The Impact of the Jewish Lobby on American Foreign Policy in the Middle
East
UMUT UZER
PERCEPTIONS
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
December 2001- February 2002 / Vol. - VI Num.4
*Umut Uzer is a PhD candidate at the Department of Government and
Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia.
INTRODUCTION
For the last half century, America has played a key role in efforts to
bring a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The state
system in the Middle East has consolidated itself and the United States
is dissuading any attempts at the revision of the Middle East subsystem,
as the US’s policy of dual containment toward Iraq and Iran
demonstrates.
While American engagement in Middle East peacemaking efforts can be
perceived as a positive development, the role of domestic constraints in
American foreign policymaking have the potential to distort the
even-handed approach that is expected of the United States if it is to
contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. One
such policy is the US Congress’ constant attempt to transfer the
American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
This article analyses the impact of the internal dynamics of American
politics on American foreign policy in the Middle East. More
specifically, the role of the Jewish lobby in American foreign policy
toward Arab-Israeli negotiations is investigated through focusing on a
series of US government policy formulations. In this regard, a brief
conceptual introduction of interest groups in the American body politic
will be followed by case studies —such as the sale of AWACS planes to
Saudi Arabia or the pressure on Congressman Paul Findley— to prove or
disprove the power of the Jewish lobby in American politics at large.
The respective impacts of the President and the Jewish lobby on
policymaking toward Middle Eastern affairs will be explicated.
>From this study it will be evident that the power of the Jewish lobby in
America, while real, is substantially exaggerated. While the Jewish
lobby has some influence over the policymakers, when the President
perceives a particular policy of major significance (what we call
‘salience’), then he will overrule the lobby and implement the policy he
prefers. It will be demonstrated that security issues have a higher
priority for the president than economic policies. Hence, it follows
that politics has primacy over economics.
INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA
Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that the political culture of the United
States induced the establishment of associations “to promote the public
safety, commerce, industry, morality and religion”. James Madison before
him argued that the duty of the government was to reconcile the
divergent interests of interest groups.1 An interest group is defined as
“any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes
certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment,
maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are implied by
the shared attitudes”.2
Interest groups lobby the government to open a “communication process”
and present technical information to congressmen. In fact, it was argued
that the pressure group had no power to punish a legislator.3 These
analyses stemmed from the low-level of success and sophistication among
the lobbyists of the 1950s. However, the rapid increase in the
lobbyists’ strength in the 1980s was a function of greater
specialisation and the lobbies’ readiness to support political campaigns
financially. America’s strongest labour union, AFL-CIO for instance,
contributed significant sums to friendly congressmen. Big corporations
similarly made important contributions to the legislators.4
Typical interest groups such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL),
National Rifle Association (NRA), and the American Medical Association
(AMA) and others such as big companies began competing with each other
and established political action committees (PACs) to influence their
friends financially. ITT and other large corporations were more
influential than the labour unions since they made larger contributions
through PACs and employed better lobbyists. With this technique, they
were able to have more impact on the legislators’ orientations since
campaign reform legislation had outlawed large contributions to
political parties thereby diminishing the parties’ organisational
capabilities in many parts of the United States.5
The lobbyists’ success emanates from their mobilising of constituents,
providing information to the public and consequently changing public
opinion to their favour. In this endeavour, while money is important, it
is not the only factor shaping policy. Needless to say, interest groups
do not control public policy but have a significant contribution in the
formulation of some parts of it.6
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING AND
THE POWER OF THE JEWISH LOBBY
The major actors in Middle East policymaking are the President together
with his national security and minority affairs advisers; the State
Department with the secretary of state at its head, the Bureau of Near
East and South Asian Affairs under an assistant secretary of state,
Bureau of International Organisations and the Policy Planning Staff; the
Department of Defence together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
International Security Agency; the Intelligence community with the
Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency playing key
roles; the Congress; the Press, interest groups (both pro-Israeli and
the oil companies supplementing the pro-Arab organisations) and lastly
public opinion.7 Policymaking can be a function of calculations by
rational decision-makers working for the national interest, the result
of competition between governmental agencies or the influence of
domestic constraints on foreign policy decisions.8
One interest group cannot have total influence over American foreign
policy in the Middle East; it can increase the saliency of the issue and
engage public opinion as well as focus on Congress, the President and
the State Department. It can thus constrain the policies but not
initiate or dictate new policies. Since public opinion is to a large
degree pro-Israel, the Jewish lobby or ethnic interest group can define
the boundaries of policy. In other words, the lobby can have an
influence on the details of a policy but cannot guarantee its success or
failure. Neither the Jewish lobby nor the oil lobby has a significant
influence on foreign policy decision-making.9
Keeping this framework in mind, we can proceed to the sources of Jewish
power in the United States and its impact on major government decisions.
