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FVL1~01
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23.06.2005 02:01:15
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11-19 век;
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Re: Ну при...
>Полным к ней презрением со стороны короля. Что учитывая наличие только легких калибров и изобилие картечи в ущерб ядрам (заточка на ближний бой) - ХОРОШЕЙ ее не делает.
Но тем не менее тактика полевой артиллерии у шведов была на высоте? Позволю себе цитаты с одного форума:
Contrary to popular myth Karl XII used artillery in most of his major victories. The artillery played an important part at Narva 1700, The crossing of the D?na in 1701 and Holowczyn 1708. Klizsow 1702 was fought with only 4 3-pounders but this was due to the fact that the corps containing the artillery train had not yet joined Karl's army.
However both of the active commanders at Poltava Lewenhaupt andn Rhenskj?ld had fought their battles with little or no artillery and probably felt that speed and surprise was more vital than the (limited) firepower of the remaining Swedish guns.
Of course Stenbock made extensive use of artillery at both Helsingborg 1710 and especialy at Gadebusch 1712.
It was always there at all of the Swedish actions. There were another 30 Swedish guns at Poltava which were left out of the main action for example, giving a total of 34. At Helsingborg there were 34 Swedish guns and at Gadebusch 30. But at Narva there were 37 and Holowczyn 28, so basically it was very constant.
The number of guns per 1000 men was fairly highin many battles compared to other armies:
At Narva: 3.7 guns per 1000 men
At D?na: 5.14 guns per 1000 men (only counting the assault force and it's artillery support, not including the batteries of Riga's fortifications and the remaining army)
Holowczyn: 2.24 guns per 1000 men
Helsingborg: 2,43 guns per 1000 men
Gadebusch: 2.14 guns per 1000 men
As acomparison the French army of 1690-1714 had 0.8-1.5 guns per 1000 men. At Blenheim Eugene and Marlborough had 1.17-1.26 guns per 1000 men.
Of course there were the battle such as
Kliszow: 0.33 guns per 1000 men
Fraustadt: 0 or 0.63 guns per 1000 men
Poltava: 0.25 guns per 1000 men
in which the artillery played an insignificant or non-existent role.
At Narva and D?na the artillery provided effective fire support for static batteries at the start of the battle.
Once tha battle had started the artillery was left behind due to the terrain (snow at Narva, the batteries were afloat at D?na) and the lack of mobility
At Holowczyn the one battery provided covering fire for the crossing of Charles and the Lifeguards while the other battery provided flanking fire against any attempt by Sjeremetiev to move against the Swedish crossing. This battery played a vital part in the defeat of R?nne's counter-attack.
The use of artillery in Helsingborg and Gadebusch battles was part of the battleplan from the start and not the result of the Swedes getting stuck long enough for the artillery to have time to deploy.
At Helsignborg the artillery provided direct support to the infantry from the start, there never was a question of advancing the battle line without the artillery. At Gadebusch the artillery actualy formed a part of the advance guard and first covered the deployement of the remainder of the army and then advanced together with the infantry in order to provide contious support. These "new" tactics were the result of Stenbock's preference for proper combined arms tactics and Cronstedt's improved artillery tactics. Cronstedt was one of the most energetic and talented commanders in the history of the Swedish artillery (second only to the great Lennart Torstensson).