От Deli2
К Novik
Дата 15.07.2002 18:06:15
Рубрики WWII; Современность; Спецслужбы; Политек;

Re: Нет

>>Тут опять спор случится об том какой хрен чьей редьки слаще. Наряду с "Нахтигалем" ещё были и "Смерчи" разные - братья близнецы по роду занятий.
>Насчет "Смерчей" расскажите подробней, интересно.

Кое что, всё перевести при всём желании - увы...

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/2/Anusausk1.htm

Comparative Analysis of Armed Resistance for Independence in the Baltic Countries and Ukraine
S u m m a r y
The struggle of Western Ukraine for the independent State of Ukraine against Poland, the Soviet Union and Germany goes back to 1918. The movement for the restoration of independence in Baltic countries after the Soviet occupation in 1940 grew into armed resistance in 1941. The geopolitical situation in 1940– 1941, postured the Soviet Union as the worst enemy of the independence movements in the Baltic countries. The non-aggression and lingering strategy was practised with respect to German occupation. Whereas the Soviet occupation policy was opposed by armed resistance as well as other means. The armed resistance movements in the Baltic Countries and Western Ukraine in 1944–1953 became major determinants for the future historical events.
Studies of armed resistance in other Soviet-held territories, their respective scale and intensity, can be compared with the scale and intensity of armed resistance in Lithuania and Western Ukraine. For instance in 1947 the scope of the movement in Lithuania was 9–15 times intense than in Latvia in, battles with MVD–MGB forces and sustained casualties on both sides. The movement in Estonia accordingly was 3–4 times smaller than in Latvia. Anti Soviet movements in the struggle against totalitarian regimes both in Baltic Countries and Ukraine were based on the support of their populations inherent national values and the quest for independence. It was the first strong blow to communist regime and armed response to genocide policy.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/5/Nijole.htm
Nijolė Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė
The Strategies of the Movement for the Liberation of Lithuania
S u m m a r y
In 1944 the underground organisations of Lithuania agreed to exercise the following tactics for the restitution of Lithuania’s independence:
1) to employ various diplomatic instruments provided that the Soviet Union, complying with the Atlantic Charter, retreated from occupied territories;
2) to organise a general uprising in case of an armed conflict of the Soviet Union with Western countries.
Up to 1946 Lithuania hoped that an International Conference of Peace will restore the pre–war state borders. So one of the major tasks of partisan movement at that period was to continually remind the free countries of Lithuania’s subjugation and inform about Soviet terror in the country. After subjugation the Lithuanians boycotted elections organised by the Soviets and forcible mobilisation to the Red Army. They also made various hindrances against the foundation of public governmental bodies and the arrival of colonists.
At the onset of the Cold War between 1946 and 1948, and particularly after Winston Churchill’s speech in Fulham and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, Lithuania believed that Western countries would exercise a direct power against the Soviet Union. Following the communist coup d’etat in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the isolation of Berlin’s eastern sector, it was assumed that the Soviet Union itself would start a war. Taking into consideration the international situation Lithuanian partisans tried to slow down the process of collectivisation and the destruction of farmsteads.
In 1949 an all partisan organisation called the Movement for the Liberation of Lithuania (LLKS) was formed. The movement was directed by the Supreme Council. The Council worked out a plan and tactics for the liberation of Lithuania. The LLKS, an international situation being favourable, was to organise a general uprising, to form provisional governmental bodies, to guard state borders and to represent Lithuania’s interests at international organisations. Since the Soviet occupation persisted the Council modified the tactics of the movement and engaged new forms of resistance. The movement focused its activities on ideological struggle. The LLKS decided to curtail military operations but the existing system of the partisan Staffs and communications were preserved. The number of underground publications during that period considerably increased. The partisan underground press that had well over 70 different publications existed until 1959 although the armed resistance had ceased some years before.


Могу перевести надписи на таблицах, согласен, что это нехорошо, что этих статей на русский не переводят. Сам выражал недовольство по этому поводу авторам сайта.

>>Одним словом Родину надо защищать от всех оккупантов без особой для этого дела сепарации и всеми имеющимися для этого пригодными легальными и нелегальными средствами...
>Не согласен. Определенные средства могут полностью дискредитировать цель. Что в случае с ОУН, кстати, и произошло IMHO.

