От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Пуденко Сергей
Дата	13.11.2006 18:54:06
Рубрики	Прочее; Управление & методология;

RAND for CIA (SAG) "Measuring National Power" 2006 survey (eng)

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файл с сайта RAND в конце. Короткий абстракт методики. Кому интересно - вникайте, что за моделью Упомянут Моргентау (его также упоминал Шушарин)

полностью файл (пдф) выложу в копилку, но ничего конкретизирующего там нету. Издеваются, собаки

а это вот об них - сам Никита ПЕТРОВ! ни фига в арифметике не понимает(путает проценты, с пунктами), ну ладно, все новорусские аналитики окончили бизнес-колледжи имени Ротшильда церконоприходского уровня


Итак,мы продолжаем НАШЕ ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЕ!
Маэстро,туш!

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http://www.strana.ru/stories/01/12/18/2223/250700.html
14 июня 2005
Китай нанес удар по престижу Пентагона и ЦРУ

Номинальная военная мощь Поднебесной, согласно выводам исследовательской корпорации RAND, всего на 6% отстает от уровня США, и этот разрыв будет сокращаться

Никита Петров

Обнародование на прошлой неделе выдержек из «секретного» доклада директору национальной разведки США о военном прорыве Китая в последние годы преследует достижение сразу нескольких целей. Среди них могут быть, например, увеличение бюджета Пентагона и разведсообщества Америки; предупреждение Пекину о необходимости контролировать юань; удар по Европе, намеревающейся отменить эмбарго на поставки оружия Поднебесной; реакция на активность России в отношениях с Китаем и возможность согласованных действий РФ, КНР и Индии. Но при всем этом «китайский фактор» Вашингтон действительно беспокоит. Рост расходов на разведку

Признанию того факта, что Пентагон и ЦРУ фактически "прозевали" наращивание военной мощи Китая, предшествовало несколько знаковых событий. Например, недавняя публикация в азиатской версии британского журнала Time. «Более 3 тысяч компаний в США подозреваются в шпионаже в пользу Китая, писал Time. По данным издания, большинство из компаний работает в районе Калифорнии, где сосредоточены основные центры высоких технологий в Америке. «Китай пытается разработать военную технику, которая могла бы конкурировать с американской и не остановится перед кражей наших технологий», - заявил изданию высокопоставленный сотрудник ФБР. При этом, по данным британского журнала, в последние годы Китай начал использовать обычных туристов и бизнесменов для сбора данных об американских производствах. Также потенциально опасными считаются американские университеты, где в настоящее время учится 150 тысяч студентов из Китая. «Сотрудники китайских спецслужб беседуют с ними до и после их поездки в Америку, спрашивают, что они видели, а иногда прямо указывают на информацию, которую им хотелось бы узнать», - утверждает издание.

Последним из шпионских скандалов в США стал арест двух китайцев, отправивших в КНР компьютерные комплектующие на сумму в 500 тысяч долларов. По данным ФБР, эти комплектующие могут быть использованы в военных целях. В настоящее время китайцы ожидают судебного разбирательства.

Конечно, разведсообщество США реагирует - национальная безопасность под угрозой. Согласно данным журнала, из-за увеличившейся угрозы со стороны Китая, ФБР было вынуждена увеличить свой штат на сотни агентов и направить по одному сотруднику в каждый научно-исследовательский центр при министерстве энергетики США. Но все это стоит больших денег а, следовательно, неплохо было бы и бюджет увеличить. С введением в США поста директора национальной разведки, которую занял бывший посол США в ООН и Ираке Джон Негропонте и которому отныне формально подчиняются все 15 спецслужб США, именно он управляет бюджетом почти в 40 миллиардов долларов. По некоторым данным, в 2006 финансовом году, который начнется 1 октября 2005 года, этот бюджет уже составит порядка 50 миллиардов долларов. Осваивать огромные деньги в Америке тоже умеют. Равно как и находить причины для увеличения расходов государства на контрразведку.

Новый старый враг Пентагона

Агентство Washington ProFile сообщило недавно, что исследовательская корпорация RAND, известная своей близостью к американским разведывательным и военным кругам, проанализировала номинальную мощь держав мира. Оценка производилась на основе трех критериев: во-первых, ресурсов и возможностей, которыми обладает та или иная страна; во-вторых, насколько успешно государство использует эти ресурсы в процессе внутреннего управления и регулирования; в-третьих, насколько успешно государство использует свои возможности на международной арене. Совокупная мощь всех государств мира составляет 100 процентов.

Согласно выводам RAND, на сегодняшний день на долю США приходится 20 процентов, на долю Европейского Союза (оценивался как единое целое) и Китая - 14 процентов, Индии - 9, Японии - 3, России, Бразилии и Южной Кореи - по 2 процента. По прогнозу RAND, к 2015 году США достигнут пика своей мощи, после чего начнется процесс ее уменьшения. Европейский Союз к этому времени утратит значительную долю своей мощи, а Китай и Индия - усилят. Мощь иных государств не претерпит особых изменений.

За несколько дней до публикации выдержек из «китайского» доклада предупреждение Китаю последовало и со стороны главы Пентагона Дональда Рамсфелда. Он, выступая на конференции министров обороны стран Азии в Сингапуре, заявил, что, по его данным, Китай тратит на наращивание военного потенциала гораздо больше, чем официально объявляет. По некоторым расчетам, речь может идти не о порядка 30 млрд. (официально заявленный военный бюджет КНР), а о 40-45 млрд. долларов ежегодно: финансирование разработок новейших видов вооружений проходит по другим, закрытым, статьям бюджета.

Это приводит к тому, что Китай быстро сокращает известное до недавнего времени отставание в оборонной сфере от своих соседей по региону - России, Японии, Южной Кореи, Индии, а также Тайваня. Этот факт вызывает озабоченность, в частности, у Токио, который ведет с Пекином борьбу за политико-экономическое влияние в регионе и отношения с которым у Японии в последнее время все ухудшаются. Японский парламент в минувшем году внес поправки в конституцию, позволяющие значительно усилить оборонное строительство перед лицом растущей «китайской угрозы».

Но больше всех наращивание военной мощи Китая, безусловно, тревожит Тайвань. Сегодня, как считают эксперты, в южных провинциях КНР размещено более 700 тактических ракет, нацеленных на Тайвань, и ежегодно этот арсенал увеличивается минимум на 120 единиц. По числу самолетов ВВС НОАК превосходит тайваньскую сторону. Однако китайские истребители в большинстве своем (за исключением российских и произведенных по нашим лицензиям Су-27 и Су-30МК2) отстают по боевым характеристикам. Впрочем, если военная реформа пройдет успешно, то НОАК уже к 2010 году будет иметь подавляющее преимущество над тайваньскими вооруженными силами в воздухе и на море.

Китай усиливается и готов выходить на международный уровень. Во всяком случае, именно в таком ключе расценили наблюдатели недавние заявления Пекина о возможности открытия базы НОАК в Киргизии - для противодействия событиям наподобие узбекским в Андижане.

Все больше стремятся «обложить» Китай и США. Пентагон уже использует в «антикитайских целях» базы в Узбекистане и Киргизии, кстати, все чаще выступая с просьбами как к местным властям, так и к России, относительно размещения на этих базах самолетов-разведчиков АВАКС. Продолжаются и переговоры США с Вьетнамом - по возможности аренды у бывшего противника некогда советской базы в Камрани, с которой можно контролировать Китай с юга.

Правда, несмотря на все это, как считают аналитики Пентагона, разрыв между НОАК и вооруженными силами США пока не только не сокращается, но и продолжает увеличиваться. Военный бюджет США превосходит китайский более чем в 10 раз. Кроме того, как подчеркивают эксперты, американцы имеют возможность испытывать новые вооружения, отрабатывать стратегию и тактику ведения боевых операций во время реальных войн - в Ираке и в Афганистане. Китайская же армия со времен конфликтов с Вьетнамом в 1970-х годах прошлого века боевых действий не вела.

Евроэмбарго и война валют

Все это происходит в то время, когда в ЕС думают, как быстрее снять эмбарго на поставку вооружений Китаю. Санкции были введены европейцами в 1989 году после подавления студенческих выступлений на площади Тяньаньмэнь в Пекине, однако теперь Китай все активнее настаивает на их отмене. Принципиальной поддержкой на этот счет ему удалось заручиться у правительств ведущих европейских держав, включая Францию, Великобританию, Германию и Италию. Упорствовать продолжают лишь некоторые небольшие европейские страны, которые ссылаются на нерешенность в КНР проблемы с правами человека. И конечно, свое безусловное неодобрение высказывают США, грозящие в случае принятия положительного решения наложить серьезные ограничения на сотрудничество с ЕС в научно-технической сфере. Хотя Пекин и заявляет, что снятие эмбарго в большей степени является политическим шагом и не приведет к немедленному заключению крупных контрактов на поставки оружия, Вашингтон опасается, что из Европы в Китай так или иначе потекут новейшие образцы техники, например радары и системы наведения ракет. Вместе с тем есть все основания полагать, что, несмотря на противодействие Вашингтона, Китай и ЕС все же смогут найти общий язык по проблеме снятия эмбарго уже в этом году, и тогда возможности Пекина для модернизации своих вооруженных сил значительно расширятся.

Официальный же Вашингтон давит на то, что со снятием эмбарго баланс сил в регионе, и в частности в Тайваньском проливе, будет нарушен. То есть опять же сможет затруднить возможное вмешательство американцев в «тайваньский вопрос», если такое вмешательство понадобится.

При этом, как указывают западные же эксперты, европейские компании, несмотря на эмбарго, уже занимаются военной модернизацией Китая. Так, британская компания Surrey Satellite Technologies Ltd. «по мере сил» увеличивает возможности китайцев в борьбе с вражескими спутниками, турбореактивные двигатели Rolls Royce устанавливают на китайские бомбардировщики JH-7A, а Eurocopter трудится над созданием военных и транспортных китайских вертолетов. Немецкие дизельные двигатели бесшумно работают на китайских подлодках-невидимках класса Song, а французские двигатели - не стесняясь шума - на новом сторожевом корабле.

Снятие эмбарго может только увеличить существующее сотрудничество. Конечно, Китай вряд ли ринется покупать европейские вооружения, но взаимодействие КНР с ВПК Евросоюза, определенно, возрастет. То есть и ЕС получит уже официально сотни миллионов евро, и Китай - не менее официально - современные технологии. Америке же не нужна ни богатая Европа, ни технологичный и хорошо вооруженный Китай.

Отметим также и тот фактор, что, по утверждениям экономистов, уже несколько лет не стихает «битва между юанем и долларом». И американская валюта в ней пока не выигрывает.

За последние десять лет Китай добился впечатляющих успехов в социально-экономическом развитии, усилении комплексной мощи: его ВВП достиг 1,4 трлн. юаней, среди развивающихся стран он является самым крупным получателем иностранных инвестиций, по объему внешней торговли занимает шестое место в мире, в значительной степени повысил уровень жизни своего населения. Специалисты инвестиционного банка «Морган Стенли» считают, что сегодня на долю КНР приходится 4 процента мировой экономики, оцениваемой в 32 трлн. долларов, и что в ближайшее время Китай станет четвертым по значению двигателем мировой экономики после США, Японии и Германии.

По общепринятым оценкам, склады китайских предприятий ломятся от товаров народного потребления, которыми можно заполонить любой национальный рынок. И это не только изделия из дешевого текстиля, но и прежде всего высококачественная электроника. Уже сейчас каждая третья фотокамера, третий кондиционер и телевизор, четвертая стиральная машина, продаваемые на мировом рынке, китайского производства. А впереди ожидается важный прорыв Китая в области науки и техники, использовании новейших телекоммуникационных, космических и других технологий.

И это начинает серьезно беспокоить ведущие экономические державы. Министры финансов и главы центральных банков «большой семерки» (без России) по сути неоднократно просили Пекин поднять курс юаня, который жестко привязан к американскому доллару и колеблется вместе с ней. Когда доллар слабеет, а в последнее время это наблюдается довольно часто, слабеет и юань. Соответственно дешевеют китайские товары, что еще шире открывает им путь на мировой рынок и что, естественно, не устраивает многие страны. И прежде всего Соединенные Штаты, где уже ведут речь о войне доллара и юаня. Однако Китай до сих пор не согласился, да и вряд ли пойдет навстречу таким просьбам, тем более из-за океана. Валютная политика - его внутреннее дело, и решать его он будет так, как это ему выгодно.

«Великая тройка»

Особое значение имеет для Вашингтона и явное развитие отношений во всех областях не только между Китаем и Россией, но и в формате сразу трех государств, чье совокупное население составляет почти половину населения планеты: Китая, Индии и России. Очередным примером этого стала недавняя встреча глав МИД трех стран в российском Владивостоке. Политики в Москве, Пекине и Дели заявляют, что всестороннее сотрудничество трех стран обеспечивает стабильность и предсказуемость в полной мере на своих рубежах и во многом в мире, стремятся защищать «мир во всем мире», содействовать развитию многополярного мира, в котором «нет места» гегемонизму, силовому давлению и терроризму. А США не без оснований переводят все это на себя - политика Вашингтона не нравится ни Москве, ни Дели, ни Пекину.

В то же время Пекин непрерывно следит за переменами в развитии международной обстановки, которые могут оказать влияние на безопасность Китая. Понимают китайцы и то, что главной парой геополитических конкурентов в наступившем веке будут их страна и США.

По большому счету незримая борьба между ними уже идет. Она, несомненно, станет очевидной при окончательном решении тайваньской проблемы, которая, несомненно, когда-нибудь решится. По словам официальных представителей КНР, руководство страны остается верным своим принципам и предпринимает искренние усилия, чтобы добиться мирного объединения Тайваня с материковой частью Китая. Однако тайваньские власти отказываются принять предложение правительства КНР об объединении по принципу «одна страна - две системы» и расширяют сепаратистские действия. Не секрет, что во многом эти действия определяются расчетом на американскую помощь. Отметим, что неприятия известных способов «воссоединения Великого Китая» до сих пор особо не следовало ни из Москвы, ни из Дели, а вот недовольство Вашингтоном - например, в его действиях в Ираке - было выражено и по-прежнему выражается чуть ли не единодушно.

Источник - Страна.ру


http://www.americaru.com/news/6847
Мировая мощь
4:01 pm, 11 июня 2005 года. GMT -5

Мировая мощь Исследовательская RAND Corporation проанализировала номинальную мощь держав мира, сообщает Washington ProFile.

Оценка производилась на основе трех критериев: во-первых, ресурсов и возможностей, которыми обладает та или иная страна; во-вторых, насколько успешно государство использует эти ресурсы в процессе внутреннего управления и регулирования; в-третьих, насколько успешно государство использует свои возможности на международной арене. Совокупная мощь всех государств мира составляет 100%.

Согласно выводам RAND, на сегодняшний день на долю США приходится 20%, на долю Европейского Союза (оценивалась, как отдельная страна) и Китая - 14%, Индии - 9%, Японии - 3%, России, Бразилии и Южной Кореи - по 2%. По прогнозу RAND, к 2015 году США достигнут пика своей мощи, после чего начнется процесс ее уменьшения. Европейский Союз к этому времени утратит значительную долю своей мощи, а Китай и Индия - усилятся. Мощь иных государств не претерпит особых изменений.

http://www.washprofile.org/ru/node/1304

http://www.washprofile.org/ru/node/197
Китайская угроза
[17.06.2005]

В 1492 году Христофор Колумб отправился в плавание, рассчитывая найти путь в Китай. Вместо этого он открыл новый континент, на котором впоследствии сформировались Соединенные Штаты Америки. Последние полвека отношения между США и Китаем были весьма противоречивыми: обе страны изначально считали друг друга противниками и даже воевали друг с другом (в Корее), позже отношения значительно потеплели и страны стали стратегическими партнерами (во время Холодной войны), а ныне все больше американцев считают Китай соперником, а также будущей супердержавой.

Исследовательская RAND Corporation проанализировала номинальную мощь держав мира. Оценка производилась на основе трех критериев: во-первых, ресурсов и возможностей, которыми обладает та или иная страна; во-вторых, насколько успешно государство использует эти ресурсы в процессе внутреннего управления и регулирования; в-третьих, насколько успешно государство использует свои возможности на международной арене. Совокупная мощь всех государств мира составляет 100%. Согласно выводам RAND, на сегодняшний день на долю США приходится 20%, на долю Европейского Союза (оценивалась, как отдельная страна) и Китая - 14%, Индии - 9%, Японии - 3%, России, Бразилии и Южной Кореи - по 2%. По прогнозу RAND, к 2015 году США достигнут пика своей мощи, после чего начнется процесс ее уменьшения. Европейский Союз к этому времени утратит значительную долю своей мощи, а Китай и Индия - усилятся.

В конце 2004 года Национальный Совет по Разведке\National Intelligence Council опубликовал краткосрочный прогноз развития ситуации в мире (носит название "Картография Будущего"\Mapping the Future), в котором предсказывается, что Китай к 2020 году значительно усилится и превратится в ключевого игрока на глобальном пространстве.




