Re: Впрочем, на...
>>> http://red-arm.ru/?post=13&d=21
>>
>>Только из другого места.
>НА red-arm все таки прослеживается резкое, в два раза уменьшение потерь среди офицеров 43-е году по сравнениею с 42-м, что противоречит Вашему исходному посту
Это не противоречие, а ваше неумение читать.
Вот две цитаты из вашей ссылки
раз:
"В 1942 г. действующие армия и флот потеряли убитыми 161 857 офицеров, пропавшими без вести - 124 488 чел.,"
два:
В 1943 г. армия и флот потеряли убитыми 173 584 и пропавщи_ ми без вести 43 423 чел.
Где тут в два раза?
>Впрочем, имхо, делать выводы такого характера по данным Кривошеева невозможно, ввиду их мягко говоря, неполноты.
Так я же не абсолютные числа ищу, а относительные (проценты). Для этого неполнота отчетных данных не мешает.
>В вермахте офицеры в бой по уставу вообще не должны были ходить,
Это, мягко говоря, неправда.
Вот пара цитат из англоязычных работ:
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/store/book.aspx?bookcode=s9010
"Rommel had his own particular approach to the 'mission command' principle, one that actually enhanced another principle emphasized by German doctrine: commanders were to lead from the front. This was the only way a commander could properly evaluate the situation on the battlefield and acquire a good knowledge of both the terrain and his enemy, which enabled him to react swiftly to any unexpected event. A commander facing a superior enemy could choose a different approach into battle, while a commander facing a weak enemy could take full advantage of success obtained on the battlefield. In a word: flexibility, which is the capability to properly assess the situation and to arrange the most suitable solution to attain the objective".
Далее приводится статистика потерь среди офицерского состава в Африканском корпусе:
"In spite of this improvement, only introduced in April 1942, DAK's officers paid a heavy price for their 'lead from the front' principle and the high level of losses suffered by German officers was not always easy to replace. Between 18 November 1941 and 20 February 1942 21.Panzer Division had 47 officers killed, 61 wounded and 40 missing; it is worth noting officers represented 10 per cent of all killed, but only 4 per cent of all wounded and 2 per cent of all missing. Figures for the period 21 May-20 September 1942 are similar, with 57 officers killed (7.5 per cent of all killed), 214 wounded (7.4 per cent, but 59 of them lightly) and 17 missing (2.4 per cent). The pattern, showing how officers were more likely to be killed than wounded or captured, was repeated across the other divisions. Losses suffered by 90.leichte Afrika Division between November 1941 and 31 March 1942 included 27 officers dead (7.6 per cent of the total), 27 wounded (3.6 per cent) and 86 missing (2.3 per cent). Between 20 October and 21 November 1942 15.Panzer Division had 13 officers killed (7 per cent), 28 wounded (5.8 per cent) and 29 missing (3 per cent)".
Вторая цитата из
http://www.ospreypublishing.com/store/book.aspx?bookcode=t146x
"German doctrine and tactics were founded on the principles of speed, manoeuvre and flexibility, and the command system thus needed to be able to work quickly and to react promptly to any unexpected situation. Caution and circumspection were seen as the most dangerous enemies, which might easily lose a commander the advantage and enable the enemy to gain precious time,
understand German intentions and react accordingly. On the other hand, fast movements and bold attacks would unbalance the enemy and pave the way for the decisive battle of annihilation.
It was also important for German commanders to lead their units forward. In this way they could quickly appreciate the situation at the front and react promptly. Such a method was required not only in the lower echelons, i.e. for company and battalion commanders, but brigade, division and even corps
commanders were required to lead their units from the front. Although Rommel was probably the most daring and bold Panzer Division commander, there were many instances of German commanders leading their own units
from the front down to corps level. Guderian himself was often to be seen with the leading elements of his corps, resolving potentially dangerous problems.
The ability to take decisions quickly and to issue orders rapidly was also vital. An expedient order issued at the right moment was always better than a formal
one that arrived too late".
Т.е. наоборот, от командиров всех уровней требовалось возглавлять своих подчиненных в боевых порядках.
>C уважением,
>Keilformation
С уважением, Пауль.
