Круг замкнулся. Новейший фрейм КМГ. Участвуют уже все,кромемедведя
за которого анализ делают индусы. Большой привет с берегов Инда,
АмуДарьи , Янцзы и Потомака. Превед, медвед!мкруг замнулся. Красивый
такой круг, япона мама. Это значит, что везде в Азии (азиаты, азиаты)
ведут релевантную современным вызовам геополит. стратегию. Вынь бананы
из ушей,сурков!
В "азиатских" материалах упоминается о (давнишних)кмг-разработках в
Японии (они использованы и китайцами)
Чрезвычайно концентрированные и емкие -индийские рефлексии о последних
китайских успехах и их геополит.стратегиях. Индусы (как непосредственные
участники) дают еще одну вершину "азиатского" многоугольника, выдвигают
свою собственное видение и собств. аналог гранд.стратегии, основанной
на стратегической концигурации страновой мощи в Азии. "Дуга" по
периметру Инд.океана грубо говоря - в этом направлении
основ.инд.стратег.интересы.(см. в конце) Любопытен анализ индуской
послания Путина на основе "силовой" картины. За суркова его работу
делают. Превед, медвед!спокойно спи под грохот канонады.
Про казахов уже не раз писал
Китайские разработки целого спектра (неревизионисткие). Несколько
направлений развитияКМГистики - 1) с тз "устойч.развития",2)
окруж.среды-экологии-энергетики, 3)многочисленные модернизации
софт-пауэр, особенно актуальные всвязи с надвигающейся Олимпиадой 2008
Америка,ну что Америка -она переживает. Империя готовит ответный удар
ИТАК! танцуют все, кроме спящего медведа. Превед, превед, глухой медвед!
Буду благодарен за помощь в переводе. Уже приведенных материалов вроде
нижеследующего и упоминаемых (к сож,они 1)платные 2)на китайском)
ВАНЬСУЙ!!
абстракты
=============
An ecosystem-based understanding and analysis for SENCE toward
sustainable development
{JIA Hai-feng} , {HOU Ji-xiong} , {CHENG Sheng-tong}
There is a need to find a comprehensive approach focusing on the
conflicts between economical growth and environmental protection.Chinese
scholars advocate a comprehensive ecosystem viewpoint named
social-economic-natural complex ecosystem(SENCE). The kernel of the
concept lies in the hierarchical structure of SENCE, through which
methods from ecological network can be useful to the compound system.
The author gives a schema depicting its structure, following a model
analysis to help understand the reliance of economy on ecosystem. It is
obvious that more actions should be done to strive for sustainable
development." class="highLight"> There is a need to find a comprehensive
approach focusing on the conflicts between economical growth and
environmental protection.Chinese scholars advocate a comprehensive
ecosystem viewpoint named social-economic-natural complex
ecosystem(SENCE). The kernel of the concept lies in the hierarchical
structure of SENCE, through which methods from ecological network can be
useful to the compound system. The author gives a schema depicting its
structure, following a model analysis to help understand the reliance of
economy on ecosystem. It is obvious that more actions should be done to
strive for sustainable development.
[Theoretical analysis on comprehensive national power for ...
Huan Jing Ke Xue. 2003 Jan;24(1):1-7.
[Theoretical analysis on comprehensive national power for sustainable
development]
[Article in Chinese]
Zhao J, Ding D, Xu Y, Xiao H, Duan G.
Research Center for Eco-Environmental Sciences, Chinese Academy of
Sciences, Beijing 100085.
The connotation of comprehensive national power (CNP) was studied, the
relationships between CNP and other related notions were comparatively
analyzed, and the process for the study of CNP was reviewed. Based on
the principles of sustainable development and the idea of ecosystem
services, the concept of comprehensive national power for sustainable
development (CNPSD) was proposed, and the main significance of CNQSD was
discussed.
Article title Theoretical Analysis on Comprehensive National Power for
Sustainable Development
Author Jingzhu, Z. Ding, D. Yajun, X. Han, X. Guangming, D.