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June 8, 2005
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF215.pdf
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Gregory F. Treverton and Seth G. Jones, Rand Corporation-- 'The main categories of capabilities in the CIA Strategic Assessments Group assessment of power are gross domestic product (GDP), population, defense spending, and a less precise factor capturing innovation in technology. In the SAG estimate, the United States is first but hardly the only power. The United States holds about 20 percent of total global power, and the European Union (EU) (considered as a unified actor) and China about 14 percent each. India holds about 9 percent; Brazil, South Korea, and Russia hold about 2 percent each. Moving toward 2015, the United States will first gain power, then decline somewhat, ending up at about where it is now. The EU, however, will lose power, as will all non-U.S. members of the G-8. The gainers will be China and India.
...“Each of the ten largest corporations in the world has a yearly turnover larger than the GNPs of 150 of 185 United Nations (UN) members, including such countries as Portugal, Israel, and Malaysia. More subjectively, at least 50 NGOs have more legitimacy than 50 UN member nations.” '






Measuring National Power
Gregory F. Treverton, Seth G. Jones
Approved for public release; distribution
ISBN: 0-8330-3798-6
The proceedings described in this report were hosted by the RAND National Security
Research Division, which conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Department of
the Navy, the U.S. intelligence community, allied foreign governments, and foundations.
Published 2005 by the RAND Corporation
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Preface
Understanding the nature and force of power long has been central to the study of international
relations and to the work of the U.S. intelligence community. This elusive task is now
all the more important because the United States enjoys an unprecedented amount of economic,
military, and technological might in comparison to other states. Yet it must exercise
its power in a world not only of state-related constraints on that power but also of transnational
forces and non-state actors (NSAs) that act as competitors, qualifiers, constrainers,
and, sometimes, enhancers of that power.
This report summarizes and extends the results of a two-day workshop the RAND
Corporation hosted with the CIA’s Strategic Assessments Group (SAG), in cooperation with
Barry Hughes and his International Futures (IFs) model. That workshop brought together a
diverse group of modelers, specialists in international relations, and thinkers about power
from both the public and the private sectors. The lead presentations on the first day were by
Paul Herman of the SAG, Barry Hughes, and Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. On the second day, the opening remarks were delivered by Jessica
Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment, Nathan Gardels, editor, New Perspectives
Quarterly, and editor-in-chief, Global Editorial Services, Los Angeles Times Syndicate/
Tribune Media; and the Chief of the SAG. We appreciate the time and effort of those
experts, many of whom we consulted more than once. Needless to say, though, we hold these
good people blameless for any shortcomings that remain.
This research was conducted within the Intelligence Policy Center (IPC) of the
RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis
for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense
agencies, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign
governments, and foundations. Comments are more than welcome. The principal author can
be reached by email at Greg_Treverton@rand.org. He is also the acting director of the Intelligence
Policy Center. For more information about the Center, please contact him by email,
or by phone at 310-393-0411, extension 7122. More information about RAND is available
at www.rand.org.


Contents
Preface.................................................................................................. iii
Figures and Table ......................................................................................vii
Summary............................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER ONE
Framing the Issues......................................................................................1
CHAPTER TWO
Measuring State Power.................................................................................3
Capabilities and How to Measure Them ...............................................................3
Conversion, Performance, or Transformation..........................................................4
Breakout Groups........................................................................................5
Strategic Resources...................................................................................5
Converting Resources into Power ...................................................................5
Instruments of Power ................................................................................6
CHAPTER THREE
Incorporating Non-State Actors and Forces and Soft Power into Power Calculations ..............9
Metrics for Non-State Actors ......................................................................... 10
The Nature of Soft Power ............................................................................ 12
Breakout Groups...................................................................................... 14
Types of Non-State Actors......................................................................... 14
Types of Transnational Actors and Forces......................................................... 15
Parsing Soft Power ................................................................................. 17
CHAPTER FOUR
Next Steps ............................................................................................ 19
1. Strengthen the International Futures Data Set .................................................... 19
2. Improve the Formulation for Forecasting Power .................................................. 20
3. Enhance the Model Foundations for Forecasting Power .......................................... 20
4. Develop Scenarios.................................................................................. 21



ix
Summary
At the dawn of the 21st century, the concept of power is more important than ever and also
more debated. How to measure the power of the United States is fundamental to the major
debates over American foreign policy. If, as the globe’s unipolar power, the United States has
power beyond precedent, then its foreign policy problem is simplified, because friends and
allies will have to follow it whether they like it or not and would-be adversaries will be cowed
by the prospect of that power.
If, on the other hand, that power is less than sometimes assumed or less usable than
hoped, the United States may face the prospect that erstwhile allies and friends will, almost
as a law of physics, want to see it taken down a peg. They will, if not balance against it, then
at least sit on the fence in circumstances like Iraq. They will be inclined to view the United
States’ travails with a certain Schadenfreude, happy to see its dominant power reduced to a
more normal size but prepared to stand with the United States if it were in serious trouble.
Measuring State Power
State power can be conceived at three levels: (1) resources or capabilities, or power-in-being;
(2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and power in outcomes, or
which state prevails in particular circumstances. The starting point for thinking about—and
developing metrics for—national power is to view states as “capability containers.” Yet those
capabilities—demographic, economic, technological, and the like—only become manifest
through a process of conversion. States need to convert material resources into more usable
instruments, such as combat proficiency. In the end, however, what policymakers care most
about is not power as capability or power-in-being as converted through national ethos, politics,
and social cohesion. They care about power in outcomes. That third level is by far the
most elusive, for it is contingent and relative. It depends on power for what, and against
whom.
The first day of the workshop concentrated on the first two levels: material capabilities
and conversion. The main categories of capabilities in the Strategic Assessments Group
assessment of power are gross domestic product (GDP), population, defense spending, and a
less precise factor capturing innovation in technology. In the SAG estimate, the United
States is first but hardly the only power. The United States holds about 20 percent of total
global power, and the European Union (EU) (considered as a unified actor) and China about
14 percent each. India holds about 9 percent; Brazil, South Korea, and Russia hold about 2
percent each. Moving toward 2015, the United States will first gain power, then decline
somewhat, ending up at about where it is now. The EU, however, will lose power, as will all
non-U.S. members of the G-8. The gainers will be China and India.


x Measuring National Power

The assessment suggests possible alliances that could match the power of the United
States acting alone or with its traditional allies. It also examines the most likely locations for
future conflict, based on six criteria. Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of the
eight most conflict-prone bilateral balances involving China. The IFs model on which the
SAG assessment is based is state-centric. It has data for 164 countries. As Figure S.1 summarizes,
it uses eight blocks of drivers: domestic sociopolitical, international political, population,
economic, agricultural, energy, technology, and environmental resources.
The work of Ashley Tellis and his colleagues examines how national resources or capabilities
are transformed or converted through state processes into more usable power, in
particular military power. The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities, though it
gets to what might be called power-in-being. It is about usable power, although it stops short
of power as the abilities to achieve particular outcomes in particular circumstances. It probes
beyond states as “containers of capability” to look at ideas, organization, and politics. The
actual process of applying the framework to states is very data intensive, so it is important to
focus on a handful of the most critical factors.
Figure S.1
Drivers of National Power

Assessing Non-State Actors and “Softer” Forms of Power
The second day focused on the changing state system. The most obvious change is that states
now have more competitors, named by what they are not—non-state actors (NSAs). They
range from terrorists and drug traffickers to advocacy groups, think tanks, and private corporations.
Those groups, and the transnational forces they create, then become the framework
within which state power must be exercised. Sometimes, as with World Bank prescriptions
for poorer nations, the exercise of these transnational forces is quite direct and raises questions
about the differential vulnerability of states to those forces. Other transnational forces
are values; they may be less easily manipulated by any actor but also may have differential
impact on states: for example, a new “wave of democracy” could be important for Syria but
would not have much effect on Denmark.
The traditional distinction between hard power and soft power is not entirely persuasive.
For one thing, economic power might be thought of by the United States as softer than
military alternatives but still be regarded as hard by the recipient. More important, the language
tends to regard soft power as subordinate and second-best, whereas in fact policymakers
would prefer to achieve their desired outcomes with soft power. If state power ranges
from coercion to bribery to persuasion, then the last is the most cost effective; it means convincing
others that your aim is also theirs. Imagine, instead, a continuum ranging from ideal
power (persuasion) to worst-case power (military).

Measuring softer forms of power is no mean feat, though some metrics are available
—for instance, university attendance by foreigners, or content analysis of media. One
direct way of making comparisons across states might be to ask the question: Where would
you live if not in your own country? Looking at cases is an indirect way to understand softer
forms of power. The recent treaty banning land mines was a remarkable confluence of NSAs
acting in concert with medium-sized powers. The NSAs controlled the agenda, setting both
the terms of and the deadline for a treaty. Another indirect way to measure the influence of
NSAs is by looking at trends, of which all six seem to contribute to redistributing power
away from states and toward NSAs:
• Access to information. The government monopoly eroded.
• Speed of reaction. Markets react in seconds, but governments are much slower, so the
information technology (IT) revolution inevitably moved action away from governments
toward nimbler organizations.
• New voices. The process created new channels of information and new, credible
voices. The loudest voice, that of government, became less dominant.
• Cheaper consultation. Because of nearly unlimited bandwidth, communication costs
began to approach zero. Coordinating large and physically separated groups became
much cheaper.
• Rapid change. Governments, by nature, are more likely to sustain the status quo than
drive change, and so NSAs are often the drivers by default.
• Changed boundaries in time and space. IT again is driving the change, just as the invention
of the printing press undermined the church’s role as broker between people
and their God.
According to one provocative argument, the soft power of the United States peaked
after the fall of the Soviet Union when, in a quite real way, “entertainment—the power of
ideas as spread by the media—finished the job of containment.” Now, however, the backlash,
especially in the Muslim world, is not just a reaction to U.S. policies. To those for
whom life centers on faith, America appears immodest and materialistic. It is not easy for the
United States to do much about that backlash.
When, moreover, the United States acts like a “normal” power, it breaks the consensus
on which soft power depends. For the unipolar power to act not only unilaterally but also
as a normal power—that is, only in its own interest—is, by definition, to undermine the basis
of the consensual hegemony granted to it by others who expect it to look after their interests
as well. Now, the “other superpower” is not a state but global public opinion, and Nelson
Mandela can be regarded as the leader of that superpower. For example, in the contest
for “whose story wins?” at Abu Ghraib, soft power topped hard power, and the United States
was demoted from hegemon to preponderant power.
Next steps for RAND, the SAG, and the International Futures model will be to
strengthen the International Futures data set by adding relevant variables; to improve the
formulation for forecasting power; to enhance the model foundations for forecasting power;
and to develop scenarios as a means of adding vividness and exploring discontinuities.


1
CHAPTER ONE
Framing the Issues

The goals of the workshop were twofold: (1) to examine in detail the attributes of, and metrics
for, understanding national power; and (2) to push beyond national power to the force
and implications of non-state actors, transnational forces, and what is usually called soft
power. The starting point was a confluence of recent work by both the Strategic Assessments
Group and RAND, and their cooperation with Barry Hughes and his International Futures
(IFs) model. The first day of the workshop focused on states and on what is customarily
called hard power—population, technology, economics, and military might. The second day
shifted attention to the role of non-state actors (NSAs) and forces, and to what are usually
called the softer elements of power—ideas and culture.
State power can be conceived at three levels: (1) resources or capabilities, or powerin-
being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and power in outcomes,
or which state prevails in particular circumstances. The starting point for thinking
about, and developing metrics for, national power is to view states as “capability containers.”
Yet those capabilities—demographic, economic, technological, and the like—only become
manifest through a process of conversion. States need to convert material resources, or economic
prowess, into more usable instruments, such as combat proficiency. In the end, however,
what policymakers care most about is not power as capability or power-in-being. They
care about power in outcomes. That third level is by far the most elusive, for it is contingent
and relative. It depends on power for what, and against whom.
The first day of the workshop concentrated on material capabilities and conversion.
The second day examined some of the forces and constraints through which state power
must be exercised. Of particular interest were the roles of transnational actors, ranging from
international organizations to drug traffickers, and the influence of ideas and culture.
With regard to capabilities, the Strategic Assessments Group (SAG) recently published
a classified study forecasting the likely structure of the international system in 2015.
That study develops a sophisticated and provocative set of rankings of national power. That
work attempts to fuse macro-level economic, military, demographic, and technological factors
into a summary measure. Its recent publication was greeted with great interest by
Washington policymakers, including at the most senior level.
The report grew out of SAG collaboration with Barry Hughes, who developed the
International Futures modeling system. It is intended to serve as a thinking tool for the
analysis of long-term country-specific, regional, and global futures across multiple, interacting
issue areas. IFs is heavily data-rich. It represents major agent-classes (households, governments,
firms) interacting in a variety of global structures (demographic, economic, social,
and environmental). Hughes broke IFs into its three parts: foundations and characteristics of
the power measure, strengths of that measure, and its known weaknesses.

With regard to performance or conversion, Ashley Tellis and his RAND colleagues,
in Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age (MR-1110-A, 2000), argue that appreciating
the true basis of national power now requires not merely a meticulous detailing of
visible military assets but also a scrutiny of such factors as the aptitude for innovation, the
soundness of social institutions, and the quality of the knowledge base. All of these factors
may bear upon a country’s capacity to produce not only effective military power but also a
full quiver of national power instruments. The framework measures three distinct areas: national
resources, national performance, and military capability. It then elaborates on the rationale
for assessing each of these areas and offers ideas on how to measure them in tangible
ways.
Breakout group assignments were made in advance. For the first day, participants
were divided into three groups—one each on strategic resources, conversion, and power instruments
—and were given relatively precise tasks. The first group was to identify three key
strategic resources; frame an ideal indicator for each, even if that indicator is not readily at
hand or measurable; and come up with its most recommended indicator. The second was to
examine how conversion differs across states and what causes those differences. For instance,
is conversion different for security-scarce states, like Taiwan, than for more secure ones?
Again, what would be the most recommended indicator? The third group was asked, since
power instruments reflect policy choices, how might that menu of choice differ in 2020 from
now? What might be on the menu in the future that is not now? And again, how might that
list differ between security scarce and more secure states?
The second day focused on the changing state system. The most obvious change is
that states now have more competitors, named by what they are not—non-state actors. They
range from terrorists and drug traffickers to advocacy groups, think tanks, and private corporations.

One of the principal investigators wrote, “Each of the ten largest corporations in the
world has a yearly turnover larger than the GNPs of 150 of 185 United Nations (UN) members,
including such countries as Portugal, Israel, and Malaysia. More subjectively, at least 50
NGOs have more legitimacy than 50 UN member nations.”1 Yet how should those actors’
power be conceived, let alone measured? As a first cut, might the state framework of strategic
resources, conversion, and power instruments be useful, even if the items in that framework
were very different—members, not armies; legitimacy, not foreign aid?
Again, breakout group assignments were made in advance, one each on the topics of
the three morning sessions. Again, the groups were given relatively precise tasks. The first
began to sketch a framework for defining the power of non-state actors, either on the basis of
the framework of strategic resources, conversion, and power instruments or in some other
way. The second examined how states will respond to transnational forces. It developed a
typology of states and then considered what outcome is likely to result when a particular type
of state confronts a given transnational force. The third sought to identify the three key elements
of soft power; frame the ideal indicator of a nation’s soft power, even if that indicator
is not readily at hand or measurable; and then come up with its most recommended indicator.
While the United States was the focus of the conversation, the effort to develop indicators
of softer forms of power was global.
____________
1 Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001), p. 49


CHAPTER TWO
Measuring State Power

Measuring power matters directly in today’s American policy debates. If the United States is
really the unipolar state, one that is preponderant almost beyond historical analogy, then its
policy problem is simplified. Other nations will have little choice but to follow it, whether
they like it or not. They will be like Canada in the famous saying attributed to former Prime
Minister Lester Pearson: “The United States is our best friend, whether we like it or not.”
On the other hand, if the United States is less dominant, then a national security strategy
based on preponderance—on the assumption that all the major powers will be on America’s
side—may not hold true. What if other nations begin to align themselves not with the
United States but against it, or at least hedge their bets?

Capabilities and How to Measure Them
The main metrics of world power used in the SAG assessment are gross domestic product
(GDP), population, defense spending, and a less precise factor that includes innovation in
technology. Power is summed as a percentage of total global power: Fourteen nations hold at
least a 1 percent share. The United States holds about 20 percent of global power; the
European Union (considered as a unified actor) and China, about 14 percent each. India
holds about 9 percent. Brazil, South Korea, and Russia hold about 2 percent each. In moving
toward 2015, the United States will first gain power, then decline somewhat, ending up at
about where it is now. The EU, however, will lose power, as will all non-U.S. members of
the G-8. The gainers will be China and India.
The assessment identifies possible alliances that could match the power of the United
States acting alone or with its traditional allies. It also examines the most likely locations for
future conflict. Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of the eight conflict-prone
bilateral balances involving China. The IFs model on which the SAG assessment is based is
state-centric. It contains data for 164 countries. As Figure 1 summarizes, it uses eight blocks
of drivers: domestic sociopolitical; international political; population; economic; agricultural;
energy; technology; and environmental resources..

Conversion, Performance, or Transformation
Ashley Tellis and his RAND colleagues offered a reexamination of the concept of national
power. They began by assuming that to understand the true basis of national power requires
not merely a meticulous detailing of visible military assets. It also requires a scrutiny of
capabilities embodied in such variables as the aptitude for innovation, the nature of social
institutions, and the quality of the knowledge base. For Tellis and colleagues, all these factors
influence a country’s capacity to produce the one element that is still fundamental to
international politics—effective military power.

Their core argument is that national power is divided into three interlinked realms:
(1) natural resources, (2) national performance, and (3) military capabilities. The first realm
encompasses the level of resources either available to, or produced by, a country. The second
realm encompasses national performance. It is derived from the external pressures facing a
country and the efficiency of its governing institutions (nominally labeled the “state”) and its
society at large. The third realm encompasses military capability, which is understood in
terms of operational proficiency or effectiveness. Military capability is produced as a result of
both the strategic resources available to a military organization and its ability to convert those
resources into effective coercive power. These three realms taken together describe national
power.
The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities, though it gets to what might
be called power-in-being. It is about usable power, though not about outcomes. It drills
down from states as containers of capability to look at ideas, organization, and politics. Its
ultimate objective is to understand the process by which national resources are converted
into military capabilities—especially capabilities that will improve combat proficiency. Tellis’
approach can be applied to any country, and his team applied the analysis to China. But
since the exercise can easily be overwhelmed by data, it is imperative at a macro level to focus
on the three or four most critical factors. The interplay of power resources, transformative
capabilities, and outcomes dominated the discussion.