It is one thing to say that Jews are influential in American politics
and another to claim that Jews control America, a claim made by former
congressman Pete McCloskey, who argued that the Jewish lobby “distorts”
American foreign policy, “terrorises” Congress and prevents an
even-handed policy in the Middle East. Former Illinois Congressman Paul
Findley believes that the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC) controls Congress’s Middle East policy and South Dakota Senator
James Abourezk argues that United States Middle East policy has became a
“captive of its client state”, that “the Israeli lobby shapes United
States Middle East policy”10
AIPAC targeted these representatives and they lost their congressional
seats. Thomas Dine, executive director of AIPAC, took credit for this
situation as well as the 1984 defeat of Senator Charles Percy of
Illinois, Roger Jepson of Iowa and Walter Huddleston of Kentucky. All
had voted for the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Paul Findley believes his
defeat in 1982 was not a result of the Lobby’s efforts but rather the
economic difficulties in his district. Nonetheless, AIPAC tried to
magnify its power by claiming that it was instrumental in Congressman
Findley’s and other congressmen’s defeats.11
There is almost a consensus on the sources of Jewish power in the United
States. There are approximately six million Jews in the US, i.e. around
three percent of the US population.12 Yet, they exert a disproportionate
influence on the policy process. This is a function of numerous factors;
a high rate of financial contribution to political campaigns,
concentration on key states that could determine the result of
elections, high turnout in elections, a high level of
institutionalisation with 500 synagogues and 300 national
organisations.13 To demonstrate the importance of financial
contributions, it would be in order to mention that in 1977, 70 out of
125 members of the Democratic National Financial Council were Jewish.
Population wise, 81 percent of Jews are concentrated in nine states. In
New York they form nine percent of the population and 18 percent of the
electorate; in New Jersey 5.5 percent of the population and 9.9 percent
of the electorate; in Florida 4.7 percent of the population and 8.2
percent of the voters; in Massachusetts 4.5 percent of the populace and
8.3 percent of the voters; in Maryland 4.3 percent of the population and
8.1 percent of the electorate; in Connecticut three percent of the
population and 6.2 percent of the voters; in California three percent of
the population and 5.8 percent of the electorate; in Pennsylvania 2.7
percent of the population and 4.9 percent of the voters; and in Illinois
2.3 percent of the population and 3.9 percent of the voters.14
It should be evident that being concentrated in a few key states as well
as showing greater participation than other ethnic groups in elections
significantly increases the power of the Jewish community in America.
Fifty to 60 percent of Jews always vote for the Democratic Party and
around 10 percent vote for the Republicans. There is a 30 percent swing
vote, which the politicians always try to pull in their favour.15
Other factors in Jewish power are the rise in the number of Jews running
for public office and single-issue voting, testing friendliness to
Israel as a, if not the, major criterion for voting for a particular
candidate.16
Public opinion has been overwhelmingly pro-Israel in America: 52 percent
pro-Israel, seven percent pro-Arab in 1974-1975 with 63 percent
supporting Jerusalem being the capital of Israel. The lowest point was
reached in 1982 with the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp massacres of
Palestinians, when support for Israel dropped to 32 percent and rose for
Arabs to 28 percent. However, in January 1983 the ratio was 49 to 12 in
favour of Israel.17 The image Arabs held in public opinion was warlike,
backward, greedy and arrogant whereas Israelis were seen as peaceful,
honest, intelligent, like Americans, brave and exploited. Moreover, the
attentive public and opinion leaders —politicians, bureaucrats,
academicians, journalists and businessmen, etc.— were more pro-Israeli
than the general public.18 It should also be added that there were
strong partisans of Israel in groupings such as the AFL and the
Christian Evangelicals. The latter saw in the establishment of Israel
the realisation of biblical prophecy. Evangelists Jerry Fallwell and Pat
Robertson, both of Virginia, were among the ardent supporters of Israel,
Fallwell being awarded the Jabotinsky prize by Menachem Begin.
