>а там именно в нехватке боевых кораблей было дело, а не в нехватке ТР (версию про нежелание капиталистов слишком сильно помогать СССР озвучивать не будем)?
Про "Пьедестал" Meanwhile the urgency of getting a convoy through to Malta was considered by the Cabinet to override all other tasks, including the despatch of another convoy to Russia. The story of that operation ('Pedestal') will be told in another chapter.2 Here we need only note that the Nelson and Victorious, the cruisers Nigeria, Kenya and Manchester and eleven destroyers of the powerful escort all came from the Home Fleet. The convoy left the Clyde on the 4th of August and passed the Straits of Gibraltar six days later. In the heavy fighting which marked its eastward progress the old aircraft carrier Eagle, the Manchester and one Home Fleet destroyer were sunk, while the Nigeria and Kenya were both damaged. It was the end of August before the surviving ships rejoined Admiral Tovey.
Про "Торч" ещё конкретней
Although, therefore, in terms of strategy the developments of the autumn of 1942 were favourable to the Allied cause, in terms of meeting Russia's pressing needs the immediate consequences were less favourable. Because the North African landings caused a great proportion of the Home Fleet's strength to be diverted south, it was impossible to run another convoy to North Russia for a time. Forty ships were ready loaded by the end of September, but to send them would have meant postponing Operation 'Torch' for three weeks. Very heavy pressure was applied by the Russians to get us to send the convoy; but the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet held firmly to the need to place first strategic requirements first. On the 22nd of September Mr. Churchill told President Roosevelt that the time had come to tell Stalin that there would be no PQ 19, and that we could not run any more PQ convoys until January.
>Ну так он бы и обеспечивал, наверное, если бы сил было побольше. Но на все (пушки+танки+самолеты+корабли) денег\сил\времени не хватило. И имели то, что имели.
Ну так если посчитать, то... На пике (1939-1940 гг.) расходы на флот составляли 18-19% от оборонного бюджета, в середине 20-х - 10%. Несложно прикинуть, что при ритмичном финансировании (и без типичных заскоков с любимой флотофобами "малой войной") можно было потянуть не меньше, чем было у тех же немцев... без дополнительных расходов вообще.