Breakout Groups
Strategic Resources
The first group’s objective was to find variables that help identify the great powers in the
international system in 2020. The most important variables include population, human
capital, economic power, technological prowess, and military capabilities. The group argued
that the single most important form of power in 2020 will continue to be military power.
The best single indicator of military power is the defense budget. Other indicators might
include expenditures on various areas of the military, such as ground, air, and naval forces.
However, these quantitative indicators do not always correlate well with military
effectiveness. History demonstrates that smaller armies have defeated larger opponents
because of better training, doctrine, and strategy.
Economic power is the foundation of military power. The most important single
indicator is GDP. Like defense budgets, however, GDP provides only a limited picture of
power. It says little about the composition of the economy, such as whether it is spearheaded
by leading sectors or dominated by old and declining ones. Other important variables
include human capital and technology. The best readily available measure of human capital
is the average year of educational attainment. For technology, the best indicator is per-capita
expenditure on research and development.
Ultimately, however, none of these indicators provides a complete picture of power
in 2020. Articulating an ideal indicator is difficult, perhaps impossible. But it is likely to have
something to do with quality: the ability of states to convert these components into outputs
and make use of them. For example, is there a sense of unity and purpose in the state to
mobilize and pursue national ambitions?
Converting Resources into Power
The second group examined how states translate resources into power. The group argued
that while many of the issues explored by Tellis and his colleagues were critical, there is still a
need to think about broadening the scope of indicators. In general, four areas are important
for power conversion.
The first area encompasses economic issues, including access to capital. Researchers
have generally focused on domestic economic resources and capabilities. However, changes
in the global economy have created an impetus to find new indicators that measure the
ability of states to utilize global resources for domestic activities. One example might be
outsourcing domestic jobs to companies in foreign countries. A second area includes a state’s
institutions and political structures. Important indicators include the level of corruption and
the size of the “selectorate”: What is the size of the group to which a leader actually is
accountable? This indicator matters because it affects the ability of states to allocate
resources.

A third area incorporates values, trust, social capital, and other aspects of civil society.
How do people cooperate and interact in political and economic relationships? To measure
this, one might explore the World Values Survey and look at community organization,
volunteering, and newspaper readership. The final area is social structure. This includes such
aspects as societal stratification, and ethnic and class divisions.
Instruments of Power
The third group discussed future national security threats and useful instruments to address
them. It argued that future threats to the United States will be caused by a combination of
economic, military, environmental, and other variables. An abbreviated list includes the
following:
• Major economic changes, such as the possibility of a flattening world economy and a
rise in offshoring and outsourcing
• Environmental hazards, such as global pollution
• Military threats, including terrorism
• Transnational organized crime
• Demographic changes, such as a rise in megacities, aging, and immigration
• Technological and educational challenges, such as a decline in U.S. educational
dominance
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
• Ideational changes, such as a decrease in liberalism or a reverse democratic wave
• New health threats, such as SARS
• An increase in new actors, such as diasporas, “smart mobs” with advanced sensors and
communications technology, and technologically savvy grievance groups.

A menu of old and new power instruments will be needed to combat these threats.
Several old power instruments need to change. One is the military. In the past, the military
focused on conventional and nuclear warfare. In the future, it will need to focus on
countering asymmetric forces. Another traditional instrument includes economic
instruments. Smarter government instruments would not stifle markets and innovation but
would provide social protection to populations. A third is diplomacy. Diplomacy in the
United States has traditionally been about selling the American way of life to foreign
governments and populations. A better approach might be to promote local groups,
institutions, and policies that are compatible with U.S. goals. For example, the U.S.
government might provide assistance to groups abroad that do not explicitly support the
United States, and might even oppose it, but that support ideals and policies that are in the
U.S. interest. This strategy may help legitimize the United States and help it better achieve
policy change through diplomacy. This would be akin to the covert U.S. support for
anticommunist but left-of-center groups in Europe in the wake of World War II.
Other changes in instruments might require government reorganization. The
objective would be to decrease the stovepipe tendency across and within government
departments and to improve cooperation. A second change might be to establish a new
relationship between the government and NSAs, which some have called “deep coalitions.” A
final change would be the adoption of strategic restraint. Exercising restraint in America’s use
of hard power abroad will decrease counterbalancing and increase regional cooperation.
9


CHAPTER THREE
Incorporating Non-State Actors and Forces and Soft Power into
Power Calculations

The second day transitioned from national power to non-state actors and transnational values
and norms. It demonstrated that familiar distinctions—for instance, between public and
private or foreign and domestic—are indeed becoming more blurred, and the role of the
state is changing. To be sure, nation states are not about to go away, and they will remain the
core of international politics for the foreseeable future. But they exercise power around and
through supranational institutions and are, in turn, affected by them and by sub- and transnational
actors.
In addition to those new actors, the second change in the nature of the state system is
what might be called the “Westphalian flip”: The Treaty of Westphalia codified a system
that was multipolar but with individual states sovereign within their domains. Now, the system
is unipolar, but the states, including the unipolar United States, are permeable to transnational
forces. Those forces are of two sorts, and states are differentially permeable. One set
of transnational forces consists of actors, both legitimate (international organizations) and less
legitimate (traffickers in drugs, arms, or humans).
The second set of forces is structural: values and norms as they come to take form in
international “regimes.” These forces may result at least in part from actions by nations or
other actors, but they also may come to have an existence of their own. States are differentially
permeable to both transnational actors and forces: a new democratic wave would bear
on Syria, but not Denmark. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has more influence
with poor countries than rich ones. But what accounts for how much particular states are
subject to these transnational forces? Are there important differences in permeability to legitimate
actors, illegitimate ones, and structural forces?
Soft power results from what states and non-state actors do and from the structural
forces in the system. Softer forms of power seem more and more important in a more connected
world. Yet governments cannot readily manipulate most soft power. Regis Debray,
the French leftist, long ago argued that Hollywood would be a more powerful global influence
for America than the Pentagon or the CIA ever hoped to be. If he is right, that influence
still comes from America in general, not from specific interests or policies of the United
States. Economic power is more a facilitator of other power, especially military, than usable
power in its own right. There are too many suppliers and too many investors to make unilateral
sanctions much of a threat in any but the rarest of circumstances. How, then, should soft
power be conceived and measured, both on its own terms and in relation to states?

The hard-soft distinction, though, is deceptive on several grounds.1 The words tend
to imply that “hard is good” and “soft is bad.” Yet in practice, policymakers believe the reverse:
If they can prevail through the exercise of soft power, that is much better than having
to apply, for instance, military muscle. Joseph Nye emphasizes that soft power is the power
of attraction, not the power of coercion. When other countries are persuaded that American
ideals or policies are legitimate, indeed desirable, then the “soft power” of the United States
is enhanced.
Nor is the distinction between the two very precise. Economic power, for instance, is
sometimes regarded as soft and sometimes as hard. It depends on who is doing the perceiving.
From the perspective of the United States, economic sanctions may be softer than military
force, yet from the perspective of the target, those sanctions may look very hard indeed.
Rather than hard and soft, it makes more sense to think of power along a continuum from
coercion, at one end, to persuasion or attraction at the other, with bribery or economic inducements
perhaps in the middle. State power is the power to coerce with threats, to induce
with payments, or to attract or co-opt to do what the persuader wants.
Metrics for Non-State Actors
If power is ultimately the capacity to determine outcomes, it is often said that the capacity of
NSAs to affect both international and domestic outcomes is growing. Yet measuring that effect
is elusive. As always, it is tempting to measure what can easily be measured, and as a result
the most important factors may be excluded. To take an example from national power,
gross domestic product statistics not only undervalue unpaid work, especially that done by
women, but also exclude the nation’s natural resources, which have value in the national income
accounts only as they contribute to producing current goods and services.
NSAs have long been active in human rights, the environment, and national resources,
and they are increasingly cooperating with UN agencies. They might be thought of
as existing along a continuum from pure advocacy at one end to pure service delivery at the
other. Some of the largest non-government organizations, or NGOs, are churches, which are
mostly at the service delivery end of the spectrum. Yet the line separating churches from
what are customarily thought of as NGOs, organizations like Amnesty International, is
blurred.
So how should we begin to understand, if not measure, the role and power of NSAs?
One way is by looking at cases and their outcomes. Another is to examine trends. For instance,
the process that led to the international treaty banning land mines broke all the usual rules. It
brought together NGOs and medium-sized governments, like Canada, Australia, and Belgium.
All five permanent members of the UN Security Council initially opposed the idea.
But the NSAs not only put the text on the agenda at the beginning, they also set the goal and
terms of the debate: “Join us or not, but we will not compromise the basic goal.” And they
achieved a treaty in 14 months. The keys to success were that, on the one hand, there was
little money in land mines, hence weak private interests advocating on their behalf. On the
____________
1 The distinction owes most notably to Joseph S. Nye, Jr. See The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower
Can’t Go It Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); and Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004).


other hand, a wide coalition of groups—from Vietnam veterans to health and agriculture
advocates—favored a ban.
In the negotiations for a global warming framework agreement that was the precursor
to the Kyoto Protocol, the medium-sized countries were again central, and the NSAs were
again far out in front. Agreement was reached in a matter of months, not years. States remain
key, but NSAs shape and channel the power of states. Governments can dig in, as the United
States has done on global warming. But when an eventual global warming treaty is produced,
it will be produced within the framework that was shaped by the Kyoto process.
A second way of conceiving the power of NSAs is to look at trends. Surely, the IT
revolution, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, redistributed power away from states
and toward NSAs, in at least six ways:

• Access to information. The government monopoly on information has eroded. In the
1980s, environmentalists became concerned about old growth forests in the northwestern
United States. But how much of those forests had been lost? The government
did not say. But the Wilderness Society used Landsat images to make its own
estimates. That use of commercial imagery, commonplace now, was revolutionary
then.
• Speed of reaction. Markets react in seconds, but governments are much slower, so the
IT revolution inevitably moved action away from governments toward nimbler organizations.
• New voices. The process created new channels of information and new, credible
voices. The loudest voice, that of government, became less dominant.
• Cheaper consultation. Because of nearly unlimited bandwidth, communication costs
began to approach zero. Coordinating large and physically separated groups has become
much cheaper—witness the role of ethnic diasporas in the United States.
• Rapid change. Governments, by nature, are more likely to sustain the status quo than
drive change, and so NSAs are often the drivers by default. That was true of the civil
rights movement, although the term NGO was not in use then. Rapid change, however,
often has an ugly side and produces a backlash, like the violent Islamic reaction
in many parts of the world today.
• Changed boundaries in time and space. IT again is driving the change, just as the invention
of the printing press undermined the church’s role as broker between people
and their God. Is the state’s role as broker being similarly undermined? Surely, definitions
of “us” and “them” are changing, notably in Europe and the Muslim world.

In response, though, participants observed that the tug of war between states and private
groups has been going on for a long time: Recall the Rothschild banks, the Masons, or
the Red Cross. At the same time, the share of GNP controlled by states is generally going up,
not down. NGOs are hardly new. If there is a difference now, it is one of scale. Not only are
NSAs ubiquitous, but it is not necessary to be a Rothschild to get access to decisionmaking.
Notice the difference between the private relief activities of the Red Cross and the land
mines treaty. Red Cross activities begin and remain private. But it was governments that in
the end signed the land mines treaty, and governments will enforce it. Yet to the extent that
the technology for enforcing the treaty is public, individuals or non-government groups can
monitor the rules directly.

NSAs have influence in a number of ways. At the extreme, a Pacific island country,
Vanuatu, in effect turned over its climate delegation to a London-based NGO. With 900
climate-related treaties in existence, governments, even big ones, simply cannot manage them
all. They become dependent on NGOs. In other cases, NGOs may have influence in part
because they are congruent with the interests of important states; in that sense, what Freedom
House does is congruent with U.S. interests in democracy. By contrast, NGOs are weak in
Japan. Part of the reason is Japan’s tax system, but the weakness goes deeper. Many NGOs
are led by women, who have been excluded from the traditional corridors of power. In that
sense, the weakness of the NGO sector is a mirror of deeper weaknesses in the making of
Japanese policy.
In sum, four kinds of reaction or backlash to the growing role of NSAs can be identified.
One, especially in the richer countries, is the increased salience of security, the traditional
domain of states, after September 11. A second reaction, more visible in poorer countries,
is the growing recognition that those countries may have too little governance instead
of too much. They need more legitimate authority, not less, to enforce contracts, open information
flows, and the like.
A third reaction, in poor countries but perhaps more so in rich ones, is based on legitimacy.
For all their faults, governments in democracies have the legitimacy that comes
with being elected. But no one elected Amnesty International. Moreover, governments are
intended to develop an integrated public interest, while most NGOs have narrow or special
interests. They also tend to be all-or-nothing organizations, not eager for the compromises
that are the stuff of politics. American democracy is starting to display the fact that piling
special interests on top of one another is not the same as integrating across them to produce a
public interest.
Finally, if the middle class is in some sense a creation of the state, then a fourth
backlash may derive from the changing role of the state. Governments used to control the
value of their currencies but can do so no longer. They now have little control over where
“their” companies locate research or production, and those companies are less and less theirs.
The U.S. debate over outsourcing may be a symptom of that backlash.

The Nature of Soft Power
National borders are surely more porous now, and the nature of power itself may be changing.
In one direction, by 2010 a third of California’s smog will come from China. In the
other direction, China’s border is also porous, and “Net-izens” there outnumber Communist
Party members. Power now derives from economics and from the pull on hearts and minds;
power, especially soft power, depends on consent. It depends on the dominant power not
behaving as a normal state but rather taking the interests of other states into account when
framing its actions.
In the latter sense, the soft power of the United States may already have peaked. In
Iraq, in particular, it looked to others as though it was pursuing, if not its own unilateral interests,
then surely its own unilateral vision. In soft power terms, the United States may already
have been demoted from hegemon to predominant power. Ideas defeated the Soviet
Union. Debray’s argument is on the mark. Or as Michael Eisner might put it, entertainment
finished the job of containment. That was the high point for the “colonels of Disney.” Now,
there is more competition, ranging from Al Jazeera to the Chinese web.
Moreover, the backlash, especially in the Muslim world, is not just a reaction to U.S.
policies. To those for whom life centers on faith, America seems immodest and materialistic.
Masoumeh Ebtekar, the highest-ranking woman in the Iranian government, says that a
woman covering up her body should be considered super-feminism because it frees her from
sexual objectification and harassment in the workplace. The backlash also occurs within the
United States, for behind the lascivious media images, the country is socially conservative.
When the United States acts not only unilaterally but also as a normal power—that
is, only in its own interest—it undermines the basis of the consensual hegemony granted to
it by others, who expect it to look after their interests as well. The “other superpower” is now
not a state but rather global public opinion, and Nelson Mandela can be regarded as the
leader of that superpower. In the contest for “whose story wins?” at Abu Ghraib, soft power
topped hard power, and the United States undermined its power. It was demoted from hegemon
to preponderant power. The strong school of French intellectuals who had become
anti anti-American, like Jean-Franзois Revel, were undercut.
Moreover, regaining soft power is harder than rearming. The latter takes only political
will, while the other is a long march to reestablish credibility and re-win hearts and mind
once lost. However, there is no visible global challenge to America’s soft power at present.
The Muslim reaction is not a hegemonic challenge. Nor is the appeal of China, which has
replaced Japan as Asia’s economic beacon; young Koreans now learn Chinese, not English.
Another perspective on soft power begins with the proposition that power is the capacity
to determine outcomes. Soft power then becomes everything short of physical force; it
is “preparing the battlefield.” For intelligence to notice what the hundred richest people in
the world are doing is to know the context in which the world operates. A common answer
to the question of why the United States cannot control Iraq when Saddam Hussein could, is
that it is not as ruthless as he was. Yet that does not seem satisfactory. Another part of the
answer seems to be the diversification of the world away from the United States as a cultural
model.
In that sense, no investor would now “buy” unipolarity. Not only are China and India
on the rise economically, but military power, where the United States is most dominant,
is less usable than it was before. During the Cold War, there was talk of the “Finlandization”
of Europe. Now we may be seeing the “Sino-ization” of Asia. Moreover, culturally as well as
economically, the world is evolving away from a hub-and-spoke arrangement with the
United States as the hub.
For intelligence, this situation implies the need to think about and measure the soft
power of others. Osama bin Laden has lots of soft power. Yusuf Islam (formerly Cat Stevens)
is half-forgotten in the United States, but he remains popular in Malaysia. Denying him entry
to the United States in 2004 was treated as a kind of joke here, but it was a serious matter
—and a powerful symbol—elsewhere. Unusual metrics may bear on soft power, and normal
clandestine collection is not likely to be very useful in producing information to flesh
out those metrics. In Nazi Germany, for instance, soldiers’ obituaries charted the decline of
Hitler as a symbol; early on, those soldiers died for “Fьhrer and Fatherland,” but by war’s
end they mostly died for their country alone.
China and India are very different from one another. Does that difference increase or
decrease their soft power? Or does the fact that they remain poor create a lag in noticing that
power? In any case, they will be competitors, and information technology will be critical.
They both want to take their “brand” out of the “ethnic ghetto” of hyphenation (Chinese-
American or Indian-American), into the mainstream. But is cultural power good or bad? The
example of the U.S. entertainment industry makes that an open question. In any case, intelligence
needs to monitor the competition. One indicator would be content analysis to see
which “stories” are most prevalent or most accepted. Soft power lets some countries, the
Nordics for example, punch above their weight. For others, like Turkey or Austria, soft
power needs to be seen in their context, not ours.