Единственная оговорка - цели должны быть военные: военные объекты, гос.учреждения оккупационных властей, коммуникационная сеть и т.д.
На полном серьёзе, разговаривал как то с одним ирландцем, у них (он из Шин Фейн был) именно такая официальная тактика действий.

С уважением, http://memorandum.tinklapis.lt
От Deli2
К Deli2 (15.07.2002 18:06:15)
Дата 15.07.2002 18:33:20

ДП про белых и пушистых "освободителей"

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/1/Inga1.htm
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF SOVIET SECURITY IN LITHUANIA (1941-1954)
Summary

History of the activities of state secret office and development of structures is one of the most interesting and meaningful research field in the sphere of history of the state policy. Research of the state secret police activities discloses aspects of internal and foreign policy of the state, makes the possibility to lighten the directions of state policy. Great importance was attached to secret police in Soviet Union. The secret police was the main tool realizing the repressive policy of the totalitaristic state. Soviet repressive bodies were founded in Lithuania from the very first days of 1940. During the war the repressive body was evacuated to the depth of the Soviet Union and there continued its work and was preparing for the new occupation. After the War (in the summer of 1944) agency of NKVD (MVD) and NKGB (MGB) of Soviet Lithuania directly took part in the extermination of people in the country, restrained the resistance against the invaders, took repressive action against the progressive part of the society. In 1953 the active resistance of Lithuanians against the Soviet system was broken down, physically and spiritually were exterminated thousands of peaceful Lithuanians. The greatest part responsibility should be given to the Soviet State secret agency that had been working in Lithuania. Research of the developement of those structures and their separate subdivisions discloses directions of the activities, methodics, meaning of the country life.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/1/mindaugas_pocius_mvd.htm
SPECIAL MVD-MGB TROOPS IN LITHUANIA (1945-1959)
Summary

Special MVD-MGB troops were formed in Lithuania for military operations against armed resistance movement and were responsible for the execution of the most complicated KGB tactical tasks. Great death loses of Lithuania's Freedom Fighters and peaceful population, ruined lives and physical and moral health, tortures, horrible experiences was the result of the doings of these shock troops.

Special troops - the principal KGB measure - during the period of 1950-1953 liquidated the last existing regional and district combined headquarters. This fact determined the annihilation of the Movement of Lithuania's Freedom Fighters the leading organisation of the movement. Fictious district headquarters, mainly formed from MGB secret agents helped the repressive organs to finally break down organised resistance. In operations against National partisans in 1952-1953 MGB military units as well as quislings (istrebiteli) were little involved and the activities of secret agents and operations of special troops became principal axis of KGB activities. During the period of 1950-1953 special troops had been most actively and effectively used by MGB (armed resistance would have lasted at least two more years without unless the secret agents activities).

From the material investigated it can be ascertained that during the period of 1945-1950 special troops killed 500 partisans and about 220 partisans were taken prisoners. About 700 resistance participants had been insidiously interrogated. It made possible for KGB to expose and arrest about 4900 resistance movement supporters, signallers and reservist. On the basis of documents it can be ascertained that up to 60 supporters and civilians were killed by special troops. These are well known and based facts, but in fact the number af peaceful civilians who perished could be several times greater. Many of such victims were ascribed by MGB to be "bandits".

It can be firmly maintained, that shock troops of secret agents:

1. physically and moraly tortured armed resistance fighters and people who did not participate in the resistance movement (women, old people, children);

2. killed peaceful civilians, rezervers of partisans, signallers and supporters;

3. pillaged the property of peaceful civilians and resistance fighters.

Neither shock toopers nor their leaders/commanders followed any laws. It should be noted that the responsibility for genocide and criminal crimes executed by special troops against Lithuanians has also to be assumed by the supreme government of Lithuanian SSR and the chief commanders of the MVD-MGB of the Soviet Union, the initiateres of the formation of terrorist special troops and their controllers.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/1/Juozas_%20Starkauskas.htm
THE ACTIVITIES OF NKVD FORCES OF REAR DEFENCE FRONTS IN LITHUANIA (1944-1945)
Summary

During the years of the Word War II Soviet and Nazi occupants replaced one another (the first Russian army troops reached state borders of Lithuania in 1944 07 04, and Klaipėda was seized/taken in 1945 01 28). Lithuanians experienced great tortures inflicted both by front army actions and by the atrocities of various NKVD army formations following front army - such as infantry regiments and frontier regiments.

