Две интересные статейки Джейнс про аль-Каиду, Чечню и Россию
Al-Qaeda and the Chechens
Dr Mark Galeotti
Nov. 21, 2001
Osama bin Laden has long been suspected by Russia of sponsoring Chechen militants. Now the 'war on terror' is giving Moscow the chance to target the more extreme rebels. Dr Mark Galeotti reports.
The Russians have for a long time regarded Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda ('The Base') network as a direct threat. In particular, Moscow has, for obvious political reasons, sought to link Bin Laden directly with the Chechen rebellion. They have presented him as the paymaster and йminence grise behind the rebels, and he has been eager to claim credit for the continuing war. In August 2000, for example, one of his aides declared that he had sent 400 Arab and Afghan fighters to Chechnya, while other accounts have suggested that Al-Qaeda donated up to US$5m or even $10m to the rebels.
However, these figures are grossly exaggerated. While there may be some credence to the assessment that there were 400 Arab and Afghan fighters within the rebel ranks, this should not be regarded as some kind of Al-Qaeda foreign legion. Instead, it is more likely to include all the outsiders who came to fight motivated by individual religious commitment, anti-Russian feeling or mercenary self-interest. Some were undoubtedly linked to, or perhaps even paid by, Al-Qaeda. In this respect, though, it has been in the interests of both Moscow and Bin Laden to talk up Al-Qaeda's role in the war. Furthermore, there have been other groups supporting the rebels, clearly to an extent linked with Al-Qaeda but not under Bin Laden's control, such as the Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood Organisation (Al-Iqwanul Muslamoon), which appears to have also contributed funds and some fighters.
In fact, it has long been clear that Al-Qaeda's support is confined to the most extreme wing of the insurgent movement, one almost as fiercely opposed to moderate rebel President Aslan Maskhadov as the Russians. Bin Laden's main achievement to date has been to fragment the rebels to the point where concerted efforts against the Russians are all but impossible, and if anything his leverage in Chechnya has been weakening. His main associates have been forced into retreat or lost; they include: Salman Raduyev (seized by the Russians last year); Ruslan Gelayev (reportedly now in Georgia); and Shamil Basayev (increasingly disillusioned with Bin Laden's extremism). His last main ally is the Jordanian-born warlord Emir Khattab who himself has faced escalating attacks. It has also been reported that Khattab had sent a 50-man group back to Afghanistan to help defend Bin Laden. However, it may well be that this was not so much a generous gesture of support by Khattab so much as Bin Laden recalling the remaining rump of the force he had sent to Chechnya.
The irony is that the events of 11 September and Bin Laden's actions may actually help Moscow and the mainstream Chechen rebels reach some accord. The war in Chechnya has reached an impasse: the federal forces have failed to break the rebels, but they are sufficiently weak and divided that they cannot oust the Russians. Senior figures both in Maskhadov's camp and even in the Russian General Staff are increasingly disillusioned with the war. The campaign in Afghanistan helped bring both sides closer to the negotiations which tentatively began in late October. The threat of escalating conflict and chaos in Central Asia has also raised serious concerns about Russia's relative lack of genuinely operational forces, and the extent to which the war monopolises such units from both the army and the interior troops. As a result, the Russians have once again begun to publicly accept that there are distinctions between the Chechen nationalists and the Islamic extremists and are focusing their attacks on the latter. For example, Khattab was injured in a Russian attack apparently directed specifically at him. At the end of October, Saudi-born Abu Omar Mohammed Al-Seif, the person responsible for handling Khattab's links with its outside backers, was also reportedly killed in a Russian attack. There are even indications that the unusual precision and accuracy of the Russian attacks might even be in part due to Maskhadov's partisans providing on-the-ground intelligence on Khattab's movements. Meanwhile, the US campaign against terrorism has given Maskhadov greater scope to dissociate himself from the extremists. In late September, Putin's representative to the region opened talks with a close ally of Maskhadov's, establishing the basis for later, more substantive negotiations.
There is rather more reason to accept Moscow's belief that Bin Laden was involved in terrorist attacks on Russia, although he was probably more of an inspiration than a mastermind. Although there are still questions about some of the blasts, and worryingly persistent suggestions that the Federal Security Service (FSB - Federalnaya sluzhba bezopasnosti) may have known about or even planted some devices, it is difficult to deny that there was a pro-Chechen campaign of bomb attacks in 1999. Indeed, the same Abu Omar was reportedly involved in organising some or all of them. Al-Qaeda's function, as in so many such cases, was probably to facilitate and support individuals and cells personally committed to launching the attacks, in retaliation for Russian operations in Chechnya, rather than to initiate them.
Following Russia's decision to support the allied coalition against terrorism (see JIR, November 2001, pp48-49), Moscow became increasingly worried that it might face a renewed Islamic terrorist threat. The FSB warned that the war in Chechnya, by radicalising other North Caucasian groups, provided the terrorists with an endless supply of recruits and sympathisers. However, a new and alarming possibility is that Al-Qaeda may in due course turn to the Russian and post-Soviet mafiya for weapons, expertise and services. Dealings between a radical Islamic grouping and Russians, at a time when Russia is still fighting a war in Chechnya, may seem far-fetched. However, there have already been credible indications of some links and deals. For example, some of the support for rebels in Chechnya - possibly around $250,000 - appears to have been spent on buying weapons from Russian criminal gangs, which were then transferred directly to the battlefield. North Caucasian criminals - possibly Avars or Dagestanis - appear to have been used as intermediaries, possibly to ameliorate Islamic discomfort at dealing with Russians, but it is extremely unlikely that the senior figures within Al-Qaeda were unaware of the identity of their ultimate suppliers. Instead, it is probable that they simply accept that it is a necessary compromise to make in pursuit of wider goals.
This raises the prospect of Al-Qaeda making further, greater use of the mafiya. In particular, the more the US-led campaign against its assets and allies bites, the more Al-Qaeda will be forced to adopt new methods to continue its operations. One key area will be money laundering. Admittedly, Al-Qaeda makes good use of underground hawala banking systems, which are extremely hard to intercept or disrupt, but the serious international efforts being directed against its activities make many of the brokers who are the 'banks' of the hawala system disinclined to maintain a relationship with the terrorists. Thus, both its regular and underground money-laundering networks may come under serious pressure and its assets face confiscation. In this context, the mafiya has huge and well-established money laundries in operation which already deal with much larger sums than the terrorists need to move. Admittedly, the mafiya charges for its money-laundering services around three to four times the cost of using hawala, but if this is the price Al-Qaeda has to pay to continue to use its resources, it is one it can afford.
However, it is possible to minimise or prevent this. To the mafiya, Al-Qaeda is a useful possible client, but not one so significant or lucrative that it is worth jeopardising its international freedom of manoeuvre and relative security within Russia. Russian organised crime is well aware of its political environment, already visible in its new low profile following Putin's election and his evident determination to crack down on overt disorder. If Moscow is prepared to put the same effort into denying its Slavic criminals links with Bin Laden as it does the Chechen rebels, then this door should also be closed to Al-Qaeda.
Dr Mark Galeotti is the Director of the Organised Russian & Eurasian Crime Research Unit at Keele University, UK.
