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BRIEFING
Date Posted: November 29, 2001
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - DECEMBER 05, 2001
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ABSOLUTE MINEFIELD
NICK BROWN JDW Special Correspondent
London
Traditional anti-personnel landmines will one day be relics of the past. But what will replace them? Nick Brown examines the potential alternatives
Landmines are among the cheapest and most effective defensive weapons armies can call on - features that have simultaneously made them very popular with armed forces globally as well as the subject of widespread international condemnation.
This stigmatisation ultimately resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (or Ottawa convention) of 1997. There are now 142 signatories, but only 122 have actually ratified the convention.
Notable absences from the treaty include China, Russia and the USA. China has shown little interest in complying with the terms of the convention and it is not known what programmes it is looking into. Russia has made vague statements supporting the convention, but has also demonstrated a real attachment to traditional anti-personnel landmines (APLs) for defending static positions in Chechnya. Though there are scant details of programmes in development, it is believed that the Russian State Research and Development Engineer Institute and the Science-Research Machinery Building Institute are studying ways to modify current designs to make them compliant. This could include putting an operator into the loop or automatic self-deactivation after a set time.
Under the Clinton administration, the USA made a firm commitment to at least try to become a signatory to the convention by 2006, though this came with some reservations with regard to the mixed minefields across South Korea.
According to Maj Mike Halbig of the US Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, "the [Bush] administration is currently reviewing the US landmine policy. We will address both military requirements and humanitarian concerns in conducting the review. No final decisions regarding funding and so forth for landmine alternatives will be made until the review is complete".
In the meantime the USA has been studying, under a 'three-track programme' a range of alternative systems that may replace traditional landmines for a range of functions (Jane's Defence Weekly 19 July 2000). Track I includes research into systems to replace the mixed landmine fields in South Korea and is led by the US Army. Alongside Track I, the USA went some way to ease objections to its continued use of landmines by only deploying self-destructing APLs, or self-deactivating landmines with a pre-set lifetime.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) leads Track II which covers longer-term and more technologically-advanced alternatives.
A third 'track' was added in 1999 to explore combining existing and new technologies and operational and tactical doctrine to provide equivalent capabilities to non-self-destructing APLs, mixed anti-tank and APL systems and anti-tank mines with anti-handling devices. This study was contracted out to the National Academy of Sciences. The National Research Council (NRC) has since produced the 'Alternative Technologies to Replace Landmines' report, an analysis and list of recommendations. These alternatives revolve around four main concepts: adding an operator into the loop to discriminate between non-combatants and friend or foe; introducing cheap, advanced sensors leading towards a networked battlespace; improving anti-tank mine capabilities; and installing self-deactivation or self-destruct devices.
Developing landmine alternatives, however, is not solely seen as a like-for-like transfer. The alternatives must be at least as effective and the NRC found that alternative technologies, that do not look like traditional landmines but fulfil a similar function, can actually be far more effective than current systems.
At present, landmines fulfil three main functions: protective, tactical and nuisance. Protective minefields can guard a defender's flanks and warn of infiltration. Tactical minefields directly limit the enemy's movement, essentially slowing down the attacker in an engagement area or canalising them to where the greatest weight of fire can be brought to bear. Nuisance minefields make enemy forces move cautiously by disrupting, delaying and weakening or destroying follow-on forces. APLs are also deployed to protect the bigger and more easily located anti-tank mines from dismounted troops.
The USA's Track I programmes are well under way. They specifically include the Non-Self-Destructing-A (NSD-A) system and the Remote Area-Denial Artillery Munition (RADAM).
NSD-A is a direct way of working around the constraints of the convention. Developed by Alliant Techsystems and Textron Systems, it targets dismounted troops and consists of hand-emplaced landmines with built-in sensors that detect intrusion into the field and send a signal back to the operator who decides whether or not to activate the field. NSD-A could be further enhanced with the conceptual Hand-Emplaced Sensor Field (HESF) that the NRC believes may be introduced before 2006. It could also be linked into a network of other sensors as part of the US Army's Future Combat Systems or DARPA's Microunattended Ground Sensors Programme.
HESF would provide early warning and make use of everything from acoustic, laser and infra-red 'tripwires' to biological, seismic or video sensors to alert the operator to intruders. It could also be used to cue indirect-fire and support weapons pre-registered to the target area. However, NSD-A and HESF would both need continuous monitoring and maintenance, including ensuring uninterrupted power supplies, so the systems would prove very time consuming for troops maintaining the defences in South Korea.