Journal title CHINESE JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
Bibliographic details 2003, VOL 24; PART 1, pages 1-7
Publisher CHINESE JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE Country of
publication China
ISBN ISSN 0250-3301
Language Original
Pricing To buy the full text of this article you pay:
?5.00 copyright fee + service charge (from ?7.45) + VAT, if applicable
Publication Types:
English Abstract
статьи в кит.журналах
------------------------------
On System of Comprehensive National Power Journal of Jinan
University(Philosophy & Social Science Edition)]
Ideological power of comprehensive national Power [?????? Gansu Social
Sciences]
Theoretical Analysis on Comprehensive National Power for Sustainable
Development Chinese Journal of Environmental Science] ,
Preliminary study about bringing athletic sports into the essential
factors constituting comprehensive national power [Zhejiang Sport
Science]
Expand and Develop the National Spirits, Strengthen the Comprehensive
National Power [ Journal of Liaoning Administration College]
Study on Impact of Globalization Times Culture in Our Comprehensive
National Power Journal of Yellow River Conservancy Technical Institute]
The Significant Affect of Improving Cultural Power for Reinforcing
Comprehensive National Power in Our Country [ Journal of Henan
Polytechnic University(Social Sciences)] , YANG Yun-xiu
Culture and Comprehensive National Power [ Ascent]
Considering Morality as a Major Part of Comprehensive National Power
Journal of Changji University]
Ecosystem Services Evaluation Based on Comprehensive National Power for
Sustainable Development-the Evaluations on 13 Countries [ Systems
Engineering -Theory & Practice]
The Elements and Structure of China's Comprehensive National Power: A
Perspective from New Type Modernization [ Journal of Eastern Liaodong
University(Social Sciences)]
National Strategic Capability and Comprehensive National Power
Contemporary Internal Relations] , Zhan Jiafeng
Development of Libraries and Comprehensive National Power Journal of
Shaanxi Institute of Junior Managerial Personnel] , Zhao Fengying
The function of technical standard and the relationship between
technical standard and comprehensive national power [ China
Standardization]
National Strategic Capability and Comprehensive National Power
Contemporary Internal Relations] , Zhan Jiafeng
Орлан пережиает. Америка. Доклад Конгрессу (самое начало)
====================================
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MILITARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
I. GOALS OF CHINESE GRAND STRATEGY, SECURITY STRATEGY, AND MILITARY
STRATEGY
A. Chinese Grand Strategy
China's primary national goal is to become a strong, modernized,
unified, and wealthy nation. It views its national standing in relation
to the position of other "great powers." Beijing clearly wants to be
recognized as a full-fledged great power. China considers itself a
developing power whose natural resources, manpower, nuclear-capable
forces, seat on the UN Security Council, and growing economy give it
most of the attributes of a great power. It wants to achieve "parity" in
political, economic, and military strength with other great powers. If
present trends continue, Beijing believes it will achieve the status of
a "medium-sized" great power by 2050 at a minimum. China also wants to
become the preeminent Asian power by generating enough "strength" so
that no major action will be taken by any other international actor in
Asia without first considering Chinese interests.
Chinese analysts calculate the standing of nations by measuring
"comprehensive national strength." of these nations. A small circle of
strategic advisers for deceased paramount leader Deng Xiaoping developed
the method driving this calculus in the 1970s and 1980s. This method
relies on a dynamic process of measuring quantitatively and
qualitatively key components or "subsystems" of a country's
multi-layered comprehensive national power system. Utilizing this
method, Chinese analysts measure four subsystems of national power: (1)
material or hard power (natural resources, economics, scientific and
technology, and national defense); (2) spirit or soft power (politics,
foreign affairs, culture, and education); (3) coordinated power
(leadership organization, command, management, and coordination of
national development); and, (4) environmental power (international,
natural, and domestic).
The PRC government has not enunciated a "grand strategy" to guide its
activities and approach to international affairs, in the Western sense
of the term. Indeed, Chinese leaders are largely preoccupied with
domestic concerns, especially the need to maintain conditions of
national unity and internal stability. We can infer from official
statements by senior leaders, government planning documents, and
government-affiliated writings that the nearest Chinese equivalent to a
"grand strategy" would be its national development strategy, which aims
to comprehensively develop national power so that Beijing can achieve
its long-term national goals. Deng Xiaoping first enunciated this
development strategy in the late 1970s as the "Four Modernizations." The
post-Deng leadership, led by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General
Secretary Jiang Zemin, has reaffirmed this strategy.