Evangelical-Jewish relations however were predicated only on support for
Israel while on domestic issues, Jews, who are mostly liberal, were on
opposing sides to the archconservative fundamentalists.19
Support for Israel was not confined to protestant evangelicals only. A
Catholic priest, Robert Drinan, argued that it was the religious and
political duty of American Christians to contribute to Israel’s
security.20
The Lobby contributes to the existence of a special relationship between
America and Israel, comparable only to the one between the United States
and Great Britain, emanating from common Judeo-Christian roots,
democracy, pioneering spirit and strategic interests.21
The AIPAC is the most influential and one of the best-organised lobbies
in Washington. Its precursors are the American Zionist Emergency
Council, established as the Zionist Organisation of America’s lobby in
Washington in 1943, which changed its name to the American Zionist
Council as Louis Lipsky assumed its presidency. The name was changed
again in 1953 to the American Zionist Council of Public Affairs (AZCPA)
and finally the AIPAC in 1959.22 It was Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles’ demand to talk to a single Jewish organisation that precipitated
the establishment of the AIPAC.23 I.L. Kenen, AIPAC’s first executive
director, claims that they established the organisation to counter the
propaganda and the power of the “petro-diplomatic complex”, which
included oilmen, diplomats, missionaries and CIA agents. James
Forrestal, Secretary of Defence, and the Arabists at the State
Department were an important part of this complex.24
Kenen was head of AIPAC from 1951-1974. The Executive Directors that
came after him were Morris Amitay, 1974-1980, Tom Dine, 1980-1993,25
Neal Sher, 1993-1996, and Howard Kohr in 1996.26 With Amitay assuming
power, a more activist lobbying effort was taken and this became even
more so with Dine, who boasted about increased aid to Israel and defeat
of congressmen not friendly to Israel. In fact, the AIPAC’s leverage was
increasing as there was a marked increase in the tendency of middle
class Americans to get involved in politics and of Congress to become
more responsive to special interests. An ethnic interest group can be
compared with single-interest groups such as those focusing on the
environment or abortion. While AIPAC was accused of dual loyalty at the
expense of the American national interest, it is possible to say that
lobbying is part of American democratic practice and political
tradition.27
For an ethnic lobby to be successful, the general public needs to share
its concerns and the government should have parallel orientations. Also,
the locus of decision should preferably be the legislative rather than
the executive branch and the issue at stake should be of major concern
to the lobby. There should be a unity of purpose, cohesiveness,
financial resources and an active constituency (factors that the Arab
lobby lacks) and the lobby should have a clear strategy and
understanding of the techniques of lobbying. Possessing most if not all
these factors, AIPAC successfully lobbied the Congress to lobby the
Executive.28
Providing economic aid to Israel was a major consideration in AIPAC’s
establishment. Furthermore, it published the Near East Report to provide
information29 to the policymakers from a pro-Israeli point of view.
It would be in order to analyse some of the policy decisions in which
the AIPAC in particular and the Jewish lobby in general tried to
influence Congress. Economic and military aid to Israel were paramount
among these decisions.
In 1962, during the Kennedy administration, in what became the first
major military sale, the US sold Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel.
The transfer of 200 Patton tanks and some Skyhawk planes followed in
1966. By 1968, however the sale of Phantom jets became a major issue in
American politics. The AIPAC as well as the American Jewish Committee,
with the AFL (which is traditionally friendly to Israel) were all
pressuring the government to go ahead with the sale. Both the Democratic
Party and the Republican Party endorsed the sale, as well as the
presidential candidates. However, these domestic pressures did not in
the end lead President Lyndon Johnson to approve the sale; France’s
reluctance to supply arms to Israel and the Soviet Union’s unwillingness
to co-operate with the US to limit arms to the Middle East encouraged
the president to sell Israel the Phantoms. Furthermore, the public was
supportive of such a decision.30
Despite reluctance of the bureaucracy (State and Defence departments)
and some members of Congress, such as William Fulbright, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the President saw the sale of
Phantoms to Israel in strategic terms and decided in its favour.31
In the war of attrition, the arrival of Skyhawks and Phantoms throughout
1969 improved Israel’s air force both quantitatively and
qualitatively,32 and this symbolised the beginning of ever-increasing
quantities of American military aid.
