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Дата 11.12.2002 13:39:41 Найти в дереве
Рубрики ВВС; Версия для печати

Предлагаю тему; МиГ 29.

Здравствуйте!



Читаю сеишцас неболшую справку в интернете,про сабжа.
Много неприятного, ну например чего стоит такой пассаж.
The Indian Air Force (InAF) MiG-29 Experience:

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India published on 31March1993 the results of
an in depth study on the operational performance and reliability of the MiG-29 aircraft.
This study was first reported in Aviation Week & Space Technology during 25July1994
(pg.49), and has been obtained by author from Mr. Pushpindar Singh, of the Society of
Aerospace Studies, New Delhi.

65 x MiG-29 single-seat and 5 x dual-seat trainers with 48 x spare engines (sparing factor
of 0.7/aircraft) were delivered between 1986 and 1990 at a total program cost of
approximately $600 million that included initial spares and support. These aircraft were the
first MiG-29's to ever leave the Soviet Union and were not up to the weapons system
standard of those that went later to the Warsaw Pact allies. The aircraft were sent
disassembled by sea, and re-assembled, and test flown in India. By 1990 three squadrons
were operational. Two Flight Data Ground Processing Units were included to help pilots
debrief their utilization of flight controls and systems. Expectations were that single-seat
aircraft would fly 15 hours per month (180 hrs/yr) and dual-seat aircraft 20 hours per
month (240 hrs/yr).

There were extensive problems encountered in operational and maintenance due to the
large number of pre-mature failures of engines, components, and systems. Of the total of
189 engines in service, 139 engines (74%) failed pre-maturely and had been withdraw
from service by July 1992, thus effectively shutting down operations. 62 of these engines
had not even accomplished 50% of their 300 hours first overhaul point. Thus the desired
serviceability showed a steadily decreasing trend.

Engineering reports mainly attribute RD-33 failures to design/material deficiencies causing
discolored engine oil (8), cracks in the nozzle guide vanes (31), and surprisingly, foreign
object damage (FOD). The eight material deficient engines (discolored oil) were repaired
by the contractor under warrantee provisions, but the engines had to be recycled to the
manufacturer. The thirty-one engines with cracks in their nozzle guide vanes were fixed in
the field by contractor teams and adjustments were made to the entire engine fleet. But
even though the incidents reduced the occurrences of the cracks, they continued. But the
FOD situation is the most interesting, especially after the inlet FOD doors received world
press coverage, but there were other concerns about production quality control that led to
problems.

Since the Indian Air Force received early model Fulcrum A's, some just after the 200th
production article, there were quality control deficiencies that resulted in numerous pieces
of FOD (foreign object damage) and tools being left behind after final construction inside
of the aircraft. Remember that the Fulcrum skeleton is made first and then the skin is
riveted over top, in the way aircraft were made in the fifties and sixties in the West. Nuts,
bolts, tools, etc. all made their way to the engine bays and inlet ducts and when they were
loosened up after accelerations they damaged engines and equipment.

On top of all this, it was discovered that the unique FOD doors on the MiG-29's inlets
were not stopping material from getting into the engine ducts. Since the doors retracted
"up" into the inlet, debris that was kicked up by the nose wheel lodged on or at the bottom
of the door seal and then was ingested into the engine when the door opened during the
nose gear lifted off the ground during takeoff.

This problem was known from the earliest days. After the first four MiG-29 prototypes
were evaluated, the nose gear was moved further back, but nose wheel "mud-flaps" or
guards were still required to protect the engine from flying debris. It took until 1988 before
all delivered aircraft were so equipped, therefore the initial batch of InAF aircraft had to be
locally retro-fitted with mud guards and that activity was not completed until June 1992.
All costs were supposed to be re-imbursed by the contractor but Mikoyan reneged and
left the InAF with $300,000 in liabilities. In subsequent MiG-29K/M models the FOD
doors were replaced by screens that closed "down", forcing any debris out of the louvers
repositioned to the lower side of the inlet duct..

The Indian Air Force procurement contract was concluded in September 1986, and the
first engine was expected to go into overhaul in 1989. However, four engines prematurely
came up for overhaul and no repair facility had been prepared. As time went on, 115 of
the 122 engines (94%) prematurely failed and had to be re-cycled through engine depots
in Russia at great cost. Backlogs were created and only 79 (65%) engines returned on
schedule. Even when a regional Indian repair facility was completed in August 1994, the
high failure rates continued and the majority of broken engines had to be sent back to
Russian depots. Self-sufficiency was achieved in 1994, only after the operations tempo
was significantly reduced on a permanent basis. In the process of refurbishing failed
engines, the total technical life of most of the engine fleet was effectively reduced from 800
hours / 8 years to 400 hours / 4 years, at a minimum.

Non-availability of radar and weapon system components also resulted in the grounding of
seven aircraft for a period of six to twenty months. Two may have been damaged for life
due to cannibalization. Besides this, a large number of subsystems and computers
experienced unpredicted failures in the last four years which adversely effected the
operational readiness of the squadrons. Some of the computers were field-repaired by
specialists from the manufacturers, others were replaced. These repair costs were all in
excess to the initial contract costs. It was noted that the 10 additional computers, which
were imported, cost the InAF around $806,000. Two Flight Data Ground Processing
Units quickly became unserviceable during their warranty period and have been lying
un-utilized and un-repaired for over two years.

The InAF Headquarters also noted in March 1991 report that a severe shortage of
product support equipment had resulted in the decline of fleet availability by 15-20%,
which in turn, took negative effect on operational readiness and mission requirements.

So in general, lessons learned from this first out-of-country operation of a Russian
front line fighter were:

1. The MiG-29 had intensive problems in operation and maintenance since its induction
due to premature failure of engines, components, and systems. 74% of the engines failed
within five years, were out of supply pipeline for three years, and reduced aircraft
availability by 15, to 20%. This led to a decision to restrict flying efforts and therefore
compromised operational and training commitments.

2. There were significant shortfalls in the performance of the MiG-29 fleet resulting in
operational and training inadequacies. The shortfall ranged from 20 to 65% in respect to
combat aircraft availability and 58 to 84% in trainers between 1987 - 1991.

3. There was a mismatch between induction of the aircraft (1987) and the establishment of
its repair facilities (end of 1994). Until that time engines had to be continually sent to
manufacturers abroad at great monetary cost, reduction of one-half total life, and a
significant stretch of schedule.

4. Non-availability of critical radar components and spares resulted in the grounding of
significant numbers of aircraft. Five aircraft were out of action for over six months while
two were in the hanger for over two years. Unserviceability of computers and the inability
to fix them cost excessive amounts of money to rectify.

5. The pilot debrief Ground Data Processing Unit, imported at high cost, was left lying
around unserviceable and unused since its reception in August 1990.

6. The lack of nose wheel mud guards had to be solved by importing upgrade kits and
expensive local re-design after material deficiencies could not be overcome.

With a regional support capability in place (regardless of how tenuous it was) and having
one of the few respectable MiG-29 operating legacies, the Indian aerospace companies,
especially Hindistan Aeronautical Ltd. (HAL), and the InAF became natural partners for
MAPO in consummating the sale of MiG-29's to Malaysia. They were offered the
opportunity to get involved with providing training and logistics support for the new
Malaysian MiG-29 program. India, of course, gives greater credibility to MAPO in
convincing customers that the MiG-29 is a viable fighter candidate for Pacific Rim nations.
It remains to be seen, however, what solutions the new joint venture brings to the Indian
Air Force problems.


http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29.htm
С уважением, Денис.