" по/вдоль ж/д? Но джентльменам не хватало "волшебного пенделя".
Lake Lesjaskog is a long, narrow lake, about eight miles by a half mile, bounded by woods. High and desolate mountains skirt the southern shore but there is easy access on the north from the road and railway connecting Dombaas and Aandalsnes, which lie almost within a stone's throw. The servicing flight arrived there in two parties on 23rd and 24th April, having experienced great difficulty in sorting their stores (which were neither listed nor labelled) and getting the essential items sent forward by the only two lorries which could still be found in Aandalsnes. A runway measuring about 800 by 75 yards had been prepared with local labour, which had also swept the snow from a track between the main road and the lake edge.[7] Unfortunately, only one inadequate route had been swept from the edge to the runway; this was half a mile long and a foot deep in snow, and the stores had to be conveyed over it on three horse-drawn sledges, intermittently available. The village of Lesjaskog was two miles away, so that even the provision of forage for the horses involved difficulties. However by 5 p.m. (24th April), the servicing flight had laid out fuel and ammunition along the runway in small dumps and collected every possible tin, jug, or other container for refuelling. It had at once been perceived that the essential work of refuelling and starting machines would be difficult: only two refuelling troughs had been despatched, and the starter trolley could not be used as the batteries were uncharged and no acid had been sent with them. Moreover, the ground staff included only one trained armourer to maintain seventy-two Browning guns for the squadron. Two guns from a naval battery of Oerlikons, which was landed at the same time as the R.A.F. stores, had also arrived for anti-aircraft defence and a platoon of Marines to guard the petrol supply. Such was the position when No. 263 Squadron, commanded by Squadron-Leader J. W. Donaldson, took off from the deck of the Glorious, with four maps among eighteen pilots, none of whom had been in action previously, 180 miles from shore, in a snowstorm. Their aircraft were Gladiators—obsolescent biplanes which could operate from small landing-grounds. Escorted by two Skuas of the Fleet Air Arm, they descended on the lake at 6 p.m. without serious mishap, although the heaped-up snow at either side of the runway had melted during the day so that its ice surface was half covered by trickling water. Meanwhile, the Germans had flown high above the lake and reconnoitred it. Our aircraft were immediately refuelled and one section placed at instant readiness, but the enemy did not return that evening.
The night (not surprisingly) was bitterly cold. When daylight came, carburettors and aircraft controls were frozen stiff, and in the absence of batteries the engines were difficult to start. It was nearly two hours after first light when the first aircraft took off to protect the landing ground against an attack; one Heinkel was shot down but the enemy succeeded in dropping some bombs on the lake. At 7 a.m. two aircraft were sent to patrol the battle area, but the servicing party was still struggling to get more engines started when the main enemy onslaught began an hour and a half later. This was clearly timed to coincide with the opening of the land operations at Kvam, in which it was one main function of our own aircraft to give much-needed support. Heinkel bombers approached in threes, which broke formation as they came up to the target to bomb and machine-gun the lake from various heights. At least five Gladiators were destroyed before they could get into the air, but two rose to meet the first big attack and accumulators then helped up others. But many of the ground staff, who were strangers to the unit and unfamiliar with their aircraft, took shelter in the trees, from which they did not emerge, although the naval contingent dauntlessly fought their guns (including some borrowed Lewis guns) and although they could see their own officers and sergeants at their tasks of starting engines and refuelling and rearming aircraft.
In these circumstances, it took between one and one-and-a-half hours to refuel and rearm a single machine. Consequently most of the Gladiators were bombed and set alight or disabled by blast while awaiting fuel and ammunition on the ground.
Two sections of three aircraft took off during the forenoon, of which one renewed the patrol of the battle area at Kvam and gave encouragement to British and Norwegian forces alike, while the other sought to protect the landing ground. Altogether, forty fighter sorties were carried out during the day, in which the pilots engaged thirty seven separate enemy planes and shot down at least six. But there could be only one ending to a situation in which the enemy could attack our sole landing ground with numerically superior forces and almost without intermission, bringing up more dangerous aircraft (Junkers 88s) as the day wore on, and could safely surmise that we had no reinforcements within reach. In the afternoon the lake was fast becoming unusable as the bombs broke up the runway (132 craters were counted in the immediate vicinity of the lake); the belted ammunition was exhausted; and unarmed pilots were taking off in the brave but forlorn hope of turning enemy machines off their course and distracting their bomb-aimers by what could only be feint attacks.
An alternative landing place had been notified to the British at Setnesmoen, a Norwegian peace-time army camp just outside Aandalsnes, with a parade ground which was considered capable of forming a tolerable one-way landing ground. The necessary work had been put in hand at midday on the 23rd. The Squadron-Leader therefore flew to this position and sent back a message that the rest of the squadron were to transfer from Lesjaskog, where all aircraft no longer serviceable were to be wrecked and burned. The serviceable aircraft (apart from his own), by this time numbering only four, were moved accordingly, and at midnight the ground staff followed, bringing with them petrol and ammunition and leaving thirteen wrecked aircraft behind. The next day (26th April) it was decided that three aircraft should patrol the area of the landing ground and Aandalsnes, but they merely drove the enemy bombers to operate at heights to which the lack of oxygen equipment forbade our pilots to follow. The fourth aircraft acted as a scout in the Dombaas-Otta area, reporting troop movements to Force Headquarters, while the fifth was sent to examine Sunndal, where a German landing had been reported. Its engine failed completely, so that the pilot was obliged to descend by parachute, and by nightfall three others were unserviceable on account of damage which there was no means of repairing.
The one Gladiator left was not flown again. Instead, hopes were pinned on concealing Setnesmoen from the enemy until the arrival of No. 46 Squadron (Hurricanes), whose commanding officer landed on the evening of the 27th. He urged the Air Ministry to send his squadron at once, accompanied by key ground staff and servicing equipment in flying boats. But the Ministry ruled against this reinforcement: evacuation had now been decided upon, and in any case Hurricanes were not lightly to be expended. There remained the possibility of using No. 254 Squadron (Blenheim Fighters), which had been moved to Hatston in the Orkneys, and from there had succeeded in flying two one-hour patrols by three aircraft over Aandalsnes on the 25th, when they shot one Heinkel into the sea. On the 29th these patrols were renewed and plans made to increase their duration by refuelling the aircraft at Setnesmoen. But the Germans bombed Setnesmoen the same day, so the patrols found themselves unable to land.
Our attempt to base much-needed fighters in Central Norway was therefore abandoned after a trial of strength lasting forty-eight hours. The resulting situation was the more grave for our land forces as the Air Ministry was unable to accede to General Paget's requests for heavy-bomber attacks, whether against the enemy's guns massed at Kvam or against his lines of communication down to Lillehammer or against his airfield, on the ground that the targets were out of range.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-NWE-Norway/UK-NWE-Norway-8.html