Soft power might be measured in a number of ways. The technological innovation
might be tracked up and down the value chain. Nations’ patterns of aid might be observed.
The spread of language learning, especially of English versus Chinese, might be monitored.
So might the spread of art, films, and other icons of culture; Japanese films are now “cool”
when the global teenager is not necessarily American. One could ask how much the popularity
of governments affects soft power. Tourism, emigration, alliance networks, and patterns
of telephone and Internet communication would be other indicators. Surveys might ask
“what country’s products would you most like to purchase?” as an index of economic power;
or “what country’s news and information do you most trust?” as a measure of national integrity.
The ensuing discussion continued the debate about hard versus soft power, again
recognizing that the terms are not entirely satisfactory. Soft power probably enhances the
room for the weak to maneuver, giving them more opportunity to resist coercion. Still, for
realists, the traditional view of the world as anarchic still holds. Realists believe that what alienates
people around the world is not America’s culture but rather its use of power as reflected
in its policies. From an economic perspective, too, the state retains a hold—perhaps a
reflection of its role in creating a middle class. People are prepared to pay higher prices for
steel if protectionism safeguards U.S. jobs. When jobs are outsourced overseas, it is seen as a
loss. Plainly, hard and soft power are complements in the end: Hard power destroyed the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam in Iraq, but exercising the softer power of consent has
proven harder.

Breakout Groups
Types of Non-State Actors
The first group was charged with thinking about different types of NSAs. It developed a taxonomy
that included types of non-state actors; ways to measure the power of non-state actors;
and constraints on their power. It divided non-state actors into six types.
The first type includes corporations, whose power can be measured in financial resources,
human capital, technology, and information. States constrain the power of corporations
by exercising regulatory oversight over them. The second type incorporates NGOs and
civil society, whose power can be measured by examining their influence on elites, popular
opinion, and civil action. However, they are constrained because most cannot implement
policy; they can only advocate it. The third type includes international organizations, such as
the World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization (WTO), and UN. The modes of power
for some of these organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF, include allocating government
and private financial flows. The modes of power are somewhat different for organi-
zations like the WTO and UN, which try to build consensus for state collective action and
changes in policy and the status quo.
The fourth type covers regional economic associations such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU. These groups exercise power by defining
market access and working to develop consensus for state action. The fifth type of non-state
actor includes terrorists and criminal cartels. These actors can wield substantial asymmetric
power, based on their willingness to use violence, encourage corruption, and affect policy.
The final type covers virtual networks, such as computer hackers and music-sharing groups
like Kazaa. Table 1 summarizes the results of this group’s discussion.
In addition to these types of non-state actors, there are also hybrid organizations. For
instance, the International Organization for Standardization, which develops standards for
businesses and governments, brings together states, NGOs, and private companies. Of particular
interest for the intelligence community might be to ask several questions about all
types: Which non-state actors have methods and objectives that run in parallel with U.S. national
interests, and which against? How can the United States influence non-state actors?

Table 1
Types of Non-State Actors
Type Modes of Action Measures Constraints
Private corporations Conduct market operations Profit, market share States still have regulatory
oversight
NGOs and civil
society
Provide information and
assistance
Media appearances, resources
Often single-issue organizations;
can’t implement
policy, only advocate
International
organizations
Allocate financial resources,
send signals about investment
possibilities
Resources, size Little impact on powerful
countries
Regional economic
organizations
Accelerate economic
growth through trade
Size, amount of trade States still retain primary
economic power
Terrorists and
criminal cartels
Use terror, engage in illicit
activity
Resources, size, global
reach, capabilities
Asymmetry of power
compared to states
Virtual networks,
such as computer
hackers
Influence ideas and views of
users
Website hits, number of
subscribers
No troops and hard power


Types of Transnational Actors and Forces
The second group also started with NSAs and other transnational forces. Its initial list was
similar to the first group’s—NGOs, international organizations, diasporas, terrorists, international
criminal organizations, informal transnational coalitions, multinational corporations
(MNCs), and the media. The list might be summarized in three categories defined by what
the international actors seek: actors whose objective is to advocate values, norms, and policies
(NGOs and intergovernment organizations); actors who try to circumvent or undermine
state power (terrorists and criminals); and actors whose relationship with the state is one of
convenience (MNCs).
The salient forces are nationalism, human rights, democracy and accountability, free
markets, trade, demographics, globalization, and non-state governance. Others would include
environment, perhaps the strongest area of international governance. The spread of
nuclear capability and weapons is another, and the information revolution is also continuing

to spread and develop. A simple two-by-two matrix is useful in tracing the effect of these actors
and forces (Figure 2).

The horizontal axis represents a continuum from strong government to weak. The
vertical axis represents regime type, which ranges from democratic to autocratic. This matrix
produces four boxes: (1) a democracy with a strong government, like France; (2) a democracy
with a weak state apparatus, like Mexico (the United States might also be in this category);
(3) an autocratic state with a strong government, like China; and, finally, (4) a weak
autocracy, for instance, Sudan.
The figure might be used to help assess state responses and vulnerabilities to particular
transnational forces. Consider the impact of ethnic diasporas residing in a state. Their effect
in a strong democratic state is likely to lead to conflict; the ongoing debate over head
scarves for Muslim women in France is an example of that conflict. By contrast, diasporas are
more likely to co-opt government policy in a weak democracy. In the United States, for example,
the Cuban lobby has controlled U.S. policy toward Cuba for two generations. U.S.
policy on Cuba is run from Miami. When a strong autocracy confronts a diaspora, the outcome
is likely to be a strong government effort, probably successful, to eliminate the diaspora.
An example would be the Soviet Union, which went to great lengths to deny ethnic
minorities an independent identity. When weak autocratic states confront a diaspora, the
result is likely to be civil war.
Or consider free trade as a transnational force. In a weak, democratic state, the result
would be the rise of dual economies and political conflict as the informal economy grew. In a
strong democracy, the likely outcome of free trade would be an effort toward managed trade.
In a strong autocracy, the result would be selective liberalization with suppression of
other aspects of the neo-liberal regime—China is a good example. In a weak autocracy, the

Figure 2
Types of Transnational Actors
France
Democratic
Strength of government
Regime type
Strong Weak
Autocratic
Mexico
China Sudan
RAND CF215-2

Incorporating Non-State Actors and Forces and Soft Power into Power Calculations 17
impact of free trade would be to bypass the state structure completely, which would lead to
corruption and other manifestations of a breakdown in the rule of law.
Parsing Soft Power
The third group started from the premise that “soft power” was not a useful term. Instead,
the range from coercion to attraction might be divided into economic, ideational, and cultural
power. Indicators for the first might be foreign aid, trade partners, trade volume, and
the like; for the second, university attendance by foreigners, members or adherents, contributions
received, hits on websites and the like; and for the third, where foreigners choose to live
or work, content analysis of media, and the like.
What is the best single indicator of a nation’s power in this realm? Poll responses to
the question, “where would you like to live other than your own country?” would capture
some of all three dimensions and also involves some personal stake in the answer. For that
reason, it may be a better question than “which country do you admire most and why?”
(“Where would you least like to live?” might measure negative soft power.)


19
CHAPTER FOUR
Next Steps
Power is an elusive concept. As the famed political scientist Hans Morgenthau wrote, “The
concept of political power poses one of the most difficult and controversial problems of political
science.”1 This conference examined the attributes of national power and metrics for
understanding it. The aim was to push beyond the concept of power as material capabilities
and to explore the role of non-state actors, transnational forces, and what some have termed
soft power. The presentations, breakout group sessions, and discussions led to several possible
next steps for RAND, the Strategic Assessments Group, and the International Futures
model:
• Strengthen the International Futures data set by adding relevant variables.
• Improve the formulation for forecasting power.
• Enhance the model foundations for forecasting power.
• Develop scenarios.
1. Strengthen the International Futures Data Set
The conference discussions elicited several variables and indicators that provide information
about the current state of power distribution in the international system—especially in its
softer forms—which might be incorporated in IFs. Particular examples include cultural attractiveness,
political outcomes (such as WTO rulings), knowledge generation and use, nonstate
actors, governance effectiveness, and a measure for globalization.
Cultural attractiveness includes the consumption of U.S. culture; the prevalence of
English; the spread of U.S.-style institutions; and the attractiveness of U.S. universities. It
would be interesting to find or develop an opinion poll that asked respondents the question
about softer forms of power that seemed to participants to be the best indicator: If you could
live anywhere in the world other than in your own country, where would you live and why?
Would you choose because of economic, political, cultural, or other reasons?
A second set of indicators is political outcomes, such as UN votes and WTO dispute
rulings. Which states win and which lose? A third would frame knowledge generation and
use. This includes a variety of research and development expenditures (total amounts, basic
research levels, military research levels); the extent of education at the college level and be-
____________
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Third Edition (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1963), p. 27.

20 Measuring National Power
yond; quality of education; and knowledge infrastructure, such as computers, telephones,
networked users. Fourth is the growth and influence of non-state actors, such as NGOs.
Fifth is a variable for “governance effectiveness,” perhaps tied to the World Bank Indicators
of Governance and Institutional Quality data set. A composite governance indicator might
include a governance effectiveness measure and levels of democracy, transparency, and perhaps
economic freedom. A final indicator might be a measure of globalization tied to foreign
direct investment flows and trade connections.
It would be useful for the Strategic Assessments Group to have these measures available
for analysis. The International Futures database and analysis toolkit offers an obvious
route to accomplishing this step. It provides basic tools for longitudinal analysis, crosssectional
analysis, and mapping. In fact, a number of measures such as those suggested above
are already in the database in some form. Some logical next steps would be developing a list
of additional measures desired, adding data where possible, tagging “power indicators” in the
broader IFs database to facilitate bringing them up for focused analysis, and building a specialized
report form for countries (and groupings) that focuses on power measures in categories
yet to be developed.
2. Improve the Formulation for Forecasting Power
It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in several ways. First, they could
be linked to the set of factors from which the aggregate power index is computed. The system
of flexible weighting that already exists should make this linkage relatively easy. In addition,
it might be useful to create an absolute power index. The current power index measures
relative power; states are measured as a percentage of system power.
Over time, however, many states and non-state actors have been increasing their absolute
power in ways that affect overall system behavior. For instance, when non-state actors
like terrorist groups achieve significant absolute power, such as the ability to do harm, that
fact may be more important than their relative power, which still is likely to be modest. On
the other hand, the relative power of the United States, while enormous, has limits in absolute
terms—limits visible in Iraq. So some indicators or thresholds for absolute power would
be helpful, particularly for U.S. intelligence.
Second, it may be useful to simplify and improve the user interface for addressing
power. It might be helpful, for instance, to add a basic report capability focused on the indices
of power and the component elements of it. It might also be worth considering a specialized
form to simplify the controlling of weighting and index construction.
3. Enhance the Model Foundations for Forecasting Power
Forecasts are only as good as the underlying model. The model foundations could be enhanced
in at least three areas. First, it would be useful to turn attention to the representation
of the production function in the economic model. The quality of economic growth forecasts
is fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be helpful to better represent
that production function in a way that builds more extensively on current endogenous
growth theory. Second, it might be helpful to develop the education submodel. Third, the
20 Measuring National Power
yond; quality of education; and knowledge infrastructure, such as computers, telephones,
networked users. Fourth is the growth and influence of non-state actors, such as NGOs.
Fifth is a variable for “governance effectiveness,” perhaps tied to the World Bank Indicators
of Governance and Institutional Quality data set. A composite governance indicator might
include a governance effectiveness measure and levels of democracy, transparency, and perhaps
economic freedom. A final indicator might be a measure of globalization tied to foreign
direct investment flows and trade connections.
It would be useful for the Strategic Assessments Group to have these measures available
for analysis. The International Futures database and analysis toolkit offers an obvious
route to accomplishing this step. It provides basic tools for longitudinal analysis, crosssectional
analysis, and mapping. In fact, a number of measures such as those suggested above
are already in the database in some form. Some logical next steps would be developing a list
of additional measures desired, adding data where possible, tagging “power indicators” in the
broader IFs database to facilitate bringing them up for focused analysis, and building a specialized
report form for countries (and groupings) that focuses on power measures in categories
yet to be developed.
2. Improve the Formulation for Forecasting Power
It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in several ways. First, they could
be linked to the set of factors from which the aggregate power index is computed. The system
of flexible weighting that already exists should make this linkage relatively easy. In addition,
it might be useful to create an absolute power index. The current power index measures
relative power; states are measured as a percentage of system power.
Over time, however, many states and non-state actors have been increasing their absolute
power in ways that affect overall system behavior. For instance, when non-state actors
like terrorist groups achieve significant absolute power, such as the ability to do harm, that
fact may be more important than their relative power, which still is likely to be modest. On
the other hand, the relative power of the United States, while enormous, has limits in absolute
terms—limits visible in Iraq. So some indicators or thresholds for absolute power would
be helpful, particularly for U.S. intelligence.
Second, it may be useful to simplify and improve the user interface for addressing
power. It might be helpful, for instance, to add a basic report capability focused on the indices
of power and the component elements of it. It might also be worth considering a specialized
form to simplify the controlling of weighting and index construction.
3. Enhance the Model Foundations for Forecasting Power
Forecasts are only as good as the underlying model. The model foundations could be enhanced
in at least three areas. First, it would be useful to turn attention to the representation
of the production function in the economic model. The quality of economic growth forecasts
is fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be helpful to better represent
that production function in a way that builds more extensively on current endogenous
growth theory. Second, it might be helpful to develop the education submodel. Third, the

representation of debt and its impact on countries needs significant work. Some significant
power shifts could occur in the international system in the future as a result of exchange rate
changes and financial crises.

4. Develop Scenarios
It would be extremely beneficial to develop a number of scenarios about the future of power,
rather than relying only on the base case. The most obvious set of scenarios would build on
different assumptions of economic growth rates. For example, RAND, which has a long tradition
of developing scenarios and other ways of thinking about the future, has applied a
technique called “fault lines” to China. The analysis asked what major fault lines (adversities)
might seriously affect China’s ability to sustain rapid economic growth. It identified such
factors as unemployment, poverty, and social unrest; corruption; HIV-AIDS and epidemic
disease; and water resources and pollution. It then asked how these adversities might occur,
and by how much they would affect China’s growth.
Wild cards—exogenous shocks to the system—are also important to consider. If the
IFs model is run forward from, say, the 1960s, it does not do well at predicting what actually
happened. The main reason is external shocks, such as the oil crisis of the 1970s. Future
shocks might include energy system shocks, such as a dramatic increase in oil prices; financial
shocks; the collapse of key regimes; or lethal new terrorist attacks. One way RAND has
looked at shocks is by considering breaking continuities, searching for factors where predictions
of continuity seem dubious, even if predicting exactly how, let alone when, that continuity
might break is elusive. Such breaks seem especially likely when two measures of continuity
are uneasy partners. Examples of factors identified in work on Asian futures several
years ago included the following:
• Korea: The heavily armed confrontation is sustained; North Korea declines economically
but does not collapse.
• China-Taiwan: Relations heat up and cool down, but the standoff continues. China
does not accept de facto Taiwanese autonomy and Taiwan does not declare de jure
independence.
In sum, the conference produced a number of fruitful next steps. These include
strengthening the IFs data set, improving the power index, enhancing the power model’s
foundations, and developing future scenarios. These steps can provide policymakers with a
more useful set of variables to measure power and ultimately should improve their ability to
understand the future security environment.


----
This product is part of the RAND Corporation conference proceedings series. RAND
conference proceedings present a collection of papers delivered at a conference. The
papers herein have been commented on by the conference attendees and both the introduction
and collection itself have been reviewed and approved by RAND Science
and Technology.


=======


supplement
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/papers/DKCohen.pdf
[PDF] Mapping the Global Future,Формат файла: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - В виде HTML
Relative Threat Assessment Working Group. Background Briefing Paper. March 4, 2005 ... Disease was analyzed as a threat mostly in the discussion of China—a ...
'это прошлогодний доклад,о нем много кричали,он нетак важен как методика

---

От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Пуденко Сергей (13.11.2006 18:54:06)
Дата	22.11.2006 06:41:37

"Measuring National Power" - Treverton+Jones, and Tellis. Первые выводы

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Обнаружил более связную статью Тревертона и Джонса в Гарвард Ревю, спецномер по теме, 2005. И упоминание книги Эшли Теллиса с коллективом авторов "Measuring National Power..." ,видимо, там и описываются подробности методы.
Сделал он-лайн перевод статьи, кривой. Надо бы нормальный, и подробней про Теллиса с компанией и их книжку

Всё это ИМо очень неспроста. У ребят небрежно упоминаются " расчеты" разных новеньких методов , спомощью которых "по науке" собираются крушить Китай, главный их теперь враг. Статья 2005, среди методов - НГО, "фолт лайнс"(fault lштуы)и еще какой-то "удар в крушащую точку", кажется. По сути, там и основы стратегий типа оранжада в Евразии .
По-моему, дело идет к основательной и м.б. решающей схватке, не дожижаясь "2020", намеченной методологами вроде наших "военных китаеведов" как год окончательного и бесповоротного триумфа Дракона.
Штаты (Орлан) в отличие от Медведя вовсе не гниломозглые,подыхать или растопыриваться не собираются. Они будуь убивать,насмерть. И "Измерения мощт" теперь -главное оружие в методологии. Даже бедный Сурков очнулся(явный отзвук этой "эпистемической борьбы" ЦРУ- САГ с АВН-КНР. Методологию сурковского проекта "Политический атлас мира" раскрыл странник на ворлдкризисе, в двух абзацах (вчера). В Эксперте напомню вчера аж пять больших статей, с картинками. Наш ответ КМГ. Нет слов, каззлы гниломозглые. Подведут они страну под монастрыь,по-моему, остались считанные годы до игр Дракон-Орлан. И деваться нам просто некуда, судя по всем раскладкам военных китаеведов (не пойму до конца,но они не имея способов поднять страну из соттояни сырьевого придатка теперь уже Дракона,кажется склоняются к "рапродаже" того что осталось.
Вот теперь до меня дошел тезис А.Зиновьева о скором главном событии - треугольгике , в котором Россия обречена стать предпольем решающей войны 21 века. Обречена, так ААЗ сказал, я думал это загиб, но он видимо просто оказался в очередной раз впереди других благодаря уму и опяту.


