The United States is considering a protracted ground campaign in Afghanistan. As thousands flee the war-torn country, the core military target -- the support network of Osama bin Laden -- may develop beyond Afghanistan's borders in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. By spring 2002, Kyrgyzstan will likely emerge as a hotspot in the anti-terrorism campaign.
Analysis
During an Oct. 9 press briefing, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell alluded to expanding the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign beyond Afghanistan. Seconding his comments, British Prime Minister Tony Blair told the BBC that attacks on Afghanistan represent only a first phase in the campaign.
But expanding the anti-terrorism campaign will require a conventional military cordon around Central Asia. Islamic militants in the region have for the past year broadened their recruiting efforts to appeal to moderate, nonviolent Muslims, and Russian-led security forces in the region cannot isolate what have become diffuse militant enclaves. U.S. ground forces will be left vulnerable to attack by Taliban sympathizers in states surrounding Afghanistan. Without a follow-on ground campaign running deep into Central Asia, U.S. ground forces will contain Afghanistan only to be flanked by militant networks in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
Militants in Central Asia pose a threat to the anti-terrorism campaign in part because of their proximity to Afghanistan and poor border security -- particularly in Kyrgyzstan -- which could allow Afghan fighters to seek cover in non-hostile nations. Moreover as Central Asian leaders jockey to support the U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan, citizens could view their stance as inviting attacks on all Muslims and this could fuel popular support for militant groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which is active in Kyrgyzstan.
Russian-Led Force Will Stoke Conflict in Central Asia
Russia will establish a regional command center for Central Asia's new rapid reaction force in Kyrgyzstan on Aug. 1. While this is intended to counter Islamic rebels and give Russia a way to further establish itself militarily in the region, a Russian-led crackdown on insurgents likely will spark a rise in conflict long term.
Analysis
Russia plans to establish a regional command center for a new Central Asian rapid reaction force on Aug. 1. The force is part of a cooperative effort among the region's governments to combat the threat from Islamic radicals. The center will be designed as a military headquarters where Russian and Central Asian officers will likely plan and lead counterinsurgency operations in the region.
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Central Asian governments are not blind to the threat of the IMU, which battled with Kyrgyz and Tajik forces in mountain combat in 1999 and 2000. Intermittent rebel attacks on border guards prompted all Central Asian states, along with Russia, to increase cooperation on counterterrorism efforts and border interdiction.
Regional peacekeeping efforts are now conducted under the auspices of the Collective Forces of Quick Deployment (CFQD). Ground and air forces from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Belarus are subordinate to Russian command while Uzbekistan cooperates frequently in military exercises. The Kyrgyz Defense Ministry reports that CFQD military exercises in the southern province of Batken will end Oct. 13. The latest round of exercises focuses on routing criminal networks in the region.
According to analyst Aziz Soltobaev of American University in Kyrgyzstan, CFQD war games designed to repel the IMU assume a conventional incursion model.
The presumption that security forces will clash with a conventional enemy along a clear frontline has not prepared the CFQD to purge the IMU from the region but perhaps to contain it. According to Soltobaev, the IMU is now concentrating efforts to recruit militants in the Chui region, where the capital of Kyrgyzstan is located. This is a consequence of Uzbekistan's vigilance in border security and the comparative ease of penetrating Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan.
IMU recruiting in Kyrgyzstan has dovetailed with substantial recruiting efforts by Hizb-ut-Tarir, a decidedly political organization that lobbies against repressive security measures against Muslims in the Ferghana Valley. The Ferghana Valley is an impoverished region and represents a nexus of borders shared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Though IMU and Hizb-ut-Tarir are distinct organizations -- one militant, the other political -- each group offers an outlet for the region's poor to fight crackdowns on radical and nonviolent Wahabbite Muslims alike.
The latent power of the IMU and the potential radicalization of Hizb-ut-Tarir pose a threat to the U.S.-led coalition within Kyrgyzstan. Traditionally, the IMU has sought to overthrow the administration of Uzbek President Islam Karimov, the group's fiercest opponent in Central Asia. Militants will portray his increasing cooperation with the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign as a declaration of war against all Muslims. A swelling of militant recruits from within Kyrgyzstan will draw the United States' attention to regions north of Afghanistan.
Domestic militant threats will not deter Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from supporting U.S. operations, however. On Oct. 10, Karimov softened his restrictions on U.S. Special Forces in Uzbekistan, allowing them to undertake relief and rescue missions only, according to CNN International. This signals Uzbekistan will assume a more direct role in supporting military attacks on Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, too, is at risk of provoking Muslims by supporting U.S. attacks. On Sept. 25, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, upon consultation with Collective Security Treaty states, agreed to open his country's air space to the United States.
The rally of Central Asian leaders to support U.S. operations does not amount to a preservation of regional security. Central Asia's rapid reaction force is unable to neutralize the IMU, whose ranks are likely to swell in light of a protracted U.S. campaign in Afghanistan. With a substantial militant threat emerging north of the Afghan theater, the U.S. ground campaign must expand deeply into Central Asia from spring to summer 2002.