От Venik
К All
Дата 28.02.2002 21:54:21
Рубрики Современность; Локальные конфликты;

Две интересные статейки Джейнс про аль-Каиду, Чечню и Россию

Al-Qaeda and the Chechens
Dr Mark Galeotti
Nov. 21, 2001

Osama bin Laden has long been suspected by Russia of sponsoring Chechen militants. Now the 'war on terror' is giving Moscow the chance to target the more extreme rebels. Dr Mark Galeotti reports.

The Russians have for a long time regarded Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda ('The Base') network as a direct threat. In particular, Moscow has, for obvious political reasons, sought to link Bin Laden directly with the Chechen rebellion. They have presented him as the paymaster and йminence grise behind the rebels, and he has been eager to claim credit for the continuing war. In August 2000, for example, one of his aides declared that he had sent 400 Arab and Afghan fighters to Chechnya, while other accounts have suggested that Al-Qaeda donated up to US$5m or even $10m to the rebels.

However, these figures are grossly exaggerated. While there may be some credence to the assessment that there were 400 Arab and Afghan fighters within the rebel ranks, this should not be regarded as some kind of Al-Qaeda foreign legion. Instead, it is more likely to include all the outsiders who came to fight motivated by individual religious commitment, anti-Russian feeling or mercenary self-interest. Some were undoubtedly linked to, or perhaps even paid by, Al-Qaeda. In this respect, though, it has been in the interests of both Moscow and Bin Laden to talk up Al-Qaeda's role in the war. Furthermore, there have been other groups supporting the rebels, clearly to an extent linked with Al-Qaeda but not under Bin Laden's control, such as the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood Organisation (Al-Iqwanul Muslamoon), which appears to have also contributed funds and some fighters.

In fact, it has long been clear that Al-Qaeda's support is confined to the most extreme wing of the insurgent movement, one almost as fiercely opposed to moderate rebel President Aslan Maskhadov as the Russians. Bin Laden's main achievement to date has been to fragment the rebels to the point where concerted efforts against the Russians are all but impossible, and if anything his leverage in Chechnya has been weakening. His main associates have been forced into retreat or lost; they include: Salman Raduyev (seized by the Russians last year); Ruslan Gelayev (reportedly now in Georgia); and Shamil Basayev (increasingly disillusioned with Bin Laden's extremism). His last main ally is the Jordanian-born warlord Emir Khattab who himself has faced escalating attacks. It has also been reported that Khattab had sent a 50-man group back to Afghanistan to help defend Bin Laden. However, it may well be that this was not so much a generous gesture of support by Khattab so much as Bin Laden recalling the remaining rump of the force he had sent to Chechnya.

The irony is that the events of 11 September and Bin Laden's actions may actually help Moscow and the mainstream Chechen rebels reach some accord. The war in Chechnya has reached an impasse: the federal forces have failed to break the rebels, but they are sufficiently weak and divided that they cannot oust the Russians. Senior figures both in Maskhadov's camp and even in the Russian General Staff are increasingly disillusioned with the war. The campaign in Afghanistan helped bring both sides closer to the negotiations which tentatively began in late October. The threat of escalating conflict and chaos in Central Asia has also raised serious concerns about Russia's relative lack of genuinely operational forces, and the extent to which the war monopolises such units from both the army and the interior troops. As a result, the Russians have once again begun to publicly accept that there are distinctions between the Chechen nationalists and the Islamic extremists and are focusing their attacks on the latter. For example, Khattab was injured in a Russian attack apparently directed specifically at him. At the end of October, Saudi-born Abu Omar Mohammed Al-Seif, the person responsible for handling Khattab's links with its outside backers, was also reportedly killed in a Russian attack. There are even indications that the unusual precision and accuracy of the Russian attacks might even be in part due to Maskhadov's partisans providing on-the-ground intelligence on Khattab's movements. Meanwhile, the US campaign against terrorism has given Maskhadov greater scope to dissociate himself from the extremists. In late September, Putin's representative to the region opened talks with a close ally of Maskhadov's, establishing the basis for later, more substantive negotiations.

