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К Андрей Диков Ответить по почте
Дата 20.09.2023 21:38:10 Найти в дереве
Рубрики WWII; Армия; 1941; Локальные конфликты; Версия для печати

Re: Т е...

>>выраженная в пресс-релизе 7 ноября 1941. Рад, что вы ее разделяете.
>
>А как они процитировали предложение Сталина в прес-релизе? Можно копипасту?

Только в телеграмме посла США из Хельсинок, финской прессы у меня нету:

he Minister in Finland ( Schoenfeld ) to the Secretary of State
Helsinki , November 7, 1941.
[Received November 8—1:04 a.m.]
561. Following translation authorized statement local press today.

“Report has been spread abroad recent days that August 18 last Finland was apprised conditions on which Soviet Union was willing conclude peace with Finland. This report has been spread not only for propaganda purposes. It is directly untrue.

Detailed reports of conversation which Finnish Minister Washington had with a representative of USA State Department August 18 last and through which it is claimed Finnish Government was apprised of Soviet Russian peace offer will be published after Finnish Government’s answer65 has been delivered to diplomatic representations recently made by USA Government.

Alleged content of supposed peace conditions came to knowledge of Finnish Government through a foreign radio propaganda broadcast, 5th, current, November.”66

Schoenfeld

Это финны соврали, потому что:

emorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
[Washington,] August 18, 1941.
The Minister of Finland called to see me this afternoon at my request.

I told the Minister that I wished to inform him in the utmost confidence that this Government had received information to the effect that should the Government of Finland be so disposed, the Soviet Government was prepared to negotiate a new treaty of peace with Finland which would involve the making of territorial concessions by the Soviet Union to Finland.

I said that I was communicating this information as a transmitting agent and that at the moment I was expressing no official opinion with regard thereto. I said that I wished to make it, however, completely clear that the information I was giving the Minister implied in no sense whatever any weakening on the part of the Soviet Government. I said that, from the official statements made to us by the Soviet Union and from every other evidence available to this Government, the Soviet Government is not only resisting magnificently German aggression against Russia but is likewise prepared to fight indefinitely against Germany, and that from our knowledge of the military situation there seemed every reason to suppose that Russia may do so successfully and for a protracted period.20 I said that this information referred solely to Finland and should consequently be viewed solely in that light.

The Minister at once raised certain obvious questions. First, in view of the experience Finland had had with the Soviet Union in 1939, what guarantees would Great Britain and the United States offer Finland that any peace treaty which the Soviet Union might now be disposed to negotiate would be maintained? Second, what assurance would Finland be given that, in the event that Germany was defeated and the Soviet Union were to become the predominant military power, Russia would respect any promises which Great Britain or the United States might have made and would not again undertake to seize Finland and deprive the Finnish people of their independence?

I replied that these questions were questions which I was not prepared to discuss. I said it seemed to me, first of all, that it was necessary to determine what the attitude of Finland might be with regard to the possibilities which I had communicated to the Minister and that consequently the questions which he had raised were questions which [Page 57]need only come up for discussion in the event that the Government of Finland desired to explore these possibilities.

I said further that it appeared to me that the question was a momentous one for the Finnish Government to determine. I added that in view of the considerations the Minister had advanced I wondered what guarantees or assurances Finland thought she would have of retaining her own independence and autonomy if Germany succeeded in winning and were then the overlord of all of Europe. I said that in such event Finland could look to no one for assistance whereas if Germany were defeated she would have many extremely powerful friends on her side.

While the Minister was with me the British Ambassador, who had come to say goodbye to me just before the Minister entered my office, sent me a personal written message of which the following is a transcript:

“As I came out of your room I was given a telegram from the Foreign Office apropos of the approach you had told me of from the Soviet Ambassador21 to you about the Finns.

“I had told Eden22 of the difficulties you foresaw the Finns must feel in cutting clear of the Germans, quite apart from the Communist implication. And I said that you proposed as a first step to see what the Finnish Government might have to say about it.

“The Foreign Office are concerned—as no doubt you will be—that no impression should be created in the Finnish (and German) mind that the Soviet are angling for peace with Finland.

“If such an impression were created, it would of course be the opposite to that which we desire to produce. You will, I have no doubt, have this risk in mind—and I am sorry to bother you with this note—but I did not want to break in upon you again. (Signed) Halifax.”

S[umner] W[elles]