>>С текстом меморандума Криппса нет никаких проблем см. док № 396 Малиновки. http://bdsa.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1809&Itemid=30
>судя по указанию, что Криппс передал "написанный от руки перевод", это и надо считать источником. но любопытно было бы всё же посмотреть английский текст
Кто бы с этим спорил. Впрочем, это замечание относится к любому документу, написанному не по-русски.
>>Так, как и говорил Криппс, Мюнхен может получить второе дыхание, если Великобритания потерпит существенные поражения в войне с немцами. В апреле 1941 года исключить такой вариант развития событий было невозможно. О чем и идет речь.
>история, однако, поставила эксперимент -- в течение полутора месяцев Британия таки понесла существенные поражения, но никакого второго дыхания "Мюнхен" (в вашем понимании) не получил -- да и не мог получить, т к собствено Мюнхен имел совершенно иные задачи, чем представляется советской точке зрения
Опять-таки это видно только задним числом. При принятии решения Москвой весной 1941 года это было не очевидно. О чем в данном случае и идет речь.
кстати, вот интересная статья о пребывании Криппса послом в Москве
Another way of influencing Soviet policy was to threaten to
negotiate with Hitler. Shortly after Cripps's arrival in Moscow this
problem was discussed in the Foreign Office.2 Cripps eagerly seized
on the suggestion. He wrote to the Foreign Office on 30 July 1940
suggesting that the Soviet government be informed that a British
response to German peace approaches might be influenced by the
response of the Soviet government to British attempts to establish
better relations.3 Cripps reverted to the threat in a memorandum
that he presented to Vyshinsky on 1 February 1941. He wrote that:
. . . it was not outside the bounds of possibility, if the war were protracted
for a long period, that there might be a temptation for Great Britain (and
especially for certain circles in Great Britain) to come to some arrangement
to end the war on the sort of basis which has again recently been
suggested in certain German quarters, that is, that Western Europe should
be returned to its former status, while Germany should be unhampered
in the expansion of her 'living space' to the east.*
Cripps had no authority from London to make this statement. In
spite of this he repeated the same threat to Molotov on 18 April
1941.*
Cripps's demands that concessions be made to the Soviets on the
question of the Baltic States became more insistent as the German
armies moved through the Balkans. The collapse of Yugoslavia, the
German invasion of Greece and the signing of the Soviet-Japanese
non-aggression pact gave his demands an added urgency. On 17 April
he telegraphed London that the unwillingness of the government to
make concessions left the Soviets open to Axis pressure alone. The
government was finally persuaded to act by this warning and
Cadogan suggested that Halifax inform the United States government
that de facto Soviet sovereignty over the three Baltic States
would be recognized in return for solid advantages such as the supply
of raw materials to Turkey and Greece and a restriction of supplies
to Germany. But when on 19 April the government learnt of the
interview which Cripps had had with Molotov, a day earlier, they
informed Washington that the Soviets were not prepared to make
the slightest concessions.6
1. F.O. 371/24849 N 7500, 19 Dec 1940.
2. F.O. 571/24844 N 5769, 22-23 H y 1940.
3. F.O. 371/24844 N 6072.
4. Woodward, i. 607-9.
5. F.O. 371/29465 N 1692 and Premier 3/395/6.
6. F.O. 371/29465 N 1667, 1692, 1725, 1778. See also Premier 3/395/16.
вот кстати и архивная ссылочка на английский текст меморандума