Разумеется, и у китайцев и особенно у амеров ну ОЧЕНЬ много словес про "новый мир, сотрудничество, демократию, НГО", просто осанну поют. То-то наши их вбили псоле тех "докладов". Но у Орлана еще много заготовочек вроде "крушащих мощь точек" и "линий-прорех".

"Если все гворят о мире, значит дело идет к войне" (с)машина времени

Просьба перевести некриво Тревертона и помочь разобраться сребятами Теллисом и Ко

Статья и версия перевода - в Копилке

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От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Пуденко Сергей (22.11.2006 06:41:37)
Дата	02.12.2006 11:54:56

Эй, русские свиньи! "Если мы хотим победить, мы должны использовать soft power"(2006)

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Очередной привет из очередного think tank (Gorbachov- fund) . "Наше
вам с кисточкой", русские финктанковцы,от друзей из цру. Цитата
"Эта война может быть "длинной", если мы хотим победить, мы должны
использовать soft power"

Никто не подскажет. что это за хмырь - Джозеф Най ?

у меня уже сложилось чувство,что последние, кто очнется и начнет б-м
верно и самое главноеоперационно учитывать "КМГ",софт пауэр и тому
подобные "гегемониальыне факторы", будут рфовские начальники.
Потом сам глуповский Начальник скажет ДАЁШЬ!!! -и мимо в ту же секунду
проскачет, топоча копытами и крича " я, я верно меряю!" - толпа
шустриков и гавриков

Show Must Go on!

Маэстро,туш. Мы продолжаем наше представление. На арене - бункер
Горбачева и его гости!
орфография ("гобачев") -оригинала


------

Джозеф Най
Уроки холодной войны для современного мира *


Управлять страхом
Первая половина XX века была крайне кровопролитной, поэтому самое
удивительное
в холодной войне - это то, что она так и не переросла в "горячую". В
современном мире
по-прежнему существуют традиционные угрозы, одновременно появились
новые - это
проблемы, порожденные информационной революцией и глобализацией, в
первую
очередь транснациональный терроризм. Терроризм не является новой
проблемой, новой
проблемой является "приватизация" войны: 11 сентября 2001 года
"Аль-Каида" убила
больше людей, чем японская авиация во время налета на Перл-Харбор в
сентябре 1941
года. Сегодня мы обязаны извлечь уроки из итогов холодной войны, но,
извлекая их,
важно помнить о различиях между той эпохой и сегодняшней.

Первый урок, который мы можем извлечь из холодной войны, состоит в том,
что
кровопролитие никогда не бывает неизбежным. Вероятность перехода
конфликта в
"горячую" стадию может снижаться или повышаться, но избежать его можно
всегда.
Строго говоря, даже сама холодная война не была неизбежной. Впервые
прочитав NSC 68
(меморандум Совета национальной безопасности, предлагавший начать
массированную
программу наращивания американской военной мощи для сдерживания
советской
угрозы), президент Трумэн отнесся к нему скептически. Но с началом
наступления
северокорейских войск через 38-ю параллель Трумэн отбросил сомнения и
одобрил
выделение громадных средств на реализацию мер, предлагаемых в NSC 68.
Важно
управлять собственными страхами: наблюдая за превращением Китая в
сверхдержаву, мы
не должны позволить нашим страхам определять наши отношения с этой
страной.
Второй урок холодной войны состоит в том, что развитие конфликтов очень
сильно
зависит от личных качеств конкретных лидеров. Невозможно понять
происхождение
холодной войны, не поняв Сталина и Трумэна, окончание холодной войны
невозможно
понять, не понимая Горбачева и Рейгана.

Военная мощь и экономика
Третий урок состоит в том, что военная мощь имеет свои ограничения.
Конечно,
военная мощь важна, и взаимное ядерное сдерживание сыграло большую роль,
особенно
на начальном этапе холодной войны. Но следует помнить, во-первых, что
ядерное оружие
настолько ужасно, что использовать его, по сути, невозможно - оно может
служить только
инструментом сдерживания. Во-вторых, надо помнить о том, что в эпоху
национализма,
на которую наложилась информационная революция, управлять враждебно
настроенным
населением невозможно. США потерпели поражение во Вьетнаме, СССР - в
Афганистане, несмотря на то что были ядерными державами. Сегодня старая
модель
оккупации просто не работает. К сожалению, США начинают это понимать
слишком
поздно, уже оказавшись в Ираке.
Четвертый урок - это важность экономической мощи. В конце XX века мы
пережили
то, что называют третьей индустриальной или информационной революцией. В
основе ее
- поразительное снижение стоимости обработки и передачи информации: с
1970 по 2000
год она сократилась в тысячу раз! Это означает, что мир коренным образом
изменился и
экономическая модель, которую строил Сталин, с ее металлургическими
комбинатами и
электростанциями, успешная в условиях второй индустриальной революции,
сегодня не
подходит. Сегодня только рынок способен достаточно быстро реагировать на
вызовы
современности.
Когда Михаил Горбачев пришел к власти, игра уже была проиграна. Старая
экономическая система не смогла приспособиться к третьей индустриальной
революции.
В СССР в 1985 году было 50 тыс. персональных компьютеров, тогда как в
США из было
уже 30 млн. Урок состоит в том, что невозможно сохранить
конкурентоспособность, если
мы не готовы к постоянным инновациям, к тому, что Джозеф Шумпетер
называет
творческим разрушением. Концепция "творческого разрушения" означает,
что, желая
получить что-то, мы должны от чего-то отказываться, надеясь, что
полученное будет
лучше того, от чего мы отказались. Пытаясь просто сохранить имеющееся,
мы, скорее
всего, будем обречены на поражение.

Мягкая сила и магический кристалл
Пятый урок - это важность мягких форм влияния, или soft power. Soft
power - это
способность добиться от других желаемого, не принуждая их, а привлекая.
Добиваться
желаемого можно запугивая других (метод кнута) или покупая их согласие
(метод
пряника), а можно добиваться, чтобы они сами хотели сделать то, чего ты
хочешь. Это и
есть soft power. Надо отметить, что в 1945 году СССР обладал очень
большим
потенциалом soft power: коммунизм как идея был привлекателен для многих
европейцев, а
СССР - как страна, победившая фашизм. Но большая часть этого потенциала
была
потеряна, в том числе в результате вторжений в Венгрию и Чехословакию.
СССР терял
soft power по мере того, как рос его военный потенциал: использование
военной мощи
подрывает потенциал soft power, а значит, и совокупную мощь государства.
Традиционно считалось, что победит тот, у кого армия больше. Урок,
однако, состоит
в том, что в информационный век побеждает тот, чья история убедительнее,
чья история
способна привлекать людей. Поэтому мы должны использовать оружие против
людей
вроде бен Ладена, но вместе с тем, если мы хотим победить, мы должны
использовать soft
power, чтобы привлечь большинство умеренных мусульман и не позволить бен
Ладену
рекрутировать среди них сторонников.
Шестой урок - это роль ядерного оружия. Во многом холодная война не
стала
"горячей" именно благодаря ядерному оружию. Оно сыграло роль
"магического
кристалла". Если бы русскому царю, немецкому кайзеру и австрийскому
императору в
августе 1914 года можно было показать, как будет выглядеть мир в августе
1918 года,
показать, что война будет ими проиграна, их империи будут раздроблены,
едва ли они
решились бы начать войну. Ядерное оружие так ужасно, что позволяет
представить, как
будет выглядеть мир после войны. В этом смысле оно действительно сыграло
сдерживающую роль.
Извлекать уроки из холодной войны важно, но нельзя забывать и об
опасности
прямолинейных аналогий. Сегодня мы имеем дело с новыми проблемами, и
ошибаются
те, кто называет угрозу международного терроризма новой холодной войной
или
четвертой мировой войной. Эта война может быть "длинной", но она будет
отличаться от
предыдущих конфликтов. История никогда не повторяется, в лучшем случае
она лишь
рифмуется.

-------
* Перевод выступления Джозефа Ная на конференции 1 марта 2006 г. в
Гобачев-Фонде,
опубликованный газетой <Коммерсант> 06.03.2006

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От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Пуденко Сергей (02.12.2006 11:54:56)
Дата	07.01.2007 09:18:56

"Soft power"(2004) -вводная автора концепции в Альманахе

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http://situation.ru/app/j_art_1165.htm

Ходовая и адже расхожая формула "софт пауэр" стала употребляться направо и налево. Только что например в статье амер.политологов в Независьке

Вопрос в том, как Тревертон-Джонс таковую " в измеримых величинах" представляют. Сказано, что используют концепцию Ная(Нэя), но не сказано - как

Напомню, китайцы уже с самого начала в КМГ использвуют весовую и экспертную оценку "мягких" компонент КМГ. И известно, в общем, как. В итоге в китайских документах делаются утверждения вроде "КМГ выросла на столько-то за ткой-то период" ( в том чсиле -жесткие и мягкие компоненты)

Отсалось свести концы с концами. И кто у кого "заимоствовал".

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От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Пуденко Сергей (02.12.2006 11:54:56)
Дата	02.12.2006 12:54:12

Defining Power. How to Predict Future Balances - Treverton Jones 2005

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кривой перевод чрезвычайно занимательной статьи тех самых ,кто написал
доклад для САГ ЦРУ.

http://hir.harvard.edu/symposia/65/

Defining Power
More than Might?
Volume 27, Issue 2
When the French Foreign Minister suggested the USSR might placate the
Pope by tolerating Catholicism, Josef Stalin famously quipped, "The
Pope? How many divisions has he got?" It is an irony of history that the
figure whose weakness Stalin scorned helped to catalyze the fall of his
empire. The late Pope John Paul II is widely regarded as pivotal to the
events that ultimately led to the fall of Communism... (More)

Stalin's Joke
From Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer 2005

When the French Foreign Minister suggested the USSR might placate the
Pope by tolerating Catholicism, Josef Stalin famously quipped, "The
Pope? How many divisions has he got?" It is an irony of history that the
figure whose weakness Stalin scorned helped to catalyze the fall of his
empire.

The late Pope John Paul II is widely regarded as pivotal to the events
that ultimately led to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. With his
churches providing meeting places that promoted the rise of Poland's
Solidarity Movement and his preaching against fear and for "fidelity to
roots," John Paul II confronted Communism's philosophy of oppression and
promoted a revolution of peace. By the late 1980s, Soviet domination in
Eastern Europe was crumbling under a wave of peaceful popular revolt. As
former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged in 1992,
"Everything that happened in Eastern Europe in these last few years
would have been impossible without the presence of this Pope."

History delivered a decisive verdict: the joke is on Stalin. The joke
is, however, too easily dismissed as only a joke, as one more blunder of
a terrible dictator and one more myopia of his obsolete system. The tale
is also a cautionary one that should give cause for reflection. Modern
practitioners and theoreticians of international relations agree that
power is important, but deciding how expansively to define power
remains, now perhaps more than ever, a central question. It is the
question that guides this symposium. What is power? By extension, how
has power changed, and what is its future?

Power has assumed an evasive identity that academics and politicians
alike struggle to pinpoint. Some realists say military power is
preeminent, papal proclamations notwithstanding. Some emphasize the
economic basis of power, believing political ascendancy impossible
without economic dominance. Some swear by people power-roughly the "soft
power" of Harvard's Joseph Nye-that is earned and obtained through
domestic public opinion. Still others focus on power wielded through
diplomatic means, noting the importance of individuals such as US
President Woodrow Wilson, architect of an international order.

A brief chronology of international cooperation and conflict lends
credence to each characterization of power. It is in the changing global
context, which alters the nature and distribution of power, that the
debate becomes critical. Even the past 30 years have witnessed a
profound historical shift as borders have become more porous, economic
flows more free, democratic governance more widespread, and liberal
ideology more accepted. A small terrorist organization, Al Qaeda, has
wielded great power against the ostensibly impenetrable United States.
Non-governmental organizations, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, helped stabilize the Asian tsunami crisis while state
governments faced administrative barriers to the provision of relief.
And a previously impoverished and politically closed state, China, has
sustained an explosion in economic growth that prompts many to envisage
superpower status in its future. Today, the means of obtaining and
wielding power are changing, and the international system is struggling
to adjust.

Our authors attempt to anticipate this uncertain future as they analyze
distributions of power in our world and in worlds still to come. Gregory
Treverton and Seth Jones begin by demystifying the forces that
characterize power and offering an array of analytical tools with which
power might be measured. Robert O. Keohane examines which international
actors are most and least accountable in the exercise of their power,
while Rodney Bruce Hall takes note of the increased contribution of
non-governmental organizations to the international arena. Peter
Ackerman and Jack DuVall highlight the strength of "people power," or
civilian-based resistance, as a strategic means to stable democratic
ends. The symposium culminates with an interview with Richard Haass, who
distinguishes power from influence and forecasts changes in the
distribution of power among states and non-states alike.

It should be clear that any understanding of power in the modern world
must transcend the question of "how many divisions has he got." How
exactly to transcend Stalin's question is the complicated but
indispensable puzzle this symposium begins to solve.



-----
Features Stalin's Joke

+++ Measuring Power
How to Predict Future Balances
by Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones


http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1339


Измерение Мощи
Как Предсказывать Будущие Балансы
Определение (Мощи), издание 27 (2) - Лето 2005
Григорий Тревертон - Директор РЭНДА Центр Политики (Интеллекта)
Corporation's и Объединённый Декан Школы Дипломированного специалиста
РЭНДА Pardee.
Сет Г. Джонс - политический ученый в РЭНДЕ и дополнительном профессоре в
Джорджтаунском Университете.


(Мощь) - неуловимое понятие(концепция). Поскольку политический ученый
Ганс Моргентау написал, " понятие(концепция) политической (мощи)
излагает одну из самых трудных и спорных проблем политической науки. "
Понимание природы(характера) (мощи) долго был центральным к исследованию
международных отношений и к работе американского Сообщества Интеллекта.
Задача теперь тем более важна и неуловима, потому что Соединенные Штаты
обладают беспрецедентным количеством экономической, военной, и технологи
ческой энергии по сравнению с другими государствами(состояниями). Все же
это должно осуществить его (мощь) в мире не только связанных с
государством(состоянием) ограничений на ту (мощь), но также и
межнациональных сил и негосударственных актеров, которые действуют как
конкуренты, определители, constrainers, и, иногда, усиливающие агенты
той (мощи).

В рассвет 21-ого столетия, понятие(концепция) (мощи) является что более
важно, и более обсужденный. Как измерять (мощь) Соединенных Штатов
фундаментально для главных дебатов по американской внешней политике.
Если, поскольку globe's "unipolar (мощь), " Соединенные Штаты имеет
(мощь) вне прецедента, то его проблема внешней политики упрощена, для
друзей и союзников, должен будет следовать за этим, любят ли они это или
не, и потенциальные противники будут запуганы перспективой той
власти(мощи).

Если, с другой стороны, фактическая американская (мощь) менее чем
иногда принимается(предполагается) или менее годная к употреблению чем
надеявшийся, то Соединенные Штаты могут стоять перед перспективой, что
бывшие союзники и друзья будут, почти как закон физики, хотеть видеть
снятое ориентир. Они будут, если не "balance " против этого, то по
крайней мере сидят на заборе при обстоятельствах как Ирак. Они будут
склонны рассмотреть Соединенные Штаты ' пытка с определенным
Schadenfreude- довольны, чтобы видеть, что доминирующая (мощь)
(сокращала) до более нормального размера, хотя готово стоять с
Соединенными Штатами, если это серьезно было в беде.

Установление государственной (Мощи)

Размеры(Измерения) (мощи) имеют значение значительно в today's
американских дебатах политики). Если Соединенные Штаты - действительно
униполярное государство, тот, который является преобладающим почти вне
исторической аналогии, то ее проблема политики(полиса) упрощена. Другие
государства(состояния) будут иметь небольшой выбор, но следовать за
этим. Они будут походить на Канаду в известном высказывании, приписанном
прежнему Премьер-министру Лестеру Персону: Соединенные Штаты "The - наш
лучший друг, любим ли мы это или нет. " С другой стороны, если
Соединенные Штаты являются менее доминирующими, то стратегия
национальной безопасности, основанная на preponderance-on предположение,
что все главные полномочия будут на Соединенных Штатах ' side-may не,
сохраняется. Что, если другие государства(состояния) начинают
формировать себя не с Соединенными Штатами, а против этого, или по
крайней мере страховать их ставки?