The sales to Saudi Arabia of F-15s in 1978 and AWACS in 1981 led to an
open clash between the President and the Jewish lobby. AIPAC put its
full weight behind the effort in the Congress to block the sale. In both
cases, the President was victorious, which shows that when the President
presents an issue as a matter of national security, it is highly
unlikely that the Lobby can prevail over the Executive. Yet, a lobby’s
very challenge to the US President shows its level of confidence.
In February 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced the administration’s
intention to sell Saudi Arabia 60 F-15s; Egypt 50 F-5Es and 15 F-15s and
Israel 75 F-16s as a package. AIPAC tried to prevent the sale but the
Saudis threatened to buy planes from France and started their own
lobbying effort, which included 25 lobbyists including former Defence
Secretary Clark Clifford, former Senator Fulbright, and Fred Dutton. The
National Association of Arab Americans lobbied Congress in favour of the
sale. In May 1978, the Senate voted 54 to 44 in favour of the sale,
proving that the Lobby cannot win against “a fully committed
president”.33
The 1981 AWACS debate was much harsher than the 1978 F-15 sale. In this
incident, the AIPAC mobilised its constituency more than ever,
bombarding congressmen with letters, telegrams and phone calls. The
Arabs, on the other hand, had Boeing, United Technologies and Mobil on
their side, the latter giving advertisements to major newspapers arguing
for the Arab side’s validity. Former presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter
also rallied to President Reagan’s side. Ford said that America could
not let the Jews run American foreign policy and Reagan said it is “not
the business of other nations to American foreign policy”. The President
met with numerous Senators to both offer inducements and make threats.
The House of Representatives voted 301:111 against the sale whereas the
Senate approved the sale with 52 votes for and 48 against. The President
convinced the Senate that he should not be humiliated or constrained in
the making of foreign policy. This event was seen by the Jewish lobby as
the validation of the power of the Arab lobby and led to an increased
interest in AIPAC among American Jews, contributing to its increase in
power.34
While the Lobby lost these issues, it is fair to say that the sale would
not have had so much, if any, opposition but for its efforts. Similarly,
the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which conditioned the granting of most
favoured nation status on the Soviet Union to its allowing Jews to
emigrate freely, or the anti-boycott legislation against the Arab
economic boycott of Israel would not have come to Congress if the Jewish
lobby had not brought these issues on to the agenda.35 Similarly, the
letter of 76 senators addressed to the President countered the
reassessment of the Ford-Kissinger policy (to force Israel to negotiate
with Egypt) and, to show its disapproval, Congress blocked the sale of
Hawks to Jordan. In fact, there was no public support for the policy of
reassessment. The US-Israel memorandum guaranteed supplies of arms to
Israel and the non-recognition of the PLO until it accepted United
Nations resolutions 242 and 338 and recognised Israel’s right to
exist.36
These examples show the significance of the Jewish lobby and its power.
Yet, they also demonstrate that the President can defeat the Lobby if he
perceives an issue as salient.
Israel’s 1991 demand for $10 billion over the following five years led
to the prevalence of the administration as well. With the break-up of
the Soviet Union, Jews in that country began to emigrate to Israel in
ever growing numbers. Israel asked the United States to provide it with
an additional $10 billion on top of the $3 billion it was getting. In
April 1991, Housing Minister Ariel Sharon announced 13,000 new housing
units in the occupied territories for the prospective Russian
immigrants. On 6 September, President George Bush asked for a delay of
the economic aid for 120 days to compel Israel to stop the settlements.
The release of the loans was seen as a top priority for the AIPAC and
was presented as an economic and humanitarian issue, whereas the
administration argued that it was a security issue. Loans were freed
after the Labour Party under the leadership of Yitzhak Rabin won the
elections in Israel and froze the settlements. The AIPAC’s role was
seriously curtailed in this incident since Congress and public opinion
were not particularly supportive and American-Israeli interests were not
converging. It clearly demonstrated that the AIPAC could limit but not
lead policy.37
The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 can be viewed as proving the power of
the Lobby, yet the executive overruled this irresponsible policy. In
Congress, the power of the Israeli lobby is always stronger than in the
Executive and the passing of this act can be seen as the result of the
endeavours of friends of Israel in the Congress in conjunction with
AIPAC lobbying.