There is rather more reason to accept Moscow's belief that Bin Laden was involved in terrorist attacks on Russia, although he was probably more of an inspiration than a mastermind. Although there are still questions about some of the blasts, and worryingly persistent suggestions that the Federal Security Service (FSB - Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti) may have known about or even planted some devices, it is difficult to deny that there was a pro-Chechen campaign of bomb attacks in 1999. Indeed, the same Abu Omar was reportedly involved in organising some or all of them. Al-Qaeda's function, as in so many such cases, was probably to facilitate and support individuals and cells personally committed to launching the attacks, in retaliation for Russian operations in Chechnya, rather than to initiate them.

Following Russia's decision to support the allied coalition against terrorism (see JIR, November 2001, pp48-49), Moscow became increasingly worried that it might face a renewed Islamic terrorist threat. The FSB warned that the war in Chechnya, by radicalising other North Caucasian groups, provided the terrorists with an endless supply of recruits and sympathisers. However, a new and alarming possibility is that Al-Qaeda may in due course turn to the Russian and post-Soviet mafiya for weapons, expertise and services. Dealings between a radical Islamic grouping and Russians, at a time when Russia is still fighting a war in Chechnya, may seem far-fetched. However, there have already been credible indications of some links and deals. For example, some of the support for rebels in Chechnya - possibly around $250,000 - appears to have been spent on buying weapons from Russian criminal gangs, which were then transferred directly to the battlefield. North Caucasian criminals - possibly Avars or Dagestanis - appear to have been used as intermediaries, possibly to ameliorate Islamic discomfort at dealing with Russians, but it is extremely unlikely that the senior figures within Al-Qaeda were unaware of the identity of their ultimate suppliers. Instead, it is probable that they simply accept that it is a necessary compromise to make in pursuit of wider goals.

This raises the prospect of Al-Qaeda making further, greater use of the mafiya. In particular, the more the US-led campaign against its assets and allies bites, the more Al-Qaeda will be forced to adopt new methods to continue its operations. One key area will be money laundering. Admittedly, Al-Qaeda makes good use of underground hawala banking systems, which are extremely hard to intercept or disrupt, but the serious international efforts being directed against its activities make many of the brokers who are the 'banks' of the hawala system disinclined to maintain a relationship with the terrorists. Thus, both its regular and underground money-laundering networks may come under serious pressure and its assets face confiscation. In this context, the mafiya has huge and well-established money laundries in operation which already deal with much larger sums than the terrorists need to move. Admittedly, the mafiya charges for its money-laundering services around three to four times the cost of using hawala, but if this is the price Al-Qaeda has to pay to continue to use its resources, it is one it can afford.

However, it is possible to minimise or prevent this. To the mafiya, Al-Qaeda is a useful possible client, but not one so significant or lucrative that it is worth jeopardising its international freedom of manoeuvre and relative security within Russia. Russian organised crime is well aware of its political environment, already visible in its new low profile following Putin's election and his evident determination to crack down on overt disorder. If Moscow is prepared to put the same effort into denying its Slavic criminals links with Bin Laden as it does the Chechen rebels, then this door should also be closed to Al-Qaeda.

Dr Mark Galeotti is the Director of the Organised Russian & Eurasian Crime Research Unit at Keele University, UK.
От apple16
К Venik (28.02.2002 21:54:21)
Дата 01.03.2002 11:23:32

Я так понял у вас аккаунт есть на Janes...

Добрый день

...и Вы делаете полезное дело потихоньку публикуете
различные материалы по скажет так теме "современность".

У меня вопрос - насколько я понял
из Ваших PDF для доступа к фотоматериалам не требуется
специального аккаунта - если знать точный URL.

например:


Есть ли у Janes на сайте раздел посвященный не
современности а чему-нибудь историческому
(начало века например).

Если есть возможность, качните пожалуйста оттуда один PDF с фотографиями?

Я тогда смогу написать ботика и выкачать у них
все фотографии по этой теме.
(собираю я их :))

(естественно без угрозы для целостности сайта
- траффик у меня небольшой и с полной аннонимностью)

Результаты выложу на какой-нибудь народный сайтик :)

__________
Apple
От Venik
К apple16 (01.03.2002 11:23:32)
Дата 01.03.2002 14:41:54

так точно

Мое почтение!