Государственная (мощь) может быть задумана на трех уровнях: уровень
ресурсов(средств) или способностей, также известных как
(мощь)-в-будучи, уровень преобразования (мощи) через национальные
процессы, и уровень власти(мощи) в результатах, которыми обращаем Ваше
внимание на state's тенденцию преобладать при специфических
обстоятельствах. Отправная точка для того, чтобы думать about-and
развивающаяся метрика for-national (мощь) должна рассмотреть
государства как "capability контейнеры. " все же те
capabilities-demographic, экономические, технологические, и
others-become проявляют только через процесс преобразования. Государства
должны преобразовать материальные ресурсы(средства), или экономическое
мастерство, в инструменты более годные к употреблению, типа боевого
мастерства. В конце, однако, то, о чем высшие чиновники заботятся больше
всего, не (мощь) как способность, или даже (мощь), преобразованная из
национального идеала, политики, и социального единства. Они заботятся о
(мощи) в результатах. Тот третий уровень (мощи) является безусловно
самым неуловимым, поскольку это случайно и относительно. Это зависит,
как (мощь) проявляется, и против кого осуществлена (мощь).

Главные категории, используемые, чтобы идентифицировать(опознать) первый
уровень государственной власти(мощи), уровень способности, являются
валовым национальным продуктом (валовой внутренний продукт), население,
расходы защиты, и менее точный фактор, захватывая новшество в
технологии. Используя эти оценки, (мощь) суммирована как процент полной
глобальной (мощи), и четырнадцать государств(состояний) держат по
крайней мере долю в один процент. Соединенные Штаты - наверху структуры
млщи, хотя это - едва изолированная и односторонняя (мощь). В то время
как Соединенные Штаты в настоящее время (проводят) почти одну пятую
полной глобальной (мощи), это близко сопровождается Европейским союзом,
который рассматривают как объединенный актер, и Китай, который каждый
держит приблизительно 14 процентами. Индия, кроме того, держит
приблизительно 9 процентов, в то время как Бразилия, Южная Корея, и
Россия каждый держит приблизительно 2 процента.

Эти числа, хотя только оценивает, предлагают возможные союзы, которые
могли соответствовать (мощи) Соединенных Штатов, действующих один или с
его традиционными союзниками. Такая оценка (мощи) также исследует
наиболее вероятные местоположения на будущий конфликт, основанный на
шести критериях. Проектирования указывают, что Азия - безусловно самая
опасная (регион), с шестью из восьми самых склонных к конфликту
двусторонних балансов, вовлекающих Китай. Оценка также указывает, что к
2015, уровню американской (мощи) будут близко угрожать Китай и Индия, в
то время как Европейский союз и все неамериканские члены Группы Восемь
испытают медленное снижение в (мощи).

Преобразование Ресурсов(Средств) во (Мощь)

Ученый Carnegie Эшли Теллис и его коллеги в РЭНДЕ недавно предложили
повторную проверку понятия(концепции) "national власти(мощи). " Они
начали, предполагая, что дотошная детализация видимых военных активов
обязана понимать истинное основание национальной (мощи). Это также
требует исследования таких переменных как способность для новшества,
природа(характер) социальных учреждений, и качества основы знания. Для
Теллиса и его коллег, все эти факторы влияют на country's (способность)
произвести один элемент, который является все еще фундаментальным для
международной politics-effective военной (мощи).

Их основной аргумент - то, что национальная (мощь) разделена на три
связанных царства: природные ресурсы, национальная работа(выполнение), и
военные способности. Первое царство охватывает уровень
ресурсов(средств), или доступных для, или произведенный, страны. Второе
царство, национальная работа(выполнение), получено из внешних давлений,
стоящих перед страной и эффективностью ее управляющих учреждений и ее
общества в целом. Третье царство, военные способности, понято в терминах
эксплуатационного мастерства или эффективности. Военная способность
произведена и в результате стратегических ресурсов(средств), доступных
для военной организации и в результате ее способности преобразовать те
ресурсы(средства) в эффективную, принудительную (мощь). Эти три
царства, взятые вместе описывают национальную (мощь).

Подход Теллиса - все еще одна из материальных способностей, хотя это
добирается до того, что можно было бы назвать (мощью)-in-being. Это - о
(мощи) годной к употреблению, но не вовлекает результаты (мощи). Вместо
того, чтобы расценивать государства как, простой "containers
способности, " этот подход рассматривает идеи, организацию, и политику.
Его окончательная цель состоит в том, чтобы понять процесс, которым
национальные ресурсы преобразованы в вооруженные силы(военных)
capabilities-especially те, которые улучшат боевое мастерство.
Фактически, Теллис ' подход может быть применен к любой стране, и его
команда опытным путем применила анализ к Китаю. Но так как данные могут
легко сокрушить осуществление, это обязательно на макро-уровне
сосредоточиться на трех или четырех самых критических факторах. Поэтому,
взаимодействие ресурсов(средств) (мощи), поддающихся трансформации
способностей, и результатов доминировало над обсуждением.

Хотя многие из проблем, исследуемых Теллисом и его коллегами являются
критическими, есть все еще потребность думать о расширении возможностей
индикаторов. Вообще, четыре дополнительных области важны для
преобразования (мощи). Первая область охватывает экономические проблемы,
включая доступ к капиталу(столице). Исследователи вообще
сосредотачивались на внутренних экономических ресурсах(средствах) и
способностях. Изменения в мировой экономике, однако, создали стимул,
чтобы найти новые индикаторы, которые измеряют способность государств
использовать глобальные ресурсы(средства) для внутренних действий.
Например, станет все более и более важно определить воздействие
привлекающих третьих лиц для выполнения работ внутренних рабочих мест к
компаниям в зарубежных странах. Вторая область вовлекает учреждения и
политические структуры, определенные для данного государства. Важные
индикаторы включают уровень коррупции и размера того, что называют
"selectorate "- другими словами, размер группы, которой лидер является
фактически ответственным. Этот индикатор имеет значение особенно, потому
что это затрагивает способность государств (разместить) и распределять
ресурсы(средства). Одна треть, и связанный, область включает ценности,
трастовый, социальный капитал, и другие аспекты гражданского общества.
Таким образом, как люди сотрудничают и взаимодействуют в политических и
экономических отношениях? Заключительная область - социальная структура,
мера, которая включает социальную стратификацию и этнический и
разделения класса.

Стратегические Ресурсы(Средства)

Какие переменные помогут нам идентифицировать великие державы в
международной системе в 2020? Важные переменные включают население,
человеческий капитал(столицу), экономическую (мощь), технологическое
мастерство, и военные способности. Однако, (отдельная) самая важная
форма (мощи) в 2020 продолжит быть военной (мощью). Хотя военная
(мощь) лучше всего обозначена бюджетами защиты, другие (измерения) могли
бы включить определенные военные расходы, типа (земли), воздуха, и
военно-морских расходов(проведения) силы. В то время как эти индикаторы
являются легко измеримыми, однако, они не всегда коррелируют хорошо с
военной эффективностью. Фактически, история демонстрирует, что меньшие
армии победили больших противников из-за лучшего обучения, доктрины, и
стратегии.

Сегодня, экономическая (мощь) - окончательный (основа) военной (мощи),
и лучший индикатор экономической власти(мощи) - валовой внутренний
продукт. Как бюджеты защиты, однако, валовой внутренний продукт
обеспечивает только ограниченную картину (мощи). Это говорит немного о
составе экономики, типа того, возглавлено ли это ведущими секторами, или
во власти старых и уменьшающихся(снижающихся). Поэтому, часто одинаково
важно рассмотреть переменные, типа человеческого капитала и технологии.
Лучший "грубый " мера человеческого капитала - средний год
образовательного достижения. В измерении технологии, лучший индикатор -
на душу расходы на научные исследования.

В конечном счете, однако, ни один из этих индикаторов не обеспечивает
полную картину (мощи) в 2020. Артикулирование идеального индикатора
трудно и, возможно, невозможно. Но это, вероятно, будет иметь некоторое
отношение к "quality ": способность государств, чтобы преобразовать эти
компоненты в продукции и использовать их. Что действительно решает, что
(мощь) в конце - state's способность, через единство и цель,
мобилизовать и преследовать национальные амбиции.

Инструменты Власти(Мощи)

Почему мы оцениваем и предсказываем уровни (мощи)? Оценка (мощи)
является критической к пониманию будущих угроз национальной безопасности
и развития полезных инструментов, чтобы обратиться к ним. Это
утверждается, например, что будущие угрозы Соединенным Штатам будут
вызваны комбинацией экономических, военных, экологических, и другими
переменными. Сокращенный список этих угроз включает терроризм,
загрязнение, межнациональное организованное преступление,
демографические изменения и даже новые угрозы здоровья, типа Серьезного
Острого Дыхательного Синдрома.

Поэтому, меню "old " и "new " инструменты (мощи) будет необходимо, чтобы
сражаться с этими угрозами. Фактически, несколько "old " инструменты
(мощи) нуждаются к замене- из них один, который является вооруженными
силами(военными). В прошлом вооруженные силы(военные) сосредоточились на
обычной и ядерной войне. В будущем, это будет должно сосредоточиться на
том, чтобы противостоять асимметричным силам. Экономические инструменты
находятся (одновременно) в потребности изменения; (более умные)
правительственные инструменты не душили бы рынки и новшество, но
обеспечат социальную защиту к поселениям.

Более интересный, возможно, значения для дипломатии как традиционный
инструмент (мощи). Дипломатия в Соединенных Штатах традиционно была о
продаже американского образа жизни к иностранным правительствам и
поселениям. Лучший подход мог бы состоять в том, чтобы продвинуть
местные группы, учреждения, и политику(полисы), которая является
совместимой с американскими целями. Например, американское правительство
могло бы начать(ввести) политику обеспечения помощи группам за границей,
что идеалы поддержки и политика(полисы), совместимая с американскими
интересами, даже когда эти группы явно не поддерживают, и возможно даже
выступать против, Соединенные Штаты.

Эта стратегия может помочь узаконивать Соединенные Штаты за границей и
помогать этому лучше достигать изменения политики через дипломатию и
совместные(кооперативные) усилия. Кроме того, это могло бы быть
выгодно(полезно) для Соединенных Штатов, чтобы принять политику
"strategic сдержанности. " Тренирующаяся сдержанность в Соединенных
Штатах ' использование твердой (мощи) за границей уменьшит
уравновешивание и увеличит региональное сотрудничество.


Улучшение Нашей Способности Предсказывать (Мощь)

Несколько переменных и индикаторов обеспечивают информацию о текущем
состоянии распределения (мощи), особенно более мягкие формы. Такие
переменные-которые включают культурную привлекательность, политические
результаты и управления, поколение знания и использование, и управление
эффективностью- могут быть включенными в предсказание распределений
(мощи).

Первая из этих переменных, культурной привлекательности, включает
"consumption " (потребление) американской культуры, распространенность
английского языка, распространение учреждений американского стиля, и
очарования американских университетов. Было бы интересно провести опрос
общественного мнения, который задавал вопросы ответчиков, типа: Если бы
Вы могли бы жить где-нибудь в мире, кроме вашей собственной страны, где
Вы жили бы и почему? Ваш выбор был бы больше всего под влиянием
экономических, политических, или культурных факторов? Одинаково
интересный был бы индикатор поколения знания и использования. Это
включает разнообразие научно-исследовательских расходов (общие суммы,
уровни фундаментальных исследований, военные уровни исследования),
степень образования на уровне колледжа и вне, качество образования, и
инфраструктуры знания, типа компьютеров, телефонов, и распространенности
сетевых пользователей. Третья переменная - набор политических
результатов, типа голосов ООН и Мировых Торговых
управлений(постановлений) спора Организации, которые определяют, который
заявляет победу и который проигрывает, в то время как дополнительные
индикаторы могут включить влияние негосударственных актеров,
эффективности управления, и мер глобализации.

Могло бы быть полезно основываться на этих переменных и индикаторах
несколькими способами. Сначала, они могли быть включены в набор
факторов, от которых вычислены совокупные индексы власти(мощи).
Фактически, система гибкой надбавки, которая уже существует, должна
сделать это объединение легким. Кроме того, могло бы быть полезно
создать индекс неограниченной власти в отличие от текущего индекса
относительной (мощи). Хотя государства характеризованы их процентом от
системы, много государств и негосударственных актеров увеличили их
неограниченную способами, которые затрагивают полное поведение
системы. Например, когда негосударственные актеры, типа террористических
групп достигают существенной неограниченной власти, включая способность
причинить вред, тот факт может быть более важным чем их относительная
(мощь), которая, вероятно, будет скромна. С другой стороны,
относительная (мощь) Соединенных Штатов, в то время как огромно в
абсолютных терминах, имеетпределы - которые стали видимыми в Ираке.
Индикаторы или пороги для неограниченной власти были бы полезными.

Во вторых, может быть полезно упростить и улучшать пользовательский
интерфейс для того, чтобы обратиться к (мощи). Это могло бы быть
полезно, например, добавлять, что основная способность сообщения
сосредоточилась на индексах (мощи) и составляющих элементов этого. Это
могло бы также стоить полагать, что специализированная форма упрощает
управление строительства(сооружения) индекса и надбавки.

Прогнозы, однако, только будут столь же хороши как основная модель. Есть
по крайней мере три области, где (основы) любой модели (мощи) могут быть
увеличены. Сначала, было бы полезно повернуть внимание к функции
производства в экономической модели. Качество прогнозов экономического
роста фундаментально для большинства того, что делает модель. Было бы
полезно лучше представить ту функцию производства в пути, который строит
более экстенсивно на текущих теориях эндогенного роста. Другое
критическое изменение) вовлекает развитие подмодели образования.
Возвращения к образованию, и в терминах качества и распространенности,
могут иметь важные значения для моделей будущих структур власти.
В-третьих, область, которая нуждается в существенной работе, -
представление долга и его воздействия на страны. Существенные изменения
(мощи) могли произойти(встретиться) в международной системе в результате
изменений обменного курса и финансовых кризисов.

Кроме того, было бы (полезно) развить множество сценариев о будущем
мощи), вместо того, чтобы положиться только на основной случай. Самый
интуитивный набор сценариев основывался бы на различных(других)
предположениях о нормах(разрядах) экономического роста. Например,
Корпорация РЭНДА применила технику, названную(вызванную) "fault линии "
к Китаю. Анализ спросил, какие главные "fault линии, " или бедственные
ситуации, могли бы серьезно затронуть способность China's выдержать
быстрый экономический рост. Это идентифицировало такие факторы как
безработица, бедность, социальное волнение, коррупция, эпидемические
болезни, так же как водные ресурсы и загрязнение. Это тогда спросило,
как эти бедственные ситуации могли бы произойти, и тем, насколько они
затронут рост China's.

Ключи- внешнего воздействия (exogenous), к потрясению системы- , тоже
важно рассмотреть. Будущие удары могли бы включить удары системы
энергии, финансовые удары, крах ключевых режимов, или смертельных
террористических нападений. Одним путем РЭНД смотрел на удары -
"breaking " continuities-searching для факторов, где предсказания
непрерывности кажутся сомнительными, даже если предсказывая точно, как,
уже не говоря о то, когда, та непрерывность могла бы сломаться,
неуловимо. Ломка особенно вероятна, когда две меры непрерывности -
неудобные партнеры. Например, несколько лет назад, воздействуйте на
включенные удары exogenous модели азиатского Фьючерса в Корее и Китае. В
Корее, поддержана (в большой степени) вооруженная конфронтация, как раз
когда Северная Корея (снижается) (в экономическом отношении), но не
разрушается. Точно так же в конфликте Китая-тайваня, величина отклонения
идет вверх и вниз в температуре, в то время как Китай не принимает
фактическую тайваньскую автономию, и Тайвань не объявляет де-юре
независимость.

В сумме, есть множество шагов, которые должны быть предприняты, если мы
должны лучше понять (мощь) и предсказать международные распределения
(мощи). Они включают усиливающиеся индексы родственника и неограниченной
власти, увеличивая (основы) модели власти(мощи), и развивая будущие
сценарии. Если (предпринято), эти шаги могут предоставить тактикам более
полезный набор переменных, чтобы измерить (мощь), и в конечном счете
улучшить их способность понять будущую окружающую среду безопасности.

© 2003-2006 Гарвард Международный Обзор. Все права защищены.

http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1339/
Measuring Power
How to Predict Future Balances
by Gregory Treverton, Seth G. Jones
From Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer 2005
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Gregory Treverton is Director of the RAND Corporation's Intelligence
Policy Center and Associate Dean of the Pardee RAND Graduate School.
Seth G. Jones is a political scientist at RAND and adjunct professor at
Georgetown University.


Power is an elusive concept. As the political scientist Hans Morgenthau
wrote, "The concept of political power poses one of the most difficult
and controversial problems of political science." Understanding the
nature of power has long been central to the study of international
relations and to the work of the US Intelligence Community. The task is
now all the more important and elusive, because the United States enjoys
an unprecedented amount of economic, military, and technological might
in comparison to other states. Yet it must exercise its power in a world
not only of state-related constraints on that power, but also of
transnational forces and non-state actors that act as competitors,
qualifiers, constrainers, and, sometimes, enhancers of that power.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the concept of power is more important,
and more debated. How to measure the power of the United States is
fundamental to the major debates over US foreign policy. If, as the
globe's "unipolar power," the United States has power beyond precedent,
then its foreign policy problem is simplified, for friends and allies
will have to follow it whether they like it or not, and would-be
adversaries will be cowed by the prospect of that power.

If, on the other hand, de facto US power is less than sometimes assumed
or less usable than hoped, then the United States may face the prospect
that erstwhile allies and friends will, almost as a law of physics, want
to see it taken down a peg. They will, if not "balance" against it, then
at least sit on the fence in circumstances like Iraq. They will be
inclined to view the United States' travails with a certain
Schadenfreude-happy to see the dominant power reduced to more normal
size, though prepared to stand with the United States if it were
seriously in trouble.

