"Turkish aspirations in the eastern Caucasus soon became apparent not only to the British but also to the Germans (in 1918). And the Germans did not remain indifferent to plans that might come into serious conflict with their own. In April 1918, when Enver's plan acquired definite form, the Germans were already extending their occupation of Ukraine and preparing to assume control of the northern littoral of the Black Sea. The Germans reached Kharkov on the 20th and soon afterwards they were in Sevastopol and Rostov. A German representative, General von Lossow, was an active presence at the Batum Conference while the adventurous Colonel Kress von Kressenstein - not very friendly to the Turks after his failure in Palestine - appeared in Tiflis where he established the best relations with the Georgian members of the Transcaucasian government. In the capital of Kura, the German colonel found the atmosphere very favourable to an intrigue directed against the establishment of a barrage against the Turkish designs on Baku.
The Germans were not much interested in the success or failure of the Pan-Turkish campaign. But they were in desperate need of the oil of Baku and they were convinced that once the city was in Turkish hands there would be little oil produced... Von Kressentein managed to sustain a lively activity in Tiflis during the month of May and he showed himself the man for the emergency. He was aware that Georgian troops could offer no effective obstacle to the Turks, but the Turkish command might become embarrassed if Georgian detachments were covered with the German flag. For the purpose of giving a German cover to Georgian military movements, von Kressenstein mobilized all available men of Georgia in and around Tiflis. Meanwhile, the Georgian members of the Transcaucasian government saw in German protection the only possible salvation for their own national interest. ...the opinion among Georgians was that once the Turks had been admitted to the country they would never leave it.
For the Armenians the situation was rather different. The Germans were not interested in the defence of the Armenian territory and were ready rather to encourage the Turkish move across Armenia into northern Persia in order that any British move towards Baku might be checked. With only indefinite hopes of ultimate support from the British, the Armenians had no alternative but to show fight to the invader."
Von Kressenstein had one more part to play:
"Within a week of the ultimatum to the Armenians (14-15 May), the Turks presented a further ultimatum to the Transcaucasian government in Tiflis demanding the immediate transfer of the line of the Transcauscasian railway running from Batum through Tiflis to Baku. The Transcauscasians played for delay on the ground of discussing details of a peaceful arrangement and on the 27th a coup de theatre, prepared by Colonel Kress von Kressenstein, took place in Tiflis. The Georgian members of the Transcauscasian government proclaimed Georgia a(n independent) republic. The new republic, furthermore, accepted a German protectorate. Von Kressenstein and von Schulenburg themselves announced this protectorate from the window of Tiflis town hall."
German forces were sent to Georgia from Palestine. On 10 June,
fighting actually took place between German/Georgian troops and Turks.
The Turks captured several prisoners and continued their advance until
there was 'a telegram from German general headquarters'. The Turkish
forces then withdrew and continued to Baku. An interesting little
sideshow.
