The U.N. Security Council recently approved a resolution telling the leadership of the separatist Abkhazia province that they will not achieve independence and should begin negotiations for reintegration into Georgia. Global and regional events are bringing the Abkhaz-Georgian conflict to a head, and it will be Abkhazia's longtime sponsor Russia that ultimately will resolve the dispute -- in Georgia's favor.
Analysis
A July 29 U.N. Security Council resolution flatly dismissed Abkhazia's drive for independence, stated that its leadership must negotiate a political settlement to reintegrate back into Georgia, and spotlighted the breakaway province's rejection by longtime sponsor Moscow. Abkhazia has been the Kremlin's preferred hammer to keep Georgia in line, but lately relations with Tbilisi and the West have taken priority.
Abkhazia's brief but brutal war of independence in 1993 -- which sent hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians fleeing the province -- was only possible with robust Russian support, including air strikes on Georgian positions. Georgia is perhaps the most independent-minded of the former Soviet republics, and Tbilisi's dogged pursuit of an alliance with the United States has been a source of unending frustration within the Kremlin.
Moscow has kept 1,600 soldiers in the province officially to act as peacekeepers but unofficially to keep Georgia destabilized. Russian diplomatic efforts -- including veto threats in the Security Council -- also have kept U.N. operations there to a minimum, and prevented international organizations from doing anything more than setting up a buffer zone between Abkhazia and Georgia proper.
By voting for the July 29 U.N. resolution, which basically told the Abkhaz that they will never be independent, Russia essentially sold the province out and ensured its isolation, because no country recognizes Abkhazia's as independent. The trigger for Moscow's change of heart comes from its recent desire , which means recasting its relations with Georgia as well.
One way Russia has sought to demonstrate its new stance is by dropping its previous opposition to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil-export pipeline, which Moscow once condemned because of the plan for the pipeline skirt Russian territory in transporting Caspian oil to Turkey. Russia still looks to benefit from the BP-led project by using state-owned oil company Rosneft to build a link to the pipeline from Russia's primary oil port of Novorossiysk.
The problem for Russia is that the would run straight through Abkhazia. While this may not have been as much of a concern in the past, Abkhaz fighters may react to their abandonment by Russia with violence and sabotage against oil infrastructure and personnel.
The province no longer has Russia as its lone sponsor, and the Georgians are receiving American military training -- the secretary of Georgia's Security Council even said Aug. 7 that the government would consider allowing U.S. troops to participate in anti-terrorist operations on its territory, AP reported. It is thus only a matter of time before the Abkhaz are overwhelmed again.
By most measures there are only about 130,000 Abkhaz left in the province, and Georgians still outnumber them there, even after a decade of on-again off-again ethnic cleansing. An eventual reassertion of Georgian control may not be inevitable, but it is becoming ever more likely. Even so, this remains more of a long-term scenario, as Georgia is hardly a strong, able state in its own right.
Russia's problem is that it does not have the luxury of waiting for outside forces to subdue the Abkhaz. If it is to take advantage of the project, it has to complete its spur line by BTC's expected Jan. 1, 2005 date. That means Russia must sell the Abkhaz out at an even faster rate, including ending all forms of support and possibly even itself moving against the separatists. But having exercised de facto independence for nine years and being stuffed to the gills with Russian weapons, the Abkhaz are certainly not going to go down quietly.
While it's unclear how events will unfold, a showdown with the Abkhaz against the Georgians, Russians and perhaps the United Nations and United States is brewing. Already this year the Russians have abandoned their paratrooper base at Gudauta, which once represented the core of Abkhaz-Russian relations.
It is likely that the Georgian government will attempt to retake the province by force. But without direct assistance from the United States or Russia, Tbilisi's success is uncertain. The Russians might also try to invade directly, but not only would Georgia and the United States protest the violation of Georgian "sovereignty," Moscow could also find itself locked down in a second Chechnya. After all, Chechen assistance proved essential to the Abkhaz war of independence, and the Abkhaz are nothing if not quick learners.
The least bloody solution would be a mass exodus of Abkhaz to Russia proper. In an attempt to seek protection from Georgia, the Abkhaz government earlier this year encouraged its citizens to apply for Russian citizenship; some 60 percent of the Abkhaz population now holds Russian passports.
As Abkhazia faces increasing pressure from all directions, Russia could collaborate with the United Nations to resettle a trickle of Abkhaz within the Russian federation. The acceptance of only 130,000 people wouldn't be an undue burden for Russia, and it wouldn't take long before most of the Abkhaz were out of the province, leaving Georgia to retake the territory.