Ascertaining State Power

Measurements of power matter significantly in today's US policy debates.
If the United States is really the unipolar state, one that is
preponderant almost beyond historical analogy, then its policy problem
is simplified. Other states will have little choice but to follow it.
They will be like Canada in the famous saying attributed to former Prime
Minister Lester Pearson: "The United States is our best friend, whether
we like it or not." On the other hand, if the United States is less
dominant, then a national security strategy based on preponderance-on
the assumption that all the major powers will be on the United States'
side-may not hold true. What if other states begin to form themselves
not with the United States but against it, or at least hedge their bets?

State power can be conceived at three levels: the level of resources or
capabilities, also known as power-in-being, the level of power
conversion through national processes, and the level of power in
outcomes, by which we refer to a state's tendency to prevail in
particular circumstances. The starting point for thinking about-and
developing metrics for-national power is to view states as "capability
containers." Yet those capabilities-demographic, economic,
technological, and others-become manifest only through a process of
conversion. States need to convert material resources, or economic
prowess, into more usable instruments such as combat proficiency. In the
end, however, what policy-makers care most about is not power as
capability, or even power converted from national ethos, politics, and
social cohesion. They care about power in outcomes. That third level of
power is by far the most elusive, for it is contingent and relative. It
depends on how the power manifests itself, and against whom the power is
exercised.

The main categories used to identify the first level of state power, the
level of capability, are gross domestic product (GDP), population,
defense spending, and a less precise factor capturing innovation in
technology. Using these estimates, power is summed as a percent of total
global power, and fourteen states hold at least a one percent share. The
United States is at the top of the power structure, though it is hardly
an isolated and unilateral power. While the United States currently
holds nearly a fifth of total global power, it is closely followed by
the European Union, considered as a unified actor, and China, which each
hold about 14 percent. India, moreover, holds about 9 percent, while
Brazil, South Korea, and Russia each hold about 2 percent.

These numbers, though only estimates, suggest possible alliances that
could match the power of the United States acting alone or with its
traditional allies. Such a power assessment also examines the most
likely locations for future conflict, based on six criteria. Projections
indicate that Asia is by far the most dangerous region, with six of the
eight most conflict-prone bilateral balances involving China. The
assessment also indicates that by 2015, the level of US power will be
closely threatened by China and India, while the European Union and all
non-US members of the Group of Eight will experience a slow decline in
power.

Converting Resources into Power

Carnegie scholar Ashley Tellis and his colleagues at RAND have recently
offered a re-examination of the concept of "national power." They began
by assuming that a meticulous detailing of visible military assets is
required to understand the true basis of national power. It also
requires a scrutiny of such variables as the aptitude for innovation,
the nature of social institutions, and the quality of the knowledge
base. For Tellis and his colleagues, all of these factors influence a
country's capacity to produce the one element that is still fundamental
to international politics-effective military power.

Their core argument is that national power is divided into three linked
realms: natural resources, national performance, and military
capabilities. The first realm encompasses the level of resources either
available to, or produced by, a country. The second realm, national
performance, is derived from the external pressures facing a country and
the efficiency of its governing institutions and its society at large.
The third realm, military capabilities, is understood in terms of
operational proficiency or effectiveness. Military capability is
produced as a result of both the strategic resources available to a
military organization and its ability to convert those resources into
effective, coercive power. These three realms taken together describe
national power.


The Tellis approach is still one of material capabilities, though it
gets to what might be called power-in-being. It is about usable power,
but does not involve power outcomes. Rather than regard states as simple
"containers of capability," this approach considers ideas, organization,
and politics. Its ultimate objective is to understand the process by
which national resources are converted into military
capabilities-especially those that will improve combat proficiency. In
fact, Tellis' approach can be applied to any country, and his team has
empirically applied the analysis to China. But since data can easily
overwhelm the exercise, it is imperative at a macro level to focus on
the three or four most critical factors. Therefore, the interplay of
power resources, transformative capabilities, and outcomes have
dominated the discussion.

Though many of the issues explored by Tellis and his colleagues are
critical, there is still a need to think about broadening the scope of
indicators. In general, four additional areas are important for power
conversion. The first area encompasses economic issues, including access
to capital. Researchers have generally focused on domestic economic
resources and capabilities. Changes in the global economy, however, have
created an impetus to find new indicators that measure the ability of
states to utilize global resources for domestic activities. For example,
it will become increasingly important to determine the impact of
outsourcing domestic jobs to companies in foreign countries. A second
area involves the institutions and political structures specific to a
given state. Important indicators include the level of corruption and
the size of what is called the "selectorate"-in other words, the size of
the group to which a leader is actually accountable. This indicator
matters especially because it affects the ability of states to allocate
and distribute resources. A third, and related, area incorporates
values, trust, social capital, and other aspects of civil society. That
is, how do people cooperate and interact in political and economic
relationships? The final area is social structure, a measure that
includes societal stratification and ethnic and class divisions.

Strategic Resources

What variables will help us to identify the great powers in the
international system in 2020? Important variables include population,
human capital, economic power, technological prowess, and military
capabilities. However, the single most important form of power in 2020
will continue to be military power. Though military power is best
indicated by defense budgets, other measurements might include specific
military expenditures such as ground, air, and naval force spending.
While these indicators are easily quantifiable, however, they do not
always correlate well with military effectiveness. In fact, history
demonstrates that smaller armies have defeated larger opponents because
of better training, doctrine, and strategy.

Today, economic power is the ultimate foundation of military power, and
the best indicator of economic power is GDP. Like defense budgets,
however, GDP provides only a limited picture of power. It says little
about the composition of the economy, such as whether it is spearheaded
by leading sectors, or dominated by old and declining ones. Therefore,
it is often equally important to consider variables such as human
capital and technology. The best "off the shelf" measure of human
capital is the average year of educational attainment. When measuring
technology, the best indicator is per capita expenditure on research and
development.

Ultimately, however, none of these indicators provides a complete
picture of power in 2020. Articulating an ideal indicator is difficult
and, perhaps, impossible. But it is likely to have something to do with
"quality": the ability of states to convert these components into
outputs and make use of them. What truly determines power in the end is
a state's ability, through unity and purpose, to mobilize and pursue
national ambitions.

Instruments of Power

Why do we evaluate and forecast levels of power? Power assessment is
crucial to understanding future national security threats and developing
useful instruments to address them. It is argued, for example, that
future threats to the United States will be caused by a combination of
economic, military, environmental, and other variables. An abbreviated
list of these threats includes terrorism, pollution, transnational
organized crime, demographic changes, and even new health threats such
as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.

Therefore, a menu of "old" and "new" power instruments will be needed to
combat these threats. In fact, several "old" power instruments need to
change-one of which is the military. In the past, the military focused
on conventional and nuclear warfare. In the future, it will need to
focus on countering asymmetric forces. Economic instruments are equally
in need of change; smarter government instruments would not stifle
markets and innovation, but would provide social protection to
populations.

More interesting, perhaps, are the implications for diplomacy as a
traditional instrument of power. Diplomacy in the United States has
traditionally been about selling the American way of life to foreign
governments and populations. A better approach might be to promote local
groups, institutions, and policies that are compatible with US goals.
For example, the US government might initiate a policy of providing
assistance to groups abroad that support ideals and policies compatible
with US interests, even when these groups do not explicitly support, and
perhaps even oppose, the United States.

This strategy may help to legitimize the United States abroad and help
it better achieve policy change through diplomacy and cooperative
efforts. Moreover, it might be beneficial for the United States to adopt
a policy of "strategic restraint." Exercising restraint in the United
States' use of hard power abroad will decrease counterbalancing and
increase regional cooperation.


It might be useful to build on these variables and indicators in several
ways. First, they could be incorporated into the set of factors from
which aggregate power indices are computed. In fact, the system of
flexible weighting that already exists should make this incorporation
easy. In addition, it might be useful to create an absolute power index
in contrast to the current index of relative power. Although states are
characterized by their percentage of system power, many states and
non-state actors have been increasing their absolute power in ways that
affect overall system behavior. For instance, when non-state actors such
as terrorist groups achieve significant absolute power, including the
ability to do harm, that fact may be more important than their relative
power, which is likely to be modest. On the other hand, the relative
power of the United States, while enormous in absolute terms, has
limits-limits that have become visible in Iraq. Indicators or thresholds
for absolute power would be helpful.

Second, it may be useful to simplify and improve the user interface for
addressing power. It might be helpful, for instance, to add a basic
report capability focused on the indices of power and the component
elements of it. It might also be worth considering a specialized form to
simplify the controlling of weighting and index construction.

Forecasts, however, will only be as good as the underlying model. There
are at least three areas where the foundations of any power model can be
enhanced. First, it would be useful to turn attention to the production
function in the economic model. The quality of economic growth forecasts
is fundamental to most of what the model does. It would be helpful to
better represent that production function in a way that builds more
extensively on current theories of endogenous growth. Another critical
change involves the development of the education sub-model. Returns to
education, both in terms of quality and prevalence, may have important
implications for models of future power structures. Third, an area that
needs significant work is the representation of debt and its impact on
countries. Significant power shifts could occur in the international
system as a result of exchange rate changes and financial crises.

Furthermore, it would be beneficial to develop a number of scenarios
about the future of power, rather than relying only on the base case.
The most intuitive set of scenarios would build on different assumptions
of economic growth rates. For example, the RAND Corporation has applied
a technique called "fault lines" to China. The analysis asked what major
"fault lines," or adversities, might seriously affect China's ability to
sustain rapid economic growth. It identified such factors as
unemployment, poverty, social unrest, corruption, epidemic diseases, as
well as water resources and pollution. It then asked how these
adversities might occur, and by how much they would affect China's
growth.

Wild cards-exogenous shocks to the system-are also important to
consider. Future shocks might include energy system shocks, financial
shocks, collapses of key regimes, or lethal terrorist attacks. One way
RAND has looked at shocks is "breaking" continuities-searching for
factors where predictions of continuity seem dubious, even if predicting
exactly how, let alone when, that continuity might break is elusive.
Breaking is especially likely when two measures of continuity are uneasy
partners. For example, several years ago, work on the Asian Futures
model included exogenous shocks in Korea and China. In Korea, the
heavily armed confrontation is sustained even as North Korea declines
economically but does not collapse. Similarly, in the China-Taiwan
conflict, the stand-off goes up and down in temperature while China does
not accept de facto Taiwanese autonomy, and Taiwan does not declare de
jure independence.

In sum, there are a number of steps that must be taken if we are to
better understand power and forecast international distributions of
power. These include strengthening indices of relative and absolute
power, enhancing the foundations of the power model, and developing
future scenarios. If taken, these steps can provide policy makers with a
more useful set of variables to measure power, and ultimately improve
their ability to understand the future security environment.


Improving Our Ability to Forecast Power

Several variables and indicators provide information about the current
state of power distribution, especially the softer forms. Such
variables-which include cultural attractiveness, political outcomes and
rulings, knowledge generation and use, and governance
effectiveness-might be incorporated in predicting distributions of
power.

The first of these variables, cultural attractiveness, includes the
"consumption" of US culture, the prevalence of English, the spread of
US-style institutions, and the allure of US universities. It would be
interesting to conduct an opinion poll that asked respondents questions
such as: If you could live anywhere in the world, other than your own
country, where would you live and why? Would your choice be most
influenced by economic, political, or cultural factors? Equally
interesting would be an indicator of knowledge generation and use. This
includes a variety of research and development expenditures (total
amounts, basic research levels, military research levels), the extent of
education at the college level and beyond, the quality of education, and
knowledge infrastructure, such as computers, telephones, and the
prevalence of networked users. A third variable is the set of political
outcomes, such as UN votes and World Trade Organization dispute rulings,
that determine which states win and which lose, while additional
indicators may include the influence of non-state actors, governance
effectiveness, and measures of globalization.


http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1340/




The Politics of Power
New Forces and New Challenges
From Defining Power, Vol. 27 (2) - Summer 2005
Richard N. Haass is the President of the Council on Foreign Relations.
He is also author of The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History'
s Course.


What are the primary forces that characterize power in today's world?


What you are asking boils down to distinctions between different kinds
of power. Power comes in a number of packages. You have military power,
economic power, diplomatic power, some would even say cultural power.
What all these types of power have in common, however, is that power is
not to be confused with influence. Power is another word for potential;
power is a capacity. What foreign policy is about-what national security
policy is about-is translating capacity, potential, and power into
influence or accomplishments. Power is simply what you begin with. The
question for the people who have it, wield it, or who influence those
who wield it, is what do you do with that power.


How is power distributed among states, and how is that distribution best
measured?


It is a complicated question. Take the United States, for example.
Obviously the United States has the greatest concentration of military
power by an order of magnitude. The United States has tremendous
economic power given the size of its roughly US$11 trillion economy. The
United States also has enormous diplomatic power. These types of power
are all dependent on one another: military power and political power are
in part reflections of an economic foundation, and economic power is, in
part, a reflection of the global stability that allows normal economic
activity to take place. So various forms of power are to some extent
interdependent.

In addition, what matters in international relations is not simply how
much power you have, but how much power others have and what they do
with it. Power as an end in itself is not very interesting. What really
matters is one's ability to translate power into influence. So the fact
that the United States may have far more military power than another
country on paper is less relevant than the question of what amount of
military power the United States is able and willing to bring to bear in
a given situation, in contrast with the amount of relevant military
power someone else is willing to bring to bear. It is extremely
difficult to go from static measures, which do not reveal a great deal,
to something that is more meaningful.


How have the forces of globalization shifted power, not only among
states, but also among international organizations and non-state actors?


As your question suggests, one of the shifts has been away from states.
States never quite had a monopoly on power. Even hundreds of years ago
there were other actors, such as the Catholic Church and the Dutch East
India Company. But it is fair to say that states now share more power
with non-state actors than at any other time in history. A non-state
actor can range from something that is quite small-it could be an
individual on the Internet-to something quite large, such as the United
Nations. It can be a multinational corporation. It can be a group like
Greenpeace or Doctors Without Borders. It can be Al Qaeda or even
Hezbollah. In other words, non-state actors can be benign or they can be
anything but benign.

Power in its various forms is not, then, simply the province of
nation-states. This is enhanced by globalization-by globalization I mean
the flow of things across borders with tremendous velocity and in
tremendous volume, whether ideas or people or drugs or arms or fissile
material or greenhouse gases or money. What makes it so interesting is
that in many cases these flows take place at such speed and in such
volume that governments cannot control them. In some cases, governments
do not even know about them. So there has been something of a shift away
from states toward these other organizations. All that said, there is
also a danger in allowing the analysis to go too far. States still
remain the principal actors in the international system. More than any
other set of actors, nation-states can shape the international system,
and more than any other state, the United States can have an impact. I
would describe states as first among equals, or more literally, first
among unequals. One has to recognize that primacy. At the same time,
states are not alone in this world.


Is the trend toward a decrease in sovereignty destined to be long-lived
or merely ephemeral?


There have been challenges, certainly, to the primacy of the state or to
the dominance of the state, and some of these challenges come from what
you might describe as "below." By that I mean smaller entities, such as
corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), whether they be
benign or malignant. States are also challenged by larger entities, such
as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), or various
regional organizations such as the European Union and African Union. It
is thus fair to say that the sovereign state is being challenged from
below and also from above.

What is interesting is that some of these challenges are structural and
some are voluntary. For example, in the area of trade, nation-states are
willingly ceding some of their sovereignty to the WTO because it serves
their interests to have trade regulated by such an organization. We must
then distinguish between those areas in which governments voluntarily
give up certain sovereign rights-as in trade and, potentially, the
environment and global climate change-and those areas in which the state
finds itself challenged simply as a fact of life. I think we are talking
about very different phenomena going on in the world.


You spoke of globalization as forcing challenges to state primacy,
almost as if states have had these challenges thrust upon them. But is
globalization not a system that states themselves, particularly the
United States, have desired and created?


In some areas, the shift of power is a voluntary one. Trade is a perfect
example of governments shifting certain authority to an organization
such as the WTO. In my view, the shift has occurred because the US
government has correctly decided that it benefits from a world trading
system that requires the existence of an organization such as the WTO
with its dispute-resolution mechanism. Elsewhere, however, the shift
toward globalization simply happened. In many economic areas, one simply
has, for example, the emergence of independent or increasingly
independent multinational corporations, or one has pools of investment
that flow.

So there are somewhat autonomous actors with which states have to
interact, but the states still have a lot of power. This is not all or
nothing. States can still do much to regulate the activities of
autonomous organizations. States can also decide not to just regulate
but to outlaw these organizations, which is the case with respect to the
drug trade, the slave trade, and terrorism. The bottom line is that
states have considerable capacity to push back. International relations,
if you will, becomes two-pronged: not just state-to-state, but between
states on the one hand and sub-national and supra-national actors on the
other.


We talked about the preeminence of US power. What are the greatest
threats, international or domestic, to US power at this point?


In the short term, the greatest threat would probably be a massive
terrorist attack, possibly involving a weapon of mass destruction. That
has to be the principal security threat facing the United States today,
but I could list many others, including an assassination in a critical
country such as Afghanistan or Pakistan where no obvious alternative
leadership is in place. I could imagine an economic crisis, triggered
either by an economic event or a non-economic event, with the same
result-a massive flight from the dollar with all its economic but also
strategic consequences. I can imagine a crisis in the Taiwan Strait that
could confront the United States with some extraordinarily difficult
decisions about how to act.