Many Liethuanians in the hope of supposrt from the West resisted forming the occupants - many of them participated in active armed resistance forming numerous partisan detachments (in spring of 1945 the partisans of the detachments numbered from about 30 to 40 thousand men), others resisted passively - by evading forceful enlisting into the Red Army or avoiding to execute various directions of new occupants. To break down the resistance in Lithuania in 1945 there were concentrated elite NKVD forces numbering up to 20 thousand. The effectualness of the forces can be accounted not only for their quantity but their mobility too - using American "Stutbbekers" they swiftly moved from one locality to another. These forces in 1944 shot 2436 and in 1945 - 9777 people at least 1/3 of whom were not partisans but peaceful civilians. The atrocities increased the resolution to fight and armed resistance in Lithuania lasted as long as 1953 when the last resistance movement headquarters commanding the movement were routed.

Among different NKVD army formations devastating Lithuania in 1945 the so called NKVD army front rear defence regiments played an exceptional role. Lithuania was occupied by two fronts - the Ist Baltic Front and the IIIrd Byelorusian Front. Besides NKVD rear defence units of these two fronts Lithuania experienced the atrocities of a similar type NKVD army of Leningrad and the Ist Ukrainian Fronts. It should be noted that two campaigns had been executed by this army in Lithuania - in 02.1944-02.1945 and in 06-10.1945 (in 02-06.1945 the army "was establishing" Soviet Power in East Prussia) whereas NKVD forces of other fronts just after the War were demobilised and re-reformed.

Especially notorious was the group of NKVD forces of the 3rd Byelorussian front (commander General Lieutenant Liubyj) which during its first Lithuanian campaign consisted of 5 and during the second campaign of 3 regiments (1-1,5 thousand soldiers made a regiment). All the regiments of the Front that hed been sent again to Lithuania in June 1945 had been awarded with Honoured titles or orders and operated extremely brutally. As a rule the farm-steads suspected of supporting partisans were burnt down. This rezulted in hundreds of farm-stead being burnt down in rural districts of Lithuania. Rural districts of Panemunes dzuku and Čekiskes in the district of Kaunas had suffered most. Here entire village were burnt down and their inhabitants were killed.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/2/Starkausk1.htm
Soviet Home Army, Its Strategy and Tactics in 1944–1953
S u m m a r y

In 1944–1945 Lithuania was devastated by eleven of NKVD army rear defence regiments of four fronts., 7 frontier platoons, 4–5 infantry regiments and 3–4 special NKVD regiments. The enemy did not take into account the patriotism of the people of Lithuania and the specifics of guerrilla war, especially when the war is supported by the majority of the population. KGB made methodological mistakes in tracing the leaders of partisans and the roots of resistance. The inert communist – KGB way of thinking reasoned that people against the Soviets should be rallied round either by a personality or by some organisation. That is why in their instruction they directed to look for leaders of the underground first, and only then for partisan detachments. About a hundred different platoons were sent to the forests of Lithuania to fight partisans every day and per year the number of such platoons per year totalled 44–65 thousand platoons The number of platoons fighting against partisans was 45–65 thousand per year.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/3/Juozas_Starkauskas.htm
Juozas Starkauskas
KGB Frontier-Guards in Lithuania After the War
S u m m a r y

After the War the NKVD frontier troops were used to execute a two-fold task in Lithuania. First, the troops reinforced to the extreme the Western borderland of Lithuania and prevented the contacts of Lithuanian resistance forces with Lithuanian emigrants in the West. Second, the troops were used in close battles with Lithuanian partisans.

The first four KGB frontier troops were dislocated in Lithuania in August 1944. Later the troops were reinforced. Till February 1945, the KGB frontier troops were basically engaged in cleaning up the rear of “criminal elements”, i.e. of Lithuanian partisans. Since February 1944, the troops were employed in guarding the Lithuanian–Polish and the Lithuanian–East Prussia borders and the sea-cost. From the Field frontier troops and the Reserve frontier cordons the KGB practised to form combined troops. Such combined troops generally had up to 1,000 frontier guards and were used in battles with Lithuanian partisans as deep as 50km into inland. It is supposed that only in 1944–1945 some 3,000 Lithuanian people were shot by frontier guards during the partisan war.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/4/juozas.htm
Juozas Starkauskas
The MVD 4th Division Operation in Lithuania in 1946
Summary

In 1946, the Soviet occupation executors both in Moscow and Vilnius, after L. Berija’s infamous plan to rout Lithuania’s armed resistance in two weeks had completely failed, understood, that a sustained war with the partisans of Lithuania is in store for them.

