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К И. Кошкин
Дата 20.02.2016 12:58:32 Найти в дереве
Рубрики Современность; Флот; Версия для печати

Страхи американцев в 50-х и 60-х описаны здесь

https://usnwc.edu/getattachment/bfd7502d-682c-444d-946c-63245227ae68/Hiding-in-Plain-Sight--The-U-S--Navy-and-Dispersed.aspx

Акценты вполне расставлены, кмк:

THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1950S
One of the primary challenges facing the U.S.Navy in the early years of the Cold War was how to employ its command of the sea to influence events ashore. The Soviet Union was essentially a land power; it did not possess a fleet capable of challenging Americanmaritime supremacy. Instead,American andWestern European policy makers expected a land attack against Western Europe and the Middle East to constitute the Soviets’ principal offensive thrust in any future conflict.4 As early as 1948, the U.S. Navy began envisaging an offensive strike force that would seek to slow the Soviet ground advance acrossWestern Europe.5 By 1956, the carriers of the Navy’sMediterranean-based Sixth Fleet were tasked with not only slowing any Soviet attack headed west and south but also striking key targets in the southern European part of the Soviet Union.6
In order for their aircraft to reach their targets, however, the Sixth Fleet’s carriers had to move into the easternMediterranean, close to the Soviet Union, and survive there long enough to conduct launch operations. In the mid-1950s, the carriers’ chances of doing so appeared slim. A series of air-defense exercises over the preceding years had demonstrated the fleet’s inability to defend itself against even relatively small Soviet air raids.7 In 1956, Admiral John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, conceded in his annual report, “It is widely recognized that a carrier task force cannot provide for its air defense under conditions likely to exist in combat in the Mediterranean.”8

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THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1960S
The Sixth Fleet focused most of its attention on the threat posed by Soviet long-range aviation in part because there was no significant Soviet naval presence outside home waters at the time. In the mid-1950s Soviet surface combatants started to visit foreign ports occasionally, and they began conducting annual exercises in the North and Norwegian Seas in the late 1950s, but there were still relatively few Soviet submarines operating in the Mediterranean. The commander of the Sixth Fleet from 1958 to 1959, Vice Admiral Clarence E. Ekstrom, felt the submarine threat facing Sixth Fleet was “quite manageable.”28


Словом, боялись базовой авиации - и, можно сказать, только её и боялись.