What is interesting, however, is the low likelihood of war between the
United States and another major power in the near future. With the
exception of a Taiwan crisis, it is inconceivable to me to envision a
conflict between the United States and any of the other major powers of
the day, essentially China, India, Russia, Europe, or Japan. This is
worth noting; it constitutes a remarkable break in the historical
pattern of the previous few centuries, when great power conflict was not
just the norm, but the dominant paradigm for the world.

In terms of long-term risks, one has to consider what North Korea, Iran,
and others might do with weapons of mass destruction and their nuclear
programs. As decades pass, the United States will face the challenge of
how to deal with a rising China and a declining Russia. Both challenges,
while different, could be extremely difficult for the United States,
because one thing we do not want to see is a reversion to an
international system in which great power competition again becomes the
dominant characteristic.


What would happen were the United States to lose much of its predominant
power?


The United States could lose its predominance in essentially one of two
ways, yielding very different worlds. One would result from the loss of
US predominance to China. The United States would not be replaced by
China-that is far-fetched-but rather would lose its position of primacy.
This could come from a combination of a gradual weakening of the United
States and a gradual strengthening of China. The world would be no
longer unipolar, but bipolar or multipolar. Thus one alternative world
would be one in which the balance of power would re-emerge, replacing
today's imbalance of power. You would have a much more competitive
relationship between the United States and China, perhaps the emergence
of a new Cold War. That to me is one way in which history could evolve
over the next several decades, although it is not a terribly attractive
way, to say the least.

A very different alternative to a unipolar world would be an apolar
world in which the current situation is replaced not by the emergence of
one or more powers with whom the United States has to share world
leadership, but by the ending of US primacy. The danger is that without
US primacy and without any sort of a balance that would take its place,
the world would degenerate in many ways, and it may even take on
elements of a modern dark ages. That would be a world in which, for
example, terrorist organizations had tremendous sway, in which failed
states could be counted in the dozens, in which disease-HIV/AIDS and
others--ravaged societies and populations, and in which local conflict
became endemic. That to me would be an even worse alternative.

So I would suggest that the goal of US foreign policy should be to avoid
either of these alternatives, either the emergence of a multipolar, new
Cold War kind of world or the emergence of a world without poles, in
which order breaks down.


What would be the role of the United Nations in the apolar world?


The role of the United Nations in any world is what the major powers
want the role of the United Nations to be. The United Nations is not an
independent sovereign entity. When the major powers agree, the United
Nations can act, and when the major powers cannot agree, the United
Nations essentially has to be a bystander to history, and that is the
whole concept of the Security Council. So, almost by definition, if you
are talking about a world in which order is breaking down in the
political-military sense, in the areas of health, or in the areas of
trade, where protectionism becomes the rule, by definition this is a
world in which international institutions, including but not limited to
the United Nations, play hardly any role.


You said that the goal of US foreign policy, very broadly, should be to
avoid the emergence of a multipolar world or an apolar world. That would
suggest that US foreign policy should really be about maintaining or
increasing US power. What are your broad strategic recommendations for
sustaining and furthering US power?


I would favor the United States maintaining its position of primacy-not
as an end in itself, but as a means to an end. The purpose of our
foreign policy cannot simply be to perpetuate US predominance, because
if that is all our foreign policy is, inevitably we will end up in that
second world I talked about where competitors will rise.

The purpose of US foreign policy should be to enlist others, in
particular the major powers, in helping the United States meet the
defining challenges and problems of this era. Those defining challenges
are essentially manifestations of globalization-things like terrorism,
the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protectionism, genocide,
state failure, and so forth. In all of these situations, the United
States needs partners. It needs their active cooperation.

So I would suggest that the purpose of US foreign policy should be to
integrate others into promoting international cooperation to meet these
challenges head-on, none of which the United States can successfully
cope with by itself. Either we lack the resources, or in some cases the
nature of the problem is such that no country, no matter how great its
resources, can successfully deal with it alone. Again, this is where
globalization comes in. It is in that nature of global problems that
they cannot be solved by individual countries.


So again you are saying it is influence, not power, that the United
States wants to wield?


That is part of it, because the United States needs to bring its power
to bear. But I take your point, that it also needs to translate our
power into influence so that others bring their power to bear, and that
is the only way the United States will be successful. In order to do so,
I would suggest that there are two prerequisites. One is that the United
States needs to stay strong, both so that it has something to bring to
the table and also to discourage others from challenging it. But second,
it has to be persuasive, which means the United States has to support
goals that others will not see as simply in US self-interest, but also
in theirs. So the purpose of successful diplomacy should be to create
large degrees of overlap between what is the US national interest and
what others come to see as their national interest.


How do rogue states like North Korea and Iran, which are great powers
neither economically nor militarily, but have nonetheless garnered
substantial political leverage, come to wield power?


There are many ways to have power. It does not take tremendous military
might or economic wealth to wield power. Terrorist operations, for
example, are quite cheap. What Al Qaeda did on September 11, 2001 was to
some extent one of the most cost-effective military operations-indeed it
may well have been the most cost-effective military operation-in the
history of the world. It was cost-effective not only in terms of what it
cost them and in terms of the destructive consequences, but also in
terms of the national response that the terrorist attacks stimulated.

Other countries or other groups do not need to match the United States
tank for tank, plane for plane, or dollar for dollar in order to have
substantial power, especially if a country got ahold of a weapon of mass
destruction. North Korea has power through counterfeiting and through
drugs. Iran has power through their support for terrorism and because of
its energy resources, which has been augmented by an extremely tight
energy market and gives it a good degree of international leverage. So
countries may have forms of negative power-the power to cause harm, or
the power to destroy. There are also countries with potential positive
power, and the goal of US foreign policy ought to be to get those
countries with positive power to partner with us, to contribute what
they can so we can take on those that have negative power.


While Europe has recently implied an interest in selling arms to China,
the United States has a close relationship with Taiwan, and Russia has
and may still sell arms to Iran. Each of these arms-sales flows is
somewhat contrary to the idea of an ideal world order envisioned by the
other powers. Is this indicative of some underlying conflict in the way
power is distributed among these states?


I think it is simply a reflection of the fact that we live in a world in
which there is not always 100 percent agreement or consensus on what
needs doing, and even when there is consensus on the goals, there is
profound disagreement on how to get from here to there. So countries,
for example, might agree that they do not want an Iran or North Korea to
acquire nuclear weapons or, if they do develop them, to use or transfer
them, but they could-indeed they do at times-have very different ideas
about what should be done in order to influence an Iran or a North
Korea.

For example, in the run-up to the Iraq War, there were very different
ideas about what needed to happen, or what strategies should be pursued.
You mentioned the case of the European technology transfer to China. The
Europeans are clearly motivated by a desire to expand their ability to
sell to the world's fastest growing market, and it is still unclear if
the United States and Europe can therefore agree on what guidelines
ought to govern this technology transfer.

It is also still unclear if there will be consensus among the United
States, Europe, and Russia about how to specifically put together a
package to shape Iranian behavior vis-a-vis its nuclear program. But we
live in a time where, as I said before, the chance of major power
conflict is remote.

It does not mean that the major powers are existing in some sort of a
19th century concert where they agree on everything. They are not.
Foreign policy takes place in this in-between situation, and the goal of
diplomacy is to move it more in the direction where we and the others
essentially come closer in our assessments of what needs doing, but we
are obviously not there yet.


So you believe these disagreements, at least at this stage, reflect more
superficial challenges?


It has profound consequences, but it does not mean that simply because
we disagree on technology transfer to China, the United States and
Europe are in an adversarial position. We are not. Sometimes the United
States and others are simply going to have to agree to disagree, and
when that happens, we try to limit the disagreement.

It normally makes sense to try to compartmentalize differences, so even
if the United States and Europe disagree about what technologies ought
to be transferred to China, that does not preclude their ability to
cooperate on what needs to be done about Iran or the Middle East or some
other problem. We have to accept the fact that there are going to be
inevitable areas of disagreement, and the challenge of diplomacy is to
limit the scale of the disagreement and then also to limit the
spillover.


Let us shift gears to Asia for a minute and discuss the balance of
power, or the way power exists right now in states in Asia. Over the
last 20 to 25 years, a lot of predictions about the future of power in
Asia have gone wrong. For example, we heard of Japan as a rising power,
which did not materialize. The tiger economies of the 1990s did not do
so well. Why do you think these predictions did not pan out?


All predictions do not work out exactly as planned because people tend
to extrapolate from the present into the future, and history is not
linear. That said, they were not all that wrong in the sense that Japan
has grown significantly. It is one of the world's major economies, and a
somewhat unappreciated development is how Japan has become one of the
most significant military powers in the region and the world. So even if
Japan has not become quite the superpower that some predicted, it still
has become a significant regional and international player economically
and militarily. This is despite its economic drift.

China is growing at a remarkable rate, plus its base has gotten bigger.
However, its gross domestic product per capita is only around US$3,000,
so it obviously has a long way to go. It is likely that it will get
there, although it is not guaranteed. There are a lot of things that
could derail China, from a Taiwan crisis to simple domestic instability
if its political system proves unable to deal with the dynamism of what
is happening economically.

I would say, taking a step back, what distinguishes Asia is this sense
of dynamism. That you do have a significant number of countries,
including China, Japan, India, Korea, and others that are growing to
varying degrees economically. I think the real question for Asia is how
it accommodates all this economic growth-to what extent countries try to
translate their economic power into military power, to what extent it
can develop institutions that will help it get through what could
otherwise be a difficult transitional period. The only other point I
would add to it is that all of this suggests to me the importance of the
United States remaining actively involved. If there is any chance Asia
is going to get through this transitional period in a stable, orderly
way, it is going to be because the United States remains very much
involved in Asia, and ultimately participates in local arrangements
meant to increase the degree of order in the area.

© 2003-2006 The Harvard International Review. All rights reserved.
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/print.php?article=1338

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От	Кактус
К	Пуденко Сергей (22.11.2006 06:41:37)
Дата	22.11.2006 15:49:14

В копилке пусто (-)

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От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Кактус (22.11.2006 15:49:14)
Дата	22.11.2006 19:59:06

Re: В копилке...

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Сорри,завтра выложу текстовый вариант файла перевода..После доклада. Он вс1 же будет заточен на "китайскую (гео)полтическую физику". Просто всё сразу прёт валом, не успеваю раскладывать" полупродукты" в форум. Но обязтаельно обсудим Теллиса. Он всё же акцнтриует мощь по уровням воееного типа. Весьма интересно,но китайцы -немного другое по методЕ

Книжку Теллиса закажу ,говорят будет канал

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От	Пуденко Сергей
К	Пуденко Сергей (22.11.2006 06:41:37)
Дата	22.11.2006 09:15:29

Re: "Measuring National Power" Tellis / . ЙЕСС!

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Гнездо, видимо. И очень важная статья

Помогите со сбором и переводом,хотя бы поверху,главного. Это оно

сайт НБР, несколько спецвыпусков, главные материалы написал Теллис

http://www.nbr.org/publications/book.aspx?ID=85
http://www.nbr.org/publications/chapter.aspx?ID=310
Overview: Military Modernization in Asia
http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/sa05_1overview.pdf

полностью с картинками

Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty
Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills

Published September 2005
ISBN 0-9713938-6-9




Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, the fifth volume in the Strategic Asia series, focuses on the defense capabilities of key Asian powers in the context of their grand strategies. Through a combination of country, regional, and topical studies, the book assesses how Asian states are modernizing their military programs in response to China's rise as a regional power, the war on terrorism, changes in U.S. force posture, the revolution in military affairs, and local security dilemmas. In addition to this central theme, each chapter examines the changing balance of power in Asia and identifies likely threats and opportunities that may arise in the next five years.



КАК и по каким уровням они измеряют мощь?там есть данные и по СССР

Еще - единственный русс.мат-л про занятия м-ра Теллиса
http://www.tarusa.ru/~alik1/sgs/VOLUME11/NUMBER1/v11n1p4.pdf

A Stepping-Stone to a Fully Nuclear Future?
M. V. Ramana Science and Global Security, 2003, Volume 11, pp. 81–83

ШАГ К ПОЛНОМУ ЯДЕРНОМУ БУДУЩЕМУ? М.В. Рамана
Рецензия на книгу Эшли Теллиса «Новое ядерное положение Индии: между скрытымсредством сдерживания и реальным арсеналом»
India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, Ashley Tellis (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 885 pages, ISBN 0-8330-2781-6 (pbk)

В течение многих лет официальной целью США в отношении ядерного оружия Индии иПакистана было стремление ограничить, со временем сократить, а в конце концов и уничто-жить их оружие и средства его доставки. Но с середины 90-х годов, и, в особенности, послеядерных испытаний 1998 года, все большее число влиятельных американских политиков иэкспертов призывало США просто признать ядерные возможности Индии и Пакистана и ра-ботать над формированием ядерных позиций обеих стран. В отношении Индии идея заклю-чается в том, чтобы она не переступала своих границ и не стала региональной державой, которая может в принципе противостоять интересам США. Кроме того, индийский арсеналне должен стать достаточно большим, чтобы встревожить китайских руководителей на-столько, чтобы они в ответ стали наращивать свои ядерные силы. Это могло бы нарушитьстатус-кво в Восточной Азии, которое в настоящее время в основном является благоприят-ным для США, и такое нарушение стало бы поэтому нежелательным. До ядерных испытаний 1998 года американские аналитики нередко использовали дляописания ситуации в Индии и Пакистане термины невооруженные и скрытое средствосдерживания. Надежда заключалась в том, что используя преимущества такого состояниядел, можно будет убедить обе страны оставаться на этом уровне. К несчастью для защитни-ков такого подхода, индийские ядерные испытания похоронили эту надежду, вместе с идеейо том, что состояние дел до 1998 года было устойчивым. Книга Эшли Теллиса «Новое ядерное положение Индии: между скрытым средствомсдерживания и реальным арсеналом» представляет именно это направление аналитическихусилий. Теллис работает старшим политическим аналитиком в организации «РЭНД Корпо-рейшн», мозговом центре ВВС США, и в настоящее время является старшим советникомпосла США в Индии. Поэтому его взгляды обладают значительным весом при формирова-нии политики США в отношении Южной Азии.
Книга «Новое ядерное положение Индии» является прекрасным обзором публичных до-кументов по ядерной политике Индии. Даже несмотря на то, что книга в первую очередьпредназначена для продуманного анализа текущей и будущей ядерной политики Индии, внее включены главы по техническим характеристикам индийского ядерного арсенала – запа-сам расщепляющихся материалов, средствам доставки, и т.п. Подробное документирование(95 страниц ссылок, не считая обширных сносок!), детальная и систематическая аргумента-ция делают эту книгу справочным руководством, которое трудно переоценить. Эта книгадолжна находиться на книжной полке каждого, кто интересуется ядерной политикой Индии. Теллис выдвигает тезис о том, что Индия выйдет на стадию «существующей силы» – ядерной позиции, располагающейся где-то между формой, существовавшей до 1998 года, иготовым к использованию ядерным арсеналом, качественно подобным арсеналам ядерныхдержав. Предсказание заключается в том, что Индия разработает и изготовит ядерное ору-жие и системы его доставки, но с ключевыми компонентами, находящимися под граждан-ским контролем.

....

еще

http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/229584.html
Битва за Индию
Роберт Маклин (Robert T. McLean)
ИноСМИ.Ru
29 августа 2006 года
Конфликты и беспорядки на Ближнем Востоке привлекают к себе внимание значительной части цивилизованного мира, но на планете разворачивается и другая битва, хотя мало кто на Западе знает о ее возможных последствиях и даже о самом ее существовании. В эту битву вовлечены великие державы мира, и вполне возможно, что именно она будет формировать международные отношения в обозримом будущем. Ядерное соглашение, которое администрация Буша в марте подписала в Нью-Дели, направило США по верному пути в этой борьбе, но если Вашингтон хочет одержать победу, он должен не допустить, чтобы краткосрочный успех принимали за окончательный триумф, и продолжать двигаться дальше.

О подъеме Китая и расцвете Индии много говорят. Их растущая важность в глобализующемся мире побуждает обозревателей как на Востоке, так и на Западе предсказывать, что 21-й век станет веком Азии. Россия и Китай поддерживают это явление, рассматривая его как способ создания "многополярного мира", и именно эта возможность сдвига власти вовлекла администрацию Буша в негласную конкуренцию за будущее господство в Азии.

...

Эшли Теллис (Ashley J. Tellis), представитель Фонда Карнеги за международный мир, в прошлом году опубликовал чрезвычайно важную работу, в которой писал: "В отличие от своих предшественников, президент Джордж Буш продемонстрировал сильное стремление к преобразованию отношений с Индией, вызванное существующим в его администрации пониманием геополитических проблем, с которыми Соединенные Штаты могут столкнуться в 21-м веке". Администрация Буша пока не перетянула на свою сторону государство, которое ЦРУ как-то назвало самым важным "колеблющимся государством" столетия, но демонстрация той же решимости, что и в случае с Ираком, может помешать появлению азиатского блока, способного стать угрозой для нового века Америки.

Роберт Маклин - научный сотрудник Центра политики безопасности в Вашингтоне .


инфо для сведения
Книжка Теллис с соавторами "Измерение мощи" продается в Амазоне, пейпербэк, 2001, 8 баксов, дешевле пареной репы.Ниу кого нет выхода на амазон?

А на сайте НБР видимо развернутые ЕГО работы уже на основе его методы -их которых тоже много можно узнать

Ведь ГРУ, СВР , МГИМО, ВВП, Сурковы у нас заняты делом, им не то этой ЗАУМНОЙ ХЕРНИ. Умников им не трэба, они сами хитрые как сто китайцев. Оне, ВВП, из пистолей в ГРУ в телевизоре стреляют. Оне орлы!

Мудак этот русмедведь так и подохнет с бананми в ушах.

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