In 1946, the Soviets distributed in Lithuania 199 garrisons of the MVD Regular Forces. These garrisons were stationed in all district administrative centres and many rural district centres of Lithuania. The Soviets took these measures, because the tactics of terror they used in Lithuania in 1944–1945, was of little effect. The Lithuanian partisan units were very quick in recovering their losses in the battles with the Soviet forces. One of the sources of their recovering, were the victims, that survived the KGB terror. Local collaborators, the number of which was not numerous, pressed the Soviets to station garrisons. Particularly insistent were the collaborators of district administrative centres. On the one hand, they were afraid to cross their district’s limits without being accompanied by the Soviet guards, and on the other hand, they feared lest partisans should attack administrative centres.

In 1946, the MVD 4th Infantry Division consisted of 12 regiments. Basically, the division kept using the Cossack attack tactics, exercised in Lithuania in 1944–1945. But the Soviets adjusted the tactics to a new situation: Three regiments of the Division were broken into a number of mobile detachments, that ranged all over Lithuania. The garrisons of the rest 9 regiments, broken into a variety of specific detachments, were stationed in every administrative centre of Lithuania. The adjustment of the Cossack tactics meant, that the KGB was looking for a more effective means in the fight against Lithuania and its freedom fighters

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/5/juozas1.htm
Juozas Starkauskas

Armed Soviet and Party Activists and Other Paramilitary Units

Summary

During the partisan war in Lithuania between 1944 and 1953, the Communist Party and the KGB made efforts to form various groups from civilians besides the existing Soviet militarised punitive detachments, formed from semi-professional men who were called “istrebiteli”. Those non-professional militarised groups were to protect the centres of small rural districts (later rural district centres too) that were continually subjected to the partisans’ attacks and secondly, if necessary to make attacks on partisans themselves. Nevertheless, a real military power both by manpower and armament had two big groups of armed civilians. The first group included the so-called Soviet and party activists that were periodically to visit the country-side controlled by partisans. The second group included people that were to guard collective farms “kolkhozi” and appeared in 1948–1949. Part of the Soviet and party activists as well as part of the members of the Soviet militarised punitive detachments (istrebiteli) were transferred to groups guarding collective farms. The number of people belonging to the second group was from six to eight thousand. Many of them were armed with rifles and submachine guns. In fact, nearly every communist or a member of the Komsomol carried arms, particularly those who resided in small rural district centres because they were continually subjected to the partisans’ attacks.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/1/arvydas.htm
Arvydas Anušauskas

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/3/Arvydas_Anusauskas.htm
Two Objects of the KGB Secret Activities
S u m m a r y

The article deals with the KGB technological espionage and the activities against the supporters of independent Lithuania. Although these two KBG activities are very little related historically, they have both been organised and executed by the KGB Secret Service. The KGB applied diverse methods and various combinations of the methods in its Secret Service activities. The diversity on the one hand and the similarity on the other hand of the methods used by Secret service in handling different problems is worth studying as it helps to get a better idea about the KGB activities.

Technological espionage. The search of information about new technologies was a very important issue for the KGB. The KGB division in Lithuania has also been engaged in technological espionage. The KGB of the Lithuanian SSR as well as other KGB regional divisions got the directions from Moscow. Meanwhile, Moscow formed the principal problem, which was split into minor tasks. The KGB agents realised those minor tasks by obtaining necessary technical documentation and reports. For instance, tasks No104,108,115,132,134,145 and No149 have been related to space-spying satellites. These tasks were also related to laser weapons. The Chernobyl catastrophe stimulated the espionage in nuclear reactor’s security, and the design and control methods of accidents. The agents of task No 202 were engaged in espionage of high temperature gas-cooled reactors. The KGB was also interested in the possibility of using gas-cooled reactors in submarines and space-spying satellites. The KGB agents had to penetrate into certain companies and organisation of the USA, France, Italy, England, Japan and Germany. The following companies were of major interest to the KGB Secret Service: Argonne National Lab., Hanford Engineering Development Lab., Idaho National Engineering Lab., Westinghouse Electric Co., General Electric Co., General Atomic Co., Gas-cooled Reactor Associates, Department of Energy, (the USA); Framatome, Centre d’Etudes Nucleaires de Cadarach, Centre d’Etudes Nucleaires de Sacley, Creso-duar Electricite de France, Novatome, Comissariat a l’Energy Atomique, (France); Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, Kernforschung-sanlage Julich GmbH, Hochtemperaturreactorbau GmbH, (West Germany); Nucleare Italiana Reaktor Avansati (Italy); Yorkshire Imperial Metals Ltd. (England); Mitsubishi Metals Research Institute (Japan). The so called “key” words such as fast breeder reactor, high temperature gas-cooled reactor, core, reactor vessel, radioactive waste, design accident, etc. have been searched in the documents obtained by Secret Service agents.

