От badger
К All
Дата 26.07.2004 14:35:40
Рубрики WWII; Армия;

А прокомментируйте отрывок? :)

Learning from Mistakes

1

The winter of 1969 was an exceptionally bitter one in the Soviet Far
East. When the first clashes with the Chinese took place on the river
Ussuri, and before combat divisions reached the area, the pressure exerted
by the enemy was borne by the KGB frontier troops. After the clash was over,
the General Staff held a careful investigation into all the mistakes and
oversights which had occurred. It was quickly discovered that several KGB
soldiers had frozen to death in the snow, simply because they had never
received elementary instruction in sleeping out in temperatures below zero.
This was alarming news. A commission from the General Staff immediately
carried out experiments with three divisions, chosen at random, and came to
a depressing conclusion. Wartime experience had been irrevocably lost and
the modern Soviet soldier had not been taught how he could sleep in the
snow. Naturally he was not allowed a sleeping bag and of course he was
forbidden to light a fire. Normally a soldier would spend nights when the
temperature was below freezing-point in his vehicle. But what was he to do
if the vehicle was put out of action?
The chiefs of staff of all divisions were immediately summoned to
Moscow. They were given a day's instruction in the technique of sleeping out
in snow at freezing temperatures, using only a greatcoat. Then each of them
was required to convince himself that this was possible, by sleeping in the
snow for three nights. (It should be remembered that March in
Solnechnogorsk, near Moscow, is a hard month, with snow on the ground and
temperatures below zero.) Then the chiefs of staff returned to their
divisions and immediately the entire Soviet Army was put to a very hard
test--that of spending a night in the open in numbing cold and without any
extra clothing. It seemed as if those who were stationed in deserts in the
south were in luck. But no--they were sent by turns to either Siberia or the
north to be put through the same tough training. Thereafter, spending a
night in the snow became a part of all military training programmes.
Two years before this, following the shameful defeats in Sinai, when it
had become clear how much Arab soldiers fear tanks and napalm, urgent orders
had been issued, making it compulsory for all Soviet soldiers and officers,
up to the rank of general, to jump through roaring flames, and to shelter in
shallow pits as tanks clattered by just above their heads, or, if they could
not find even this protection, to lie on the ground between the tracks of
the roaring vehicles.
The Soviet Army re-learned its lessons within a single day. I have felt
napalm on my own skin, I have crouched in a pit as a tank crashed by
overhead, and I have spent terrible nights in the snow.
At the beginning of the war, the Red Army had no idea how to organise
the defence of the country or, particularly, of the large towns. It had
never been taught how to do this. It had only learned how to attack and how
to `carry the war on to the enemy's territory'. However, the war began in
accordance with the plans of the German General Staff rather than of their
Soviet opponents. One catastrophe followed another. Attempts to defend Minsk
lasted for three days, to hold Kiev for two days. Everyone was at their
wits' end to know how to organise things better. Kiev fell at the end of
September and by October Guderian was approaching Moscow. Suddenly,
something quite astonishing happened. Soviet defences became impenetrable,
specifically those around Moscow, Tula and Tver'. For the first time in the
course of the Second World War, the German military machine was brought to a
standstill. It is said that freezing weather played its part in turning the
tide. This was true enough in November and December, but in October the
weather was sunny. Something had happened; a radical change had occurred.
The next year, the battle for Stalingrad took place--the city was defended
throughout the summer, and frosts played no part in the outcome. This
campaign will go down in history as a model for the defence of a large city.
A second such model is the defence of Leningrad which held out for almost
three years, during which one and a half million of its citizens lost their
lives. It was under attack for two winters and three summers. Freezing
temperatures played no role here either--the city could have been taken
during any season in these three years.
In the Soviet Army the dividing line between inability to perform a
particular role and the capacity to carry it out with great professional
skill is almost indiscernible. Transitions from one to the other occur
almost instantaneously, not only in tactics, strategy and the training of
personnel but also in equipment programmes.

А правда что-ли замерзли люди в 69 и проводилось обучение в связи с этим?

Согласны ли вы с последним (выделенным) абзацем ?

Автора не указываю, кто не знает - может попробовать угадать :)
От В. Кашин
К badger (26.07.2004 14:35:40)
Дата 26.07.2004 17:04:28

Неужто Богданыч?

Добрый день!
> In the Soviet Army the dividing line between inability to perform a
>particular role and the capacity to carry it out with great professional
>skill is almost indiscernible. Transitions from one to the other occur
>almost instantaneously, not only in tactics, strategy and the training of
>personnel but also in equipment programmes.


>Согласны ли вы с последним (выделенным) абзацем ?

Доля правды в нем есть. Практика разрешения накопившихся за долгое время проблем в ходе аврала - особенность нашего национального стиля руководства. Со стороны это действительно может выглядеть как чудо, хотя в реальности все объясняется свойственным нашим людям сочетанием разгильдяйства и потрясающей способности к концентрации и мобилизации в ключевые моменты.

С уважением, Василий Кашин
От badger
К В. Кашин (26.07.2004 17:04:28)
Дата 26.07.2004 21:49:51

В точку :)

Виктор Суворов. Советская Армия: взгляд изнутри (engl)
Viktor Suvorov. Inside the Soviet Army

http://kulichki.com/moshkow/WSUWOROW/army_engl.txt


> Доля правды в нем есть. Практика разрешения накопившихся за долгое время проблем в ходе аврала - особенность нашего национального стиля руководства. Со стороны это действительно может выглядеть как чудо, хотя в реальности все объясняется свойственным нашим людям сочетанием разгильдяйства и потрясающей способности к концентрации и мобилизации в ключевые моменты.

Гм, интересная мысль :)
Углублять будем? :)

Скажем слыхал когда-то что авральность для нас характерна из-за не совсем благоприятных климатических условий - урожай скажем для нашего крестьянина убрать быстро(пока погода не испортилась) было гораздо важнее, чем для французского :)
От В. Кашин
К badger (26.07.2004 21:49:51)
Дата 27.07.2004 10:52:45

Re: В точку...

Добрый день!
>Виктор Суворов. Советская Армия: взгляд изнутри (engl)
>Viktor Suvorov. Inside the Soviet Army

> http://kulichki.com/moshkow/WSUWOROW/army_engl.txt


>> Доля правды в нем есть. Практика разрешения накопившихся за долгое время проблем в ходе аврала - особенность нашего национального стиля руководства. Со стороны это действительно может выглядеть как чудо, хотя в реальности все объясняется свойственным нашим людям сочетанием разгильдяйства и потрясающей способности к концентрации и мобилизации в ключевые моменты.
>
>Гм, интересная мысль :)
>Углублять будем? :)

>Скажем слыхал когда-то что авральность для нас характерна из-за не совсем благоприятных климатических условий - урожай скажем для нашего крестьянина убрать быстро(пока погода не испортилась) было гораздо важнее, чем для французского :)
 Да, это достаточно распространенная теория. Помню, в институте преподаватель истории России любил ее излагать. В русском земледельческом цикле чередуются периоды работ сверхвысокой интенсивности, когда приходится вкалывать круглые сутки, и периоды, когда особой работы нет (напр. зима). Отсюда и некоторые особенности национального характера.
С уважением, Василий Кашин