Based on this intellectual foundation, China's grand strategy aims for
comprehensively developing national power so that Beijing can achieve
its long-term national goals. This grand strategy, which Beijing defines
as "national development strategy," was first initiated by Deng Xiaoping
in the late 1970s and has been reaffirmed by the post-Deng collective
leadership, which is led by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General
Secretary Jiang Zemin. This development strategy is based on an
assumption that economic power is the most important and most essential
factor in comprehensive national power in an era when "peace and
development" are the primary international trends and world war can be
avoided. In this context, Beijing places top priority on efforts to
promote rapid and sustained economic growth, to raise technological
levels in sciences and industry, to explore and develop China's land-
and sea-based national resources, and to secure China's access to global
resources.
Although this development strategy assumes that economic power is the
most important factor in comprehensive national power, Beijing's
strategy also prioritizes addresses the development of military power as
a secondary complement to policies of reform and opening up for ensuring
that China's economic power will rise; for protecting important national
interests; and, for supporting a policy of eventually playing the role
of a great power and perhaps emerging as the preeminent power in Asia.
Nonetheless, Chinese leaders since Deng have placed military
modernization as the fourth in priority order of the Four
Modernizations. In the aftermath of Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo--to
include the May 1999 bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade--some
Chinese officials have considered seriously reordering the country's
national priorities by upgrading the importance of defense development
in China's national development strategy. However, the senior leadership
elite reaffirmed its priority emphasis on economic growth, scientific
and technological development, and resource exploration/ development at
the August 1999 leadership retreat at Beidaihe.
In addition to developing the material "hard" components of national
power (natural resources, economics, science and technology, and
national defense), some analysts believe China's national development
strategy seeks to enhance the political, diplomatic and economic
components "soft" component of national power, which it believes
determines the effectiveness of a nation's material power. Beijing is
seeking to enhance its "soft" international power by refining its
national policies and decisionmaking capabilities; improving its foreign
political, diplomatic, economic, and military relationships; increasing
its role in and contribution to multilateral activities, to include the
United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) and the Asian Pacific Economic Council (APEC); raising the per
capita income of its people to the global norm for advanced nations;
and, improving the social quality of life for its people, including
health and education on par with the leading nations of the world.
China's national development strategy also places special importance on
strengthening the "unifying" and "coordinating" component of national
power, based on a judgement that development of the material, political,
diplomatic, and economic (hard) and spirit (soft) components of national
power requires macro adjustment, control and coordination of these two
components. Against this backdrop, the senior CCP Central Committee (CC)
leadership regularly emphasizes the importance of "party building,"
which involves modifying and enhancing the party and government's
control apparatus, as well as rejuvenation and development of successive
generations of party cadre. The CCP also places particular emphasis on
ensuring the absolute control of the PLA by the CCP's General Secretary
and Politburo Standing Committee via the CCP CC's Central Military
Commission (CMC), which is chaired by General Secretary Jiang Zemin.
Management of various national programs that impact on hard and soft
components of national power is exercised by several governmental
organizations, especially the State Development Planning Commission, the
State Economic and Trade Commission, and the National Defense Science,
Technology, and Industry Commission. Interagency review and policy
formulation is conducted by a number of secretive, so-called "leading
groups" in the CCP CC, including the Foreign Affairs Leading Group, the
Taiwan Affairs Leading Group, the Finance and Economics Leading Group,
and the CMC. Senior leaders within the CCP CC's Politburo Standing
Committee exercise decision-making authority.
In seeking to coordinate the development of the hard and softvarious
components of national power, some Chinese analysts recognize that
environmental "restricting conditions" can influence--negatively or
positively--a nation's ability to develop these components. In
particular, China believes that the international (world structure and
different balances of power), natural (resources, geography, and
ecology), and social (political, economic, and social systems and their
stability) environment can influence directly the direction and pace of
national development. Accordingly, China's development strategy
emphasizes the need to encourage positive environmental influences and
to minimize negative ones. Since 1985, Beijing has promoted the
evolution of the global balance of power from a bipolar to a multipolar
structure and has sought a peaceful, stable security environment along
China's vast periphery and on the international scene generally. Over
the last decade, China has improved its capability to respond to natural
disasters--including floods, droughts, earthquakes, plagues, famines,
and forest fires--to which China is particularly vulnerable because of
geography and historic settlement patterns, including land reclamation.
