|
|
От
|
Maeron
|
|
|
К
|
Петр Тон.
|
|
|
Дата
|
07.08.2002 06:57:16
|
|
|
Рубрики
|
1941;
|
|
Re: Что ж...
>Да, серьезное, конечно, доказательство - эта Ваша ссылочка:-)
То есть, ну ее на фиг, если с Вашими взгядами не соглашается? ;-)
Вот Вам еще "ссылочка": G. Jukes, "The Red Army and the Munich Crisis", Journal of Contemporary History, Apr.91, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp.195-214
Вот что там говорится, например: "Until now, it has not been feasible to asses this possible alternative outcome [имеется в виду советская военная поддержка Чехословакии] because Soviet statements of their readiness to help Czechoslovakia have not been backed by any details of the military preparations undertaken by the Red Army during the crisis. Even the spate of recent publications on the circumstances leading up to the outbreak of the second world war fo the most part contain no references to the military factor."
Это перекликается с тем, что говорил Рэгсдэйл: "Ragsdale's documentary evidence of the Soviet mobilization leads to two questions vital to an understanding of the unfolding of the crisis. First, why were the Soviet actions, which are so well documented in East European literature and archival material, not reflected in Western sources on the Munich crisis? Ragsdale posited that the intelligence agencies of Germany, France, and Britain did not know of the mobilization. While agreeing that this may have been the case, Kramer added that the French leaders knew through diplomatic channels that the Soviet mobilization was underway."
>8.09.38 посол США во Франции У. Буллит спросил у мининдела Франции Ж. Боннэ, правильны ли сведения о том, что "русские концентрируют на границе с Румынией крупные военные силы". Боннэ подтвердил правильность этих сведений и рассказал ему о всех советских приготовлениях. А он знал и про 30 сд первого эшелона, и про 30 сд второго...
Значит, мобилизацию начали 21 сентября, а французы о ней знали еще 8го? Ну-ну... Или может там речь немножко о другом шла?
Вообще же, СССР официально уведомил Францию о мобилизации 25 сентября. Бенеш же к тому времени уже успешно капитулировал. Таким образом, кому СССР устраивал "показуху" остается загадкой.
>Как и где излагалась измененная позиция Румынии по вопросу прохода/пролета советских войск/самолетов?
"Air force assistance would have been a crucial element. The Soviet air force was the world's largest, and reaching Czechoslovakia would have involved only brief overflights through Polish or Romanian airspace. The two governments would probably have refused consent, but protocol could have been satisfied, and confronation avoided, by inaccurate anti-aircraft fire. The German Minister in Romania reported on 3 June that the Romanian General Staff had agreed to Soviet overflights, provided the aircraft carried Czechoslovak markings, and the crews only Czechoslovak identity documents. Three weeks later he reported that the King had vetoed the proposal, but that the Court Minister had admitted that Romania lacked the resources to enforce the ban. In late August, the Romanian government told the French Head of Mission that it would 'shut its eyes to Soviet aircraft flying over Romania at an altitude of 3,000 metres or more, since this altitude is practically out of range of Romania's anti-aircraft artillery.'"
Jukes, op.cit.
"He [Litvinov] reminded Payart [the French charge d'affaires in Moscow] that Romania's foreign minister had suggested that this country would close its eyes to Soviet overflights. This point was confirmed when in a conversation with Bonnet on 11 September, Comnene made it clear that given the weakness of the Romanian air defences, Soviet overflights would go unopposed but no authorization would be given for Soviet troops to cross Romanian territory. Though there were rumours of a Soviet-Romanian agreement on land forces, Comnene repeatedly denied them. 'Inform all legations', he telegraphed from Geneva to Bucharest, 'that news reports concerning the accord, or even conversations concerning the crossing of Soviet troops through Romania, are absolutely false.' According, however, to the study by Ivan Pfaff published in 1996, the subject was discussed, in secret, between Litvinov and Comnene at Crassier, near Geneva, on the night of 14 September. An oral agreement was reached that in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia or after a date was announced for such an attack, the Romanians would permit 100,000 Soviet troops to pass through a land bridge in Bukovina and allow a massive overflight of Soviet planes with troops and weapons to reach Czechoslovakia."
Zara Steiner, "The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affaris and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in 1938: New Material From the Soviet Archives", The HIstorical Journal, 42, 3(1999), pp.751-779