The US Army argues that monitoring is labour-intensive and may not be the most effective use of manpower. To overcome this, the army proposes a 'battlefield override switch' that would switch the minefield to automatic, effectively making it revert to 'victim'-activated status. However, this is highly contentious and would arguably break the Ottawa convention. The NRC accordingly recommends the US Department of Defense (DoD) step up a two-version approach, one with the switch and one without, while the issue of compliance is resolved.
The recent cancellation of the RADAM system (JDW 21 November), which was illegal under the Ottawa treaty, did not impede Track I. It is unclear at the moment but it is thought that RADAM funding will be reallocated to other alternative systems.
Outside Track I, there are a number of systems compliant with the Ottawa treaty, and if not currently in service, then at least probably available by 2006. These include the M18 'Claymore' command-detonated mine that has long been in service and a potential upgrade to this, the Multiple-Shot Claymore, effectively a magazine of three or four Claymores that would detonate one after the other to increase the effect.
For mounted targets, the DoD and the Office of the Project Manager, Mines, Countermine and Demolitions propose several systems, from simply removing the APL element from combined systems and replacing them with increased numbers of anti-tank mines, to wholly new developments.
The NRC recommends stepping up development of the US Army and Marine Corps' non-lethal Container-Launched Area-Denial System (CLADS), currently on hold, to use in tandem with the already-fielded Volcano anti-tank mine and remote-delivery system. CLADS is activated by tripwire and fires .32-cal rubber balls across a 360º field of fire up to 15m. A Volcano-CLADS combination could be launched from vehicles or helicopters to rapidly lay a tactical minefield.
However, the lack of a lethal APL element would reduce the amount of time a committed attacking force would need to breach the field. Despite this, a number of non-lethal studies are under way for riot control, peacekeeping roles and anti-tank protection, thus providing armed forces with a greater range of responses.
These systems include adaptations of existing weapons, like the Claymore's evolution into the rubber ball-firing Modular Crowd Control Munition role. The French Army deploys a similar system, the hand-emplaced Lacroix Defense Sphinx-Mader, but with a scaleable response. This can emit a warning tone, fire smoke and warning rounds as well as more dangerous fragmentation rounds.
Other systems include mine-like devices which release tranquilising, psychotropic or debilitating, but ultimately harmless, chemicals when trodden on or activated by remote control. Japan, the USA and other Western countries are studying obscurants and advanced entangling devices. Although these systems add a capability to armed forces, they are not seen as a direct replacement for APLs in a battlefield setting. More aggressive non-lethal systems could fulfil these roles.
Tasertron and Primex Aerospace in the USA are testing the air-delivered or hand-emplaced Taser Area Denial Device. This launches miniature barbed darts in a variety of directions out to between 15ft and 30ft. When the darts hit, 50,000V of electricity are flashed into the victims, incapacitating them by causing violent muscle spasms.
In the area-denial role, directed-energy weapons are being investigated, though they will likely face strong legal opposition and will not be available for some time. Microwave devices are particularly favoured because they can be 'tuned' to have 'progressive penalty' capabilities. One defence scientist said that "this means that a fairly simple microwave device could be placed in an area to be denied to the enemy and at a range of, say, 100m. Intruders would experience discomfort as their skin is heated by the microwaves. If they continue into the field and get closer to the device, they get progressively hotter as fever sets in until the especially foolhardy are cooked to death". According to unconfirmed reports, systems have already been demonstrated to induce an artificial fever at 107ºF.
Dr Nick Lewer, from Bradford University's Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, also draws attention to the electromagnetic-beam weapon, the Vehicle-Mounted Active Denial System (VMADS), which was unveiled by Raytheon at the US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate in March. VMADS causes a burning sensation, but no visible marks at up to 700m.
The US Army and Air Force are also said to be developing sonic weapons that bombard victims with agitating sound waves. Like the microwave systems, these can have a discomforting, debilitating or even lethal effect and could also work against vehicles.
In the meantime, under Track I, the NRC recommends increased development of the Hornet/Wide Area Munition Product Improvement Programme (WAM PIP) for mounted threats. This builds on Textron systems' hand-emplaced Hornet anti-tank mines already in production for the US Army.
The WAM PIP places an operator in the loop to control a series of Hornet/WAMs linked to a laptop overlaid with a global positioning system (GPS)-enhanced electronic map showing the location and status of each mine. The operator, up to 5km away, would then decide which Hornet/WAMs to activate and could switch the field on and off to allow friendly forces to manoeuvre across the minefield in accord with the ebb and flow of battle. In addi tion, Hornet/WAM sensors could also be switched to autonomous mode - similar to the NSD-A battlefield override switch - or self-destructed by the operator.