>У меня вопрос - насколько я понял
>из Ваших PDF для доступа к фотоматериалам не требуется
>специального аккаунта - если знать точный URL.

Вроде да, но я не совсем уверен, что это для всех фотографий. У Джейнс все разбито по публикациям, вроде Jane's Intelligence Review или Jane's Fighting Ships. В некоторых разделах фотки доступны всем если знать URL. Так-ли это для всех разделов - я не уверен.

>Есть ли у Janes на сайте раздел посвященный не
>современности а чему-нибудь историческому
>(начало века например).

Вот этого у них нет. У них инфа исключительно по технике состоящей на вооружении в настоящий момент. К тому-же с этого сайта очень трудно качать файлы: они там наворочали кучу всяких защитных мер.

То что я накопал можно найти тут:
http://www.aeronautics.ru/archive/vif2_project/pdf_archive.htm

С уважением, Venik
От apple16
К Venik (01.03.2002 14:41:54)
Дата 01.03.2002 14:59:03

Спасибо

а хоть один документик
с Jane's Fighting Ships можете утянуть?

Дело в следующем - если иметь
несколько базовых URL то фотографии
можно тянуть
(я просто перебираю все возможные :))

Проверьте пожалуйста можно ли утянуть PDF
зная его URL.
От Venik
К apple16 (01.03.2002 14:59:03)
Дата 01.03.2002 15:19:12

Re: Спасибо

Мое почтение!

>а хоть один документик
>с Jane's Fighting Ships можете утянуть?

Я вот как раз это и качаю сейчас.

>Дело в следующем - если иметь
>несколько базовых URL то фотографии
>можно тянуть
>(я просто перебираю все возможные :))

Угу, я догадался. :)

>Проверьте пожалуйста можно ли утянуть PDF
>зная его URL.

PDF я сделал. У Джейнс все разбито на HTML по десять линков н статьи на каждой странице. И единственное чем это можно скачать - Adobe Acrobat. Перепробовал много чего другого но все бестолку.

С уважением, Venik
От apple16
К Venik (01.03.2002 15:19:12)
Дата 01.03.2002 15:30:32

Re: Спасибо

Я просто не понял как у них защита сделана
- после авторизации выдается некий дивный URL
с которого уже можно работать.

Или постоянно идете передача session id
или еще чего.

Можете дать начальный URL для
Fighting Ships например?

кстати из первых 1000 URLS примерно 480
вхождений (я сами картинки не качаю а просто проверяю
на 200) - похоже их больше чем в вашем PDF :(
(это я про Jane's Naval Weapon Systems)
От Venik
К apple16 (01.03.2002 15:30:32)
Дата 01.03.2002 20:16:55

Re: Спасибо

Мое почтение!

>Я просто не понял как у них защита сделана
>- после авторизации выдается некий дивный URL
>с которого уже можно работать.

Работает так: мой комп на работе из Филадельфии подключается к файрволлу в Сиэттле, тот подключается к серверу Джейнс, оттуда идет запрос на license назад на файрволл и на боинговский license сервер, ответ идет обратно Джейнс, и т.д. Нагромоздили короче всего много. Если-бы пароль или по IP адресу то проблем бы не было.

>кстати из первых 1000 URLS примерно 480
>вхождений (я сами картинки не качаю а просто проверяю
>на 200) - похоже их больше чем в вашем PDF :(
>(это я про Jane's Naval Weapon Systems)

Фотографии у них организованны не по принципу что директория соответствует определенной публикации. Там навалено всего много в разных местах а инфа о том что где находится добывается из базы данных. Поэтому вы накопали больше фоток чем в моем PDF.

С уважением, Venik
От Василий Фофанов
К Venik (01.03.2002 14:41:54)
Дата 01.03.2002 14:43:19

А нет ли у Вас возможности из Ammunition Guide качать? (-)
От Venik
К Василий Фофанов (01.03.2002 14:43:19)
Дата 01.03.2002 15:19:59

там есть Ammunition Handbook, постараюсь... (-)
От Marat
К Venik (01.03.2002 15:19:59)
Дата 01.03.2002 17:28:00

можно тоже просьбу...