The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, Public Law 104-45 passed by the 104th
congress calls for the “relocation of the United States Embassy in
Israel to Jerusalem”, stressing that the city had been the capital of
Israel since 1950 and was the seat of Israel’s President, Parliament and
the Supreme Court. It recalled the 1990 Senate Concurrent Resolution
arguing for the necessity of Jerusalem remaining undivided and the 1992
Senate Concurrent Resolution commemorating the 25th anniversary of the
reunification of Jerusalem. In June 1993, 257 members of the House of
Representatives sent to Secretary of State Warren Christopher a letter
asking for the American embassy in Tel Aviv to be transferred to
Jerusalem. In March 1995, 93 senators sent a letter to Christopher
reiterating the same demand. Finally, the Jerusalem act declared that
Jerusalem should remain undivided and be recognised as the capital of
Israel. Moreover, the US embassy “should be established in Jerusalem no
later than May 31, 1999”. By 8 November 1995, this became a law without
the President’s signature but he used the waiver provision to delay the
transfer of the Embassy.38
This piece of legislation, had it been implemented, would have been a
major obstacle to the peace process since the Israelis and Palestinians
have yet to negotiate and decide on the status of Jerusalem. Its
implementation would have pre-empted the final status negotiations.
Similarly, after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the autumn of
2000, such a decision would have further exacerbated the situation.
More importantly, one study showed that 57 percent of the American
public agreed with the decision, whereas 30 percent disagreed. While 88
percent of Americans supported the peace process, 60 percent were
against an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital
because many believed that the Arabs’ hidden objective was Israel’s
annihilation.39
The cases studied show that the Jewish lobby’s influence on American
policy in the Jackson-Vanik amendment and anti-boycott legislation was
substantial. Whereas it was very limited or non-existent in the 1978 and
1981 decisions on arms sales to Saudi Arabia and during the Lebanon War
and the first Intifada (1987-1993).40
THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT
Presidential involvement is essential in the formulation and
implementation of a particular policy. To demonstrate this
interrelationship between policymaking and the Lobby, these observations
are essential: Truman supported the Lobby 54 percent of the time,
Eisenhower 55 percent, Kennedy 67 percent, Johnson 59 percent, Nixon in
his first term 48 percent, in his second term together with Ford in
1973-1976 58 percent, Carter 36 percent and Reagan 54 percent. This
means that most presidents since Truman supported the Lobby in its
initiatives more than half of the time. When the President supports the
Lobby, it wins 95 percent of its policy initiatives, whereas when the
President opposes it, it still wins 27 percent of the time. In general
terms, 60 percent of its initiatives are successful.41
When the locus of decision is on the Executive, the Lobby wins 11
percent of the time despite presidential opposition. When the locus of
decision is on the Legislature, the Lobby wins 55 percent of the time,42
undoubtedly an impressive success.
The policy content is also significant in the relative influence of the
Lobby. The Lobby wins 54 percent of economic issues, 22 percent of
security issues and 13 percent of political issues, despite the
President. The Lobby’s success on economic issues stems from the fact
that Congress decides these and its lack of success with
politico-strategic affairs stems from their being decided by the
executive branch.43
We now come to issue of salience for the President. When an issue is
deemed of utmost importance, political and strategic issues for
instance, the Lobby’s influence decreases, however when the issue is not
considered vital to American interests, mostly economic issues, then the
Lobby’s influence increases dramatically.
Steven Spiegel formulates this matter as such: if the President gives
low priority to the Arab-Israeli Conflict, then Congress’s and the
Lobby’s influence increases, whereas when the President sees the area as
a major American foreign policy priority then interest group leverage
decreases.44 In fact, the significance of the role of the President is
manifested as each newly elected president brings new advisers, hence
people with different ideological orientations, assumptions and hence
new rules. He actually changes the framework in which foreign policy is
articulated and implemented.45
CONCLUSION
The proposition that Jews control or dictate American foreign policy is
false. Yet, the political weight of the Jewish community on foreign
policymaking is well taken. Otherwise, events such as the Jerusalem
Embassy Act of 1995 could not be explained. After all such legislation
has no direct bearing on American interests.
A strong executive severely constrains the Lobby’s involvement. In
Congress, the Lobby finds close allies, who often take decisions that
could negatively affect the peace negotiations.
Foreign policy is designed and implemented according to the interests of
the nation. Domestic constraints, while taken into consideration by the
decision-makers, can be overruled if the sublime interests of the state
dictate otherwise in the judgement and analysis of the statesmen.
