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Пауль
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Begletz
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31.07.2013 17:40:27
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Рубрики
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WWII; ВВС;
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Скорее, сам её и придумывает.
"By the end of November it was clear that Tolbukhin’s troops would
capture parts of Transdanubia within weeks or even days, and then advance
on Budapest from the southwest. Malinovsky, attacking from the east, was
presumably unwilling to share the glory of taking Budapest, which is the
only possible explanation for his decision that the 2nd Mechanised Guard
Corps and the 46th Army should cross the Danube and encircle the city
from the west ahead of Tolbukhin. The senselessness of this strategically
unnecessary measure, which was to cost a great many lives, becomes obvious
in view of the fact that by that time the German and Hungarian defence
had collapsed south of the point where Malinovsky intended to cross by
force, and that Tolbukhin’s troops, advancing at a rate of 10–20 kilometres
a day, would soon have reached Budapest from the southwest".
По факту же войска Малиновского продолжали действия согласно директиве Ставки от 5 ноября, где прямо говорится: "Вывести быстрее правое крыло фронта (7 гв., 53, 27 и 40-я армии) на западный берег р. Тиса с тем, чтобы повести наступление широким фронтом и разбить будапештскую группировку противника ударом правого крыла фронта с севера и северо-востока во взаимодействии с ударом левого крыла фронта (46-я армия, 2 и 4 гв. мк) с юга".
С уважением, Пауль.