Здравствуйте!

...выложить кантри профайл оставшихся республик быв. СССР (не все выложено) и стран АСЕАН (напр. Майлайзии)?

C уважением
От Venik
К Marat (01.03.2002 17:28:00)
Дата 01.03.2002 20:09:04

в ближайшее время делаю (-)
От Василий Фофанов
К Venik (01.03.2002 15:19:59)
Дата 01.03.2002 16:42:27

Пардон, Handbook, конечно

Хотя какой идиот так назвал книжку толщиной не то 600 не то 1000 страниц?....

Вобщем скажите если есть возможность, у меня есть конкретные запросы :)

С уважением, Василий Фофанов, http://members.dencity.com/fofanov/Tanks
От Venik
К Василий Фофанов (01.03.2002 16:42:27)
Дата 01.03.2002 20:08:29

Re: Пардон, Handbook,...

Мое почтение!

>Вобщем скажите если есть возможность, у меня есть конкретные запросы :)

Да я всю ее скачаю как только с Jane's Fighting Ships покончу. Так проще будет.

С уважением, Venik
От Василий Фофанов
К Venik (01.03.2002 20:08:29)
Дата 01.03.2002 22:48:11

Уууууу Аааааа (падает на пол и бьется в конвульсиях)

Неужели Вы прямо-таки из своего карманА не пожалели за подписку выложить?

С уважением, Василий Фофанов, http://members.dencity.com/fofanov/Tanks
От Venik
К Василий Фофанов (01.03.2002 22:48:11)
Дата 02.03.2002 08:08:03

ужо, вы меня плохо знаете :)

Мое почтение!

Это всем презент от американского ВПК :)

С уважением, Venik
От Василий Фофанов
К Venik (28.02.2002 21:54:21)
Дата 28.02.2002 22:00:28

Хмм...

>and Shamil Basayev (increasingly disillusioned with Bin Laden's extremism).

А откуда ребятки знают о Басаеве такие подробности? И куда он кстати вообще делся, что-то как-то тихо о нем в последнее время...

С уважением, Василий Фофанов, http://members.dencity.com/fofanov/Tanks
От Venik
К Василий Фофанов (28.02.2002 22:00:28)
Дата 28.02.2002 22:10:57

Re: Хмм...

Мое почтение!

>А откуда ребятки знают о Басаеве такие подробности? И куда он кстати вообще делся, что-то как-то тихо о нем в последнее время...

Он с Масхадовым и Ладеном в отпуск на Карибы ломанулся...

С уважением, Venik
От Venik
К Venik (28.02.2002 21:54:21)
Дата 28.02.2002 21:54:56

Вторая статья

JANE'S INTELLIGENCE DIGEST - OCTOBER 12, 2001

SPECIAL REPORT - Why was Russia's intelligence coup on Al-Qaeda ignored?
Claims that Western intelligence services failed to gather vital information about Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and links between the Taliban regime and Pakistan have been exposed as fallacy by the leaking of an astonishingly detailed report. Compiled by Russian intelligence, the report was passed by Moscow's Permanent Mission at the UN to the Security Council and the Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in March. This special JID investigation explores the implications of this extensive report, which our Russian intelligence sources have confirmed as genuine.

In the immediate aftermath of the multiple terrorist strikes in the US on 11 September there was widespread disbelief that Western intelligence agencies appeared to have so little specific information concerning the recent activities of Saudi-born terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden. Although he has featured on the FBI's 'Most Wanted' list of suspects for several years, an earlier US military response to the suicide bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 failed to kill the Al-Qaeda chief or to disable his extensive network of activists. The key reason cited for this negative result was the difficulty of locating Bin Laden and his mobile bases within Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

However, a leaked Russian document reveals that on 9 March 2001 Moscow presented the UN Security Council Committee on Afghanistan with a very comprehensive and detailed report on Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The report not only provided extremely explicit intelligence concerning 55 alleged Al-Qaeda bases and offices located throughout the areas of the country controlled by the regime in Kabul, but also provided copious information on 31 senior Pakistani officers whom it is alleged were at that time actively involved with Bin Laden and the Taliban.