America has the resources and the prestige to contribute to the peaceful
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the transformation from a
conflictual to a peaceful relation between the Arabs and the Israelis,
American help is needed. The United States, as a superpower, if it is
responsive to and respectful of the cultures and needs of the world, and
pursues a balanced policy toward all the contending parties, can
contribute to peacemaking in various regions of the globe.
1 Wilson, Graham. Interest Groups in the United States, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 2.
2 Walker, Jack, Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons,
Professions, and Social Movements, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1991.
3 Wilson, pp. 107-08.
4 Ibid., pp. 113-15.
5 Ibid., pp. 127-28, 141-44.
6 Browne, William. Groups, Interests, and US Public Policy, Washington
DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998, pp. 236-37.
7 Quandt, William. ‘Domestic Influences on United States Foreign Policy
in the Middle East: the View from Washington’ in William Beling (ed.),
The Middle East, Albany: SUNY Press, 1973, pp. 264-67.
8 Quandt, William, Peace Process, Berkeley: UC Press, 1993, p. 8.
9 Quandt, William, ‘Domestic Influences…’ in Beling (ed.), pp.267-68,
274-75, 282; Carol Silverman, ‘Image versus Reality’, unpublished PhD
dissertation, University of Virginia, 1996, pp. 10-11.
10 Silverman, Carol, ‘Image versus Reality’, p. 1; Novik, Nimrod, The
United States and Israel, Boulder: Westview, 1986, p. 56; Findley, Paul,
They Dare to Speak Out, Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1985, pp. 25-26; Bard,
Mitchell, The Water’s Edge and Beyond, New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991,
pp. 1,5.
11 Findley, pp. 49, 321-22.
12 Goldberg, J.J., Jewish Power, Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1996, pp.
xx-xxi.
13 Jordan, Hamilton, Memo 6/77; Novik, p. 59.
14 Jordan, op. cit.; Goldberg, J.J., ibid., p. 30.
15 Goldberg, J.J., ibid., p. 35.
16 Novik, ibid., pp. 63-64.
17 Gilboa, Eytan, American Public Opinion toward Israel and the
Arab-Israel Conflict, Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987,
pp. 66, 111, 146.
18 Gilboa, op. cit., pp. 307, 316-17.
19 Novik, Nimrod, ibid., pp. 87-90; Findley, Paul, ibid., p. 244.
20 Drinan, Robert, Honor the Promise, Garden City: Doubleday, 1977, p.
220.
21 Gilboa, ibid., p. 1.
22 Tivnan, Edward, The Lobby, New York: Simon Schuster, 1987, pp. 24,
35-39.
23 Tivnan, op. cit., p. 40.
24 Kenen, I.L., Israel’s Defense Line, Buffalo: Prometheus, 1981, p.
114.
25 Silverman, ibid., p. 2
26 Goldberg, ibid., p. 226.
27 Silverman, ibid., pp. 6, 10, 17, 19, 22.
28 Silverman, ibid., pp. 27-33.
29 Silverman, ibid., pp.78, 83-84.
30 Silverman, ibid., pp.87-88, 98-100.
31 Silverman, ibid., pp. 86, 109.
32 Korn , David, Stalemate, Boulder: Westview, 1992, pp. 163-77.
33 Bard, ibid., pp. 39, 41, 45, 49; Silverman, ibid., pp. 157, 160;
Goldberg, David Howard, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Interest Groups, New
York: Greenwood, 1990, pp. 69-70.
34 Tivnan, ibid., pp. 142, 153, 157, 160; Bard, ibid., pp. 57-59.
35 Bard, ibid., pp. 78, 291.
36 Ben-Zvi, Abraham, Alliance Politics and the Limit of Influence, Tel
Aviv: JCSS, 1984, pp. 16-22.
37 Silverman, ibid., pp. 237, 240-41, 251, 255, 259-60, 271, 295.
38 Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995.
39 Pipes, Daniel, ‘A View of US Jews’, Jerusalem Post, 28 September
1999.
40 Goldberg, David Howard, Foreign Policy and Ethnic Groups, ibid., p.
97.
41 Bard, ibid., pp. 255, 267-69; Halperin, Morton and Arnold Kanter,
‘The Bureaucratic Perspective’ in Robert Art and Robert Jervis,
International Politics, 2nd edition, 1985, p. 465.
42 Bard, ibid., p. 276.
43 Bard, ibid., pp. 278, 299.
44 Spiegel, Steven, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 10.
45 Spiegel, op. cit., p. 15.