От Александр Антонов Ответить на сообщение
К Ibuki
Дата 19.03.2011 20:44:54 Найти в дереве
Рубрики Космос; Версия для печати

В документе заявлено что возможности GMD и SM-3 по селекции ложных целей аховые.

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На первой же странице:

"Both the GMD and SM-3 systems are highly susceptible to massive confusion that leads to complete performance breakdowns when they encounter objects that have characteristics that are unexpected. These unexpected characteristics could include warheads that look different from what is expected, and/or objects that look somewhat like warheads. Even when it was known that false signals could be created by fragments from a chuffing rocket motor, the failure to prepare for it led to the catastrophic failure of the FTG-06 scene recognition program. This
unintentional countermeasure that caused the failure of the FTG-06 can be easily replicated in combat by intelligent and resourceful adversaries, and requires technology that is far less complex than the technology needed to build and operate ballistic missiles.
Infrared and radar data from MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC),
shows that it will not be difficult for adversaries to create objects that will confront the scene matching process with targets that can
easily be mistaken for warheads. Thse same MIT Lincoln Laboratory data shows that the SM-3 Block IA kill vehicle, which cannot measure the temperature of objects it observes, will be
entirely inadequate if it encounters objects that are small and hot that produce infrared intensities comparable to those from warhead."

Машинный перевод нужен?

http://translate.google.ru/#en|ru|Both%20the%20GMD%20and%20SM-3%20systems%20are%20highly%20susceptible%20to%20massive%20confusion%20that%20leads%20to%20complete%20performance%20breakdowns%20when%20they%20encounter%20objects%20that%20have%20characteristics%20that%20are%20unexpected.%20%20These%20unexpected%20characteristics%20could%20include%20warheads%20that%20look%20different%20from%20what%20is%20expected%2C%20and%2For%20objects%20that%20look%20somewhat%20like%20warheads.%20%20Even%20when%20it%20was%20known%20that%20false%20signals%20could%20be%20created%20by%20fragments%20from%20a%20chuffing%20rocket%20motor%2C%20the%20failure%20to%20prepare%20for%20it%20led%20to%20the%20catastrophic%20failure%20of%20the%20FTG-06%20scene%20recognition%20program.%20%20This%20%0Aunintentional%20countermeasure%20that%20caused%20the%20failure%20of%20the%20FTG-06%20can%20be%20easily%20replicated%20in%20combat%20by%20intelligent%20and%20resourceful%20adversaries%2C%20and%20requires%20technology%20that%20is%20far%20less%20%20complex%20than%20the%20technology%20needed%20to%20build%20and%20operate%20ballistic%20missiles.%20%0AInfrared%20and%20radar%20data%20from%20MIT%20Lincoln%20Laboratory%2C%20a%20Department%20of%20Defense%20Federally%20Funded%20Research%20and%20Development%20Center%20%28FFRDC%29%2C%20%0A%20shows%20that%20it%20will%20not%20be%20difficult%20for%20adversaries%20to%20create%20objects%20that%20will%20confront%20the%20scene%20matching%20process%20with%20targets%20that%20can%20%0Aeasily%20be%20mistaken%20for%20warheads.%20%20Thse%20same%20MIT%20Lincoln%20Laboratory%20data%20shows%20that%20the%20SM-3%20Block%20IA%20kill%20vehicle%2C%20which%20cannot%20measure%20the%20temperature%20of%20objects%20it%20observes%2C%20will%20be%20%0Aentirely%20inadequate%20if%20it%20encounters%20objects%20that%20are%20small%20and%20hot%20that%20produce%20infrared%20intensities%20comparable%20to%20those%20from%20warhead.

Так какие новые возможности и тенденции имелись ввиду? :)

С уважением, Александр