Beijing also is seeking to exploit more fully its natural resources and
to develop the military force projection capabilities necessary to
protect its access to potentially resource-rich areas of contested ocean
territory in the North, East, and South China Seas. Moreover, China is
implementing cooptive and coercive measures to maintain social stability
in a domestic environment in which economic reforms measures have
created or exacerbated political, labor, rural, criminal, and ethnic
sources of civil unrest. Beijing has proven willing to move quickly to
contain or quell any new sources of dissent, including the
quasi-religious Falun Gong sect which has emerged as a national-level
political issue over the last year.
In this context, several developments over the last decade--especially
in the last year--have prompted some Chinese elites to question
seriously China's longstanding benign security assessments that "peace
and development" are the primary international trends, that world war
can be avoided, and that balance of global power is shifting from a
bipolar to a multipolar structure. Senior leaders are concerned
primarily that the United States wants to maintain a dominant position
in the Eurasian balance of power by containing the growth of Chinese
power and preventing a resurgence of Russian power. Beijing assesses
that Washington is trying to sustain a "unipolar" balance of power by
strengthening its security alliance with Tokyo and by expanding NATO's
reach beyond Western Europe. China thinks that Russia's internal
troubles preclude it from playing a sustained role in offsetting US
dominance in Eurasia. Moreover, Beijing suspects that new US-Japan
Defense Guidelines Review measures authorize Japanese military action
beyond Japan's previous defense posture and prompt Tokyo to improve its
regional force projection capabilities. Beijing also calculates that US
efforts to develop national and theater missile defenses will challenge
the credibility of China's nuclear deterrence and eventually be extended
to protect Taiwan, a move that China would consider a gross intervention
in Chinese affairs and that would complicate China's efforts to
establish an intimidating conventional theater missile capability
opposite the island.
In the aftermath of Operation ALLIED FORCE's success in Kosovo, Beijing
thinks it will have increasing difficulty managing potential U.S.
meddling in internal Chinese affairs or military interventions in
potential conflict scenarios involving China. A wide range of Chinese
elites point to US intervention in Kosovo as setting a dangerous
precedent for eventual US military operations against China in Taiwan
Strait or South China Sea conflict scenarios. They also suspect
Washington will intervene openly or covertly in Beijing's internal
disputes with ethnic Tibetan or Muslim minorities in western China.
Beijing also suspects that the precedent of US intervention in Kosovo
reinforces any US inclination to intervene in a North Korean crisis
scenario, a move that could challenge longstanding Chinese interests on
the Korean peninsula. United States nonintervention in response to
Moscow's military operations in Chechnya has moderated Chinese concerns
about the precedent of ALLIED FORCE operations somewhat, based on the
fact that, unlike Yugoslavia, China and Russia maintain nuclear-capable
forces. Nonetheless, Beijing's fundamental concerns about US military
intervention in potential conflict scenarios involving China remain
real.
From China's perspective, these international trends are creating an
international environment that will "restrict" Beijing's efforts to
develop the hard and soft material, political, diplomatic, and economic
components of national power. China believes that these trends indicate
that it will be difficult for Beijing to develop a special relationship
with Washington that would fundamentally moderate any US intent to
"contain" China or that would encourage the United States to cooperate
with China in offsetting Japan's growing power. Moreover, China's
fundamental problem in responding to this negative security environment
is that it has limited options in developing the international leverage
necessary to offset US power in Eurasia. Since the 7 May 1999 bombing of
China's embassy in Belgrade, China's leaders reportedly have been
discussing ways to offset US power, to include accelerating military
modernization, pursing strategic cooperation with Russia, and increasing
China's proliferation activities abroad. However, none of these options
is likely to improve fundamentally Beijing's position.
China does not appear to have concluded that any of these options would
necessarily improve its security environment. Senior leaders resisted
domestic pressures in the early- and mid-1990s to raise the importance
of defense development in China's national development strategy because
of concern that doing so would complicate efforts to ensure the growth
and modernization of China's economy. Beijing believes that the economic
growth is an important element in its strategy for maintaining the
stability of its domestic social environment; moreover, foreign trade
and investment links are central to China's development of the economic
element of material (hard) component of national power. China's leaders
also suspect that increasing the role of defense in national priorities
would only reinforce Washington's efforts to contain China and justify
Japan's intent to improve its force projection capability. Over the last
decade, senior PLA strategists periodically have cautioned China's
leaders to avoid being goaded by the United States into a lopsided arms
race that could derail China's economic modernization.
