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Второй пример JDW Russia - Navy's needs: hard to justify
2 Images
FEATURE
Date Posted: August 01, 2000
JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY - AUGUST 02, 2000
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Russia - Navy's needs: hard to justify
John Downing
INTRODUCTION:
John Downing spent the last 11 years of his naval career on the Defence Intelligence Staff and subsequently joined the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is now a naval and strategic defence analyst
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent emergence of the 'new-world order', along with the progressive weakening of the Russian economy, has hit what was already a fragile Russian Navy.
Finding it difficult to justify its raison d'être, the navy struggles to obtain funding to ensure combat readiness, equipment maintenance and long-term development.
The Strategic Deterrence Forces' guarantee of nuclear retaliation remains the main national priority. Similarly, with mounting concern over emerging potential threats from 'near abroad' countries such as Chechnya, the army and air forces have had a clear role to play.
The naval case was more difficult to present. The Soviet Navy was developed during the Cold War as a maritime counter to NATO; this organisation, however, is no longer deemed politically hostile. The navy today is unable to make a significant contribution to the growing number of small regional conflicts in which Russia is involved.
As a result, naval planners have concentrated their assets on the two primary governmental directives: strategic deterrence; and defence of the Russian sea lanes. To do so the navy has optimised its core combat capabilities, yet retained its traditional concept of layered defence operations in a somewhat more diluted form.
Most of the current naval budget goes towards the nuclear-powered ballistic missile (SSBN), nuclear-powered attack (SSN) and nuclear-powered cruise missile (SSGN) submarine fleets. Despite this focus the number of SSBNs has fallen sharply from 62 in 1990 to only 18 this year. These include two Typhoons, two Delta Is, seven Delta IIIs and seven Delta IVs. Six Typhoons originally were introduced, but four were withdrawn from service because of the expense of maintaining the boats. The remaining Delta Is are nearing the end of their operational lives; they are expected to be decommissioned next year.
Most of the SSBNs are in the Northern Fleet, Russia's main naval operating area. The rest are in the Pacific Fleet although these are expected to be withdrawn soon; in this case the few remaining operational units will be transferred to the north.
The fact that training standards have fallen means low morale has hit even the elite branch, which is generally better motivated than other naval personnel. This has been brought on in part by the low serviceability; at present only one SSBN can be maintained on deterrent patrol from each fleet area. This stems from a fleet-wide lack of dockyard support that affects submarines and surface ships alike. Refits and basic engineering work has fallen far behind schedule as the navy strives to pay dockyard staff.
New construction is minimal. The first Borey-class SSBN is under construction, but it is unlikely to enter service until 2008 because of slow progress. It was expected that the Borey-class submarines would use a new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), designated SS-N-28. But Western sources now believe this programme has either been delayed or cancelled and that the boats will enter service fitted with either a naval variant of the SS-27 or the SS-N-23 (NATO reporting name: 'Skiff') SLBM or even a modified version of the SS-N-23 SLBM called 'Sineva'.
The SSN element comprises 29 boats including eight Akula Is, two Akula IIs, eight Oscar IIs, one Sierra I, two Sierra IIs, seven Victor IIIs and one Yankee Notch. Like the SSBNs, most of the SSNs are in the Northern Fleet. Operational patrols are generally conducted near the Russian mainland, although SSNs and SSGNs in recent years have conducted longer-range excursions, taking up station on the east and west coasts of the USA near US SSBN bases. The SSNs and SSGNs have attempted to trail US submarines and aircraft carriers.
The first Yasen-class SSN/SSGN is under construction at Severovinsk. This advanced multi-purpose submarine uses the SS-N-27 anti-ship missile in vertical-launch system silos and SS-N-15 ('Starfish') missiles, which can be fired as part of a weapon mix from its torpedo tubes. The first boat is expected to enter service in 2005. A ninth Oscar II is also due for launch, but there is some doubt as to whether it will be completed.
Eighteen non-nuclear-powered submarines remain in the Russian order of battle. Most of these are based with the Northern and Pacific fleets, with some in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea. The conventionally-powered Lada/Amur submarine programme is also under way at St Petersburg. It is a sophisticated design with a very low acoustic signature. Armed with 533mm torpedoes or mines, it may in future be retrofitted with the SS-N-27. The boat also has the option to be fitted with an air-independent propulsion fuel cell plug, which would greatly improve its snorting cycle. The first two units are due to be launched next year.
The surface fleet is in poorer shape than its submarine counterpart. On initial inspection its inventory appears impressive, comprising nearly 80 major warships including one aircraft carrier; 160 minor combatants; 24 amphibious ships and 70 mine countermeasure vessels. Very few of these warships, however, are combat-ready. The carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, for example, has rarely put to sea in recent years and its air group has only minimal experience in deck operations. The rest of the surface fleet shares a similar fate and many hulls are slowly rotting in port. Recent intelligence sources have estimated that the navy's current operational total readiness might be as low as 10%, in stark contrast to a figure seven times higher at the height of the Cold War. New construction for surface combatants is effectively non-existent.
In February Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Kuroyedov said he intended to deploy an aircraft carrier group to the Mediterranean within the next 12 months. He more recently said it would happen by year-end.
The Russian Naval Air Force is an essential component of the fleet's combat capability. The Tupolev Tu-22M ('Backfire'), the force's primary aircraft, exists to conduct missile attacks against major surface units in concert with near-simultaneous launches by submarine and surface ship firings. The Sukhoi Su-24 ('Fencer'), Su-25 ('Frogfoot') and Su-27 ('Flanker') fighters conduct shorter-range attack and air defence missions, while the long-range Tu-95 ('Bear-D') bomber carries out reconnaissance missions. The Tu-142 ('Bear-F'), and to a lesser degree, Ilyushin Il-38 ('Mays') and Beriev Be-12 ('Mails') conduct area anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Shipborne and shore-based ASW helicopters support these. However, the maritime air arm is poorly maintained and pilots on average fly 40 hours annually.
The naval export market is weak: only four hulls are in the pipeline. A Slava-class cruiser, under construction since 1984, may be sold to Ukraine. The one Grom-class frigate, Novik, has been authorised for sale, but it is still only 20% complete three years after the keel was laid. A second Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer is due to be delivered to China in December, and three modified Krivak-class frigates are under construction for India in St Petersburg.
The Slava-class missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov fires a rocket near Murmansk during a demonstration. One cruiser of this class, still under construction, may be sold to Ukraine
(Source: PA/ITAR-TASS)
Most of the naval budget goes towards Russian nuclear-powered submarines
(Source: PA/EPA)
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© 2000 Jane's Information Group