There is also an investigation into a follow-on to the WAM PIP, designated the A2. This will include improved sensors and an improved warhead to perform better against 'soft' targets. According to the NRC, the A2 is "currently scheduled to be type-classified as standard in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2003 [FY03]." Likewise, the standard WAM PIP is fully funded and is expected to be available by 2006. The main disadvantage is likely to be cost. As the system is very advanced, individual unit costs will inevitably be much higher than current anti-tank mine systems, though the tactical advantages will be greatly improved. This could be further enhanced if the Hornet/WAM is ruggedised for remote delivery.
Various countries in western Europe are developing similar systems. For example, the UK is studying an improved Textron/Insys Hornet WAM, competing against a developmental Rheinmetall system with two top-attack munitions, for its Area Defence Weapon contract.
The USA's Track II is studying more ambitious projects for introduction after 2006, in particular the Self-Healing Minefield and a system based around 'tags' and minimally-guided munitions.
The pure Anti-Tank Self-Healing Minefield is being studied in three main forms, though the basic principle guiding all the programmes is broadly the same. According to DARPA, "the Self-Healing Minefield is an intelligent, dynamic obstacle that responds to an enemy breaching attempt by physically reorganising [itself]". Each mine is networked to the surrounding mines and, once scattered, the mines autonomously organise themselves into a set pattern, with propulsion designs ranging from pyrotechnic thrusters to 'hopping' devices.
When a mine disappears from the network, either through destruction of a target or by deactivation by a breaching force, neighbouring mines move to fill the gap, so an open breach cannot be maintained. This necessitates the breaching force either carrying out a much slower, sustained assault to exhaust the field of mines, or retreating into areas that have been remined by the field itself.
The tags concept, under development by DARPA, would act in a more anti-personnel role and though it is only at an embryonic stage, the guiding principles have been clearly defined. It relies on the distribution of miniscule 'tags' across a field, that would attach themselves to the clothing or equipment of infiltrating troops and alert the defender that they were moving, allowing the operator to trigger an appropriate response.
The direct response being studied by DARPA is based on minimally-guided munitions that would then home in on these tags, making small corrections in-flight to allow for a moving target. The tags could also be used to cue support weapons. Modelling has shown that only one- third of infiltrating personnel would need to be tagged for the system to be effective, especially if it was being used to cue area-effect support weapons.
Because the lethal part of the system would be portable, residual environmental effects would be minimal. However, the system has a number of problems to overcome, including how to distinguish between friendly forces that have accidentally picked up tags and how individual projectiles will distinguish between multiple targets. On a more basic level, Dr Tom Altshuler, from DARPA's advanced technology office, adds that "it would be nice to tell the difference between a two-legged and four-legged creature".
Outside the remit of Track II, the NRC also identified several other, fairly exotic systems that may be available after 2006. The only one actually in development is DARPA's Raptor. However, according to the NRC, even then "considerable resources would be required to develop, produce and field Raptor".
Raptor is based around an advanced overwatch sensor that can be deployed deep into a battlefield to recognise large combat formations and detect, track and classify individual vehicles. This would then co-ordinate the delivery of Hornet/WAM-style munitions by vehicle or helicopter up to 25km in front of friendly forces and back to a brigade-level controller who would have a clear picture of the battlespace on a GPS display highlighting targets and friendly forces. The controller would then dictate what tactical response was needed, from 'mine' activation to indirect-fire and support weapons.
DARPA has also said that Raptor could be continuously upgraded as sensor technology becomes available. This could discriminate between friend and foe and even detect low-flying aircraft and artillery fire. According to the NRC's report, incremental upgrades "should be ready for production at various times up to [FY] 2008".
Thales Defence Communications of the UK is also studying a similar capability and recently began marketing its Miniature Intrusion Sensor (MIS). This has a seismic-detection capability and can detect moving personnel and vehicles between 20m and 60m away (JDW 31 October).
Also for the purely APL role, but even further off, the NRC identified three main anti-personnel systems: the Unmanned Remote Ambush System (URAS); the Laser Radar (LADAR) Directed Machine Gun (LDMG); and the Distributed Sensor Antipersonnel 'Minefield' (DSAM).
The URAS basic unit would be Claymore-type mines sited to cover identified approach routes in an ambush role or pre-positioned and camouflaged to protect an anti-tank minefield. The mines would be cued by a miniature infra-red camera, probably the US Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate's UL3, with an acoustic sensor to wake up the video link, which will then feed images to an operator. DARPA is also pursuing a goggles or visor 'head-up display'-style system that could show the picture provided by the UL3.