While China's options are limited in seeking to offset US power, its
security policies and positions increasingly have contained themes that
indirectly or directly challenge US security policies and positions
politically. Beijing frequently makes public and private statements that
accuse the United States of engaging in "hegemonistic" international
behavior. China also has enunciated a "new security concept" that calls
for basing international security on multilateral dialogue and on
pledges by states to foreswear the use of military threats, coercion,
and military intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. In
particular, this new security concept criticizes the bilateral and
multilateral security alliances as being relics of the Cold War that
undermine, rather than enhance, international security. Over the last
three years, China has juxtaposed this position with US efforts to
strengthen the US-Japan security alliance and to encourage the
enlargement of NATO in various diplomatic or public forums in a thinly
veiled effort to criticize US security policies in Eurasia. More
recently, China has cooperated with Russia in successfully lobbying
other United Nations members to support a UN resolution that criticizes
US development of national missile defenses.
China's criticism of the direction of US security policies, in part,
reflects genuine security concerns on the part of its leaders about
perceived efforts by Washington to "contain" and "encircle" China and to
encourage Japan to expand its defense scope in ways that Beijing
believes will undermine regional security. However, this criticism also
is driven by a calculus in China that US policies are creating an
"international" environment that will "restrict" Beijing's efforts to
develop the material (hard) and spirit (soft)comprehensively the various
components of national power and complicate China's effort to become the
preeminent power in Asia. China embarked on this effort to develop
comprehensive national power during a period in which it believed it
could focus on "peacetime construction" because it faced a benign
security environment, a situation senior leaders increasingly are
questioning in the post-Cold War era.
....
индусский анализ
-------------------------
Implications of China's Rise: An Indian Perspective
Brig Arun Sahgal
The continued growth of China's overall national power, including its
military capabilities, and the manner in which strong resurgent China
will employ this power will have far-reaching consequences both for Asia
and the world. The Chinese leadership's commitment to build
comprehensive national strength and leveraging its strategic
configuration of power to achieve its strategic interests remain a
major factor in shaping the future stability and security of Asia.
China as it consolidates it power over the next couple of decade is
likely to have a multi-dimensional impact upon other states of the
Asia-Pacific region, an assessment broadly accepted by the strategic
community the world over. Most of these countries are likely to be
affected by Beijing's changing economic and military capabilities, its
trade and defence policies, its approach toward resolution of bilateral
disputes, and the manner in which it will leverage this power. India,
which too is rapidly developing as a strong economic and military power,
will be greatly impacted by these developments particularly as both
countries share common strategic space in Asia. Even in United States
there is growing recognition that following Soviet disintegration, and
Japanese power contained within the U.S.-Japan alliance, China will be
leading challenger to its future geopolitical aspirations in
Asia-Pacific. China is emerging as a 'peer' competitor and an
alternative center of power and influence in the region. Analysts are of
the view that United States determination to preserve its status of
global pre eminence and China's determination to reassert its historical
and traditional dominant position in Asia is likely to lead to
unavoidable and inevitable rivalry Sino-US rivalry. This will impact on
virtually every international issue and in all parts of the world, with
Asia bearing the brunt. The dimension and manner in which competition
unfolds will to a degree determine the course of future security
situation in Asia-Pacific.
China's Role in Asia
It needs to be acknowledged that China's growing power and expanding
role in Asia, is not only likely to continue but this trend could get
accelerated over the next two decades, barring an unforeseen internal
crisis in China. In geo strategic terms states across Asia are likely to
be "sucked" into the Chinese economic vortex through increasing economic
ties, resources relationships, and investments in infrastructure. As one
analyst recently observed that China's Asian strategy is linked directly
to its multinational strategy-using multilateral and regional
organizations to bolster its economic and political ties across
Asia-which supports its modernization strategy. As a result, Asian
economies are getting increasingly intertwined with China, which, is
beginning to have geopolitical implications for Asia in general and
India in particular. An interesting aspect that emerged during a recent
international Scenario Building Seminar in Canberra, Australia was the
likely problem faced by the US in managing existing alliances in Asia in
the backdrop of growing economic integration of Asian economies with
China.