To make things work smoothly, the KGB had to have an exhaustive knowledge about its agents. So since 1987 a new test in choosing the KGB agents has been introduced. The highest evaluation point was 8750. The data of the test was computed by a special formula. The highest point could have been given only to the USA citizen, the head of a research centre , who collaborated with the KGB out of “ideological” convictions. Such agents communicated and provided secret information for the KGB only through mediators.

The search for radical methods in handling ideological opponents. M.Gorbachiov’s “perestroika” and “open” policy, and favourable international situation, induced the KGB to search for new working methods. The KGB very scrupulously analysed new political situations, developing both abroad and at home, and immediately created new strategies. In January 1988, the KGB analysts were right in foreseeing that the leaders of legal opposition in Lithuania will be the representatives of intelligentsia. The KGB analysts made virtually right guess concerning the development of political events at home. But the analysts failed to guess the scale of movements for independence. The failure delayed the search for radical methods in handling ideological opponents, and the idea that “power” methods might be applied for the preservation of the USSR integrity became more and more acceptable by the KGB.

http://www.genocid.lt/Leidyba/2/nijole2.htm
MGB–KGB Agencies in Occupied Lithuania
S u m m a r y

Soviet occupation induced part of society to collaborate with occupation authorities. By the open supporters of the occupation authorities there appeared an army of secret collaborators – the agents of MGB–KGB. Espionage and ideological processing is a necessary condition for a totalitarian system to exist. There existed three basic motives of recruiting the agents: discrediting material, personal interest and ideological community. The interior policy of recruitment in the SSSR can be divided into three periods. The periods differ both in the tactics of recruitment and the reaction of an individual to the fact of being recruited. The first period covers the decade of partisan war. During the period the KGBists did not inquire much into psychological characteristics of a candidate and recruited any person that had fallen into their vision. The consent to collaborate was usually got by blackmail using discrediting material. With the end of the partisan war the tactics had changed. The candidate was gradually involved in fulfilling KGB tasks. The third period coincides with the years of Gorbachov’s “perestroika”. It seemed more dangerous at that time to become an agent then to refuse to collaborate. Ideological community became the main motive for collaboration. The KGB objectives during the Revival were to control public movements, penetrate into newly born organisations, to make influence to their activities and to split them by discrediting their leaders and establishing alternative organisations. After the declaration of independence KGB through their agents tried to advocate the idea of gradual secession from the SSSR, to discredit the right wing, to organise early elections to SC and “to remove V. Landsbergis legally”. Independence to many Lithuanian people meant getting back to their lost and destroyed mentality and life with no masks on. But for collaborators, that made up 5% of mature population, the period brought in new parts and new masks. Only a few of them took the courage to throw off the disguise publicly. Different Laws of Lustration passed in post-communist countries attempt to unharm the collaborators and to define their status by law, i.e. to help them to take off their masks.


С уважением, http://memorandum.tinklapis.lt
От Novik
К Deli2 (15.07.2002 18:06:15)
Дата 15.07.2002 18:24:07

Re: Нет

Приветствую.

>Кое что, всё перевести при всём желании - увы...

Спасибо, буду смотреть.

>На полном серьёзе, разговаривал как то с одним ирландцем, у них (он из Шин Фейн был) именно такая официальная тактика действий.

Ага. Вот уже и оговорки начались. Я, собственно, про то же - дорога в ад, как известно, вымощена благими намерениями.
От Deli2
К Novik (15.07.2002 18:24:07)
Дата 15.07.2002 19:07:02

Re: Нет

>Ага. Вот уже и оговорки начались. Я, собственно, про то же - дорога в ад, как известно, вымощена благими намерениями.

У Николы оговорок нет, у него - теория. А на практике исключения только подтверждают правило.

С уважением, http://memorandum.tinklapis.lt