A further section of the seven page report names seven top officials of the Taliban regime - including its Chief of the General Staff - who are alleged to be controlling the country's production and trading of narcotics. An accusation that the regime is actively involved in the production and distribution of heroin was just one of the specific charges laid against the Taliban by British Prime Minister Tony Blair during his speech to the House of Commons on 4 October.

Other information concerns six named Pakistani officers who are alleged to hold senior positions within the Taliban military and security apparatus - including its head of intelligence - as well as 16 examples of what the report claims are regular units of the Pakistani armed forces based in Afghanistan - an allegation that the government of General Pervez Musharraf has vigorously denied. The Russian list includes information on Pakistani parachute regiments, commando units and even an "AWACS airborne warning and control system reconnaissance aircraft", which the report indicates was operating from Mazar-e-Sharif airport and carrying out reconnaissance missions on the borders with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Of particular interest are the sections of the report which deal with the activities of named officials of Pakistan's Inter-Service-Intelligence (ISI), who are said to have been based in Afghanistan earlier this year. Some of those named, including eight ISI generals and various other military officers of senior rank, are alleged to have been based at Pakistan's embassy in Kabul (at that time Pakistan was one of only three states that actually recognised the Taliban regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan), while others are reported to have been attached to military units or were reportedly acting as 'advisers' to the Taliban.

There can be little doubt that most - if not all - of the report's content is based on the factual state of affairs in Afghanistan at the time it was compiled immediately prior to its delivery to the UN. Having had a very close intelligence interest in neighbouring Afghanistan in the run-up to its 1979 invasion - and in the 10-year occupation that followed - Moscow is very well placed to provide high-grade intelligence on the region. The then KGB recruited local officers and had a well-trained cadre of Pushto-speaking agents and analysts who specialised in the complex affairs of the region. These personnel monitored the various factions and tribal alliances within the Mujahideen, who were waging a remarkably successful guerrilla war against the Soviet armed forces. One of the young anti-Soviet warriors was, of course, Osama bin Laden.

Unlike the West, which appeared to have largely lost interest in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow has had its own very special reasons for maintaining a well-informed intelligence network there. The ongoing conflict with the Chechen separatists, as well as bomb attacks against Russian cities, including the capital, have led the Russian government to invest in gathering detailed data on the Taliban and those militants it has been sheltering.

There can be no doubt that the decision to provide this detailed intelligence to the UN Security Council (the permanent members of which are the USA, the UK, Russia, China and France) was approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin, himself a former senior KGB official. However, the most important question remains why no military action was launched against Al-Qaeda once such information had been made available by the Russian mission at the UN.

Our diplomatic sources indicate that, although the Russian material was known to US officials, a decision to either take military action against Al-Qaeda bases or put diplomatic pressure on Pakistan was shelved for the following reasons:

· The administration of US President George W Bush was hesitant to launch a military offensive against Bin Laden because of concern that it would have a very negative impact on the US role in brokering a workable peace deal between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It was for the same reason that the previous US president, Bill Clinton, failed to take advantage of an offer made last year by President Putin to use Russian military bases in Tajikistan to launch a US military attack against Bin Laden.

· There was concern that launching such a pre-emptive attack might lead to a rise in support for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda throughout the Islamic world and that there was the risk that the 1998 debacle might be repeated, with Bin Laden escaping death or capture once more.

· There was a view that US allies in the region, notably Saudi Arabia, would object to the use of military action against a regime that they recognised diplomatically.

· There was the fear that such an attack might lead to a region-wide conflict that could escalate into a full-scale Middle East war and lead to the targeting of US facilities and personnel abroad.

Detailed as the Russian report is, the intelligence it contains is now likely to be very dated. Bin Laden and his associates will no doubt be aware of its existence and probably the specific information it contains (which JID has taken the decision not to divulge here in the interests of security). As a blueprint for targeting Al-Qaeda at present it is probably of very limited value. However, the mounting evidence that Pakistan's security service and military has been so closely involved with the regime in Kabul must raise very significant doubts about both the veracity of any intelligence passed over to the US-led coalition as well as the loyalty of these institutions to General Musharraf should he continue to support the anti-Taliban coalition.