There should be no doubt that the underlying aim of the current Chinese
leadership is to make China a great power-"world class, second to
none"-and that to achieve this goal, the Chinese are consciously and
unwaveringly erecting the building blocks of comprehensive national
power. Chinese leaders understand that the hard power (e.g., military
and economic power) the country has been accumulating over the past 15
years can easily be translated into soft power that enables it to
dissuade and deter other states' behavior.
China's growth and activities in Asia underscore the importance and
urgency for India's economic success and emergence as a major regional
player. Underlying the central importance of successful economic reforms
and growth, particularly if India seeks to play a balancing role in
Asia, and wants to be accepted as the preferable strategic partner, and
above all taken seriously. In fact policymakers/academics from Asian
states, particularly from Southeast Asia, and to a degree Japan and
Taiwan would like to see India accelerating economic reforms and improve
economic infrastructure in order to provide alternative choices. It is
important for India to maximize the "arc of advantage" by strengthening
relationships with key countries in Asia-Japan, Israel, Vietnam, Taiwan,
South Korea, Singapore, and Iran-as well as Australia. The underlying
theme of Indian Prime Ministers initiative for strategic understanding
with the US despite major criticism is underscored by above realisation.
Chinese Balance of Power Strategy in Asia
This is predicated on the fact that China seeks to lead a "unipolar
Asia" and is using the concept of "multipolarity" as a smokescreen to
facilitate its dominance in Asia. To achieve this broad geo strategic
objective that is in tune with the propensities of Middle Kingdom, it is
attempting a twin track strategy. One it is incrementally maximizing the
power gap between strong Asian neighbours - Japan, India, and Russia. As
also by pitting Pakistan against India, North Korea against Japan and
South vs North Korea it is attempting to keep its potential Asian rivals
preoccupied. In addition, China is using states such as Iran, Myanmar,
and Bangladesh etc. as pawns in its balance of power strategy. Secondly
it is using soft power in terms of political and economic engagement to
incrementally enhance its strategic space in Asia. Its eventual aim is
to contain the influence of beleaguered United States to become a
pre-eminent power in Asia particularly in terms of economic and
strategic dominance. This scenario however is predicated in Chinese
perspective upon the medium and long term implications of 'India's rise'
and the manner in which resurgent India will attempt to shape its
strategic space. That this scenario is worrisome to the Chinese is
indicated by frequent assertion by Chinese scholars that whereas China
and India could coexist in Asia, their being partners was implausible.
Fundamentally Chinese believe that as both countries rise simultaneously
competition between the two is inherent. It is the nature of competition
that is often left undefined.
China's Economic Orbit
Given the current Chinese trade and other indicators China barring
unforeseen and uncontrolled internal developments will overtake the
United States over the next two decades as the largest trading partner
of every Asian nation. As trade with China grows rapidly, many of the
Southeast Asian states and even countries like Australia, South Korea
and even Japan will be drawn into the Chinese economic orbit (if not
already so), increasing Chinese influence over these states and
critically restraining their strategic choices. This trend, which will
be difficult to counter, and gives China a growing sense of autonomy on
how to build its relationships with other states. In such a scenario
dilemma for India will be whether to be more aggressive in positioning
itself as a balancer to China in Southeast Asia and Central Asia both as
an economic partner and a player of consequences in the regional
organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), ASEAN +3 (or +4) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) etc. Particularly as such a positioning runs the inherent risk of
alienating China, for the most part if it is seen as a part of broad
based collaborative strategy with the US.
Challenges Posed by China
From Indian perspective despite the enthusiasm about Sino-Indian
economic relations and growing political and strategic understanding,
there are a range of unsettling developments and concerns about China's
role and intentions in Asia that will have a direct impact on India.
These developments need to be monitored carefully and India needs to be
prepared to counter Chinese inroads with its own strategy. Unfortunately
in most areas of present and future competition India lacks a coherent
and effective counter-strategy. Be that as it may what is disconcerting
is that inconvenient and searching issues are deliberately left off the
table at high-level Sino-Indian discussions merely for the sake of
moving the relationship forward.