The LDMG and DSAM both work in a similar manner, relying on advanced sensors and remote machine gun-based kill units located by hand in advantageous, crossfire positions. The main problems with development of the LDMG will be related to power sources and improving the LADAR's ability to 'see' through obscurants like smoke or fog. DSAM relies on a vast array of cheap, small sensors littered across the battlefield to warn of intruders and so could prove more viable in bad weather or terrain. They would both be most successful in open positions with long clear fields of fire and would therefore be of limited use in adverse terrain.
Despite major investment into the search for alternatives, George Bugliarello, chairman of the Committee on Alternative Technologies to Replace Landmines at the NRC, said "although improvements in technology offer [advanced capabilities], the military may not be able to deploy alternatives for all uses of APL by 2006". Instead, the NRC recommends that a remote delivery system be studied for Hornet/WAM alongside both versions of NSD-A and a combination of other APL alternatives for fielding as soon after 2006 as possible. DoD figures state that total spending on the three tracks was $44.8 million in FY00 and requested funding $96.3 million for FY02 and $151million in FY03.
Despite the search for alternatives, there is a school of thought that says the removal of APLs is no real loss to modern armed forces. A spokesman for the British Army's School of Infantry at Warminster said: "The withdrawal of victim-activated APLs from service has fundamentally made very little difference to infantry training or tactics."
A Canadian Department of National Defence study of APL effectiveness further noted that "accepted procedures dictate that employed correctly, APLs were to always be under visual observation and covered by direct-fire weapons, which could give early warning". The report went on to cite a West Point study that concluded that "APLs did not have the operational effect of completely stopping a mission", though they do have an immediate tactical effect.
Landmines are mainly seen as defensive tools and conventional wisdom has it that the attacker tends to win wars, to which end the US military professes a manoeuvrist doctrine. In contrast to this, landmines that canalise the attacker inevitably canalise a counterattacking defender. Also, as was found during the Second World War, large minefields deny the area to the defender as much as to the attacker.
More recently, the vast mixed APL and anti-tank minefields that Iraq laid to defend against the allied ground attack during the 1990-91 Gulf War hardly broke the force's stride. However, this may have been a special case as the complete air dominance of allied forces allowed them to survey the minefields while simultaneously denying the Iraqi forces the opportunity to maintain them. The use of the British Army's Giant Viper, among other systems, rapidly cleared wide lanes with little effort.
Peter Balmer, a UK Ministry of Defence spokesman, argues that "following the signing of the [Ottawa] convention, the gap hasn't proved to be quite the barrier that some people thought it would be", though he goes on to acknowledge that the "USA's argument of needing to protect [anti-tank] mines and South Korea never really applied to the UK." To pre-empt these arguments, the NRC also studied tactical modifications that could provide similar advantages to landmines, without the constraints on manoeuvre and political stigma that deploying them entails. The recommendations included a greater use of sensors, unmanned air vehicles, increased use of guided air-to-surface weapons and forward reconnaissance to increase early intelligence on the enemy's location and disposition.
The advent of highly advanced sensors and weapons, however, will no doubt have the greatest tactical effects far beyond the advantages provided by traditional landmines. A truly networked battlespace and an accurate picture of enemy formations will radically change the way that battles are fought and traditional APLs will become relics of the past for all but the poorest and most deeply embattled states. It is an irony then that these are the very countries that are most likely to find themselves involved in a conflict where landmines are deployed and that arms-control initiatives like the Ottawa convention were set up to protect in the first place.
The UN believes that there are 120 million landmines deployed worldwide and scarred landscapes like the one in our illustration have left a humanitarian legacy of danger and devastation.
(Source: Jane's)
The mineclearing tractor deployed in Kosovo
(Source: S McGhie/Jane's)
Mine warning sign pictured in Kosovo
(Source: S McGhie/Jane's)
One of the main functions of the APL is to protect the larger and more easily found anti-tank mines. As a result of the Ottawa convention, Anti-Tank mines are increasingly deployed with anti-handling devices rather than separate anti-personnel elements
(Source: PA)
Systems like this 'glue gun' studied by the USMC do not look like traditional landmines but they add a capability to armed forces and can perform in a similar role
(Source: USMC)
Textron Systems' Hornet/Wide Area Munition is the most capable anti-tank system that will be available to the USA in the short term. There are a range of improvements expected before 2006
(Source: Textron Systems)
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© 2001 Jane's Information Group