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26.11.2006 15:36:58
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Re: а какие...
а я самого себя процитирую
:)
>не была ли это обычная программа попила денег, под ширмой новый веяний ?
нет,это была смена стартегии в Европе - с "опоры на ЯО" на опру на не собственно вонный потенциал
http://situation.ru/app/j_art_1155.htm
(отрывок)
Методики Клайна, учитывающие именно НЕвоенные потенциальные возможности стран, возможно, лежат в основе принимавшихся в те времена стратегических решений руководства США. Так, среди прочих он обосновал те же выводы, к которым пришел в ходе своих работ и В.Шлыков (см.выше п.2) - о гораздо большей значимости прежде всего не собственно военного потенциала стран Западной Европы в противостоянии Запада с СССР.
цитаты (основанные на его работе 1975г)
"European NATO has the basic resources, both material and human, to counterbalance Russia. It is an area with a larger population, greater industrial production, and higher technical know-how than the U.S.S.R. Ray S. Cline points out that Western Europe potentially could become "the most powerful regional center in the world if its resources were successfully mobilized for a common political purpose." (19а)
"During the mid-1950s, when the U.S.S.R. began developing a substantial strategic force capable of striking the United States, NATO doctrine was modified to deal with the new superpower relationship.
Initially, the Americans countered the Soviet developments by deploying a potent arsenal of "theater nuclear weapons." Alliance doctrine at the time envisioned a simultaneous use of theater nuclear forces in Europe and a strategic nuclear massive retaliation against the U.S.S.R. By the early 1960s, the enormity of potential collateral destruction and civilian casualties in the NATO Europe countries began to penetrate the American consciousness (a notion probably shared by most Europeans for several years). Accordingly1 the United States shifted its emphasis by advocating improved nonnuclear (conventional) capabilities to reduce the chances of nuclear conflict. Simultaneously, Washington promoted a doctrine of flexible response to cope with the realities of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship."(20)
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